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Abstract 
 The functions of psychiatric diagnosis - Kate Allsopp 
 
Psychiatric diagnoses are ubiquitous, but historically have been seen as problematic, even 
contested, categories. Calls for new models of mental distress have originated from 
psychiatry, clinical psychology, and the service user movement. However these proposals 
are limited in their scope. Taking a social constructionist critical realist epistemological 
approach, the thesis framed psychiatric diagnoses as active categories; constructed to meet 
particular needs and functions. The central research question of the thesis was to explore, 
from multiple perspectives, the functions of psychiatric diagnosis. Theoretical questions 
addressed the conceptual underpinnings of diagnostic categories, how they are used in 
practice, and their implications.  
Three methodologies were used. A textual examination of chapters of the DSM-5 analysed 
the heterogeneity across diagnostic criteria and explored diagnostic classification as a 
protocol for practice. Semi-structured interviews with clinicians (GPs, psychiatrists, clinical 
psychologists) and individuals who had received psychiatric diagnoses were used to 
examine the practices of diagnosis within and beyond the clinic. Finally, Freedom of 
Information Act requests made to NHS mental health trusts in the north of England were 
used to explore the uses of diagnosis in service entry and eligibility criteria. 
The findings revealed that psychiatric diagnoses performed multiple clinical, social, and 
administrative functions in multiple contexts, and acted as a proxy for various factors, with 
tensions arising across these functions. These functions invoked different underpinning 
conceptualisations, which were inconsistent across contexts. Diagnostic practices were 
found to be often at odds with the use prescribed by diagnostic manuals. Although clinicians 
used diagnosis as a flexible tool, categories were reified beyond the clinic with important 
implications for those diagnosed. The thesis structure reflects the tensions that arose as a 
result of these multiple functions, through a process of diagnostic categories travelling from 
the text of the classification itself, to clinicians, services, and beyond the clinic to the 
individuals who received them. These multiple uses and changing conceptualisations meant 
that the utility of one function could result in harmful costs elsewhere. At the intersection of 
these functions were the people diagnosed, for whom diagnostic categories had potentially 
damaging consequences. Diagnosis-focused clinicians and administrative structures such as 
benefits payments placed limitations on the extent to which individuals could publicly reject 
their diagnosis should they choose to. 
In contrast with previous proposals focused on replacing specific aspects of psychiatric 
diagnosis (such as taxonomy or individual assessment), a broader programme of system 
reform is advocated. Recommendations include the use of psychosocial and descriptive 
codes of the International Classification of Diseases and competency-based services. 
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Diagnostic categories defined by their syndromes should be regarded as valid only if they 
have been shown to be discrete entities with natural boundaries that separate them from 
other disorders. Although most diagnostic concepts have not been shown to be valid in this 
sense, many possess high utility by virtue of the information about outcome, treatment 
response, and etiology that they convey. They are therefore invaluable working concepts for 
clinicians. (Kendell & Jablensky, 2003, p. 4) 
 
 
As far as I am concerned, I am not sick. What my abusers did to me was sick. I have had a 
perfectly natural, human response to devastating experiences. Living with the knowledge of 
what was done to me, and the way in which psychiatry has added insult to injury by blaming 
me, is enough to drive anyone mad. (Dillon, 2011, p. 145) 
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1 Chapter 1: Literature Review 
 
1.1 Preface 
 
The chapter begins with an overview of psychiatric diagnosis, including definitions and some 
of its multiple functions. These vary from clinical uses, to the ways it is taken up by the 
people who are diagnosed, to categories for research. Diagnoses are valued by many 
people, professionals, and organisations in multiple ways, and facilitate multiple clinical 
activities, care and support, and research progress on a day-to-day basis. Yet, as the quotes 
on page iii illustrate, alongside these valued uses are longstanding concerns about a range 
of aspects of psychiatric diagnosis. 
 
To reflect these multiple functions, and the perspectives of those who use them, the 
following literature review outlines four key bodies of literature associated with psychiatric 
diagnosis: psychiatric, psychological, service user/survivor, and social sciences. The stances 
and arguments of each are summarised. There is, inevitably, overlap between these 
literatures, and the review informs the thesis as an overview rather than as an exhaustive 
account. These four bodies of literature are used as a way of broadening out from the 
technical to contextual, social, and political aspects of mental distress and its classification. 
The perspective and focus of study of each of the literatures is central to positioning the 
methodological and theoretical background of the thesis, which is further elaborated in 
Chapter 2.  
 
Section 1.3 explores the critiques of diagnosis from the perspectives of psychiatry, clinical 
psychology, and service user/survivor accounts. Psychiatric diagnosis is seen as a 
problematic domain by each of these literatures, and the review summarises the key 
arguments, problems and implications of diagnosis, and different ways of thinking about 
mental distress, where these are proposed. Section 1.3.1 explores the point of view of the 
psychiatric literature around diagnosis. The predominant focus of this literature is the 
technological aspect of psychiatric classification, such as its reliability and validity. Section 
1.3.2 concerns the clinical psychological literature. The perspectives of this literature are 
widened from the classification itself to a focus on the clinical relationship between clinician 
and service user. A slightly wider stance in this literature begins to incorporate a 
contextualised understanding of the lives of the people experiencing mental distress, and 
some of the negative implications of the use of psychiatric diagnosis for them. Section 1.3.3 
gives an overview of the service user/survivor literature, the perspective of which is wider 
still, with a theme of not only the impact of psychiatric diagnosis on the individual, but also 
the political and societal positioning that results from being labelled with a psychiatric 
diagnosis. 
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Sections 1.4 and 1.5 take up a somewhat different perspective. These sections outline the 
sociological and social sciences literature that, rather than focusing on the limitations of 
diagnosis, seek to open up diagnostic categories and classification in terms of their historical 
development and practices. This literature positions diagnostic classification as a form of 
constructed infrastructure of productive categories that seek to fulfil particular needs and 
functions. The literature in these sections aims to make visible the social relations involved in 
the development and practices of psychiatric diagnosis. 
 
1.2 What is psychiatric diagnosis? 
 
1.2.1 Definition 
 
The Oxford English Dictionary defines medical diagnosis as the “Determination of the nature 
of a diseased condition; identification of a disease by careful investigation of its symptoms 
and history; also, the opinion (formally stated) resulting from such investigation” (Oxford 
English Dictionary, 2017). Diagnosis is the medical assessment of symptoms, which are 
interpreted and organised within the frameworks of that profession (Goldstein Jutel, 2011). 
Psychiatric diagnoses are organised into classification systems; two currently predominant 
versions are the US Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 5th Edition (DSM-
5, American Psychiatric Association, APA, 2013) and the International Classification of 
Diseases, 10th Edition (ICD-10, World Health Organization, WHO, 1992). There are also 
regional adaptations of psychiatric classification, including the Chinese Classification of 
Mental Disorders (CCMD-3, Chinese Psychiatric Association, 2001), the Third Cuban 
Glossary of Psychiatry (Otero-Ojeda, 2000) and the Latin American Guide for Psychiatric 
Diagnosis (Berganza et al., 2004). A survey of psychiatrists across 66 countries showed that 
the DSM and the ICD are the most frequently used (Mezzich, 2002), with ICD most 
frequently used for training and clinical diagnosis, and DSM more valued for research 
purposes. The ICD is the psychiatric classification that the National Health Service (NHS) 
formally uses (NHS Choices, 2013). The two classification systems are not identical, but the 
DSM-5 provides the equivalent ICD codes alongside its diagnostic categories. As the most 
recent version of the ICD-10 is now over 20 years old (WHO, 1992), much of the literature 
included in this chapter pertains to the DSM-5 (APA, 2013). The decision to include literature 
that applied to both the DSM-5 and ICD-10 was made because the DSM-5 provides a 
considerably more recent representation of the classification of and thought around mental 
distress. 
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1.2.2 Aetiological agnosticism 
 
Unlike many physical diagnoses, which typically include information about the causes of 
diseases, psychiatric diagnostic criteria are descriptive, and with only some exceptions, do 
not include information about cause. The DSM-III (APA, 1980), for example, explicitly states: 
 
“[b]ecause DSM-III is generally atheoretical with regard to etiology, it attempts to 
describe comprehensively what the manifestations of the mental disorders are, and 
only rarely attempts to account for how the disturbances come about, unless the 
mechanism is included in the definition of the disorder” (APA, 1980, p.7, italics in 
original).  
 
The introductions of the DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000) and DSM-5 (APA, 2013a) state that, “since 
a complete description of the underlying pathological processes is not possible for most 
mental disorders, it is important to emphasize that the current diagnostic criteria are the best 
available description of how mental disorders are expressed…” (p. xli, APA, 2013a). Both 
introductions give a caution that “a diagnosis does not carry any necessary implications 
regarding the etiology or causes of the individual’s mental disorder…” (p.25, APA, 2013a). 
 
This descriptive approach is a consequence of not having complete information about the 
causes of mental distress. Pioneered by Jaspers, the concept of ‘descriptive 
psychopathology’ focuses on defining and differentiating disorders, and avoids making 
assumptions about the cause of these experiences (Burton, 2011). Since the publication of 
the DSM-III (APA, 1980), psychiatric diagnostic categories have consisted of a series of 
criteria which must be met in full for the diagnosis to be assigned. Psychiatric classification 
represents diagnoses within a positivist framework whereby revised editions of the DSM are 
seen as improving accuracy in identifying disorders (Kupfer, First, & Regier, 2002). Using a 
traditional medical model, diagnostic categories are presented as discrete representations of 
diseases, underlying, or ‘latent’, disorders, and through this means the clinician seeks to 
identify from which disease a patient is suffering (Borsboom et al., 2016). It could be said 
that there is a tension between this conceptualisation of mental distress as a series of 
diagnoses representing disorder and the concept of aetiological agnosticism put forward by 
the DSM (and by default the similarly descriptive mental disorders section of the ICD-10). 
That is, psychiatric classification is presented as the organisation of distress into categories 
of a diseased state or disorder, in keeping with the Oxford English Dictionary’s definition, yet 
the categories are simultaneously described as purely descriptive representations of 
particular states of distress. 
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1.2.3 Functions of psychiatric diagnosis  
 
There are multiple functions of psychiatric diagnosis, which are broadly described below, 
organised according to: 
• Clinical practice 
• Functions for the people who are given psychiatric diagnoses 
• Research 
 
1.2.3.1 Clinical practice 
 
1.2.3.1.1 Communication 
 
The DSM-5, as it is introduced in its preface, was “designed first and foremost to be a useful 
guide to clinical practice” (APA, 2013, p. xli). Likewise, an editor for the DSM-IV-TR (APA, 
2000) describes the primary role of diagnosis as being the facilitation of communication 
between clinical practitioners (First, 2015). Psychiatric diagnosis allows clinicians to identify 
and communicate what experiences have been observed or recorded, as well as features 
that are not present, for example, a diagnosis of depression demonstrates to others that the 
low mood is not caused by drugs or a general medical condition. However, this notion of 
differentiating cause sits uncomfortably with causal agnosticism, and may relate to the 
issues of the “essentialist fallacy” raised by Scadding (1996, p. 596), whereby the diagnosis 
is seen as the cause of the distress itself. This is discussed further in Section 1.3.2.1.1, 
Epistemological confusion. 
 
1.2.3.1.2 Management and treatment 
 
Diagnosis is seen as important for the management and treatment of distress, including 
predicting individuals’ response to treatment. NHS guidelines from the National Institute for 
Health and Care Excellence (NICE), for example, are organised by diagnosis, such as 
Clinical Guideline CG90, Depression in adults: recognition and management (NICE, 2009). 
Pharmaceutical drugs, for example ‘antidepressants’ and ‘antipsychotics’, are marketed 
towards particular diagnostic categories, although the concept of psychiatric drugs having 
specific action for specific diagnoses has been contested (Healy, 1997; Moncrieff, 2011). 
The use of diagnoses in predicting clinical outcomes offers clinicians a heuristic, although, a 
review by McMahon (2014) demonstrates the additional predictive information that is needed 
alongside the diagnostic label. For example, people with diagnoses of depression appear to 
respond better to medications when their distress is severe, whereas those with diagnoses 
of schizophrenia and severe difficulties appear to have a lesser response to psychiatric 
drugs (McMahon, 2014). Furthermore, diagnostic categories are but a very broad indicator in 
5 
comparison with the complex modelling techniques now being used to more accurately 
predict treatment outcome (Hahn, Nierenberg, & Whitfield-Gabrieli, 2017). 
 
1.2.3.2 Positive functions for the people given psychiatric diagnoses 
 
1.2.3.2.1 Meaning and understanding for those diagnosed and their families  
 
The final use of diagnostic classification that First discusses is in giving psycho-education to 
patients and families, and enabling patients to know that their experiences have been seen 
and studied in others (First, 2015). Pies (2012), however, believes that the ultimate purpose 
of diagnosing in psychiatry is to reduce the suffering and misery of those seeking help from 
mental health services. Pies argues that if diagnostic categories can ‘usefully identify’ (p. 
112), and go on to treat, distress, then they have ‘instrumental validity’ (p. 111).  
 
For the people who are given psychiatric diagnoses, many find it can have positive functions. 
Often, people seek the explanatory power of a diagnosis, to find an explanation for ‘what is 
wrong with me?’, and the doctor is authorised to provide it (Goldstein Jutel, 2011). Positive 
responses to diagnosis include feelings of relief and validation from having a name for one’s 
difficulties (Pitt, Kilbride, Welford, Nothard, & Morrison, 2009; Probst, 2015a).  
 
1.2.3.2.2 Communication and understanding from others  
 
Some research suggests that having a diagnosis helps people receive more care and 
understanding from both family and friends and mental health professionals (Pitt et al., 
2009). As well as reassuring service users that their difficulties are recognised, diagnosis 
has been argued to reduce feelings of shame, loneliness, and stigma by individuals 
recognising, and being able to inform others, that their difficulties represent the presence of 
an illness (Craddock & Mynors-Wallis, 2014). It has been argued that by using the sick role 
psychiatric diagnosis can reduce stigma (Davis, 2009), and many anti-stigma campaigns 
take up this idea. 
 
1.2.3.2.3 Access to care and support 
 
Having a diagnosis means that individuals have a means of finding out more about the label, 
and access information and support from others with the same diagnosis. Diagnoses are 
also used to facilitate access to treatment and support (Pitt et al., 2009), by clinicians making 
referrals to other services, and by service users directly. 
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1.2.3.3 Research  
 
The DSM-5 presents the manual as a tool for collecting data for epidemiological studies and 
other research. Research studies are typically organised by diagnosis in order to convey 
comparability with other research samples. Randomised control trials, for example, may use 
diagnostic categories to both include and exclude particular diagnoses to minimise the 
impact of other variables (e.g. March et al., 2004). Diagnostic categories are typically more 
rigorously applied in research than in clinical settings, for example through the use of 
structured clinical interviews to carefully match participants to diagnostic criteria in 
randomised control trials (Ehlers et al., 2003). 
 
1.3 Critiquing diagnosis 
 
These varying functions across individuals and organisations reflect Blaxter's (1978) 
observation of diagnosis as both a category within a classification system and a process, for 
example, a negotiation between doctor and service user (Goldstein Jutel, 2011). It is often 
the juxtaposition of these different functions that results in the critiques of diagnosis outlined 
below. The following section considers to what extent psychiatric diagnosis can actually 
meet the multiple functions claimed for it. Many of the above functions are contested in the 
literature that follows. Some of the literature regarding psychiatric diagnoses offers proposals 
for meeting these functions in different, non-diagnostic ways. 
 
1.3.1 Psychiatric limitations and the technological 
 
Psychiatric diagnosis currently attempts to occupy multiple roles within mental health, its 
conceptualisations, and care. These roles range from a way of explaining difficulties, to a 
framework for treatment and intervention planning, to data gathering on which to base health 
service planning. Despite its efforts to meet these functions and the demands of health 
services, clinicians, and service users and their families, psychiatric diagnosis has met with 
longstanding critique from differing perspectives (e.g. Boyle, 2002; Division of Clinical 
Psychology, 2013; Kutchins & Kirk, 1997; Szasz, 1974). The following section outlines the 
limitations of diagnosis as outlined in psychiatric literature. Psychiatric literature regarding 
diagnosis focuses largely on its function as a system of taxonomy. The limitations 
highlighted by the psychiatric literature primarily concern technological problems of 
classification, such as reliability and validity.  
 
1.3.1.1 Reliability 
 
Diagnostic classification in psychiatry has long suffered with a problem of reliability. 
Reliability concerns identifying the same diagnosis across clinicians (inter-
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and across time points for the same individual (test-retest reliability). These problems 
became particularly apparent following the publication of the DSM-II (APA, 1968). Blashfield 
and colleagues (2014) outline the research between each version of the DSM that led to 
these changes, including two significant studies that undermined perceptions of the reliability 
of the DSM-II. One study found that psychiatrists’ conceptualisations of different clusters of 
‘psychopathology’ were very different to actual patients’ distress and how this presented 
within the clinic (Overall & Woodward, 1975). The second found that American and British 
psychiatrists varied strikingly in the diagnoses they assigned to the same set of patient 
videotapes. The Americans tended to diagnose schizophrenia for each of the videos, 
whereas the British psychiatrists diagnosed a wider range of difficulties, including manic 
depressive and personality disorders (Kendell et al., 1971). In response, the DSM-III (APA, 
1980) was the first edition to introduce itemised diagnostic criteria in a bid to improve 
reliability, which although necessarily continued to describe diagnoses on a ‘symptom’ basis, 
the criteria replaced the less technical paragraphs of the previous, more psychodynamically-
oriented, editions. The historical development of the DSM is discussed further in Section 
1.4.1.1. 
 
Since the mid-20th Century, kappa statistics have been used to estimate reliability, giving a 
measure of agreement between assessments whilst accounting for chance agreement 
(Gwet, 2010). Fleiss’ generalized kappa statistic (Fleiss, 1971) has been a mainstay for 
estimating the reliability of psychiatric diagnosis, however the subject is much discussed and 
debated (e.g. Kraemer, 1992; Wongpakaran, Wongpakaran, Wedding, & Gwet, 2013). 
Kappa estimates range from minus one to plus one, with 0.7 and above typically being 
considered good agreement (Spitzer & Forman, 1979), and 0.4 or below considered poor 
(Fleiss, 1971; Spitzer, Williams, & Endicott, 2012). DSM-III showed improved overall 
reliability compared with poor reliability ratings for DSM I and II, with an overall test-retest 
kappa coefficient of 0.66 for Axis 1 diagnoses (Spitzer, Forman & Nee, 1979). The published 
DSM-III figures, however, only ever gave overall reliability estimates for diagnostic classes 
(such as schizophrenia disorders and anxiety disorders), without giving a complete 
published breakdown of ratings for individual diagnoses (Kirk & Kutchins, 1992). 
 
DSM-IV reliability estimates ranged at their lowest from 0.55 (oppositional defiant disorder) 
and 0.57 (conduct disorder), to their highest from 0.76 (schizophrenia) and 0.85 (autistic 
spectrum disorder) (Carney, 2013). These are compared with the DSM-5 field trial findings, 
which ranged from the lowest at -0.03 (non-suicidal self-injury) and -0.004 (mixed anxiety 
and depressive disorder, adults) to 0.69 (autistic spectrum disorder) and 0.78 (major 
neurocognitive disorder) (Freedman et al., 2013). The poorest performing DSM-5 categories, 
scoring at worse than chance agreement, were not included in the main section of the 
published manual but nevertheless remain as conditions for further study. The lowest ratings 
of diagnoses eventually included in the main manual were 0.20 and 0.25 (generalised 
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anxiety disorder and disruptive mood dysregulation disorder, respectively) (Freedman et al., 
2013). Compared with previous DSM estimates and kappa standards, DSM-5’s were low, 
with only one diagnosis exceeding the threshold of 0.7 for good agreement, and the majority 
being under 0.6, which represents less than good agreement according to previous DSM 
field trial standards (Spitzer & Forman, 1979). The recent DSM-5 field trials have as such 
been argued to demonstrate a continued failure to establish reliability (Kirk, Cohen, & 
Gomory, 2015).  
 
Despite Cohen’s kappa being criticised as too lenient for health research because within it 
0.41 may be considered acceptable (McHugh, 2012), the DSM-5 development team issued 
a statement regarding expectations of reliability levels, arguing that lowering the limits of 
acceptable reliability estimates from DSM-IV-TR to DSM-5 was justifiable when compared 
with reliability estimates for medical diagnosis (Kraemer, Kupfer, Clarke, Narrow, & Regier, 
2012). The new levels of acceptability were adjusted to a kappa coefficient of 0.2-0.4 for 
acceptable, 0.4-0.6 as a realistic goal, and 0.6-0.8 being seen as ‘cause for celebration’ 
(Kraemer et al., 2012, p. 14). Psychiatrists involved in the development of the DSM-IV have 
highlighted their concern over these shifting goal posts for DSM-5 reliability (Spitzer, 
Williams, & Endicott, 2012). However, other writers have highlighted the importance of 
methodology, arguing that the measurement of inter-rater reliability used in the DSM-IV trials 
produces higher estimates than the test-retest reliability used for the DSM-5 (Chmielewski, 
Clark, Bagby, & Watson, 2015).  
 
Alongside the use of criterion matching over prototype matching, the use of diagnostic 
categories in everyday clinical practice is likely to vary considerably within primary care in 
particular. The participating clinicians in the DSM-5 field trials had a minimum of 2 years’ 
psychiatric training (Clarke et al., 2013) and each of the clinic sites were psychiatric settings. 
In practice, many diagnoses, usually those identified as ‘common mental disorders’, are 
made by GPs or Improving Access to Psychological Therapies (IAPT) workers rather than 
psychiatrists. In comparison with the minimal mental health training general practitioners in 
the UK receive, the now reduced reliability estimates for DSM-5 categories are likely to bear 
little resemblance to the reality of diagnosis in primary care, which might encompass 
diagnoses from depression and anxiety to obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD) and post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) as well as potentially bipolar disorder or psychosis. 
 
Nevertheless, reliability, although necessary, is not a sufficient condition for an effective 
classification system. Reliably identifying a collection of observations does not necessarily 
make a syndrome or mental illness. Reliability alone cannot mean that a disorder is a valid 
concept (Kinderman, 2014). 
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1.3.1.2 Validity 
 
Robins and Guze (1970) were among the first to apply concepts of validity to psychiatric 
diagnoses. Their ideas focused on developing specific clinical descriptions of homogeneous 
categories of problems. Delineation of disorders is seen as central to the pursuit of validity, 
with follow up and family studies used to support or disconfirm categories. Within their 
criteria, the development of homogeneous categories is pursued in association with 
prognosis; for example, poor prognosis was seen as inherent in the diagnostic category of 
schizophrenia, such that a good prognosis for someone with a schizophrenia diagnosis was 
seen as suggesting that that person simply had a different illness (Robins & Guze, 1970). 
The DSM takes as its basis for validity Robins and Guze’s terms, and privileges reliability as 
the initial test of validity for diagnoses (Freedman et al., 2013), which as seen in the previous 
section has considerable limitations in the context of psychiatric diagnosis. 
 
The DSM strategy is one of honing diagnostic categories with ever more refined descriptive 
clinical criteria (Kupfer et al., 2002). However in addition to problematic reliability, there 
remain some key areas of concern regarding validity, which will be discussed below:  
 
• ‘Disjunctive’ diagnostic categories 
• Lack of separate, delineated disorder categories 
o Comorbidity 
o Discrete entities? 
• An arbitrarily defined divide between ‘normality’ and ‘disorder’ 
• Causal information 
• Prediction of treatment outcome: Non-specific drug action 
• Utility vs. validity 
 
1.3.1.2.1 ‘Disjunctive’ diagnostic categories 
 
Within specific diagnostic categories, Bannister highlighted, as early as 1968, the 
“disjunctive” (p.181) nature of the category of schizophrenia, whereby a person given this 
diagnosis might have some but not all of the characteristics within the diagnostic criteria, 
such that two people with the same diagnosis might not share any common experiences. In 
fact Bannister referred to the category as “so diffuse as to be unusable in a scientific context” 
(Bannister, 1968, p. 181). Many diagnostic categories have polythetic criteria, in which a 
minimum number of criteria must be present to reach the threshold for diagnosis, but no 
single criterion is essential (Skodol, 2012; Young, Lareau, & Pierre, 2014). This is in 
comparison with nomothetic criteria, in which all the criteria in a category must be met in 
order to warrant the diagnosis. As a result of the multiple symptom clusters within a 
diagnostic category, it has been demonstrated that the number of possible symptom 
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combinations to reach a diagnosis of PTSD using DSM-5 numbers over 600,000 (Galatzer-
Levy & Bryant, 2013). 
 
1.3.1.2.2 Lack of separate, delineated disorder categories 
 
The aim of increasing validity through delimitation of disorders takes as its assumption that 
diagnosis should, as Plato described of natural science, ‘carve nature at its joints’ 
(Kinderman, 2014). Hacking (2013), amongst others, critiques this assumption, complaining 
that each revision of the manual perpetuates the idea that different categories of mental 
illness can be tidied into separate compartments much as the Linnean system of taxonomy 
of plants and animals. Indeed, psychiatric literature increasingly argues against the concept 
of ‘zones of rarity’ or natural boundaries between diagnostic categories (e.g. Cloninger, 
1999; Kendler & Gardner, 1998). That is, individual diagnostic categories have not been 
demonstrated to be sufficiently separate from each other to warrant the categorical approach 
that is taken in classification systems. For example, continuous, as opposed to 
discontinuous, boundaries have been demonstrated between psychotic and neurotic 
depressions (Kendell & Gourlay, 1970a) and affective psychoses and schizophrenia (Kendell 
& Gourlay, 1970b). 
 
1.3.1.2.2.1 Comorbidity  
 
Comorbidity is described as when a person is diagnosed with more than one psychiatric 
disorder, although it is taken from medical literature in the context of disease indices, where 
comorbidity is defined as the presence of “any distinct additional entity” (Feinstein, 1970, p. 
467). Over half of individuals who meet the criteria for a psychiatric diagnosis in a 12-month 
period will meet criteria for multiple diagnoses (Kessler, Chiu, Demler, & Walters, 2005). 
High rates of comorbidity have been seen by many as indicative not only of a high 
prevalence of societal mental health problems but as a symptom of a problematic 
classification system (Hyman, 2010; Maj, 2005) that cannot adequately capture the co-
occurrence of difficulties (Sullivan & Kendler, 1998). The comorbidity problem is seen as a 
challenge to the validity of psychiatric classification. It has been argued that the scientifically 
unwarranted splitting of experiences into diagnostic categories that are presented as 
discrete, both from each other and discontinuous from ‘normal’, is the cause of the high 
degree of comorbidity reported across clinical groups (Hyman, 2010). The heterogeneity of 
diagnoses with amorphous or diffuse criteria is emphasised when combined with other 
diagnoses in comorbidity. Furthering the idea of heterogeneity within the polythetic criteria of 
the DSM-5 PTSD diagnosis described by Galatzer-Levy and Bryant (2013), described above 
in Section 1.3.1.2.1, Young, Lareau, and Pierre (2014) have calculated the number of 
possible symptom combinations to reach a diagnosis of PTSD in combination with other 
common diagnoses. Their findings range from 270 million possible combinations of 
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symptoms that would result in meeting the criteria for both PTSD and major depressive 
disorder diagnoses, to over a quintillion symptom combinations that would meet the criteria 
for PTSD and five other diagnoses. 
 
1.3.1.2.2.2 Discrete entities? 
 
These and other findings undermine the DSM model that diagnoses represent ‘natural 
kinds’, or discrete entities that represent specific dysfunction within an individual and exist 
independently of a clinician or other means of assessment (Cramer, Waldorp, van der Maas, 
& Borsboom, 2010; Hyman, 2010; Kendell & Jablensky, 2003; Thakker, Ward, & Strongman, 
1999; Zachar, 2000). Clinicians are generally seen as aware of the processes of diagnostic 
creation and their purposes of clinical utility over identification of reality (Callard, Bracken, 
David, & Sartorius, 2013), however, “once a diagnostic concept such as schizophrenia or 
Gulf War syndrome has come into general use, it tends to become reified” (Kendell & 
Jablensky, 2003, p. 5). Reification in psychiatric literature relates to ‘natural kinds’, whereby 
diagnoses are seen as ‘real things’ or diseases rather than their intended purpose as clinical 
tools; this process was recognised as problematic by the DSM-5 research team (Kupfer et 
al., 2002). It has been argued that the use of terms such as ‘comorbidity’ further contributes 
to the problematic reification of diagnostic categories as natural or real entities (Lilienfeld, 
Waldman, & Israel, 1994). 
 
1.3.1.2.3 An arbitrarily defined divide between ‘normality’ and ‘disorder’ 
 
Further to problematic diagnostic categories, Kendell and Jablensky (2003) highlight the 
fuzzy nature of the boundary between ‘normality’ and ‘disorder’. This changing recognition in 
the conceptualisation of mental health is acknowledged in the DSM-5 research agenda, and 
consequently the decision of where to make this boundary is “somewhat arbitrarily defined” 
(Rounsaville et al., 2002, p. 2). The changing concept of the definition of disorder has 
recently been empirically driven by personality research, which increasingly supports a 
continuum rather than a categorical model towards ‘personality disorder’ diagnoses (e.g. 
Clark, 2007). Philosophical debates regarding the definition of disorder are longstanding and 
lack consensus (Fulford, 2001; Lilienfeld & Marino, 1995; Wakefield, 1992; Wakefield, 2007). 
Researchers have argued that this important distinction struggles to hold up cross-culturally 
(Thakker et al., 1999). Bingham and Banner (2014) used a test of whether current 
conceptualisations succeed in excluding homosexuality from their definition of disorder to 
ascertain whether definitions can protect against future value-laden abuses of psychiatric 
diagnoses. The authors found that fact-based definitions failed to use scientific theory to 
exclude homosexuality, and value-based definitions did not acknowledge the consequences 
of oppressive societies or where particular behaviours happen to be negatively valued in 
some social contexts.  
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It has been suggested by some that the DSM-5 has increased psychiatry’s pathologization of 
‘normal’ by expanding the net of disorder with loosened criteria for some categories 
(Wakefield, 2013). An example of this increasing pathologization is the removal of the grief 
exclusion from the category of major depressive disorder, such that mourning might now be 
considered disordered (Pilgrim, 2014). Frances, psychiatrist and the chair of the APA task 
force for the previous edition of the DSM (DSM-IV-TR, APA, 2000), has been an outspoken 
critic of the DSM-5 for these reasons. The argument in his book ‘Saving Normal’ (Frances, 
2013) is not that the diagnostic premise of psychiatric classification is incorrect, but that the 
changes in the DSM-5 represent a blurring of the distinction between ‘normality’ and 
‘sickness’. In it he quotes Wykes and Callard, who state, “the pool of normality is shrinking to 
a mere puddle” (Wykes & Callard, 2010, p. 302). Frances argues that psychiatrists, by 
allowing diagnosis to encroach upon those who are ‘normal’, will mislabel people as sick, in 
turn devaluing the ‘genuinely’ unwell. Although Frances is strongly against the DSM-5 in this 
respect, it is of note that he believes that the distinction between well and unwell is 
nevertheless real, valid, and important. 
 
1.3.1.2.4 Causal information 
 
In physical medicine having a diagnosis generally offers information about what is causing 
the problems experienced (Maung, 2016). This idea is also present in mental health, but 
psychiatric diagnostic categories are explicitly atheoretical and do not give information about 
the cause other than in special cases such as PTSD. The idea of particular groups of 
diagnoses having particular causes has been discussed in the scientific literature for many 
years, such as ‘schizophrenia’ being biologically caused (e.g. Rietkerk et al., 2008; Ross, 
Margolis, Reading, Pletnikov, & Coyle, 2006; Tsoi, Hunter, & Woodruff, 2008; Tsuang, 2000) 
and ‘personality disorders’ being ‘associated with’ trauma and other negative life 
experiences (e.g. Bandelow et al., 2005; Herman & van der Kolk, 1987; Lewis & Grenyer, 
2009; Liotti, Pasquini, & Cirrincione, 2000). However, this has been described as ‘misplaced 
epistemological certainty’ (Lakeman & Cutcliffe, 2009) in that, for example, the concept of 
psychosis being a solely biological problem has been challenged very often, particularly in 
recent years, with increasing recognition of the role of childhood trauma in causing such 
experiences (e.g. Bentall et al., 2014; Read et al., 2005; Sitko, Bentall, Shevlin, O’Sullivan, & 
Sellwood, 2014; Varese, Barkus, & Bentall, 2012). These ideas are addressed further in 
Section 1.3.2.1.1, Epistemological confusion. 
 
1.3.1.2.5 Prediction of treatment outcome: Non-specific drug action 
 
Further problematic evidence associated with causal information and the differentiation 
between diagnostic categories relates to their predictive validity, which pertains to the 
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relationship between the category and prediction of treatment outcome. Distinct, 
homogeneous categories should be effectively treated with interventions specific to those 
groups (Kupfer et al., 2002). Drug treatment generally utilises a ‘disease centred’ theory that 
follows this model, in which drugs such as antidepressants and antipsychotics are seen as 
having a specific action that corrects biochemical abnormalities (Moncrieff, 2011). However, 
there is little evidence supporting the specificity of psychiatric drugs (Moncrieff, 2011; 
Moncrieff & Cohen, 2006). It has been argued, for example, that prescribing in psychiatry is 
different to that of physical medicine, as the range of psychiatric drugs’ action is such that it 
makes diagnosis “almost irrelevant” (Taylor, 2016, p. 224). Taylor says of psychiatric 
classification, “it has little or no relevance to psychotropic drug action and as a consequence 
an accurate diagnosis is not required for optimal prescribing” (p. 224).  
 
Some argue that a ‘drug centred’ model (Moncrieff & Cohen, 2006) better explains the action 
of antidepressants, in which rather than correcting a biological abnormality, the drugs are 
thought of as creating abnormal chemical states in the brain that temporarily relieves 
unpleasant mood states or other ‘symptoms’. Drugs are not, however, seen as correcting an 
imbalance or abnormality in the brain (Moncrieff, 2011), and this action is unrelated to 
diagnostic categories. 
 
1.3.1.2.6 Utility vs. validity 
 
Other researchers have viewed validity from different perspectives, such as Kendell and 
Jablensky (2003) who value a distinction between validity and utility, arguing that use of 
‘validity’ in the DSM research is conflated with utility. They conclude that current psychiatric 
diagnostic categories have little scientific validity for many of the reasons discussed here. 
Validity is defined as an invariant characteristic of a diagnostic category; that validity does 
not depend on the context of use, and that partial validity is not possible. However, despite 
poor validity, it is suggested that the categories are invaluable in their utility. The authors 
make an interesting point about utility (unlike validity) not being a stable property, and that 
this varies according to function and context, and that statements about the utility of 
diagnostic categories must be embedded within the context in which those categories are 
used, and for which purposes. 
 
1.3.1.3 Psychiatric calls for alternatives 
 
The problematic nature of diagnosis is evidenced by its frequent revision, and an expectation 
of a continual need for updates and amendments. Since its initial publication in 1952, the 
fifth edition of the DSM was released in 2013, with future revisions expected, for example via 
a formal process for proposing changes (APA, 2017) and the ‘Conditions for further study’ 
section within the text. Extensive revisions are anticipated to the ‘mental and behavioural 
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disorders’ chapter of the ICD-11, due for implementation in 2018 (WHO, 2017a) 
Furthermore, diagnosis is recognised as problematic to the extent that psychiatric 
communities have discussed the need for adaptations to the diagnostic model, and in some 
research programmes, a complete overhaul has been proposed and embarked upon. 
Different ways of conceptualising mental health difficulties in the psychiatric literature are 
outlined at the levels of taxonomic classification and clinical utility. 
 
1.3.1.3.1 Dimensional components within diagnostic categories 
 
Driven by a need for greater clinical utility, and in recognition of the research, discussed 
above, undermining the categorical approach to diagnosis, proposals have been made to 
begin introducing dimensional components to some diagnostic categories. Dimensional 
models were first proposed as a way of formally adapting DSM diagnoses in 2002 in the 
DSM-5’s research agenda (Rounsaville et al., 2002), first with reference to personality and 
later adaptation of the psychotic and mood disorder categories was anticipated in the DSM-5 
development. The DSM-5 work group aimed to form a hybrid ‘personality disorder’ model in 
which dimensional components were introduced into existing diagnostic categories (Krueger, 
2013). In spite of strong support from the DSM-5 Personality and Personality Disorders Work 
Group, a dimensional model was not included in the main section of the final publication of 
the DSM-5, and instead was noted under the later section of emerging models as an 
alternative provision. The alternative model represents aspects of problems associated with 
both ‘normal’ personality functioning, relating to the self and others, and five domains of 
pathological personality traits, which are described as ‘maladaptive variants’ (p. 773) of the 
domains of the Five Factor Model of personality (FFM) (APA, 2013). Additional dimensional 
elements have also been proposed for ADHD (Swanson, Wigal, & Lakes, 2009), social 
anxiety disorder (Skocic, Jackson, & Hulbert, 2015), substance dependence (Helzer, 
Bucholz, & Gossop, 2007), depressive episodes (Andrews et al., 2007), and psychosis 
(Allardyce, Suppes, & Os, 2007). Taxometric research supports this notion, and suggests 
that experiences categorised within diagnoses spanning mood and anxiety disorders, eating 
disorders, aggressive and antisocial behaviour, personality, and other individual differences 
including psychosis, are dimensional in nature rather than categorical (Haslam, Arcelus, 
Farrow, & Meyer, 2012). Some of these recommendations are uni-dimensional for particular 
diagnoses; others are multi-faceted, representing the heterogeneity of traditional diagnostic 
categories. The dimensions typically represent the nature and severity of specific 
experiences entailing diagnostic criteria. A quantitative measure is used to avoid the 
problems that stem from using strict categorical cut offs for diagnoses, such as sub-
threshold presentations (Helzer et al., 2007). Whilst supporting in part the current categorical 
diagnostic approach, these dimensional components represent a loosening of the DSM/ICD 
model of separation between categories. Further research suggests that cross-cutting 
dimensions may better represent empirical findings, more flexibly representing 
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transdiagnostic difficulties that bridge between categories, for example across psychosis and 
affective disorder diagnoses (Allardyce et al., 2007). 
 
Clinical staging is an assessment approach that aligns with a dimensional model of 
diagnostic categories. Borrowed from physical medicine, clinical staging identifies an 
individual’s place on a continuum of disorder progression from ‘at risk’ to ‘end stage’. 
Proponents of the adaptation of clinical staging to mental health problems argue that existing 
diagnostic classification consists of ‘late stage’ representations of diagnosis that are difficult 
to apply in primary care. This is based on the argument that relative specificity is a marker of 
later, more severe difficulties, which are associated with poorer outcomes, in contrast with 
earlier, less specific stages of distress (McGorry & van Os, 2013). The approach 
complements ‘early intervention’ strategies, and encourages more specific and detailed 
identification of difficulties at more non-specific stages of problem development (McGorry, 
Hickie, Yung, Pantelis, & Jackson, 2006; McGorry & van Os, 2013). The approach aims to 
combine categories of classification across stages of progression with specific individualised 
information (Wigman et al., 2013). Despite using diagnostic language, authors use a 
developmental model, contextualising difficulties within environmental events, and with the 
potential for expanding assessment across broad categories of common or severe mental 
disorders (van Os, Delespaul, Wigman, Myin-Germeys, & Wichers, 2013; Wigman et al., 
2013).  
 
A critical review (Baumann, Marion-Veyron, Bardy, Solida, & Conus, 2015) of clinical staging 
expresses concern regarding its emulation of the medical model of physical health, and its 
focus on problems over strengths, to the potential exclusion of the meaning individuals apply 
to their difficulties. As individuals progress across stages, the authors question whether 
progression must be unidirectional towards severe and persistent difficulties (a “prognosis of 
doom”, p. 27), or whether recovery towards levels of better functioning has been 
conceptualised. McGorry and van Os (2013, p.343) acknowledge difficulties of distinguishing 
between ‘normality’ and ‘disorder’, and ask, “how crucial or feasible is the creation of such a 
precise definition? Would a grey area with soft and flexible entry (and exit) and personal 
choice as key features of a new primary care culture be acceptable?” The authors highlight 
the desire to assess broader bands of problems in order that people can access more timely 
care, yet without a change in ethos (i.e. here psychotic experiences continue to be 
problematised as illnesses, whether ‘prodromal’ or ‘late stage’) this shift represents the 
widening of the net of disorder, and the negative implications that come with it; not least 
potentially damaging drug treatment and stigmatising labels. Nieman and McGorry (2015) 
acknowledge these concerns in relation to an ‘at risk mental state’ (ARMS) category. 
Although they note that stigma may be related more to general association with mental 
health problems rather than the ARMS category specifically, the need for further research 
into the impact of such categories is recognised. 
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1.3.1.3.2 Internalizing-externalizing dimensions 
 
By contrast to diagnostic manuals, latent variable modelling has been used to identify two 
broad but separate spectra of ‘internalizing’ problems, encompassing mood- and anxiety-
related difficulties, and ‘externalizing’ problems, such as antisocial behaviour, hyperactivity, 
and substance abuse (Kessler, Ormel, et al., 2011). Associations tend to be strongest 
between experiences within the same spectrum compared with between-spectrum 
comparisons, for example meeting the criteria for diagnoses in the internalizing spectrum 
have been shown to predict later development of problems meeting criteria for another 
diagnosis in this spectrum (Kessler, Cox, et al., 2011). As such, the internalizing and 
externalizing factors are used to explain within-domain comorbidity. There is also some 
evidence for associations between these dimensions and experiences of adversity, such as 
sexual abuse being more strongly associated with the internalizing than externalizing 
spectrum for both genders (Keyes et al., 2012). Variations on this dimensional model have 
been suggested, such as sub-domains with the internalizing spectrum of distress, or 
anxious-misery, and fear (Eaton et al., 2013; Krueger, 1999). Some heterogeneous 
diagnostic categories appear to fall across both internalizing and externalizing spectra, for 
example, bipolar and borderline personality disorder diagnoses (Krueger & Markon, 2011). 
The most notable exception to the two-factor internalizing-externalizing model suggests that 
diagnoses related to psychosis should be considered as dimensional across diagnostic 
categories (Kingston et al., 2013). Research supports a continuum between ‘normal’ and 
traditionally considered ‘disordered’ psychotic experiences, supporting a dimensional 
approach (Shevlin, Boyda, Houston, & Murphy, 2015; Subramaniam, Abdin, Vaingankar, 
Verma, & Chong, 2014). Research in this area is not unified, with some suggesting a third 
psychosis dimension (Fleming, Shevlin, Murphy, & Joseph, 2013; Kotov et al., 2011; 
Krueger, 1999; Vaidyanathan, Patrick, & Iacono, 2012). Alternatively, psychosis has also 
been conceptualised as three-factor (e.g. Liddle, 1987) and five-factor (e.g. Demjaha et al., 
2009; van Os & Kapur, 2009; Wigman et al., 2012) models. A higher order 
‘psychopathology’, or ‘P’ factor, has also been suggested that cuts across both psychosis 
and mood-related diagnoses (Caspi et al., 2013; Reininghaus, Priebe, & Bentall, 2013). 
What this research has in common, however, is strong empirical support for 
conceptualisations of mental health that bridge across traditional diagnostic categories, 
undermining the goal of identifying increasingly delineated ‘disorders’. 
 
1.3.1.3.3 Research Domain Criteria 
 
The problem of diagnostic comorbidity, discussed above, has been described by one of the 
former directors of the US National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) as, “so extensive 
among DSM-IV diagnoses as to forcefully raise questions about the underlying structure and 
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assumptions of the classification” (Hyman, 2010, p. 167). In response to these significant 
concerns about psychiatric diagnosis, the NIMH established the Research Domain Criteria 
(RDoC) project in 2009, which proposes an overhaul of the way that psychiatry views mental 
health and its causes. RDoC came to the fore in 2013 when the NIMH’s then director wrote 
an NIMH blog entry criticising the DSM, and declaring that the NIMH would no longer be 
guided by DSM categories (Insel, 2013, 29th April). RDoC is a dimensional framework for 
research organisation (Insel, 2014) that aims in the future to develop a more precise 
diagnostic system based on mechanisms rather than symptoms. Whereas current diagnostic 
categories seek to describe patterns of symptoms on which research into causal factors is 
based, RDoC aims to explore emotional, behavioural and neurobiological functioning and 
subsequently define disorder on the basis of disruption to these functioning patterns 
(Cuthbert, 2014). The focus of RDoC research centres on core processes and their 
association with brain systems, with the aim of using units of analysis better suited to 
neurophysiological research than traditional diagnostic categories (Patrick et al., 2013). Five 
domains incorporate positive and negative valence, cognitive systems, social processes, 
and arousal/modulatory systems. Constructs within these are identified, for example, fear, 
loss, responsiveness to reward, and biological systems (Cuthbert & Insel, 2013). 
 
Reflecting the potential tension between the functions of taxonomy and clinical assessment, 
RDoC’s current state as a framework for research remains vague about how the different 
units of analysis would be incorporated to form a comprehensive clinical assessment that 
directly informs intervention planning. Many commentators have expressed concern about 
the application of RDoC’s research focus to clinical practice, including the identification of 
specific clinical problems, and the extent to which clinical work would be impacted 
(MacDonald & Krueger, 2013; Shankman & Gorka, 2014; Zoellner & Foa, 2016). Patrick and 
Hajcak (2016) cite research on the FFM and other dimensional models to warn of the 
potential for descriptive-based models of mental health to be equally as susceptible to 
reification and transformation into immoveable constructs that are resistant to novel research 
findings. 
 
1.3.1.4 ‘Psychiatry in dissent’ 
 
It should be noted that the views of psychiatrists are not necessarily homogeneous. Anthony 
Clare wrote the book Psychiatry in Dissent (Clare, 1976) over 40 years ago, highlighting the 
different voices within psychiatry, representing not a single cohesive viewpoint but differing 
groups and theoretical perspectives within the discipline. These varying perspectives and 
values are still relevant today. They also reflect, but are certainly not limited to, differing 
views on psychiatric diagnosis.  
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Historically, there have been several changing conceptualisations of ‘madness’, from which 
psychiatry’s various perspectives stem. Modern concepts have origins in the “great 
confinement” described by Foucault (1967), in which asylums were used as a means of 
restoring social order by locking up the impoverished, unemployed, and vagrants, as well as 
those with mental distress and physical ailments. Influenced by the Enlightenment and ideas 
from biological and physical medicine, doctors later began to see ‘madness’ as a disease 
that could be treated (Stylianidis, 2016). Kraepelin’s classification of madness had a 
significant influence on the taxonomy of psychiatry (Stylianidis, 2016), however these ideas 
prioritised “intellectualistic” symptoms concerning thought processes (hallucinations and 
delusions, for example), over mood and affect (Berrios, 1996). Stack Sullivan, an American 
psychiatrist, argued that the Kraepelinian approach of diagnosis according to patient 
outcomes (used by Robins & Guze, 1970, discussed above in Validity) had, “…been a great 
handicap, leading to much retrospective distortion of data, instead of careful observation and 
induction” (Stack Sullivan, 1927, p. 760, cited in Read, 2013, p. 22). 
 
Meyer’s focus on community mental health care and the rise of psychodynamic treatments in 
response to World War I contributed to a focus on psychodynamic and psychotherapeutic 
approaches, expanding psychiatry from madness alone to its incorporation of ‘nervous 
disorders’ (Stylianidis, 2016). Different groups within psychiatry place different emphasis on 
each of the social, biological, and psychological concepts that developed from these 
historical changes within the discipline.  
 
1.3.1.4.1 Anti-psychiatry 
 
The anti-psychiatry movement developed in the 1960s in the UK. The term ‘anti-psychiatry’ 
was coined by Cooper (1967) to describe critical thinking within the discipline. Other 
figureheads commonly associated with the movement were Szasz and Laing. The 
‘movement’ was loosely defined, and itself consisted of many disagreements between 
proponents, with Laing eventually rejecting the term (Crossley, 1998). Commonalities, 
however, included a conceptualisation of psychiatry as “an agent of repression and of 
power” (Clare, 1976, p. 2). Szasz argued that the notion of mental illness was a myth, and 
that psychiatry’s ‘treatments’ were a means of social control (Szasz, 1974). The movement 
represented a critique of a central concept of psychiatry of demarcating a division between 
sanity and insanity (Crossley, 1998). Laing’s therapeutic community, Kingsley Hall (1964-
72), represented the concept of supporting individuals through their distress, rather than 
necessarily attempting to ‘cure’ them of it (Crossley, 1998). The movement could be argued 
to be humanistic and psychodynamic in nature, rather than biologically focused. 
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1.3.1.4.2 Critical psychiatry and social psychiatry 
 
Today, the concepts of anti-psychiatry have been transformed into critical and social 
psychiatry. The critical and social psychiatry literature is somewhat diversified, with overlap 
across the two concepts. Some psychiatrists have called for the abolishment of psychiatric 
diagnosis (Timimi, 2014). Other authors, however, focus on the medicalisation of mental 
distress, arguing that psychiatry’s focus on the technological leads to increasing prioritisation 
of drug treatment over other forms of intervention such as psychological therapies (Bracken 
et al., 2012; Sedler, 2015). Others are not averse to labelling in psychiatry but advocate a 
separation of labelling from a disease model, instead supporting a social framework for 
understanding distress, which takes into account issues of power (e.g. Moncrieff & 
Middleton, 2015), discussed further in Section 1.3.3.1.1. Thus, the critical and social 
psychiatry movements relate predominantly to psychological and social aspects of mental 
health. 
 
1.3.1.4.3 Humanistic approaches  
 
Whilst the alternatives proposed within psychiatric literature represent medical approaches 
to mental distress, other approaches could be said to represent more of a humanistic 
approach to mental distress. Humanistic approaches hold centrally the meanings and 
perspectives of participants. Unlike some approaches, the humanist model does not seek to 
reduce difficulties and their causes to variables or mechanisms (Wong, 2017). Two such 
approaches were predominantly developed by psychiatrists; Soteria and the Open Dialogue 
approach. These methods are described within this section as they represent non-traditional 
approaches to psychiatry. Both relate primarily to the treatment of psychosis. 
 
1.3.1.4.3.1 Soteria  
 
The Soteria project (San Francisco, 1971-1983) was developed loosely on the model of 
Laing’s Kingsley Hall therapeutic community in London. The approach rejected the disease 
model of ‘schizophrenia’ and, as described above, prioritised individuals’ meanings of their 
experiences and developing shared understandings (Mosher & Bola, 2013). Rather than 
traditional in-patient treatment that takes place within institutions according to professional 
practices, Soteria, and a replication facility, ‘Emanon’, were homes within the community, 
and employed non-professional staff to avoid imposing psychiatric pre-conceptions or labels 
on residents (Mosher & Bola, 2013). Two central tenets of the approach were of hope and 
expectation of recovery, and minimal reliance on antipsychotic drugs. Participants newly 
diagnosed with schizophrenia or schizophreniform disorder were assigned to either standard 
treatment as usual (TAU) or the alternative approach using a quasi-experimental design. 
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Two-year outcomes from the project were positive (Bola & Mosher, 2002, 2003). For 
example, those diagnosed with schizophrenia had a 44% higher probability of being in the 
lowest scoring categories on the Global Psychopathology Scale, a 49% higher probability of 
being in the best psychopathology improvement categories (good to excellent), and a 40% 
higher chance of working at two-year follow-up than those in the TAU group (Bola & Mosher, 
2003). Of those treated at Soteria, 43% were referred to as ‘drug-free responders’ as they 
did not take antipsychotic drugs during follow-up (compared with 94% continuous drug use 
in the TAU group). At the two-year follow-up evaluation, the effect size for this group was the 
equivalent of 38% better than the overall group mean on the composite outcome scale. 
Although the improvement was only statistically significant in one iteration of the analysis, 
the medium effect size nevertheless appeared an important finding (Bola & Mosher, 2002). 
 
1.3.1.4.3.2 Open Dialogue 
 
Rather than an existing application of applied science as such, Open Dialogue represents a 
novel ethos for intervention for mental distress. Open Dialogue is a way of thinking and 
relating to mental health that uses a family and social network-centred intervention. It was 
primarily developed in response to high prevalence of individuals with a schizophrenia 
diagnosis in Western Lapland (over twice the rates of new schizophrenia diagnoses in the 
1980s compared with the rest of Finland, Seikkula, Alakare, Aaltonen, Holma, & 
Rasinkangas, 2003) but is now used as the mainstream approach to mental health care 
within the Western Lapland area. The Open Dialogue approach has less of a focus on 
categorisation and classification of problems, and does not seek to identify deficits within the 
individual (Seikkula, Alakare, Aaltonen, Holma, & Rasinkangas, 2003). Problems are not 
identified by the professional but as they emerge from the social network, either defined by 
the individual or by someone near to them. The intervention was developed with a focus on 
crisis-resolution and a quick response following referral. The intervention consists of a series 
of open meetings between the service user or individual referred, their family and others in 
their social network or support system, and two to three staff members trained in 
psychotherapy, who might include psychiatrists, psychologists, and nurses. Open Dialogue 
has seven guiding principles: (1) immediate help within 24 hours of referral or contact with 
the team; (2) a social networks perspective including for example colleagues or friends; (3) 
flexibility and mobility which includes needs-based adaption of the therapeutic response 
and/or location of meetings; (4) responsibility of the staff team who works with the family 
across the course of the intervention; (5) psychological continuity, whereby meetings 
continue to be held for as long as is necessary and across outpatient and inpatient care if 
necessary; (6) tolerance of uncertainty, whereby a safe space is created for the team, the 
individual and their network, and premature decisions or conclusions are avoided; and 
finally, (7) the promotion of dialogism as a primary concern, empowering families with a 
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sense of agency (Seikkula & Arnkil, 2014). The value placed on dialogue takes a 
constructionist epistemology that emphasises the ways that individuals construct themselves 
in response to others; meetings adapt to the client’s changing needs (Ulland, Andersen, 
Larsen, & Seikkula, 2013). By responding to what is brought to meetings by the client, 
greater equality of power is established (Seikkula & Arnkil, 2014). 
 
The open dialogue founders have published three naturalistic outcome studies for the 
approach. The initial descriptive study suggested that across a two-year follow up period, in 
comparison with a treatment as usual (TAU) group who had diagnoses of schizophrenia, the 
Open Dialogue groups were found to have shorter hospitalisations and less neuroleptic 
medication was prescribed (Seikkula et al., 2003). During early stages of the approach, 
groups from the initial two phases of development (1992–3 and 1994–7) were compared 
over a five-year follow up period. Findings showed that the second group had fewer days in 
hospital and fewer family meetings as the programme was developed. The outcomes were 
broadly similar across the two groups, and showed better outcomes in comparison with a 
Swedish five-year follow up TAU study (Svedberg, Mesterton, & Cullberg, 2001). 29% of the 
second open dialogue group used neuroleptic medication in the course of treatment, 
compared with 93% in the TAU study, and 86% had returned to studies or full-time work with 
14% on disability allowance, compared with 62% of the TAU study patients who were on 
disability allowance at the end of follow up (Seikkula et al., 2006). A further study (Seikkula, 
Alakare, & Aaltonen, 2011) compared the earlier two phases of open dialogue intervention 
with a later period from 2003-5 to assess the consistency of findings across a ten year 
period. The findings were broadly consistent across groups, with similar percentages of 
people back in full time employment or study at follow-up (84%). The proportion of brief 
psychotic episodes was slightly higher in the third phase and their scores were higher on a 
symptom measure at follow up, however there were significantly fewer remaining psychotic 
symptoms experienced at the end of follow up for this group. Across the three groups the 
mean duration of untreated psychosis (time between first emergence of psychotic symptoms 
and start of psychosocial intervention) reduced from 4.2 months in the first group to half a 
month in the third group. The authors attribute the lower rates of development of severe 
difficulties to early contact and intervention following initial crisis. Transferability of the 
approach from Western Lapland to the UK has yet to be established, but pilot studies have 
begun (NELFT NHS Foundation Trust, 2017). 
 
1.3.2 Psychological perspectives: Incorporating individual social context 
 
The psychological literature also takes an understanding of mental distress beyond simply 
the person presenting at the clinic. It should be noted that there is some overlap between 
this literature and that of critical psychiatry, introduced above. Formal guidance from the 
British Psychological Society (BPS) (2013a) acknowledges that clinical psychologists may 
22 
use ICD or DSM categories for various functions, including facilitating communication, 
accessing support, or otherwise helping clients, carers and colleagues. However, the 
guidance is also explicit about psychologists being aware of the problems with diagnosis, 
both in terms of its technological limitations, outlined above, and the potential damaging 
impact of the use of pathologising diagnostic labels. This literature focuses less on 
classification, and more strongly values the individual relationship between psychologist and 
service user, and the representation of individual meaning and understanding associated 
with experiences of mental health. Three key topics are discussed in the review of this body 
of literature, a) limitations of the deficit model of diagnosis, b) impact of diagnosis, and c) 
psychological ways of conceptualising and working with mental distress. 
 
1.3.2.1 a) Limitations of the biomedical deficit model of diagnosis 
 
Critics have expressed concern that psychiatric classification represents distress not as a 
human response to upsetting experiences such as war or bereavement, but, within the 
biomedical model, as caused by an underlying defect or deficit within the individual 
(Kinderman, Read, Moncrieff, & Bentall, 2013). The DSM is framed as descriptive and 
atheoretical, however this literature argues that the language it uses is predominantly 
biomedical, and therefore representative of a particular perspective of conceptualising 
mental health, encouraging a biomedical view of causation. Indeed, in spite of this framing of 
diagnostic categories, psychiatrists nevertheless state, “Psychiatry has abandoned the 
reductionist “organic” vs “functional” distinction and now regards all mental disorders as 
disorders of brain function” (Spitzer & First, 2005). Along with the critiques raised within 
psychiatry, the psychological literature discusses the diagnostic model as being a 
reductionist account that limits explanations to the biomedical model. By minimising the role 
of context and life experience, evidenced contributory factors such as trauma and other 
adversities, the perspective that is encouraged by diagnostic categories is one of 
establishing what is wrong with a person, rather than understanding what has happened to 
them (Division of Clinical Psychology, 2013; Kinderman, Read, et al., 2013).  
 
1.3.2.1.1 Epistemological confusion 
 
Popper’s (1945) distinction between essentialism and nominalism has been applied to 
psychiatric diagnoses (Scadding, 1996). Scadding (1996) cites Popper’s distinction between 
realist notions of essentialism, whereby something’s definition is seen as describing its 
essence, and nominalism, whereby a definition serves to describe the features by which a 
member of a particular class can be recognised. Scadding’s description of a nominalist view 
of diagnoses reflects the perspective of psychiatric diagnoses as tools with clinical utility 
(Kendell & Jablensky, 2003), that offer a way of succinctly conveying the product of an 
assessment of someone’s distress: 
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“The names of diseases are a convenient way of stating briefly the endpoint of a 
diagnostic process that progresses from assessment of symptoms and signs 
towards knowledge of causation. They may have gone no farther than recognition of 
a familiar pattern; they may have progressed to detection of underlying disorders of 
structure or of function; or they may have identified specific causes…Some 
diagnoses - e.g. many in psychiatry - can be tested only by clinical observation and 
failure to find recognized causal abnormalities of structure or function, and convey 
no specific causal implication.” (Scadding, 1996, p. 594) 
 
However, Scadding argues, descriptions about diagnoses can fall prey to the “essentialist 
fallacy” (p. 596) of regarding the disease or diagnosis not as a descriptive summary of 
difficulties but as the cause of the distress itself. Scadding argues that colloquial speech is 
particularly susceptible to this form of reasoning, however the scientific literature also clearly 
demonstrates essentialist ideas. For example, recent research papers have reported that 
“schizophrenia causes a high degree of disability” (Parikh, Robinson & Clayton, 2017, p.299) 
and that “schizophrenia leads to an increased suicide risk and lowers life expectancy” 
(Lange, Mueller, Leweke & Bumb, 2017, p.1), showing that the notion of the diagnostic 
category of schizophrenia is essentialised as the cause of a person’s difficulties rather than 
simply a description of them. The lack of causal information in psychiatric diagnoses, 
combined with this essentialist fallacy results in a confusing tautology with regards to the 
source of individuals’ difficulties. As has been commented frequently in the case of 
schizophrenia (e.g. Rogers & Pilgrim, 2010), a person may be seen as behaving oddly, and 
a diagnosis of schizophrenia is described as the explanation for this behaviour. However, at 
the same time, because diagnostic categories are descriptive of particular behaviours and 
other representations of distress, the reason a person comes to be given a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia is because he/she is behaving in a strange way. Therefore, the explanatory 
power of a diagnosis is lost, because the reasoning used to ascribe the diagnosis and 
explain the person’s difficulties is circular. This circular reasoning extends to the use of 
medication, whereby a medical intervention is retrospectively used to explain a person’s 
difficulties. If medication alleviates distress, for example, then a conclusion is drawn that the 
distress must be caused by biomedical factors. The diagnosis, therefore, is seen as 
biomedical in origin (Probst, 2015b). This essentialist view of psychiatric diagnoses, and how 
it relates to stigma, is discussed further below in Section 1.3.2.2.2. 
 
This essentialist conceptualisation becomes problematic, however, when Moncrieff and 
Cohen's (2006) ‘drug centred’ model (described in Section 1.3.1.2.2.2, Non-specific drug 
action) is used instead of the ‘disease-centred’ theory. If psychiatric drugs are not correcting 
a chemical abnormality, but rather creating an abnormality to produce therapeutic changes 
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in mood for the individual, then it cannot logically follow that the person’s difficulties were 
biologically caused. 
 
1.3.2.1.2 Contextualising distress 
 
In addition to the literature exploring the problems with labelling and its isolation of difficulties 
within the individual in a biomedical framework of explanation, the psychological literature 
discusses extensively the contextual factors that can inform an understanding of a person’s 
difficulties. Within psychological literature, instead of problems being seen as caused by a 
disorder represented by a diagnostic category, problems are typically ‘biographically 
situated’ (Pilgrim, 2013). Individuals’ difficulties are understood within the context of a 
person’s life experiences and the ways they make sense of their difficulties. The 
psychological literature, therefore, acknowledges a slightly broader perspective of the ‘social 
relations’ of mental health in the sense of distress being contextualised within a person’s life, 
and often relational between individuals. 
 
There is a long history of literature moving from the individual, moral, mind, to consideration 
of distress within its social context. Durkheim's (1951) influential text, originally published in 
1897, was the first to explore suicide as a ‘social fact’. Social facts are described as 
practices that people tend to do with similarity as a consequence of general socialised ways 
of acting stemming from a particular social society or community (Durkheim, 1982/1895). 
Such practices include marriage, language, and currency. Durkheim described suicide as a 
social fact, conceptualising it not as an act carried out by a single individual, but as a 
relational consequence of society. Consideration of suicide rates within different 
communities and societies developed from these concepts. More recently, research has 
established strong associations between adverse experiences, particularly in childhood, and 
the later development of mental distress. This research is particularly established in the field 
of psychosis. Read and colleagues (2005) carried out one of the first literature reviews into 
childhood trauma and diagnoses of psychosis and schizophrenia, demonstrating a causal 
and dose-related relationship between the two. Since this paper was published, a growing 
body of evidence has demonstrated the association between childhood trauma and 
psychosis (Bentall & Fernyhough, 2008; Dvir, Denietolis, & Frazier, 2013; Varese et al., 
2012). A recent analysis of large scale survey data across 17 countries showed a strong 
association between childhood adversities and onset of psychotic experiences across the life 
course. A particular association was seen between childhood sexual abuse and onset of 
psychotic experiences in childhood (McGrath et al., 2017). 
 
Other research shows similar relationships between adversity and other types of mental 
distress. Recent studies have found significant relationships between intimate partner 
violence and post-traumatic stress, depression, and anxiety (Começanha, Basto-Pereira, & 
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Maia, 2017), and between childhood abuse and being diagnosed with bipolar disorder 
(Palmier-Claus, Berry, Bucci, Mansell, & Varese, 2016). Adversities such as social 
deprivation and traumatic or abusive life experiences have been found to strongly predict 
highter levels of anxiety and depression (Kinderman, Schwannauer, Pontin, & Tai, 2013). 
Studies using mediation analysis have begun to explore the ways in which psychological 
processes can impact upon these associations. In the study above, for example, Kinderman 
and colleagues (2013) found that the above relationship was mediated by rumination, self-
blame and poor adaptive coping. Social support has been shown to mediate the relationship 
between childhood maltreatment and later depression and anxiety (Sperry & Widom, 2013) 
and PTSD (Vranceanu, Hobfoll, & Johnson, 2007). An association between childhood sexual 
abuse and later life depressive and somatic symptoms and hostility in men is moderated by 
masculine norms and childhood adversities (Easton & Kong, 2016). 
 
1.3.2.2 b) Impact of diagnosis 
 
As well as the limitations resulting from a biomedical deficit model that minimises the 
strongly evidenced association between adverse and traumatic life experiences and mental 
distress, the psychological literature outlines some of the ways in which diagnosis can have 
a negative impact on the individual. The negative implications described by this literature 
concern the influence diagnosis can have on the clinician’s assessment process, and the 
direct impact on the individual diagnosed. This section outlines literature on different types of 
impact; diagnostic overshadowing; essentialism and stigma; ‘mental illness as an illness like 
any other’; and diagnosing the problems versus the person. 
 
1.3.2.2.1 Diagnostic overshadowing 
 
The process of ‘diagnostic overshadowing’ involves an existing diagnosis being used to 
explain additional problems that might otherwise be investigated or considered in their own 
right. It was first documented by Reiss, Levitan, and Szyszko (1982), whereby psychologists 
were found to subsume emotional problems under an existing diagnosis of learning 
disability, rather than seeing the emotional difficulties as a separate psychiatric problem to 
be managed and supported in its own right. More commonly documented, clinicians attribute 
physical health problems to being part of an already diagnosed mental health problem or 
learning disability, resulting in poorer physical health care for these groups because 
problems are not investigated or treated (Disability Rights Commission, 2006). The Disability 
Rights Commission report also found that where service users did not attend appointments 
or take medications as prescribed clinicians had a tendency to attribute this to the person, 
such as having a chaotic lifestyle, rather than asking why such problems were occurring, and 
what might be done about it, such as services taking responsibility for improving access. It 
has been suggested that diagnostic overshadowing may be the reason for high levels of 
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medical comorbidity and premature death amongst populations with mental health problems 
(Jones et al., 2008). Research has suggested that hospital emergency departments are a 
particular focus for this type of problematic use of diagnosis, particularly where patients have 
complex presentations, medically unexplained symptoms, and attend frequently (Shefer, 
Henderson, Howard, Murray, & Thornicroft, 2014). Others have described cases in which 
additional mental health problems are not recognised in the presence of other diagnoses, for 
example, missing experiences related to social anxiety disorder where depression has 
already been diagnosed (Kaufman & Baucom, 2014). 
 
1.3.2.2.2 Essentialism and stigma 
 
Scadding’s (1996) argument that descriptions of diagnoses are subject to the essentialist 
fallacy that diagnoses themselves cause a person’s distress was introduced with regard to 
the epistemological confusion of psychiatric diagnoses (Section 1.3.2.1.1). As Section 
1.3.2.1.1 describes, this fallacy applies to both lay and scientific conceptualisations of mental 
distress. The concept has been applied to stigma (Haslam, 2000). Haslam (2000) argues 
that the disease model of mental health is itself essentialist, and that it presents diagnoses 
as natural kinds, that is, that diagnostic categories represent underlying diseases. Haslam’s 
study demonstrates that laypeople in the general public apply this kind of thinking to 
psychiatric diagnoses, such that “we would expect to observe that the public acceptance of 
biological claims about mental disorders will be often quite uncritical and total” (p. 1045). 
Other psychological research shows that, in general, people are more likely to generalise 
from categories when they are natural kinds rather than arbitrary examples, thus when 
diagnostic categories are reified as ‘things’, people’s stigmatising generalisations from these 
diagnoses are likely to be emphasised (Ahn, Taylor, Kato, Marsh, & Bloom, 2013). The 
following literature concerns primarily public perceptions and stigmatising attitudes towards 
mental distress, however Section 1.3.2.2.4 (below) explores how these essentialised ideas 
can also impact upon services provided by mental health professionals. 
 
These findings can have negative consequences with regard to stigma. Public stigma refers 
to the negative attitudes that the public may hold towards people with mental health 
problems. A review carried out by Haslam (2011) demonstrates that people who have 
essentialist thinking about psychiatric diagnoses tend to endorse stereotypical 
representations of psychiatric patients as violent (Bastian & Haslam, 2006). Essentialist 
thinking is also associated with endorsing biomedical or genetic explanations of distress 
(Haslam, 2011), and in turn this may lead people to view those with mental distress as 
fundamentally different from themselves (Mehta & Farina, 1997; Read, Haslam & Magliano, 
2013). This is explored further in the following section (‘Mental illness is an illness like any 
other’). 
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Stigma may impact upon views of oneself as well as public perceptions of mental distress; 
self-stigma is a process whereby individuals who have been diagnosed with mental health 
problems endorse public stigma around these difficulties and internalise these beliefs 
towards themselves, leading to reduced self-esteem (Muñoz, Sanz, Pérez-Santos, & 
Quiroga, 2011). Studying the impact of self-stigma, Karidi and colleagues (2015) compared 
people with diagnoses of schizophrenia and bipolar disorder, finding that both groups 
experienced self-stigma, but the severity and impact that this had on social exclusion and 
other functioning was significantly worse for those given a diagnosis of schizophrenia. A 
recent study suggests that the effect of public stigma upon psychosocial outcomes, such as 
self-esteem and low mood, is mediated by self-stigma (Kao et al., 2016). 
 
1.3.2.2.3 ‘Mental illness is an illness like any other’ 
 
As mentioned in Section 1.2.3.2.2 in the positive functions of diagnosis, some research 
suggests that a psychiatric diagnosis reduces stigma by invoking the sick role (Davis, 2009). 
However, research has shown that labelling mental health problems as illness and using 
biomedical causal theories is, in the case of psychosis, associated with perceptions of 
dangerousness and unpredictability as well as fear, and a desire for social distance from the 
individual (Read, Haslam, Sayce, & Davies, 2006). A similar study showed that the more 
people endorse brain disease as the cause of schizophrenia or major depression diagnoses, 
the more they rate the person as dangerous (Dietrich, Matschinger, & Angermeyer, 2006). 
These perceptions of dangerousness were associated with increased fear and desire for 
social distance from the person who was diagnosed (Dietrich et al., 2006). A recent review of 
the impact of using medical language and the message of ‘mental illness is an illness like 
any other’ in anti-stigma campaigns showed that this message entrenches rather than 
relieves stigma and discrimination (Sayce, 2014). Instead of an individual’s identity being of 
an ordinary person who happens to have an ‘illness’, the ‘mental illness is an illness like any 
other’ narrative reifies differences between individuals as biological, creating an ‘other’ 
identity, which contributes to stigmatizing ‘us’ and ‘them’ public perceptions of mental health 
(Tew, 2015).  
 
1.3.2.2.4 Diagnosing the problems or the person? 
 
Emphasising the implications of essentialising psychiatric diagnosis and its association with 
identity, the BPS report Understanding Psychosis and Schizophrenia (BPS, 2014a), 
highlighted the ways in which some people with a diagnosis of psychosis “felt labelled in 
society as a ‘mental patient’ or ‘schizophrenic’” (p. 26). This finding suggests that diagnostic 
labels can impact upon the identity of the individual. Psychiatrists and GPs use diagnoses as 
way of categorising or describing a person’s difficulties, but some people who receive them 
feel that it is they themselves who are labelled. This issue is discussed further within Section 
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1.3.3, below, which explores the implications of diagnosis from the perspective of the service 
user/survivor literature and the social sciences literature. 
 
Mental health services are not immune to essentialising thinking about psychiatric 
diagnoses. This is perhaps most clearly seen in the diagnosis of ‘personality disorders’, 
where the fact that life-long character traits and longstanding patterns of behaviour attract 
diagnostic labels means that many people feel that the person, and not the distress, is being 
diagnosed. Two recent experimental studies, for example, demonstrate how a label of 
borderline personality disorder (BPD) can have a stigmatizing influence on clinicians’ 
assessment of unrelated difficulties (panic and ‘agoraphobia’), over and above a description 
of a person’s difficulties that matched the diagnostic criteria for BPD. These findings suggest 
how particular diagnoses may colour clinicians’ assessment of aspects of the person other 
than those that directly relate to that diagnostic label. The first study shows that a BPD label 
can negatively impact on clinicians’ ratings of a person’s risk, disability, outlook, response to 
and compliance with intervention for panic (Lam, Poplavskaya, Salkovskis, Hogg, & Panting, 
2015). The second showed that clinicians who were told a client had a label of BPD reported 
significantly fewer reasons to be optimistic about her treatment that those who were given 
only neutral information or a description of difficulties that related to a BPD diagnosis without 
the label itself (Lam, Salkovskis, & Hogg, 2016). 
 
1.3.2.3 c) Psychological ways of conceptualising and working with mental distress  
 
In response to the above concerns, critics from the Division of Clinical Psychology (DCP) in 
the British Psychological Society (BPS) have made calls to change the ways that mental 
health services work with and conceptualise mental distress. For example, Kinderman and 
colleagues have called to ‘drop the language of disorder’ (Kinderman, Read, et al., 2013) in 
mental health services. The authors’ proposals to use a lexicon of distress to describe 
experiences and psychological formulation in lieu of diagnosis are discussed below in 
Sections 1.3.2.3.2.2 and 1.3.2.3.3.1 respectively. Further to this call to action, the DCP 
published guidance on the use of language (Division of Clinical Psychology, 2015) stating, 
“[w]e encourage any usages which attempt to describe behaviour and experience in non-
medical terms, and within its personal, interpersonal, social and cultural context” (p. 3). The 
document gives examples of typical medical language in mental health, and offers 
suggested alternative words and phrases. For example, instead of “personality disorder”, 
contextualised alternatives are suggested, such as, “Complex trauma, complex trauma 
reaction, personality difficulties, relationship or attachment difficulties, complex presentation”. 
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1.3.2.3.1 Empirically driven approaches: Causal networks 
 
The study of causal networks across mental health problems is a novel, empirically driven, 
conceptualisation that rejects the traditional latent variable modelling approach of diagnosis. 
Rather than proposing a new classification structure, ‘symptoms’ or problems are seen as 
inter-related due to causal links between experiences (Borsboom, Cramer, Schmittmann, 
Epskamp, & Waldorp, 2011). Underlying latent variables of diagnosis, such as the ‘disorder’ 
of ‘depression’ are seen as redundant when the correlations between experiences that might 
otherwise be seen as symptoms of an underlying disorder are simply seen as causally 
related to each other (Cramer, 2012). For example, sleep problems and fatigue, rather than 
being caused by the underlying disorder ‘major depressive disorder’, are seen as causally 
impacting upon one another (Borsboom & Cramer, 2013). The causal network approach is 
also used to offer a model for comorbidity. The researchers found that half of the symptoms 
described in the DSM-IV are connected through common ‘bridge symptoms’ (p. 3) which are 
shared across diagnostic criteria (Borsboom et al., 2011), for example sleep problems and 
fatigue, which are also contained within criteria for generalised anxiety disorder. These 
overlapping symptoms and the fuzzy boundaries between diagnoses are seen as vital in 
understanding comorbidity (Cramer et al., 2010). The causal networks approach to mental 
health also links in with research into transdiagnostic mechanisms from clinical psychology, 
such as rumination (Borsboom, Epskamp, Kievit, Cramer, & Schmittmann, 2011; Nolen-
Hoeksema & Watkins, 2011). Such work includes studies of the direct connections between 
emotion and psychosis, and proposals for a developmental pathway between the two 
(Freeman & Garety, 2003). 
 
1.3.2.3.2 The scientist-practitioner model 
 
Clinical psychology has a long tradition of being an applied science. The concept of the 
scientist-practitioner was introduced by Monte Shapiro, who argued that psychologists 
should apply the scientific method where validated methods of assessment were not 
available (Shapiro, 2002). The scientific method of observation and generation and testing of 
hypotheses is applied to the individual client. The scientist-practitioner approach is a 
technological way of attempting to objectively define difficulties and understand their causes, 
which is described by Kinderman (2014) as an alternative to diagnosis. The clinician makes 
a hypothesis against which to manipulate variables and interventions in order to create a 
particular effect. Kinderman and colleagues (Kinderman, Read, et al., 2013; Kinderman, 
2014) have argued that different experiences of distress should be operationally defined 
using a shared lexicon, and that evidence-based interventions should be planned around 
these definitions, rather than by diagnosis. This is seen as separate from the use of 
diagnosis as difficulties are identified without being diagnosed as a disorder. Two of the 
30 
proposed psychological alternatives to psychiatric diagnosis also take up this approach, and 
are described in the following sections. 
 
1.3.2.3.2.1 Symptom-level and problem list pathways 
 
Much like a causal networks-based taxonomy, the symptom or problem list approach rejects 
the idea of discrete categories of ‘disorder’ as causing symptoms. Bentall (2003) suggests 
that in understanding individual ‘symptoms’ or experiences, the concept of an underlying 
disorder will become redundant. An argument has been made for the development of a 
shared lexicon of operationally defined terms in lieu of diagnostic labels (Kinderman, Read, 
Moncrieff & Bentall, 2013). This approach represents the scientist-practitioner model of 
clinical psychology when applied to clinical assessment. Introduced in relation to 
schizophrenia research (Persons, 1986), the focus of this approach has been on the 
underlying psychological mechanisms and processes that contribute to individual 
experiences within diagnostic criteria, such as hallucinations and paranoia. This approach’s 
utility is closely linked with psychological ways of contextualising distress. Research into 
symptom-specific causal pathways (Mojtabai & Rieder, 1998) has already helped inform 
understanding of the strong associations between social determinants and specific 
experiences within psychosis (e.g. Bentall, Wickham, Shevlin, & Varese, 2012; Bentall et al., 
2014; Wickham, 2015). For example, an association is frequently reported between sexual 
abuse and hallucinations (Bentall et al., 2012; Kilcommons & Morrison, 2005; Longden, 
Madill, & Waterman, 2012). Similarly, support for these causal pathways and specific 
experiences has been found across diagnostic categories, such as voice hearing within the 
context of a bipolar diagnosis (Hammersley et al., 2003). 
 
1.3.2.3.2.2 Psychological formulation 
 
Psychological formulation is central to the practice of clinical psychologists, and has been 
established as such since around the mid-twentieth century (Pilgrim & Carey, 2010). In the 
UK, for example, psychological formulation is highlighted as an important skill for 
psychologists by both the Health and Care Professions Council’s (HCPC) standards of 
proficiency for the protected title of practitioner psychologist (HCPC, 2015), and the BPS 
standards for doctoral programmes in clinical psychology (BPS, 2014b). Reflecting the 
research outlined above, psychological formulation is a way of situating distress within the 
context of adversities and other life experiences. This approach represents current 
recommendations to understand these contexts in clinical work, whereby recovery is not 
seen solely as symptom reduction (Boyle, 2002; Read, Hammersley, & Rudegeair, 2007; 
Tan, Gould, Combes, & Lehmann, 2014). In the BPS report on diagnosis, it is stated that 
psychologists should be using formulation as the basis for their clinical work (BPS, 2013a). 
Psychological formulation is a way of linking psychological theory with clinical practice. 
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Formulation summaries the key problems experienced by an individual (or a family or 
system, etc.), and uses psychological theory to collaboratively bring together an 
understanding of how those problems developed and are maintained. A formulation is a 
flexible guide to intervention based in psychological theory and processes, and is open to 
revision. In drawing upon psychological, biological and systemic factors, formulation seeks to 
contextualise distress, whilst incorporating the personal meaning associated with it (BPS, 
2011). In this manner, psychological formulation takes an idiographic over a nomothetic 
approach (Pilgrim, 2014), representing individual experiences of distress rather than using a 
broader, generalising lens to distinguish between groups of people. This process of 
conceptualising distress allows for the possibility of understanding individual narratives and 
personal meaning making which have been described as central to caring and recovery, not 
least by the recipients of mental health services (Buchanan-Barker, 2004; Casey & Long, 
2002; Thomas & Longden, 2013). Formulation, therefore, aims to take a more humanistic 
stance than psychiatric diagnosis (Johnstone & Dallos, 2014), whereas personal 
experiences associated with symptoms or problems are excluded from diagnostic categories 
(Vanheule, 2012). The benefits of the use of psychological formulation have been 
demonstrated not only in care planning and understanding service users’ difficulties, but also 
across staff teams, with potential for improving staff and service user interactions (Berry, 
Barrowclough, & Wearden, 2009; Cole, Wood, & Spendelow, 2015; Summers, 2006). 
 
In its critique of the DSM-5, the BPS’ Division of Clinical Psychology called for formulation to 
be promoted as one response to the problems of psychiatric diagnosis (BPS, 2013b). 
Constructing formulations of clients’ difficulties is also part of core psychiatry training in the 
UK, however such formulations represent a pared down version of psychological 
formulation, including biopsychosocial factors in the development and maintenance of 
problems, but not representing personal meaning or psychological theory and processes 
(Royal College of Psychiatrists, 2010). Psychiatric formulations are generally made in the 
context of a psychiatric diagnosis, and therefore represent an epistemological tension 
between the two models (Pilgrim & Carey, 2010). 
 
1.3.2.3.3 Humanistic approaches 
 
There is inevitably overlap between the medical, empirical, scientist-practitioner, and 
humanistic approaches described in this literature review. For example, it could be argued 
that, depending on the model used, psychological formulation may represent technologically 
based scientific practitioner approaches, or a more humanistic approach focused on 
meaning. The difference might be considered between types of formulation; for example the 
distinctions between a formulation based theoretically in cognitive behavioural therapy 
versus one focused on narrative therapy. In a typical ‘5Ps’ cognitive behavioural therapy 
(CBT) formulation, for example, the contributing factors (presenting issues, precipitating, 
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perpetuating, predisposing and protective factors), are viewed as variables that describe and 
explain an individual’s current distress (Johnstone & Dallos, 2014). Although such factors 
would include examples of the individual’s thoughts and experiences, the formulation is 
nevertheless arguably more detached from the individual’s phenomenological experience of 
their distress than other approaches. Johnstone, Boyle, and Cromby (2017), for example, 
presented their ‘Power/Threat/Meaning Framework’ at the BPS Division of Clinical 
Psychology annual conference, in which meaning is seen as integral to shaping the ways 
that social and societal power and threat operate upon the individual and the ways they 
experience and respond to these central processes. 
 
1.3.2.3.4 The ‘avoidance’ of biomedical conceptualisations 
 
With non-diagnostic approaches of mental distress, from a psychological perspective, comes 
a downplaying of biological factors in its development. A focus on distress as 
understandable within the context of extreme and painful life experiences reduces to a lesser 
contributory factor the role of biomedical or neurobiological factors such as brain chemistry 
or genetics. Critics have argued that such approaches make a claim or assumption that 
there is no biological pathology behind mental distress (e.g. Coyne, 2015). Boyle & 
Johnstone (2014), however, emphasise that the approach is not dualist, instead arguing that 
the role of biology as much more complex than is typically represented by diagnostic 
models. Harper (2013) and Cromby, Harper, and Reavey (2013), however, use Rose (2005) 
lifelines approach in order to situate biological factors within cultural, historical, and social 
contexts. This approach reflects a de-emphasis on biology, which promotes interventions 
other than drug treatment. Currently, with limited access to other interventions, the common 
denominator of available treatment is drugs. Frequent treatment with drugs reinforces 
notions of biological causation, for example social acceptance of the idea that chemical 
imbalance causes depression (Moncrieff, 2011). However, as described above in Section 
1.3.1.2.5, Moncrieff and Cohen (2006) argue that psychiatric drugs create, rather than 
correct, abnormal chemical states in the brain, and it is these states that provide temporary 
relief. 
 
1.3.2.3.5 A note on ‘alternatives to diagnosis’ 
 
The term ‘alternatives to diagnosis’ has effectively become a technical, even political, term in 
psychological literature. Strengthened by the debate and controversy surrounding the 
publication of the DSM-5, the search for ‘alternatives to diagnosis’ became a mainstay of 
some of the central figures in the psychological arm of the debate, as part of the campaign 
against psychiatric diagnosis and calls for a paradigm shift in mental health (Boyle & 
Johnstone, 2014). Following her seminal book, “Schizophrenia: A scientific delusion?” 
(Boyle, 2002), Boyle later questioned the use of diagnosis across mental health, exploring 
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why diagnosis is still used, and calling for the need to discuss alternatives (Boyle, 2007). 
This discussion was followed up in the same year as the publication of the DSM-5, in which 
Boyle (2013) addressed ways of preventing the neutralisation of alternatives to diagnosis by 
proponents of the biomedical model, and avoiding the assimilation of alternatives into the 
dominant psychiatric approach. Kinderman (2014) has advocated for a continuum model as 
an alternative to diagnosis, in which mental distress of the type described within diagnostic 
categories is not seen as qualitatively different from ‘normal’ behaviour and experience. 
Johnstone (2013) wrote about alternatives to diagnosis as part of the Global summit on 
diagnostic alternatives, an international campaign website set up in response to the 
publication of the DSM-5 and dedicated to the development and dissemination of 
alternatives to current psychiatric classification systems. She highlighted that we already 
have alternatives to diagnosis, such as psychological formulation and Open Dialogue, and 
argued that the notion of having to wait until alternatives to the DSM were developed is a 
fallacy. Nevertheless, widespread use of formulation or Open Dialogue would represent a 
radical change to the structure and practice of mental health services. Likewise, it remains to 
be demonstrated whether any of the proposed ‘alternatives’ could replace the myriad 
functions of psychiatric diagnosis. 
 
1.3.2.3.6 Focus on the individual 
 
Considering both psychological formulation and Open Dialogue approaches, each is 
theoretically driven and has a particular focus on individuals, rather than on classification or 
technological aspects of mental health. Each approach is already being used clinically, 
although not, in the UK, as a general method of organising mental health services and 
conceptualising mental distress. The approaches outlined within the psychological literature 
have potential limitations in their application across a broader scale in lieu of diagnosis. 
Open Dialogue, for example, may have limitations in its application to a considerably larger 
population. The small geographical area of Western Lapland has a population of just 70,000 
(Seikkula et al., 2011), and the management of service planning may be very different using 
this approach in the UK. Formulation with its idiosyncratic approach would need some 
consideration in adapting it to meet the needs of service planning and commissioning, which 
currently appears to be broadly diagnostic in nature. Furthermore, psychological literature, in 
its general approach to mental distress, conceives difficulties not as biomedical deficits or 
disorders, however difficulties are nevertheless typically located within the individual. 
Psychological interventions reflect this conceptualisation, such as a continued focus on 
individual therapy, and thus have a professional interest in maintaining this individualised 
lens (Boyle, 2011; Smail, 2012). Open Dialogue to some extent widens the context for 
distress in its systemic family and social network approach, however, its scope is limited 
beyond these immediate networks. Parker (2015) contextualises this positioning within the 
neoliberal politics of the early 1980s, arguing that psychology gained popularity as people 
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were “ideologically corralled into finding individual solutions to the problems they faced” 
(Parker, 2015, p. 55). 
 
 
1.3.3 The personal and political implications of diagnosis: Service user / survivor 
and social sciences literature 
 
The psychological literature around mental health begins to incorporate a contextualised 
account of people’s difficulties through formulation. Biographical factors such as emotional 
environment, social situation, and life experiences such as trauma and adversity are 
acknowledged. In contrast with the psychological literature, the service user/survivor and 
social sciences literatures are not only about the social context of the individual. These 
literatures consider the wider societal and political contexts of applying psychiatric 
diagnoses, and those who are diagnosed, labelled as disordered or disabled. Service 
user/survivor literature typically bridges between the individual and the political; Jacqui Dillon 
references the feminist maxim, “the personal is political” (Dillon, 2011). The service 
user/survivor literature is presented alongside relevant social sciences literature as both 
share a perspective of exploring the political implications of diagnosis, disablement and the 
personal impact on individuals. This section is outlined in the following three sections: Power 
and the construction of difference; Labelling and the creation of a ‘mentally ill’ identity; and 
Resistance.  
 
1.3.3.1 Labelling and the creation of a ‘mentally ill’ identity 
 
According to Foucault’s concept of the production of the psychiatric subject, people who are 
diagnosed are invited to see themselves as the ‘incontrovertible identity’ (Roberts, 2005, p. 
40) created by the diagnostic category. The literature suggests that there may be some 
positive aspects to this identity, such as the legitimisation of distress (Pitt et al., 2009; 
Probst, 2015). Diagnostic labels may also enable collective identities, whereby the individual 
can access networks of support from others with the diagnosis, thus reducing the isolation 
that may accompany mental distress (Goldstein Jutel, 2011). 
 
However, much of this body of literature concerns the negative impact of this change in 
identity that is brought about by diagnosis. Foucault, for example, argues that the patient is 
made dependent by the creation of this identity, thus legitimising psychiatric power (Roberts, 
2005). Labelling theory, derived from Mead’s symbolic interaction theory and conflict theory 
from Marxist and Foucauldian writings, proposes that the way that society responds to 
particular behaviours, by labelling them as deviant or otherwise different in some way, in turn 
shapes the way that labelled individuals conceptualise themselves as disordered (Probst, 
2015b). Scheff (1966) proposed that the way those in power label minority behaviours 
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creates the ‘disorder’, rather than the behaviour itself. As a result of this process of labelling 
and the essentialist thinking described earlier in Sections 1.3.2.2.2 – 1.3.2.2.4, individuals 
can be perceived as irrational, actively seen as disordered or pathologised, and socially 
excluded (Spandler & Anderson, 2015). In Goffman’s key text on stigma (Goffman, 1963), he 
describes the way that society can stigmatise a person once they can be categorised as 
different: 
 
While the stranger is present before us, evidence can arise of his possessing an 
attribute that makes him different from others in the category of persons available for 
him to be, and of a less desirable kind – in the extreme a person who is quite 
thoroughly bad, or dangerous, or weak. He is thus reduced in our minds from a 
whole and usual person to a tainted, discounted one (p3).  
 
The creation of a mentally ill identity is not limited to others’ perceptions of the stigmatised or 
‘othered’ identity discussed within psychological perspectives (Section 1.3.2.2.3 and 
1.3.2.2.4, above). This disordered identity is taken up implicitly by the people who are 
diagnosed, again raising the question of whether it is the distress or the person that is 
diagnosed. The following quotes illustrate the ways in which being given a psychiatric 
diagnosis can dramatically change a person’s identity: 
 
I was told I had a disease… I was beginning to undergo that radically dehumanising 
and devaluing transformation … from being Pat Deegan to being ‘a schizophrenic’ 
(Deegan, 1993, p.7)  
 
I went into that hospital a troubled, confused, unhappy 18-year-old and I came out a 
schizophrenic…The very first time I met [Pat Bracken, a psychiatrist] he said to me, 
‘Hi Eleanor, nice to meet you. Can you tell me a bit about yourself?’ So I just looked 
at him and said ‘I’m Eleanor and I’m a schizophrenic.’ Longden (2010, p.256) 
 
Not only can a diagnosis change a person’s identity, “being mentally ill” (as Scheff’s (1966) 
book was titled) constructs a particular social position, a socially shaped identity that leads to 
multiple forms of disadvantage (Crossley, 2004). The inequalities of this identity act across 
multiple forms of power across rights and status, in contrast with ‘non-disordered’ society in 
general, and with mental health professionals. Oppression, or the exercising of psychiatric 
authority, is seen as a consequence of the psychiatric model that is responsible for the 
creation of a victim (Coleman, 1999). Therefore, as Patricia Deegan writes, “[i]t is important 
to understand that we are faced with recovering not just from mental illness, but also from 
the effects of being labeled mentally ill” (Deegan, 1993, p. 10). 
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1.3.3.1.1 The social model of disability and mental distress 
 
Disability studies and the social model of disability (Oliver, 1983) have been applied to 
mental health. This literature explores the social oppression of disabled people. Originally 
concerned with physical impairment, the concepts of the social model of disability separate 
‘impairment’ from ‘disability’. That is, impairment can be described as a physical problem of 
body structure, which may cause activity limitations where an individual may have difficulty in 
completing a particular task or action (WHO, 2017b). Disability, however, is not located 
within the individual, and instead is seen as socially caused; a form of discrimination 
whereby society excludes and disadvantages people with impairments through social and 
environmental barriers (Beresford & Nettle, 2010; Slorach, 2016). In contrast with common 
discourse of seeing disability as a ‘personal tragedy’, and disabled people as being in need 
of ‘care’, the social model highlights the possibilities for political action to enact social 
changes in order to end the social exclusion of disabled people (Barnes, 2004, as cited in 
Slorach, 2016). 
 
In the context of literature arguing that psychiatric labelling itself creates ‘disorder’, and has a 
profound impact on those diagnosed, the application of the social model of disability appears 
well suited. However, this issue is complex. For example, the idea of ‘impairment’ has been 
likened to the notion of ‘chronic mental illness’ that so many survivors struggle against (Tew, 
2015). It is also difficult to separate ‘impairment’ from ‘disability’ in this sense; causes of 
mental health difficulties are not necessarily within the individual (as biomedical model 
psychiatric literature tends towards), or even limited to the immediate social context of the 
individual, including adverse experiences (as the psychological literature incorporates), but 
also the critical impact of much further reaching societal oppression and disadvantage. 
These issues are discussed further in the following section. 
 
Another challenge to the application of the language of impairment and the social model of 
disability to mental distress is in survivors’ reinterpretations of distress not as symptoms but 
as coping mechanisms in response to traumatic and adverse life experiences (Dillon, 2010). 
These perspectives ask that experiences of distress should be respected as creative ways of 
coping in desperate circumstances (Tew, 2015). For example, voice hearing has been 
conceptualised as representing metaphors used to represent and cope with overwhelming 
and difficult emotions in response to “painful, unresolved life events” (Longden et al., 2012, 
p. 62). As Tew (2015) describes, “if they were symptoms at all, they were symptoms of 
unresolved personal and social issues – a direction of understanding that was profoundly 
social, but took people beyond the social model of disability as a frame of reference” (p. 74). 
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1.3.3.2 Societal oppression 
 
Examples of societal oppression and disadvantage include, but are not limited to, systemic 
discrimination on the basis of ethnicity, gender, and socioeconomic status. Each of these 
sources of oppression is discussed below. This literature is included in order to represent the 
systemic issues of discrimination and oppression on the basis of factors such as gender, 
ethnicity, and socioeconomic status, which the individualised biomedical diagnosis of mental 
distress overlooks. Neoliberalist ideology, which has been argued to underpin current 
conceptualisations of recovery in mental health (McWade, 2016), is founded on the 
assumption that such forms of discrimination no longer exist. This ideology individualises 
recovery and mental distress, assuming that individuals begin with a level playing field from 
which to orchestrate their own health and wellbeing. However this assumption is highly 
problematic when the following literature is considered. Although the clinical psychological 
literature in the previous section was described as including a wider consideration of the 
social contexts of individuals’ distress, the discipline has nevertheless been criticised for 
omitting discussion of issues of race. For example, in response to the publication of the BPS 
document Understanding Psychosis and Schizophrenia (BPS, 2014), an open letter 
(Fernando, 2014) was published online, which argues that a “glaring flaw” of the report is its 
lack of consultation with black and minority ethnic groups and individuals in the UK, and its 
failure to address the issue of ‘over-representation’ of black and minority ethnic people 
subject to excessive sectioning under the Mental Health Act, placement in seclusion on 
mental health wards, and over-medication. 
 
1.3.3.2.1 Ethnicity 
 
The nosology of psychiatry is permeated by ideologies prevalent in Western society, 
and most importantly, psychiatry is based on philosophical concepts, such as 
materialism and the separation of mind and body, that are present in Western 
culture. Thus, in considering diagnosis, two facts should be borne in mind: first, 
psychiatry is ethnocentric & carries in it the ideologies of Western culture including 
racism; secondly, the practice of psychiatry, including its ways of diagnosing, are 
influenced by the social ethos & the political system in which it lives & works 
(Fernando, 1991, p. 61) 
 
The above quote from Fernando (1991) highlights the ethnocentric bias of Western 
psychiatry and therefore its diagnostic classification. This bias is illustrated, for example, by 
findings that psychiatric diagnoses given to service users vary according to the recipient’s 
ethnicity. For example, African American and hispanic patients are more likely to receive a 
diagnosis of schizophrenia than white patients (Garb, 1997), and white psychiatric inpatients 
were more likely than African Americans to be diagnosed with bipolar disorder, and less 
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likely to be diagnosed with schizophrenia (Neighbors et al., 2003). Ethnicity is influential in 
the type of treatment and limits imposed upon service users; for example, it has been shown 
that black African and black Caribbean service users with psychosis diagnoses are more 
likely than white service users to have ever been detained under the Mental Health Act 
(Davies et al., 1996). Black and mixed race men are also several times more likely than the 
general population to be admitted into a psychiatric hospital (Slorach, 2016). African-
Caribbean and black African service users are significantly more likely to be compulsorily 
admitted to hospital than white British patients, with African-Caribbean men being the most 
likely group to be forcibly admitted (Morgan et al., 2005). One meta-analysis showed that, 
the pooled odds ratio comparing black service users with white service users was 4.31 for 
compulsory admission (Bhui et al., 2003). 
 
Consequently, ‘circles of fear’ surrounding the engagement of black and minority ethnic 
service users have been reported by the Sainsbury Centre for Mental Health (Keating et al., 
2002), in which mental health and criminal justice systems are seen as coercive and 
controlling, and as systems that may cost service users their lives. The report stated that 
services were seen as inhumane and inappropriate, and that service users’ were not 
respected, nor their voices heard. 
 
Debate regarding the reasons for the ‘over-representation’ of black and minority ethnic 
people as recipients of this extreme treatment and diagnostic labels has moved on from 
notions of ‘race differences’ and the ‘pre-disposition’ of certain groups to mental distress. 
Studies have demonstrated and acknowledged the impact of racism and discrimination on 
people’s mental health. For example, studies have shown an association between ‘common 
mental disorders’ and unfair treatment and racial insults (Bhui et al., 2005), and 
discrimination and perceived discrimination (Karlsen et al., 2005). Karlsen and colleagues 
also showed a similar association with psychosis. A review of racial/ethnic discrimination and 
health demonstrated that of the 25 included papers that measured associations with 
psychological distress, 20 reported a positive association between discrimination and mental 
distress, three reported a conditional association, and just two reported no association. 
Positive associations were also found between discrimination and diagnoses of depression, 
generalised anxiety disorder, early substance abuse, and psychosis (Williams et al., 2003). 
 
More recent literature, although it is not always explicitly acknowledged (as highlighted by 
Fernando, 2014), has explored the racially discriminatory nature of mental health services 
themselves and the inequalities embedded with service provision and outcome, associated 
with the adverse experiences of black and minority ethnic groups at the hands of society and 
mental health services (National Institute for Mental Health in England, 2003). 
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Taking up Goffman’s (1963) theory of stigma, some have proposed that constructions of 
race within mental health services “imply a sense of black otherness set in juxtaposition to 
an idealised white self” (Stowell-Smith & McKeown, 2001, p. 159). Others argue more 
specifically that historical, cultural, and structural social relations, including shared 
oppression as a consequence of social inequalities, are reframed within psychiatry as 
biologically mediated risks that individuals must manage in order to improve their mental 
health (Johnson Thornton, 2010). Metzl (2010) has argued that clinical diagnoses 
“unconsciously mirror larger conversations about the politics of race” (p. ix), demonstrating 
that the category of schizophrenia has been altered over the decades, from a transformation 
of personality into a ‘protest psychosis’ in the context of the American civil rights movement 
in the 1960s and 1970s, becoming a diagnosis disproportionately given to black men. 
Kalathil and Faulkner (2015, p. 22) argue that schizophrenia “is not just a flawed diagnosis 
but a racialised pathology imposed on black communities”. 
 
Furthermore, a recent blog (Race Reflections, 2017) cautions that less biologically focused 
conceptualisations, such as psychological trauma-informed approaches to mental health 
care, may also fix the therapeutic lens too narrowly on the individual and their own personal 
experiences of trauma, rather than acknowledging, making visible, and legitimising the wider 
psychological impact of racial oppression. Likewise, Nazroo (1998) has argued that technical 
interventions focused on causal pathways may ignore the roots of health inequalities and 
wider social inequalities. 
 
1.3.3.2.2 Gender 
 
The impact of gender on mental health has long been recognised (e.g. Showalter, 1987), 
and hostility and violence towards women and girls puts them at high risk for development of 
mental distress (Taaffe, 2017). Moreover, authors have argued that not only does gender 
violence contribute to later distress, but that diagnostic categories themselves contain 
gender bias that reflects wider societal issues of gender. Ussher (2013), for example, has 
argued that several diagnostic categories in particular, hysteria, pre-menstrual dysphoric 
disorder, and borderline personality disorder (BPD), represent psychiatry’s response to 
“difficult women” (p. 63). For example, amidst social and political changes during the last 
century, both the diagnostic categories of hysteria and homosexuality were associated with 
non-conformity within gender and sexuality (Kinderman, Allsopp & Cooke, 2017). Although 
the reasons for hysteria’s removal are complex, including diagnostic heterogeneity and 
changes in conceptualisations of psychosis and neurological medicine (Micale, 1993), a 
significant contribution to the disuse of the term was the rise and development of women’s 
rights and changing gender roles within the 20th Century (Ussher, 2013). Ussher has also 
argued that pre-menstrual dysphoric disorder (PMDD) represents a modern medicalisation 
of female experiences. PMDD may be diagnosed in the presence of both feminised pre-
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menstrual changes, such as anxiety, depression, and tearfulness, and changes that conflict 
with typical feminine attributes, such as anger and irritability. However, Ussher (2013) 
highlights, pathologising these experiences within the individual ignores their wider relational 
context. Such experiences may instead be contextualised as responses to over-
responsibility or insufficient social support (Ussher & Perz, 2012) or as a ceasing of the self-
silencing that is practised during the remaining three weeks of the month (Ussher & Perz, 
2010). 
 
BPD has been extensively debated as a diagnostic category. It has been argued that there 
exists a gender bias in the diagnosing of BPD; the DSM-IV-TR reports that around 75% of 
those given the diagnosis are female (APA, 2000). Some have suggested that the reasons 
for this are complex, arguing that it is difficult to ascertain whether the gender differences are 
a result of sampling bias, biased diagnostic criteria, or sociocultural factors (Bjorklund, 
2006). One proposed explanation is that clinicians may have an inclination towards 
attributing clients’ behaviour to individual or internal causes rather than situational factors, 
and that women may be especially affected by this phenomenon, as environmental causes 
have been shown to be used to explain men’s behaviour more often than women, where 
personal factors are more likely seen as the cause of symptoms (Becker & Lamb, 1994; 
Wallston & Grady, 1985). Becker and Lamb (1994) have demonstrated clinicians’ sex bias in 
the diagnosis of PTSD, a diagnosis with clear environmental cause, and borderline 
personality disorder, a more person-centred diagnosis. The authors found that clinicians 
were more likely to assign ambiguous descriptions of distress to a BPD diagnosis when the 
vignette was said to describe a female case, and more likely to assign the diagnosis of 
PTSD when the case was introduced as male. 
 
Further examinations of the category of BPD, particularly those from feminist literature, 
argue that conceptualisations of distress should move beyond an internalised, problem-
focused account of women’s lives, and instead incorporate externalised narratives of power, 
and to understand distress and behaviours not as symptoms of disorder but as the response 
of women to societal sexual violence and oppression (Shaw & Proctor, 2005). These 
arguments propose that the predominance of women diagnosed with BPD, and the nature of 
the diagnostic category itself, are direct consequences of a societal “attempt to explain away 
the strategies which some women use to survive and resist oppression and abuse” (Shaw & 
Proctor, 2005, p. 484) by pathologising these strategies as a symptom of a psychiatric 
disorder located within the individual’s personality. 
 
Evidence has been demonstrated for a causal relationship between childhood trauma and 
later diagnosis of borderline personality disorder (Ball & Links, 2009). These associations 
are particularly apparent for sexual trauma and diagnoses of BPD, for example, 
Meichenbaum (1994) found that 70% of people diagnosed with BPD have been sexually 
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abused as children. Another study showed that 88% had experienced abuse, of which 70% 
were experiences of childhood sexual abuse (Castillo, 2000). Consequently, it has been 
argued that BPD should be re-conceptualised as complex PTSD (e.g. Herman, 1992; 
Trippany et al., 2006). However, others have argued that reassigning BPD as PTSD still 
does not address the issues of medicalising women’s problems (e.g. Becker, 2000). This re-
conceptualisation would also fail to address prejudice that may be both initiated and 
maintained by clinicians (Nehls, 1998), thus perpetuating blaming, silencing discourses 
about women.  
 
1.3.3.2.3 Socio-economic status 
 
A growing body of evidence shows that poverty and inequality lead to poor mental health. 
For example, a review of global health studies across low- and middle-income countries 
showed that the majority of studies found a positive association between poverty and 
common mental health problems (Patel & Kleinman, 2003). The authors argued that policy 
makers should recognise ‘common mental disorders’ alongside physical diseases that are 
acknowledged as associated with poverty. Inequality represents the difference between the 
richest and poorest within society. Evidence shows that the more extreme the levels of 
income inequality in a country, the poorer that country’s health outcomes, including mental 
health (Pickett & Wilkinson, 2010). Health inequalities have been shown to have an impact 
on a social gradient, whereby the lower a person’s socio-economic status, the poorer their 
health (Marmot, 2010). For example, one study exploring the health inequalities across the 
most and least deprived areas of Stockton-on-Tees demonstrated that living in the less 
deprived area afforded substantial protection against problems with mental health and poor 
mental wellbeing, with a significant gap in mental health found between the two areas. Poor 
mental health and wellbeing in the most deprived area was accounted for by multiple 
psychosocial factors, including living in polluted areas, in homes that are too dark, feeling 
unsafe walking alone in the neighbourhood at night, being in receipt of housing benefit, 
social isolation and lack of companionship (Mattheys et al., 2016). Studies have shown that 
transitioning into poverty increases the odds of children experiencing socioemotional 
behavioural problems, and the association appears to be partially explained by maternal 
mental health (Wickham, Barr & Taylor-Robinson, 2016; Wickham et al., 2017), family 
poverty, and bullying (Straatmann et al., 2017). Welfare reform and government austerity 
measures in recent years appear to have contributed to rising numbers of mental health 
problems (Barr, Kinderman & Whitehead, 2015), including an increase in suicides and 
antidepressant prescribing associated with the Work Capability Assessment used to 
reassess people on disability benefits (Barr et al., 2016). 
 
In spite of these associations between psychosocial environment and mental distress, it has 
been argued that the psychiatrisation of distress promotes a separation of mental health and 
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social context, and that neoliberal values encourage a culture of an individual, self-
responsible citizen, whereby poverty becomes linked to insufficient management of the self 
(Gillies, 2005; McWade, 2016). McWade (2016) argues that by introducing ideals of choice, 
and the notion that some choices are ‘right’ while others are ‘wrong’, the political system and 
the recovery model of mental health frame some individuals as “failed citizens” (p. 62) who 
are responsible for their poor mental health. Hansen, Bourgois and Drucker (2014) argue 
that this process is tantamount to pathologising poverty. The authors suggest that by 
demanding that people must demonstrate their ‘disabled’ status by bureaucratically using 
diagnosis, taking medication, and accepting therapy, those who do not make these ‘correct’ 
choices are condemned as the “unworthy poor” (Hansen et al., 2014, p. 82). 
 
1.3.3.3 Power and the construction of difference 
 
Central to the issues described above is the exertion of power to the detriment and even 
oppression of the ‘other’. Further to the three types of societal oppression discussed above, 
McWade (2016) argues that the concept of intersectionality can be used to represent and 
acknowledge the multiple forms of disadvantage that individuals may experience. McWade 
argues that psychiatry and the mental health system “continues to repress and restrain 
impoverished people” (McWade, 2016, p. 64). She argues that ‘recovery’, by eradicating 
personal experiences, silences the service user/survivor movement and the history of 
oppression within mental health services of women, minority ethnic groups and other socially 
disadvantaged groups.  
 
Differing understandings of distress, such as the spiritual explanations of an individual 
versus the medical model of a psychiatrist, can be considered different but parallel 
narratives. Using a social constructionist understanding, neither narrative is more ‘true’, but 
they differ in the relative power they hold (Burr, 2003; Lafrance & McKenzie-Mohr, 2013). 
Language is seen as performative, with the power to create meanings, however some 
groups have greater power than others in influencing what is accepted as knowledge (Burr, 
2003; Lafrance & McKenzie-Mohr, 2013). This has been described as a ‘narrative surrender’ 
in which the patient’s narrative of their difficulties is conceded in favour of the clinician’s 
version (Frank, 1995, cited in Goldstein Jutel, 2011). Many have argued that the creation of 
difference through disorder in psychiatry is not merely a neutral administrative exercise but 
one of the exertion of power, for example, through the expert status of psychiatry as a 
mechanism of social control (Szasz, 1974). As Pilgrim argues, “although psychiatric 
knowledge is weak, psychiatric authority is powerful” (Pilgrim, 2013, p. 339). Pilgrim (2014) 
argues that in this way, the binary approach to psychiatry (sane vs. insane, disordered vs. 
non-disordered) creates ‘othering’ of those diagnosed. This idea invokes Derrida’s theory of 
binary opposition in which pairs, rather than being neutral opposites, involve a hierarchical 
power relationship (Cooper, 1989). By constructing their distressing experiences as 
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disorders, individuals are immediately placed at the weaker pole of this binary. In drawing 
the lines of disorder, so too is normality constructed (Crowe, 2000). This process has been 
described as not simply creating difference but using moral judgements to reify this 
difference and create categories of disease (Kirk, Cohen, & Gomory, 2015), for example, 
categorising individuals as sick rather than morally deviant, particularly in the case of 
personality disorder diagnoses (Sulzer, 2015). Foucault referred to this process as the 
‘psychiatric test’ (Foucault, 2006, p. 268) in which the request for intervention is re-
transcribed in terms of symptoms and illness. Foucault’s disciplinary power of psychiatry 
(e.g. confinement of patients) is converted to medical power. Foucault describes the act of 
diagnosing in psychiatry as not simply informing a person of what their illness is, but 
legitimising the psychiatrist’s position, and in turn, the individual is created as the psychiatric 
subject (Foucault, 2006; Roberts, 2005). Smail (2012) argues that creating this difference, 
particularly of the oppressed, may in some way justify their suffering by those in power 
because “our common humanity rests upon our common embodiment” (p.93). 
 
1.3.3.4 Resistance 
 
“Many of us find that recovery means becoming politicised and aware of the social, 
economic, and human injustices we have had to endure. We find that empowerment 
and recovery means finding our collective voice, our collective pride, and our 
collective power, and challenging and changing the injustices we face” (Deegan, 
1993, p. 10) 
 
Power relations are called into question by the ways in which resistance is enacted against 
them. Much of the service user/survivor literature pertains to the resistance to psychiatric 
power. A significant factor in the initiation of service user/survivor actions of resistance, 
Campbell (1999) argues, is negative personal experience of formal mental health services. 
The literature contributes to a rights-based social movement (Crossley, 2004), securing 
rights for those diagnosed with mental health difficulties but also that seeks to understand 
and highlight wider implications of societal structure and where this places service 
users/survivors as a result of their definition as disordered. This civil rights- and liberation-
centred approach creates a blurred distinction between personal and political change 
groups, for example, the Hearing Voices Movement, which aims to influence professional 
practice (Lindow, 1999). A central theme of resistance to psychiatric practices is to challenge 
the perceived status of those diagnosed. The shaping of identity plays a key role, with an 
emphasis on self-definition, representing service users’/survivors’ reluctance to impose new 
terms or labels on each other (Campbell, 1999). Goffman’s classic text Asylums describes 
the inhabitants of asylums, and the ways in which they subverted its systems, such as 
refusing medication. Resistance to psychiatric power and the identity of ‘being mentally ill’ 
echoes Goffman’s assertion, “to dodge a prescription is to dodge an identity” (Goffman, 
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1961, p.170). In a play on the title of Scheff’s (1966) text, Crossley (2004) refers to this as 
ways of resisting the psychiatric identity, or, “not being mentally ill” (p. 161). 
 
1.3.3.4.1 Examples of resistance 
 
Part of the service user/survivor literature represents “consciousness raising” (Lindow, 1999, 
p. 213), or sharing stories and narratives of the oppression experienced by those labelled as 
having mental health difficulties. Consequently, calls have been made to demand that 
mental health professionals acknowledge and understand these struggles: “professionals 
must stop denying our experience” (Coleman, 1999, p. 161). In applying concepts of 
narrative and understanding of the ways in which mental distress is socially shaped, Thomas 
and Longden (2013, p. 62) ask that professionals “bear witness to the injustices that shape 
the lives of those who suffer.” 
 
1.3.3.4.1.1 Language 
 
Highlighting the ways in which the language of psychiatry plays a role in the exertion of its 
power, Burstow (2013) cites Audre Lorde (1984), who said, “[t]he master’s tools will never 
dismantle the master’s house”. Burstow argues that by using psychiatric or biomedical 
language in lay discourse, we perpetuate its symbolic power, and accordingly, describes 
using talk that is ‘psychiatry-resistant’ or ‘psychiatry-free’ in order to ‘tacitly…undermine 
psychiatric rule’ (Burstow, 2013, p. 80). Echoing the DCP (2015) guidelines on language 
(discussed in Section 1.3.2.3), non-diagnostic ways of conceptualising and working with 
mental health difficulties use language that attempts to be non-medical, such as ‘distress’ 
over ‘disorder’, and ‘hearing voices’ over ‘hallucinations’ (e.g. the Hearing Voices Movement, 
discussed below). These ways of using different language to describe distress are in 
keeping with Dillon’s and other service users’ representations of distress as coping 
strategies in response to unbearable emotions and challenging experiences. In this way, 
changing the language used to describe distress, without labelling, represent ways of “not 
being mentally ill” (Crossley, 2004). Coleman describes his rejection of the term, and the 
identity, of a ‘schizophrenic’: 
 
“In the early 1980s I was diagnosed as schizophrenic. By 1990 that was changed to 
chronic schizophrenic and in 1993 I gave up being a schizophrenic and decided to 
be Ron Coleman” (Coleman, 1999, p. 160) 
 
In this political positioning, the literature speaks frequently to issues of power in the 
psychiatric model, discussed previously. Madness is seen as a historical category, reclaimed 
for political action (LeFrançois, Menzies, & Reaume, 2013). The term ‘Mad’ (capitalised) as 
opposed to ‘mad’ (non-capitalised) is used as a politicised term to denote an oppressed 
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identity (Cresswell, 2016). Reclaiming the term Mad, it is argued, symbolises “a positive 
assertion of alternative identity that distances itself from any biological signifier and which 
celebrates irrationality rather than seeking to erase it from public view” (Tew, 2015, p. 73), 
which links back to the rejection of the essentialised consequences of diagnostic categories 
discussed in Sections 1.3.2.1.1 and 1.3.3.1. 
 
1.3.3.4.1.2 Peer support and recovery 
 
Peer support groups range from formal, structured meetings, to informal social groups. What 
they have in common, however, is the redressing of power imbalances traditionally seen 
within mental health services, such as the inequality in the doctor-patient relationship. 
Members of peer support groups are seen as broadly equal, and decisions are made on this 
basis. The experiential knowledge gained through having been through similar difficulties of 
distress is highly valued. The peer support initiative, therefore, not only challenges 
psychiatric authority but offers members a sense of agency in their lives and in helping 
others (Beresford & Russo, 2016; Lindow, 1999; Shaw, 2013). In sharing knowledge and 
understanding, peer support groups can also help to validate and normalise situations and 
feelings. Alternative perspectives can help individuals to find an understanding that fits with 
their distress and their experiences, in contrast to having their distress redefined within a 
model that may not match their own understandings, as in mainstream mental health 
services (Shaw, 2013). 
 
‘Recovery’, as developed by the service user/survivor movement, has many definitions, but 
has been described as giving a new sense of self and, importantly, of hope (Deegan, 1988). 
Often, the idea of recovery has been used to challenge the medicalization of distress and, as 
with peer support, the power of psychiatry (Morrow, 2013). An acceptance of different 
viewpoints is central to the idea of recovery within the Hearing Voices Movement, which is 
an example of one of the most influential user-led challenges to biological psychiatry. Two 
key assumptions of the movement are normalising voices, valuing personal meaning, and 
developing agency and expertise. In contrast with psychiatric views of voice hearing as 
bizarre and abnormal, the movement argues that hearing voices is similar to any other 
human variation, such as being left-handed. The aim is not to rid people of their voices, but 
to help them to cope with their voice hearing, or work through the unresolved and painful 
experiences that led to it. Understanding voices, within the movement, is about non-
judgementally helping others to find a preferred means of making sense of their voices, 
rather than finding the ‘correct’ or ‘true’ understanding. Most importantly, the movement 
seeks to help people to become empowered and lead the way in their own recovery 
(Longden, Corstens, & Dillon, 2013). 
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1.3.3.4.2 Barriers to resistance: Co-option 
 
‘Mad Studies’ (Menzies, LeFrançois & Reaume, 2013) is a relatively new literature that 
brings together many of the longstanding ideas explored above, incorporating exploration of 
oppression of “Mad subjects” (p.1), resistance to psychiatry, and survivor narratives. With 
the growth of Mad Studies and other social movements within mental health, concern has 
been voiced that the central ideas of these movements may be taken up by mainstream 
mental health services and undermined in their message against traditional psychiatric 
ideas. “[P]oliticians have become adept at ‘turning rebellion into money’” Slorach (2016, p. 
24) argues, giving the example of the Disability Rights movement’s slogan “nothing about us 
without us” being transformed into the NHS slogan “no decision about me without me” in a 
policy (Department of Health, 2012a) that Slorach argues further limited disability rights in 
practice. Just as Slorach describes within the Disability Rights movement, Boyle (2013) 
argues that new concepts intended to move thought away from the psychiatric model can be 
assimilated into the existing medical model through the use of language. Such has been the 
case for user driven initiatives including ‘recovery’ and ‘peer support’. These concepts, which 
began with hope and empowerment for people with mental distress, have been heavily 
transformed by their co-option by mental health services. The idea of recovery has been 
used to drive people back to employment and limit their support, whilst the use of peer 
support within the NHS has been turned into a source of low or unpaid labour that does not 
truly value the knowledge of service users (Beresford & Russo, 2016). Morrow (2013) 
argues that the concept of recovery has been reformatted within neoliberalism, creating the 
‘healthification’ of social problems, such as homelessness and poverty. By reframing social 
injustices as problems of health, the burden of responsibility is shifted from the state to the 
individual, and Morrow argues that the concept of recovery has been co-opted to this end. 
 
 
1.4 The social functions of diagnosis: Historical development of the DSM 
 
The service user/survivor movement literature takes into account the biographical context of 
distress, as well as some of the things that are produced by diagnosis, including power 
inequalities and difference, as well as oppression and the political positioning that results 
from being diagnosed. The social sciences literature presented in this review takes these 
perspectives wider, by discussing the broader social relations encapsulated by psychiatric 
diagnosis. This literature demonstrates that categories are not only productive for individuals 
(whether in positive or negative ways) but also for organisations. Where the previous 
literatures have focused on the individual and the social relations that allow the individual to 
be diagnosed or otherwise assessed or ‘treated’, this latter body of literature moves its focus 
to classificatory systems themselves. The literature at once returns to classification itself, the 
DSM and ICD, and highlights the wider social contexts within which these taxonomies were 
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historically developed, and the drivers for change as it continues to be revised today. 
Diagnoses are positioned as active categories, constructed to perform particular roles. The 
socio-political influences on diagnosis are outlined, providing evidence for diagnostic 
classification as performing a particular set of socio-cultural, financial, and political functions 
for various groups and organisations, but that need not necessarily look this way. The 
implications of diagnosis and classification are discussed within the context of these 
influences.  
 
Both the psychiatric and psychological literatures acknowledge problems of the reification of 
diagnostic categories, however these ideas are limited to the sense of diagnoses becoming 
seen as fixed or ‘real’ categories. Here, these ideas are expanded in order to make visible 
the ‘social relations’ of diagnostic classification. The concept of reification within the social 
sciences literature takes up the Marxist concept whereby human creations are seen as facts 
or realities of nature and in addition, the social and power relations associated with these 
creations are made into things (Dahms, 2011). By associating diagnostic categories with the 
biomedical model, using the language of illness & disorder, psychiatric diagnoses are seen 
as existing categories out there for the clinician to diagnose and identify, rather than 
questioning what has gone into producing these categories, why certain decisions have 
been made, and who was involved in making these decisions. The social is made invisible, 
in terms of the development of diagnostic classification systems, and the model of where the 
problem is located, seen as within the person rather than taking into account and 
understanding the wider social context. Taussig (1980) describes this process as masking 
social relations as “natural things, concealing their roots in human reciprocity” (p. 3). He 
describes this concept of the ‘reification of the patient’, but it can be applied to the diagnostic 
categories themselves. The social relations of diagnostic categories are masked, leaving the 
categories to be seen as ‘natural kinds’, rather than embedded within relationships between 
individuals and their experiences. Taussig’s analysis also incorporates the political context of 
diagnoses, discussed within both the service user/survivor and social sciences literature. 
The categories “reproduce a political ideology in the guise of a science of (apparently) ‘real 
things’” (p. 3). 
 
Within the context of reification, the following review of the historical development of the 
DSM is oriented towards diagnostic classification as a ‘thing’. Psychiatric literature frames 
diagnostic categories as neutrally descriptive and non-aetiological, or atheoretical (see 
Section 1.2.2, Aetiological agnosticism). However, the social sciences literature reviewed 
here embeds the classification within its socio-political context, revealing the specific needs 
and interests that psychiatric diagnoses have been developed to meet. Diagnoses are not 
discovered so much as designed in reflection of the needs and influences of particular 
groups and stakeholders, such as political, economical, and public interests (Manning, 
2000). Psychiatric diagnostic classification is seen, therefore, as consisting of productive, 
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rather than merely descriptive, categories. The following section outlines the ways in which 
diagnosis is reflective of social, cultural, political, and financial norms and values over 
scientific progress in the field of psychiatry.  Diagnostic categories are therefore flexible; 
open to influence rather than ever-refined mirrors of nature (Hyman, 2007; Rosenberg, 
2002). Diagnosis reflects a particular set of conceptualisations about mental health that need 
not look this way.  
 
1.4.1 Early influences on classification 
 
From Durkheim's (1951) understandings of suicide as a social fact in 1897, there is a history 
of literature arguing that there is a need for the social to be acknowledged within mental 
health. Likewise, as long as this literature has existed, it has been contested alongside more 
biomedical understandings. For instance, the DSM-I and II (APA, 1952, 1968) were strongly 
psychodynamic in approach (American Psychiatric Association, 2015), reflecting the growth 
of psychotherapy in supporting soldiers returning from the Second World War. Not only was 
this approach psychodynamic, it also recognised the impact of social and environmental 
factors. A conceptualisation of mental health was popularised that represented a spectrum of 
difficulties beginning with the general population, in contrast with earlier ideas of the ‘insane’ 
kept separate to society, both literally and figuratively (Grob, 1991). 
 
As Kinderman, Allsopp & Cooke (2017) describe, however, the factors preceding the 
development of the DSM-III marked what has been described as a ‘crisis of legitimacy’ for 
psychiatry (Lafrance & McKenzie-Mohr, 2013; Mayes & Horwitz, 2005; Wilson, 1993). This 
crisis stemmed from the problems of poor reliability described in Section 1.3.1.1. Psychiatry 
was not clearly separating between the mentally ‘ill’ and mentally ‘well’ (Wilson, 1993). This 
criticism was made infamous by Rosenhan's (1973) now classic study in which colleagues 
reporting hearing a voice saying ‘empty’ or ‘thud’ were diagnosed with schizophrenia and 
admitted into hospital. Rosenhan concluded that hospitals could not distinguish between the 
sane and insane. Anti-psychiatrist movements argued that if the line between ‘sick’ and ‘well’ 
was fluid, and distress was psychosocial in nature, then diagnoses could not be said to be 
diseases, and mental health should be conceived of as social and political rather than 
medical (e.g. Szasz, 1974). There was concern that psychiatry’s methods of assessment 
and treatment, in contrast with medicine, were too fluid and unstandardized, representing 
problems for professional accountability and insurance companies (Wilson, 1993). The 
DSM-III ‘revolution’ therefore represented a desire to align mental disorders more closely 
with physical illnesses that eventuated a shift in power away from psychodynamic 
approaches within the APA. The DSM-III was transformative in the sense that it moved from 
a clinically based biopsychosocial model to research-based medical model, which 
incorporated descriptive operational criteria and information about how to distinguish 
between categories. This shift in structure fulfilled a number of political and financial 
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functions. For example, more formal diagnostic classification created discrete illness 
categories against which to make insurance claims and to enable the greater involvement of 
pharmaceutical companies (Mayes & Horwitz, 2005; Tsou, 2011). In their analysis of the 
discourse of the introductory sections of the DSM, Romelli and colleagues (2016) highlight 
the ways in which the language of early editions of the DSM self-legitimises, establishing the 
APA as the central actor in the development of psychiatry. The DSM-III and DSM-IV, they 
argue, build upon this position politically to establish psychiatric hegemony by presenting the 
DSM as a source of valid categories of knowledge and central to education within mental 
health (Romelli et al., 2016). 
 
1.4.2 The removal of homosexuality 
 
Homosexuality was included in the first edition of the DSM in 1952, originally as a 
sociopathic personality disturbance. Its removal is a key event in the history of the DSM, 
illustrating that some of the most significant changes to psychiatric classification have 
occurred as a result of social and cultural values rather than scientific advances. In 1962 and 
1967 respectively, the first acts were passed to decriminalise homosexuality in the US and 
England and Wales, yet it still remained a category of mental disorder. Activism grew 
progressively; the Stonewall riots in 1969 helped the movement gather momentum. In 1974, 
under huge social and political pressure from gay rights campaigners, homosexuality was 
removed in its previous format. Kutchins and Kirk (1997, p. 56) argue, “the dispute over the 
inclusion of homosexuality in DSM was not about research findings. It was a 20-year debate 
about beliefs and values”. However, ‘ego-dystonic homosexuality’ took its place, which 
represented persistent distress associated with unwanted homosexual arousal. Ego-dystonic 
homosexuality was removed from the DSM-III-R in 1986, although again there was no 
theoretical change in the DSM’s definition of ‘disorder’ that encompassed the removal of 
homosexuality from its pages (Kinderman, Allsopp & Cooke, 2017). Perhaps as a result of 
this lack of clarification, further work is still in progress to declassify other diagnoses that 
relate to homosexuality. The WHO have published a bulletin calling for the removal of 
disease categories in the forthcoming ICD-11 that relate to sexual orientation (Cochran & 
Drescher, 2014). 
 
1.4.3 The making of a diagnosis 
 
1.4.3.1 Post-traumatic stress disorder 
 
In contrast with homosexuality, where activism drove a shift towards depathologisation, 
PTSD was introduced in large part as a result of pressure from veterans of the Vietnam war 
to recognise their traumatic experiences. First introduced in the DSM-III (APA, 1980), rather 
than an appeal to civil rights being used to depathologise experiences such as voice hearing 
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and homosexuality, PTSD presents an example of individuals invoking diagnostic 
infrastructure in order to access their civil rights to medical or psychological care 
(Kinderman, Allsopp & Cooke, 2017). By minimising the impact of the Vietnam war, as part 
of a policy of returning soldiers to combat as quickly as possible, those who experienced 
difficulties such as flashbacks were dismissed as having delusional thinking about the war. 
As Sarah Haley, a social worker at the Veterans Association, and later part of Vietnam 
Veterans Working Group, reported in 1969, “these professionals denied the reality of 
combat…They were calling reality insanity!” (Scott, 1990, p. 298). In creating the diagnostic 
category, experiences were legitimised that had previously been seen as malingering, or 
simply not recognised as part of the denial of the impact of particular experiences of warfare. 
Post-trauma experiences were dismissed as pre-existing psychotic tendencies or delusional 
beliefs about the war (Galatzer-Levy & Bryant, 2013). Further demonstrating the impact of a 
set of socio-political influences on the creation of diagnoses, the eventual diagnosis of PTSD 
was created as a compromise. It described a broader experience that could be used for 
anyone who had experienced extreme stress, rather than the ‘post-Vietnam syndrome’ 
originally proposed (Helzer, Robins, & McEvoy, 1987). In part this compromise acted to 
reinforce the argument by incorporating evidence from Holocaust survivors, as well as 
achieving a critical mass of interested parties in order to effect change. This process has 
been described as a ‘transformation’ of activism that allowed human interests to be 
reconceptualised as ‘science’ and therefore legitimised (Kutchins & Kirk, 1997). 
 
1.4.3.2 ‘Dangerous and severe personality disorder’ 
 
As described by Kinderman, Allsopp and Cooke (2017), whilst introduced as an 
‘administrative category’ (Burns et al., 2011) rather than a clinical diagnostic category, 
‘dangerous and severe personality disorder’ (DSPD) was created in the UK in 2001. Its 
creation was a response to public anxiety around high-profile cases of people being attacked 
by individuals diagnosed with ‘severe personality disorder’, in order to provide treatment with 
the aim of reducing reoffending (Ministry of Justice, 2011). Thus the impetus for introducing 
such a category was largely political, combining risk aversion and public protection, 
punishment, and treatment (Manning, 2002). The label served to identify individuals who met 
three main requirements, two related to risk and reoffending, and the third rested on being 
diagnosed with a ‘severe disorder of personality’, established through various diagnostic 
instruments and a minimum score on a psychopathy assessment (Trebilcock & Weaver, 
2012). Four DSPD units were set up in the UK, based in both high secure hospitals and 
prisons, and a treatment programme established. Although administrative, in that it was 
never introduced into psychiatric classification, it is clear that the label was taken up both 
from research and lay perspectives as if it were a diagnosis, for example, journal articles that 
have written about ‘a pilot programme for the treatment of individuals with dangerous and 
severe personality disorder’ (Völlm & Konappa, 2012) and in a House of Commons debate 
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‘To ask the Secretary of State for Justice how many (a) adult and (b) juvenile prisoners have 
been diagnosed with dangerous and severe personality disorder’ (Parliamentary Written 
Answers, 2008). 
 
The DSPD programme has since been disbanded, and absorbed into the Offender 
Personality Disorder Pathway, initiated in 2011 (Department of Health, 2011). The 
programme lacked on-going interest as a result of problems with efficacy, discrimination 
from other personality disorders, and cost (Department of Health, 2011; Tyrer et al., 2009) 
but also due to difficulties around the legal implications of detention without treatment in that 
there was an argument that people meeting the criteria for DSPD are ‘untreatable’, despite 
ways around this being established in tribunals (Trebilcock & Weaver, 2012). Manning notes 
this disjunction between treatment and public protection, arguing that the need to achieve 
particular social and political goals create opportunity for innovation where the existing 
means (existing categories and treatment pathways) are insufficient; “…in such a situation, a 
cherished goal will virtually justify any means” (Manning, 2000a, p. 635). 
 
1.5 The actions and practices of classification 
 
The following sections are drawn from science and technology studies, and sociology of 
classification literature. These literatures, although not typically associated with psychology, 
psychiatry, and mental health, are included as they provide important insights and an 
alternative perspective to psychiatric diagnostic classification. These concepts are presented 
below within the context of psychiatric diagnosis, and will be picked up in the analysis of data 
across the five empirical chapters that follow. 
 
1.5.1 Diagnostic categories as active constructs 
 
As is described above in the social functions of diagnoses and their construction, diagnostic 
categories are seen as created or developed, and are active in the sense that they are 
productive, and responsive to needs. That is, diagnostic categories have been developed to 
meet specific and varying needs by the individuals, systems, and organisations that take 
them up. As Brown (1995, p. 37) describes, “[r]ather than a given biomedical fact, we have a 
set of understandings, relationships, and actions that are shaped by diverse kinds of 
knowledge, experience, and power relations, and that are constantly in flux”. Diagnoses are 
seen as active categories with multiple functions across the multiple social worlds described 
in this review; clinical, social, and personal spheres. 
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1.5.2 Stabilising categories 
 
In the traditional model of scientific research, data are wrapped into a paper that 
produces a generalizable truth – after which the scaffolding can be kicked away and 
the timeless truth can stand on its own (Millerand & Bowker, 2009, p. 149) 
 
Where new categories, such as PTSD, are introduced into diagnostic classification, the 
boundaries of these categories must be identified and criteria agreed upon. As discussed, 
there may be political contributions to this process, such as the eventual inclusion of other 
types of trauma within the PTSD category, not solely that caused by the Vietnam War. 
However, and particularly with mental distress where categories are purely descriptive, the 
boundaries of the infrastructure of diagnosis are frequently blurred. Psychiatric diagnostic 
categories are actively shaped to perform particular functions and perform specific roles. 
Their use and the literature surrounding them subsequently act to stabilise these categories. 
Below is a brief exploration of two types of fact stabilisation discussed by the social sciences 
literature; the construction of certainty, and the creation of standards. 
 
1.5.2.1 The construction of certainty 
 
In their classic text, ‘Laboratory Life’, Latour and Woolgar (1986) explicate the ways in which 
scientific activity constructs facts, for example, the process of reducing complex laboratory 
findings into simplistic forms for scientific publications. This process of simplification is 
described as the pragmatic production of ordered versions of observation and discussion, for 
consumption by others. Latour and Woolgar describe how scientists ignore alternative 
readings and explanations of their data in order to consistently produce an ordered account. 
Messy fieldwork is transformed into textbook categories (Bowker & Star, 1999). This 
reductionism can be associated with the reification of diagnoses, the acceptance of 
diagnostic categories as representing illnesses ‘out there’ in the world. Related to 
categorisation within science, Star (1989) describes the development of the model of 
localization of regions within the brain, as an attempt to manage and contain uncertainty. 
Star’s study moves beyond the immediate setting of the lab, and considers the longer-term 
construction of theory, which can be applied to the development of psychiatric diagnosis. As 
has been hinted towards in this chapter, the development of diagnosis is the result of 
accumulated creation of certainty gathered from multiple forms of research evidence. 
Certainty is created when local uncertainties are put aside or otherwise resolved. 
Transforming local uncertainty into certainty, Star (1989) argues, is central to research 
organisation. Over time, and through accumulated evidence and specialist consensus, 
diagnostic uncertainty is transformed into developed taxonomies and lists of criteria 
consisting of definitive symptoms. Diagnosis is a standardised tool, a property particularly 
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pushed by the DSM-III with the introduction of specific diagnostic criteria with the aim of 
improving reliability between clinicians. Standardised tools have been described as ‘powerful 
tools for ensuring fact stabilisation’ (Fujimura, 1992, p. 204). 
 
1.5.2.2 The creation of standards 
 
Standards such as human weight charts, blood types, and electrical current now 
appear fixed and neutral, although this inert quality obscures the enormous amount 
of work needed to stabilize knowledge, freeze action, delete outliers and residuals, 
and facilitate use (Star & Lampland, 2009, p. 10) 
 
Once scientific certainty has been forged, information may be organised into agreed upon 
rules, or ‘standards’. Diagnostic categories are one example; the DSM and ICD classification 
systems are the two central standards of psychiatry (Pickersgill, 2012). A standard is used 
across more than one site of activity and is used to make disparate and heterogeneous 
systems or components work together (Bowker & Star, 1999). For example, diagnostic 
categories are used as both a way of communicating to service users and a bureaucratic 
means of recording and capturing data from NHS electronic health records. Standards are 
often enforced or mandated by professional organisations, such as the American Psychiatric 
Association and the World Health Organization. In becoming a standard language, a critical 
role of standards is in information stabilisation (Star & Lampland, 2009). The creation of a 
‘shared information infrastructure’ (Millerand & Bowker, 2009, p. 150) means that when a 
diagnosis is recorded, this clinical information is coded in a way that it can be used beyond 
what is needed for the individual clinician’s use. In this way, classifications such as the DSM 
and ICD are used by multiple social worlds or communities, and have been described as 
objects that allow communication and cooperation across these worlds, or ‘boundary objects’ 
(Bowker & Star, 1999; Star & Griesemer, 1989). Boundary objects occupy various social 
sites and at the same time meet the information requirements of each of these sites (Star & 
Griesemer, 1989). In time, standards may become so embedded that they become very 
difficult to change. The DSM, for example, has been described as ‘impermeable’ to new 
information (Patrick & Hajcak, 2016, p. 416), ‘locked-in’ (Cooper, 2015, p. 1), and as 
described above, reified. 
 
1.5.2.2.1 Material diagnosis: Formal recording of diagnoses 
 
Diagnostic classification has both symbolic and material forms. Diagnoses are integrated 
into clinical and social environments not solely through the academic or professional 
conceptualisations of the people who use them, but also via their physical forms. For 
example, psychiatric diagnoses are ubiquitous across electronic health records and Mental 
Health Act paperwork. Each of these physical formats of diagnosis has accompanying 
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conventions about how these standards work in practice within these environments (Bowker 
& Star, 1999). Additionally, the same diagnostic formats may have multiple associated 
conventions according to the stakeholder in question. For example, a diagnosis on an 
electronic health record will be used differently by a clinician taking on a new client to an 
NHS Trust using it for data capture and monitoring purposes.  
 
1.5.3 Diagnostic classification as infrastructure 
 
As standards that facilitate the sharing of knowledge across sites and systems, diagnostic 
classification becomes an infrastructure in itself. This infrastructure becomes part of the 
much wider infrastructure of mental health care and support within the NHS and across 
social care systems, including housing and welfare benefits. Bowker and Star (1999) define 
infrastructure using several central factors. Applied to psychiatric classification, these factors 
demonstrate the ways in which the diagnostic infrastructure becomes intricately woven 
throughout systems and processes such as the wider infrastructure of the ways our society 
works with mental distress. Diagnostic classification is embedded within NHS services, for 
example, their organisation and commissioning, and their electronic health records systems. 
It is embedded within our welfare system and within lay discourses about mental distress. 
Diagnostic classification reaches across time and space; the DSM and ICD classifications 
have formed widely established conceptualisations of mental distress since the mid-
twentieth century. Spatially, classification reaches across health services, academia and lay 
uses across the Western world. In a community of practice that uses an infrastructure such 
as diagnostic classification, the artefacts or arrangements of that classification are taken-for-
granted by members. Outsiders must learn about diagnostic classification and new 
members, such as trainee clinicians, develop familiarity with its features. Infrastructure can 
become largely invisible, and the meanings assigned to it by different users can be taken for 
granted. Infrastructure does not need to be recreated or compiled for each use, and so is 
effectively rendered transparent. Diagnostic classification invisibly supports a clinician in 
referring a client to another service, for example. Infrastructure becomes most obviously 
visible when it breaks down or fails to function for its users. For example, it becomes visible 
when a residual category such as ‘eating disorder not otherwise specified’ is the diagnosis 
applied to up to 70% of outpatients with eating difficulties (Fairburn & Bohn, 2005). The 
infrastructure of diagnosis can be made visible by considering both its symbolic and material 
forms. Understanding how the symbolic and material forms are used can make visible the 
meanings that different users associate with diagnosis, and how and whether the physical 
forms of diagnoses work with the conventions and conceptual arrangements associated with 
them (Bowker & Star, 1999). 
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1.5.4 Diagnoses in practice 
 
1.5.4.1 The rift between protocol and practice 
 
As a ‘standard’ within psychiatry, diagnostic criteria represent the planned or idealised use of 
psychiatric classification, a protocol of sorts for clinical assessment. In a study of the human-
artefact interaction between people and Xerox machines, Suchman (1987) explores the 
tensions between plans and ‘situated actions’. Diagnostic classification can be considered as 
such an artefact or technology, and Suchman’s work highlights the potential rift between 
these protocols for assessment and the application of diagnostic categories in everyday 
clinical practice. Situated actions must necessarily incorporate unpredicted contingencies 
and respond to the actions of others. Star and Lampland describe this as the ‘slippage 
between a standard and its realization in action’ (Star & Lampland, 2009, p. 15). It is from 
this slippage that we can better understand how standards such as diagnostic classification 
are interacted with in clinical practice, and how standards themselves may shift in response, 
both in the categories themselves or in people’s conceptualisations of them. In discussing 
their redefinition, Millerand and Bowker (2009) describe standards as a black box that is 
opened, “not always in the same way, across the set of sites” (p. 164). 
 
1.5.4.2 Flexible local practices 
 
The tension between the needs of the taxonomist and the needs of the practising clinician 
has been acknowledged (Kupfer, First, & Regier, 2002). This tension is one example of the 
need to determine the ways in which diagnosis and other methods of assessment and 
categorisation are used in day-to-day practice. Where standards such as diagnostic 
classification are imposed, for example in health settings, work-arounds are inevitable 
(Bowker & Star, 1999). That is, because classification systems are standardised, they 
cannot take account of local idiosyncrasies or individual needs. Consequently people create 
their own flexibility by working around the formal restrictions of the standard. 
 
For example, in exploring the diagnostic practices of psychiatrists in the US, Whooley (2010) 
uses Merton's (1976) idea of ‘sociological ambivalence’ to describe the ways in which an 
individual is subject to “structurally induced contradictions” (Whooley, 2010, p. 455), which 
create cognitive dissonance owing to competing interests and demands that result from the 
individual holding a particular role. Psychiatrists experience ambivalence that results from 
being at once an individual clinician and a member of a professional body; working within the 
complex structure of the mental health system and autonomously within their own clinic 
room. Not only do psychiatrists work within these tensions, Whooley argues that the DSM 
contributes uniquely to this state of ambivalence. The DSM is both the justification of the 
position of psychiatry within the mental health world, yet simultaneously the tool by which the 
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psychiatrist’s work is bureaucratically monitored. Whooley explored the ways that 
psychiatrists attempted to resolve this ambivalence and subvert the impositions of the DSM 
on their autonomy by findings ways of working around the official protocol of the DSM where 
it hindered their work. For example, the most common work-around reported by Whooley’s 
study was “fudging the numbers” (p. 460). In the insurance-dominated healthcare system of 
the US, Whooley found, insurance companies had a very concrete conceptualisation of 
diagnoses, and required that a diagnostic category be recorded before treatment 
commenced in order for reimbursement to be arranged. In managing their own clinical 
practice whilst complying with this bureaucratic requirement, psychiatrists would ‘fudge’ or 
‘disorder’ (p. 460) the diagnosis recorded on the form in order to choose a diagnosis that 
would be acceptable, “so everybody has a major depressive illness…”, one psychiatrist 
explains. 
 
To better understand the local adaptations inevitably employed at individual and health 
service levels would be to more fully understand the ways in which classification and 
assessment systems are used in practice. In exploring the practice of diagnosis, its 
implications for the stakeholders involved, not least users of mental health services, can be 
highlighted. 
 
1.5.4.3 Multi-directional influence between classification and its practices 
 
It has been argued that Latour and Woolgar’s framing of the production of scientific 
knowledge is limited in its representation of science as an active agent from which 
knowledge flow is unidirectional to passive recipients in the world outside the laboratory 
(Martin, 1994). Martin argues that this representation is overly simplified, and cannot capture 
the complexity of how scientific knowledge operates and interacts with the social world. She 
therefore represents the multi-directional influence between classification and practices by 
moving between institutional settings where scientific knowledge is produced, and beyond 
the laboratory into settings within wider society. 
 
Likewise, Bowker and Star (1999) argue that infrastructure shapes, and is shaped by, the 
conventions of the communities in which it is taken up and of the practices with which it is 
associated. An example of this bi-directional influence between psychiatric diagnostic 
classification and clinical practice is seen in the recent revision of the DSM-5 criteria for a 
bipolar disorder diagnosis. To reflect clinical practice and to formalise clinicians’ recordings 
of experiences of distress that fall outside of a diagnostic category, a diagnostic specifier for 
‘anxious distress’ was added to the diagnostic criteria so that co-occurring ‘anxiety 
symptoms’ (p. 4) can be formally identified on individuals’ health records (APA, 2013b). 
Consequently, this specifier creates a new category through which research can be 
organised. 
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1.5.4.4 Representing multiple voices and perspectives 
 
Systems of classification (and of standardization) form a juncture of social 
organization, moral order, and layers of technical integration (Bowker & Star, 1999, p. 
33) 
 
As an example of classifications changing over time, Bowker and Star (1999) cite the 
changes in conceptualisation of the category of the AIDS virus. The authors highlight the 
multiple voices in the category’s history, between the technological, organisational, social, 
and moral. These included, for example, epidemiological narratives, personal and public 
narratives about living with the disease, public health stories, and virology stories. Multiple 
voices can also be seen in our conceptualisations and categorisations of mental distress, 
some of the narratives of which are touched upon within this chapter. Categorisation of 
mental distress began in statistical and public health roots, with narratives from biomedical 
psychiatry, psychotherapy and psychology, the pharmaceutical industry, and service 
users/survivors of the mental health system.  
 
This review sought to organise an overview of the literature on psychiatric diagnosis 
widening out from the technological and taxonomic view often taken by psychiatric literature, 
and from there increasingly incorporating wider perspectives as to the social relations 
involved in the development, use, and implications of diagnosis. Nevertheless, each of the 
literatures covered in this review tend to view diagnosis from their own perspective with 
limited scope for the consideration of the other literatures. This focus on singular 
perspectives of diagnosis is reflected in some of the published debates regarding the DSM. 
In a Maudsley debate published in the British Medical Journal (BMJ), for example, the article 
by-line made this limitation clear; “Felicity Callard and Pat Bracken argue that a psychiatric 
diagnosis can disempower people rather than help them, but Anthony David and Norman 
Sartorius think that the diagnostic framework ensures that resources are allocated 
appropriately” (Callard et al., 2013). The academics on each side of the debate have clear 
arguments to make, however these do not exactly oppose one another. Debates such as 
these highlight the multiple functions and implications of diagnosis, and therefore multiple 
perspectives and positions that can be taken up by participants. However, as the BMJ 
debate reveals, what the existing literatures fail to do is sufficiently engage with a range of 
these views and functions in order to take a crosscutting approach to understanding why 
diagnosis is used, and what might be different ways of conceptualising and viewing mental 
distress. 
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2 Chapter 2: Methodological background 
 
2.1 Overview 
 
The four key bodies of literature outlined in Chapter 1 inform the methodological approach 
and theoretical questions asked by this thesis. Understanding the diverse functions, and 
ways in which diagnosis taken up across multiple perspectives, including personal, clinical, 
legal, and business spheres, is seen as central to exploring its implications, and how 
diagnostic alternatives might be conceptualised. 
 
The following chapter seeks to offer the reader an understanding of the overall philosophical 
and methodological approach of the thesis. This approach underpins each of the methods of 
data collection used within this thesis. The areas that will be outlined are: personal and 
political positioning, epistemology and language, and the overall research design and 
theoretical questions that the research sought to answer. The chapter closes with an outline 
of how the following empirical chapters are organised and the findings presented. 
 
2.2 Personal and political positioning 
 
To develop reflexive awareness of myself as a researcher and how this shapes my research, 
it was important to ensure that this thesis was grounded within an understanding of its 
theoretical and epistemological starting points and assumptions, as well as an awareness of 
its wider social and political context (Green & Thorogood, 2014). The current political climate 
of psychiatry is rooted in a long history of critical approaches such as the anti-psychiatry 
movement that began in the 1960s, stemming both from clinicians (such as Laing and 
Szasz) and survivor movements of those who had ‘survived’ treatment within the psychiatric 
system (raised in Section 1.3.3). More recently, the controversy surrounding the publication 
of the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5, 
American Psychiatric Association, 2013) brought the debate more directly into the public 
eye, with high profile pieces in the media on both sides of the Atlantic (e.g. Doward, 2013; 
Jaslow & Castillo, 2013). The responses of two significant professional bodies, the US 
National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) and the Division of Clinical Psychology (DCP) of 
the British Psychological Society (BPS) both called to reject existing diagnostic classification 
in mental health. These calls for change diverged significantly in their proposed direction of 
travel for mental health, one towards research into biological drivers (Insel, 2013) and the 
other towards more psychological ways of assessing and understanding difficulties (Division 
of Clinical Psychology, 2013). Nevertheless, the result was to spur forward research and 
discussion of alternatives to diagnosis (Boyle & Johnstone, 2014; Bracken et al., 2012; 
Kinderman, Read, et al., 2013). The context of the publication of the DSM-5 and public 
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debate surrounding it, underpinned by a history of debate and service user/survivor activism 
around mental health care allowed this research to be carried out at this time. 
 
This thesis engages with these calls for alternatives from a broadly psychological 
perspective. My supervisors, Professors Kinderman, Corcoran and Read, each work within 
clinical psychology. Professors Kinderman and Read are both qualified clinical psychologists 
who are known for being sceptical, and at times openly critical, of psychiatric diagnosis 
(Kinderman et al., 2013; Kinderman, 2016; Read, 2015; Read, Dillon, & Lampshire, 2014). 
My PhD research in the Institute of Psychology, Health and Society is part-funded by the 
Institute and part-funded by Pearson, a publisher of psychological assessment tools. My 
working background is within mental health services as part of nursing and psychology 
teams and within psychological assessment research at Pearson. Alongside this experience, 
and throughout my PhD, I have been involved in a DCP working group within the BPS, and 
have contributed to a document that is being prepared by the group that outlines the 
problems with psychiatric diagnosis and aims to establish alternatives, particularly on an 
individual clinical basis (document in preparation; see Johnstone, Boyle & Cromby, 2017, for 
information). I am not, however, trained as a clinical psychologist, nor medically trained. 
Likewise, I have not, to my knowledge, been given a psychiatric diagnosis, although I would 
consider myself to have experienced at certain times what might be labelled as mental 
health difficulties. 
 
Reflexivity is an attitude of attending to the relationship between the researcher and what is 
being studied, with the assumption that the two mutually influence and affect each other 
throughout the course of research (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2000). By not taking a positivist 
position (see Section 2.3, below) I neither consider it possible to separate myself from my 
research nor maintain researcher neutrality as is pursued within positivist paradigms 
(Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2000). I acknowledge that my interpretation of findings will be 
shaped to some extent by my particular position (Davies & Harré, 1990; Goffman, 1974). 
However, I have maintained an awareness of this personal and political positioning 
throughout the research process and made efforts to question and challenge my 
assumptions, and ensure that my framing of the findings are closely grounded within the 
research data. These issues are further discussed in later chapters where relevant. 
 
2.3 Epistemology 
 
This thesis is underpinned by a position of critical realist social constructionism, which 
incorporates ontological realism and epistemological relativism (Harper, 2012). There is no 
single, encompassing, description of social constructionism (Burr, 2003), so in this section I 
aim to define how I understand it, and how it fits with my research. In contrast with positivism 
and empiricism, which are theoretical positions that argue that the nature of the world can be 
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revealed through scientific observation (Snape & Spencer, 2003), social constructionism is 
critical of these ways of understanding the world (Burr, 2003). Rather than taking the 
positivist position that scientific tools can be used to uncover the reality of the world, social 
constructionism seeks to understand the ways in which knowledge is produced or 
constructed (Harper, 2012). This stance is particularly interested in the language used to 
construct knowledge, and takes the perspective that individuals’ experiences are mediated 
by culturally understood and shared meanings (Harper, 2012). That is, our understandings of 
the world are socially and culturally specific, and situated within our current historical 
context. Knowledge is seen as being produced via culturally specific interactions between 
people (Burr, 2003). Harper (2012) describes two positions within social constructionism; 
relativist social constructionism and critical realist social constructionism. The relativist, or 
radical, position argues that we cannot comment on the nature of reality because it is not 
possible to be in direct contact with it, instead we can only study text or talk, and that the 
researcher should not look beyond the text in its interpretation. This position suggests that 
different researchers will not necessarily interpret data in the same ways. Critical realist 
social constructionism adopts a similar epistemological position of relativism, accepting that 
there are multiple perspectives and ways of interpreting things such as data. In contrast with 
the relativist position, however, this position goes beyond texts to incorporate an 
understanding of wider historical, social, and cultural contexts. Additionally, by taking a 
stance of ontological realism, this position draws on critical realist assumptions of there 
being a reality, albeit one that we cannot understand directly (Harper, 2012). 
 
I have taken up the stance of critical realist social constructionism in order to incorporate an 
acceptance of and acknowledgement that people experience very real distress. The world 
‘out there' is seen as real, with real events that have real effects, such as trauma and 
distress, but that these experiences of distress are mediated by language, by the ways of 
expressing this distress that are culturally recognised or accepted. Pilgrim (2013) describes 
mental illnesses as not really existing, but he argues that since problems such as 
“unintelligibility, interpersonal dysfunction and common human misery” (p. 336) recur 
throughout life, they therefore amount to real problems for society and for those affected. 
The utility of incorporating a critical realist stance is in not ‘denying’ the existence of the 
‘real’, such as distress, or social structures. A criticism levelled at strong social 
constructionism is that this stance can become nihilistic, rendering thinking to discourses 
about discourses by being sceptical of any reality (Pilgrim, 2013). Smail (2005, p. 16) 
argues, “to understand how we come to suffer avoidable psychological distress we are going 
to have to extend our gaze beyond the ‘inner world’ of individuals to take account not only of 
social structure, but also of the limitations placed on our imaginings by the real world”. The 
position taken within this thesis, therefore, was used to ground the research within both the 
reality of distress and its psychosocial and political contexts beyond the individual. 
 
61 
In the philosophical position I have taken, whilst the feelings and experiences that people 
have are seen as real, by contrast, the ‘second order’ ways that we choose to talk about and 
conceptualise ‘mental health’ are not seen as fixed or real, or even approximations of a 
reality, and are mediated through language and discourse. I include within this description 
both the way that individuals talk about and ascribe meanings to their own experiences, and 
the more formal ways in which groups and organisations conceptualise mental health, for 
example, the establishment of mental health care services and diagnostic classification. 
Psychiatric diagnoses and ideas of ‘disorder’, for example, are categories that have some 
shared meaning for people, however I view them as just one way of conceptualising and 
categorising mental health which are constructed in order to meet varying functions and 
needs. They are productive categories in that they have been developed in order to produce 
certain effects and serve various functions, such as granting access to mental health 
services, categorising for research, and service planning. In this sense, our 
conceptualisations and categorisations of mental health (such as we choose to use them) 
need not necessarily look this way (Foucault, 1967), and individuals’ and groups’ 
experiences and conceptualisations of these categories are shaped by their own experience, 
by personal, social, and political contexts. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, one of the key limitations of psychiatric diagnosis is the potential 
for its essentialised location of problems within the individual, to the exclusion of 
consideration of the social, relational, and environmental factors in the development of 
personal distress. Drawing upon a social constructionist epistemology allows a redressing of 
the balance between individual perspectives and an understanding of the ways in which 
these are influenced by and take shape as a result of the shared meanings that are culturally 
and socially available to individuals (Harper, 2012) and the ways in which these meanings 
are impacted by power relations and social context across social structures (Georgaca, 
2013).  
 
2.3.1 A note on language 
 
The language of ‘mental health difficulties’ and ‘mental distress’ is used throughout this 
thesis. These common terms are used in an attempt to strike a balance between invoking a 
shared understanding of what the thesis is about, and avoiding the medical model language 
of mental health. Terms such as ‘disorder’, and ‘illness’, and diagnostic labels themselves, 
can presuppose a biomedical illness model of mental health. As discussed in the preceding 
literature review, this model can be stigmatising, as well as having other implications such as 
minimising the biographical context of distress. These types of terms, therefore, are avoided 
or qualified, following the BPS guidelines on language in relation to so-called functional 
psychiatric diagnosis (BPS, 2015). Although it could be argued that by choosing language 
that is not necessarily of the dominant discourse in mental health (such as using ‘hearing 
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voices’ rather than ‘hallucinations’, ‘difficulty’ instead of ‘disorder’), is a political statement or 
point of resistance in itself (Burstow, 2013), I have made this decision in an attempt to use 
neutral language rather than choose to represent a particular alternative model. 
 
Nevertheless, it is also recognised that this thesis takes a particular stance on these types of 
experiences. These experiences are situated within mental health ‘care’. Medical model 
language is avoided where possible, however, to some extent experiences are still seen as 
‘problems’ that are likely to warrant support and potentially more formal ‘interventions’ such 
as psychological therapy. Mental health difficulties are situated within a particular 
psychological and philosophical tradition. As referred to earlier, use of this language shapes 
the ways that these experiences are conceptualised and responded to. Although this 
language is revisited and considered throughout the thesis, use of the term ‘mental health 
difficulties’ by definition problematises these experiences, compared with other cultural or 
alternative ways of viewing them, such as the ways that hearing voices might be 
conceptualised in, for example, the Hearing Voices Movement, or shamanism (Corstens, 
Longden, McCarthy-Jones, Waddingham, & Thomas, 2014; Johnson, 1993). This issue will 
be further discussed within the thesis. 
 
Chapters 4, 6, and 7 describe the findings of a series of interviews with participants including 
clinicians and people who have been given a psychiatric diagnosis who are currently 
involved with mental health services. A specific term was needed to distinguish between 
these participant groups throughout the thesis. Varying terms used in the literature include 
‘patient’, ‘client’, ‘consumer’, ‘survivor’, and ‘service user’, each representing different 
identities and power dynamics in the relationship between person and clinician/professional 
(McLaughlin, 2009).  
 
Some surveys have found that people prefer the term ‘patient’ to ‘client’ or ‘service user’ 
(McGuire-Snieckus, 2003; Simmons, Hawley, Gale, & Sivakumaran, 2010), although the 
terms are still debated. Historically, mental health activists have rejected the term ‘patient’ 
since the 1970s, arguing that it denotes someone who is passive, and therefore incapable of 
doing things for themselves, or worthy of being listened to. Following this backlash, mental 
health professionals increasingly began to use the term ‘consumer’ (Reaume, 2002). 
However, Burstow (2013) describes what she sees as the underhand way in which 
governments and organisations have introduced terms like ‘consumer’ that use the 
“language of the marketplace” (p.86), and how this seemingly neutral phrase minimises 
critiques of the medical model. In the context of being subjected to forcible drug treatment, 
the term ‘consumer’ has been powerfully rejected by some, “I did not consume psychiatric 
drugs. They were forced down my throat” (Millett, 1991, as cited in Burstow, 2013). Burstow 
suggests ‘survivor’ as an alternative, however she describes terms such as these as framed 
within activism, as “refusal terms” (p.82) of those resisting psychiatric language. Whilst some 
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of the participants in this research identify as activists against the current mental health 
system and its conceptualisations, I do not feel that this represents all of the people I spoke 
to, and therefore find it inappropriate to use as a catchall term. 
 
For Burstow, the importance is that people can identify in any way they choose, and that the 
presumptuous way of telling a person what they should call themselves should be avoided. 
Nevertheless, whilst acknowledging the individual differences in the group of participants 
that chose to help with my research, I feel that a collective term is necessary in order to 
avoid confusion, and so I have chosen to use the term ‘service user’ for my research 
participants and to refer generally to those using services. This was chosen as a descriptive 
term, however, I do not with this imply that people are passive recipients of services. 
Instead, I use the term in the sense adopted by the Social Care Institute for Excellence 
(2016) and the Shaping Our Lives National User Network (Shaping Our Lives, 2012, cited in 
Beresford, 2012), whereby the term is seen as positive and active, whilst acknowledging that 
people should self-identify with whatever term they feel is appropriate for them. 
 
2.4 Overall research design 
 
The structure of the overall research design was drawn from Wengraf’s (2001) model of top-
down progression. Wengraf’s model has been adapted from Maxwell (1965, as cited in 
Wengraf, 2001) for semi-structured interviewing methods, and incorporates opportunities to 
include other research methods such as the document analysis used in this thesis. The 
model outlines a process of moving from an overall research purpose or interest, via the 
conceptual frameworks that underpin the research, and narrowing down to a central 
research question that gives light to a set of theory questions, and later interview questions 
and other focused questions for data collection and analysis. 
 
The following sections outline the process of research design, beginning with the refining of 
the overall research purpose and the central research question. Three theory questions 
derived from the central research question are then outlined. Together these questions form 
the aims and objectives of the thesis, which each empirical chapter was designed to answer. 
 
2.4.1 Refining the central research purpose 
 
2.4.1.1 Original central research purpose 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, Bentall (2003) suggests, based on his extensive 
research in psychosis, that mental health care should take a symptom level or ‘complaints-
based’ approach to assessment and intervention, where people’s specific experiences of 
mental distress are seen not as symptoms that indicate the presence of a disorder, but as 
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‘complaints’. Bentall argued that once the individual causal mechanisms are identified for 
individual ‘symptoms’ or experiences contained within diagnostic criteria, the diagnostic 
category itself (e.g. schizophrenia) will cease to have utility, as it adds no further value 
(Bentall, 2003). Informed by Bentall’s research, Kinderman has written frequently about the 
use of a problem list approach to mental health assessment. In his book, ‘A prescription for 
psychiatry’, Kinderman, (2014) outlines a manifesto for reforming mental health services, in 
which he supports the use of a list of well-defined problems over diagnosis as a means of 
assessment. Based on these ideas, and my background in the development of psychological 
assessment tools, the initial aim of this thesis had been to explore and develop an 
assessment approach that comprised phenomenological descriptions of distress in a 
problem or complaints checklist. However, this original central research question was 
revised in light of the reasons outlined below. The updated central research purpose is 
described below in Section 2.4.1.3. 
 
2.4.1.2 Reasons for refinement 
 
The reasons for revising the research purpose were twofold. First, following the textual 
analysis of the DSM, the decidedly heterogeneous nature of mental health was highlighted. 
As such, different experiences would need very different approaches to how these are 
assessed; therefore a standardised assessment tool attempting to measure each of these 
within the same measurement framework would be inappropriate. For example, assessing 
the nature, frequency, and severity of self-harm versus the nature, meaning and impact of 
unusual beliefs could not be done using the same measurement scale. Second, a qualitative 
phase began which intended to inform the assessment development by better understanding 
the functions that psychiatric diagnosis had on an individual level. I began interviewing 
clinicians and users of mental health services, and through an iterative process of moving 
between data collection, scientific literature, and the assumptions of my research, it soon 
became clear upon speaking with both clinicians and service users that from their 
perspectives, needs, and uses, a problem list might not suffice. This process highlighted the 
biases inherent in the original framing of the research aim. The problem list approach is 
framed from a research perspective, reflecting its proponents’ foremost academic interests. 
The approach was limited by its focus on two aspects of diagnosis; research into the causes 
of distress, and eliciting a person’s difficulties in an individual clinical assessment. However, 
these perspectives do not take into account the many other perspectives and facets of 
diagnosis and assessment in mental health that were brought to the fore during the initial 
qualitative interview phase. 
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2.4.1.3 Central research question 
 
The aims of the shift in research purpose, described above, were to better take account of 
the multiplicity of perspectives involved when considering diagnosis and its many functions. 
Furthermore, this research focus also addresses the implications of diagnosis and assessing 
and conceptualising mental health in these ways. I consider these factors essential to 
understanding what alternatives to psychiatric diagnosis could look like. As noted in Chapter 
1 the existing proposals for alternatives to diagnosis tend to stem from one or other 
perspective rather than multiple perspectives, for example the clear divide between 
taxonomic- and assessment-based alternatives. Early interviews highlighted the research 
bias in the original conceptualisation of a complaint or problem list approach, and many 
other functions that diagnosis has for individuals when they make sense of their own or 
another’s difficulties.  
 
The central research question for this thesis, therefore, was: From multiple perspectives, 
what are the functions of psychiatric diagnosis? 
 
2.4.2 Theory questions 
 
The following theory questions build upon the literature and conceptual frameworks outlined 
in Chapter 1 to elaborate on and inform the central research question. Theory questions ask 
specifically what the researcher wants to understand by doing the research (Wengraf, 2001), 
and therefore what questions the research attempts to answer. The theory questions for this 
thesis are as follows: 
1) What are the conceptual underpinnings of diagnostic categories, and are these 
consistent across contexts and practices? 
2) How are psychiatric diagnostic categories used in practice? 
3) What do diagnostic categories produce? What are their implications?  
 
2.4.2.1 What are the conceptual underpinnings of diagnostic categories, and are these 
consistent across contexts and practices? 
 
Psychiatric diagnoses as they are presented in the classification systems of the DSM and 
ICD represent descriptive criteria without, with some exceptions, including information about 
the cause of difficulties, as would be typically seen in physical medicine (see Section 1.2.2, 
Aetiological agnosticism). However, historically, in the language of the DSM and in the 
disciplines largely responsible for its shaping, there has been a shift from the use of 
psychodynamic models of mental health towards the biomedical. Psychiatric diagnoses, 
therefore, are on the one hand described as descriptive categories with clinical utility (e.g. 
Kendell & Jablensky, 2003), and on the other representations of a biomedical model of 
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mental health. In asking about the conceptual underpinnings of diagnosis and the ways it is 
taken up and used in a variety of ways, by both clinicians and service users, this research 
sought to explore the ways that theoretical and conceptual understandings of diagnosis may 
or may not be represented both in the language of the categories themselves, and in the 
ways that people speak about and make sense of them. The conceptual ideas behind 
diagnostic categories themselves are often described and debated (e.g. Hyman, 2010; 
Jablensky, 2012; Kendell & Jablensky, 2003; Kendler, Zachar, & Craver, 2011; Pilgrim, 
2013; Probst, 2015a). However, the aim of this research was to take this further by 
understanding in what ways people’s conceptualisations of mental health and diagnoses are 
represented in the ways that they talk about them, and to see how conceptualisations can 
help to explain the uses of diagnoses in practical ways. For example, would participants 
describe diagnoses in ways that represented them as: 
• descriptive categories that perform useful functions (Kendell & Jablensky, 2003) 
• categories that represent real illnesses (Hyman, 2010) 
• moral judgements (Hill, 2010) 
• a combination of these ways of thinking 
 
2.4.2.2 How are diagnostic categories used in practice? 
 
This questions looks at the differences between diagnosis as a protocol for clinical use, and 
the ways it is taken up and used in practice by multiple stakeholders, including individuals 
outside of the clinical world. If adaptations to the diagnostic protocol are made in practice, 
these work-arounds can help us to see how conceptualisations of mental distress might be 
adapted to reflect real world needs. 
 
2.4.2.3 What do diagnostic categories produce? What are their implications? 
 
Diagnoses are considered to be active categories, constructed to perform particular 
functions. In performing these roles, the literature review in Chapter 1 considered some of 
the consequences of using diagnosis in these ways. This research aimed to understand the 
implications of conceptualising mental distress in diagnostic way from multiple perspectives. 
It asks if diagnosis has negative implications, and what it is about diagnosis that has these 
undesirable consequences. 
 
2.4.3 From theory to data collection: Using multiple sources of data 
 
In order to answer the above theory questions, three different sources of data were used. 
The sources of data collection were: 1) sections of the DSM-5; 2) service eligibility and entry 
criteria for NHS adult mental health services in the north of England; and 3) semi-structured 
interviews with clinicians (GPs, psychiatrists, and clinical psychologists) and users of mental 
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health services who had been given psychiatric diagnoses. These data were used to explore 
the functions of diagnostic classification from multiple perspectives, addressing the central 
research question and the three theory questions described above. The rationale for using 
each data source and the individual methodological details for each are outlined in the 
relevant empirical chapters that follow. 
 
2.4.3.1 Organisation of empirical chapters 
 
The following five empirical chapters present the findings from the analysis of each of the 
three sources of data. Rather than organising the following empirical chapters by data 
source, the sequence was chosen to represent the consequential process of the travel of 
diagnosis, its practices, implications, and changing conceptualisation across different 
contexts. The organisation of the following chapters is represented by the flowchart in Figure 
2-1, below. The empirical chapters begin with analysis of the text of diagnostic classification 
itself (Chapter 3), expanding outwards to explore the uses and practices of diagnostic 
classification within clinical spheres. Clinical diagnostic practices are explored from the 
perspectives of clinicians making individual clinical assessments (Chapter 4) and at a 
service level from the perspective of trust - and service-defined mental health service entry 
and eligibility criteria (Chapter 5). The analysis then examines the ways in which diagnosis 
travels beyond clinical spheres and into business, legal, and social arenas (Chapter 6). The 
final empirical chapter explores how people who have received diagnoses take up and use, 
or do not use, diagnoses (Chapter 7). Each empirical chapter focuses on a particular source 
of data (e.g. interview data), however, the findings from different chapters also inform each 
other, reflecting the consequential process between the chapters.  
 
Reflecting the epistemological approach used, the social and organisational contexts of the 
data are acknowledged throughout, and the uses and conceptualisations of diagnosis are 
contextualised within the wider systemic uses of classificatory categories. For example, the 
NHS policy data from the service eligibility and entry criteria was used to provide context for 
clinicians’ uses of diagnosis for referrals into adult mental health services. Likewise, in 
Chapter 6, which explores the ways in which diagnosis travels beyond the clinic by being 
formally recorded, the interview findings are contextualised using information about the 
systemic and organisational uses of diagnostic categories. 
 
The findings of each of the empirical chapters are brought together and discussed in 
Chapter 8. 
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Figure 2-1: Flowchart representing organisation of the following empirical chapters 
 
For reference, a thematic map showing all the themes and subthemes of the following five 
empirical chapters is shown on the following page in Figure 2-2.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
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69 
 
 
 
Fi
gu
re
 2
-2
: T
he
m
at
ic
 m
ap
 o
f t
he
m
es
 a
nd
 s
ub
th
em
es
 fo
r e
ac
h 
of
 th
e 
fo
llo
w
in
g 
fiv
e 
em
pi
ric
al
 c
ha
pt
er
s 
70 
 
3 Chapter 3: Heterogeneity in psychiatric diagnostic classification: A 
textual analysis 
 
3.1 Abstract 
 
This chapter examines the heterogeneous nature of the phenomena described within the 
DSM-5, and the ways in which it reflects attempts to impose coherent structure upon these 
phenomena. Selected chapters of the DSM-5 (APA, 2013) were thematically analysed, with 
the purpose of examining the DSM-5 as a protocol for practice, exploring the ways 
heterogeneity is represented across diagnostic criteria, and what is produced as a result. 
The themes identified heterogeneity across specific diagnostic criteria, including symptom 
comparators, duration of difficulties, indicators of severity and the perspectives used. Wider 
variations across diagnostic categories examined symptom overlap across categories, and 
the role of trauma. The findings are discussed in terms of what is constructed by the 
discourse of the DSM-5, including the notion of inherently disordered experiences, such as 
voice hearing, and the implications for psychiatric authority. Pragmatic criteria and the 
representation of experiences of distress that overlap across diagnostic criteria offer 
flexibility for the clinician, but undermine the model of discrete categories of disorder. This 
model nevertheless has implications for the way that cause is conceptualised; trauma is 
seen as involved in only a limited number of diagnoses, discrete categories may lead to 
common ‘transdiagnostic’ causes being missed, and individual differences within diagnostic 
categories may be obscured. 
 
3.2 Introduction 
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, developments and amendments to systems of psychiatric 
classification can be conceptualised within the perspective of wider social and cultural 
developments (Foucault, 1967). Amongst other consequences, these socio-political and 
historical roots have resulted in considerable inherent heterogeneity in a wide range of 
psychiatric diagnoses during their piecemeal development. For example, stark differences 
are demonstrated between highly specific diagnostic criteria and those with more flexibility 
around symptom presentation, resulting in almost 24,000 possible symptom combinations 
for panic disorder in DSM-5, compared with just one possible combination for social phobia, 
which itself can be a manifestation of or the foundation of panic (Galatzer-Levy & Bryant, 
2013). 
 
In addition, Olbert and colleagues (2014) report considerable heterogeneity within the criteria 
of individual diagnoses, showing that in the majority of diagnoses in both DSM-IV-TR and 
DSM-5 (64% and 58.3% respectively), two people could feasibly be given the same 
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diagnosis without sharing any common symptoms. Such ‘disjunctive’ categories have been 
described as scientifically meaningless. Bannister, for example, pointed out as early as 1968 
that the ‘schizophrenia’ construct was ‘[a] semantic Titanic, doomed before it sails, a concept 
so diffuse as to be unusable in a scientific context’, largely because ‘[d]isjunctive categories 
are logically too primitive for scientific use’ (Bannister, 1968, pp. 181–182). Categories such 
as schizophrenia remain disjunctive in DSM-5. Young and colleagues memorably calculate 
that in the DSM-5 there are 270 million combinations of symptoms that would meet the 
criteria for both PTSD and major depressive disorder, and when five other commonly made 
diagnoses are seen alongside these two, this figure rises to one quintillion symptom 
combinations - more than the number of stars estimated in the Milky Way (Young et al., 
2014). 
 
 
3.2.1 Rationale: Analysis of the DSM-5 
 
As section 1.5.4.1 of Chapter 1 highlights, an important consideration in the study of 
diagnostic classification is the move from the protocol of the classification itself, to its use in 
practice. Diagnostic heterogeneity is therefore considered in this context. As diagnostic 
categories are seen within this thesis as active categories, developed to perform particular 
functions, this chapter considers how heterogeneity is represented across diagnostic 
categories, the functions it meets, and what is produced by diagnostic criteria. 
 
As is introduced in Sections 1.2 and 1.4.1, the DSM-5 is the latest edition of the APA’s 
diagnostic classification in psychiatry. The DSM has led the way in making significant 
changes to psychiatric diagnosis, such as the overhaul of psychiatric classification with the 
introduction of specific descriptive diagnostic criteria in DSM-III (as described in Section 
1.4.1.1.), following which the ICD and the DSM became very similar (APA, 2009). Since 
then, the WHO and the APA have collaborated to ensure that the ICD and DSM are 
compatible (Sartorius et al., 1995).  
 
The ICD-10 is the psychiatric classification that the NHS formally uses, however the 
influence of the new DSM-5, for example, on current clinical conceptualisations of mental 
health has been noted (NHS Choices, 2013). The last major revision of the ICD was the 
publication of the ICD-10 in 1994; as the new edition of the ICD is not due to be published 
for two years (World Health Organization, 2017b), the DSM-5 represents the formally 
published and most current understandings of psychiatric classification. Debate around the 
publication of the DSM-5 was covered by the UK national press (e.g. Doward, 2013), and a 
position statement was made by the BPS (Division of Clinical Psychology, 2013). Royal 
College of Psychiatry good practice guidelines have been updated to include information 
from the DSM-5 (e.g. Royal College of Psychiatrists, 2014), and an international conference 
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about the DSM-5 (“DSM-5 and the Future of Psychiatric Diagnosis: Where is the roadmap 
taking us?” Institute of Psychiatry, 2013) was held at the UK Institute of Psychiatry in 2013. 
Consequently, it was concluded that analysis of the DSM-5, rather than the ICD-10, would 
best represent current debates in mental health and formal conceptualisations of diagnosis 
in psychiatry. Analysing the most current version of Western diagnostic classification was 
thought to be important in order to reflect debates that were raised in interviews with 
clinicians and service users (the findings of which are presented in Chapters 4, 6, and 7). 
 
3.3 Aims 
 
This chapter addresses the first and third theoretical questions outlined in Chapter 2 (Section 
2.4.2); 1) what are the conceptual underpinnings of diagnostic categories, and are these 
consistent across contexts and practices, and 3) what do diagnostic categories produce; 
what are their implications?  
 
Within the thesis context of considering diagnostic categories as active categories, 
developed to perform particular functions, the purpose of this chapter was to analyse the 
DSM-5 as a protocol for practice, exploring the ways heterogeneity is represented across 
diagnostic criteria, and what is produced as a result. As part of this analysis, this chapter 
also aimed to consider the embedded taken-for-granted assumptions of the DSM-5, their 
implications. 
 
3.4 Methodology 
 
3.4.1 Included chapters 
 
For the purposes of manageability, selected chapters were analysed from the text of the 
DSM-5 (see Section 3.4.2, Method of analysis, below, for further information). Five chapters 
of the DSM-5 were chosen for analysis: schizophrenia spectrum and other psychotic 
disorders; bipolar and related disorders; depressive disorders; anxiety disorders; and 
trauma- and stressor-related disorders. These chapters were chosen in order to reflect 
commonly reported ‘functional’ (compared with organic or neurologically-based diagnoses 
such as dementia) psychiatric diagnoses as highlighted by the Adult Psychiatric Morbidity 
Survey (McManus, Bebbington, Jenkins, & Brugha, 2016a). These included ‘common mental 
disorders’, including different diagnoses of depression- and anxiety-related difficulties 
(Stansfeld et al., 2016) and PTSD, bipolar, and psychotic disorder diagnoses (McManus, 
Bebbington, Jenkins, & Brugha, 2016b). To reflect the differences in heterogeneity across 
diagnostic criteria, highlighted by Galatzer-Levy and Bryant (2013), these chapters also 
contained some of the diagnoses with the most (e.g. PTSD) and least (e.g. social and 
specific phobias) heterogeneous diagnostic categories.  
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3.4.2 Excluded chapters 
 
One common diagnosis that is not contained within the chapters that were analysed is 
‘obsessive-compulsive disorder’. This diagnosis is both common (McManus et al., 2016a) 
and included in Galatzer-Levy and Bryant's (2013) analysis, however, although previously 
listed within anxiety disorders in the DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000), the DSM-5 lists this diagnosis 
within its own chapter (obsessive-compulsive and related disorders), which contains 
numerous other diagnoses that are new and less common, such as ‘trichotillomania’ (hair 
pulling) and ‘excoriation’ (skin picking). This chapter, therefore, was excluded for the 
purposes of this analysis.  
 
To enable consideration of diagnostic categories with the potential for consistency across 
assessment and reporting (for example, self-reporting of distress), diagnoses concerning 
childhood were excluded from the analysis. For example, ‘reactive attachment disorder’ and 
‘disruptive mood dysregulation disorder’ were excluded. 
 
3.4.3 Method of analysis 
 
Thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006) was used to code themes or patterns of meaning 
across the diagnostic categories being analysed, with a particular focus on the heterogeneity 
or differences across the types of diagnostic criteria. Drawing from McKee’s (2003) concept 
of post-structural textual analysis, selected chapters were analysed rather than the whole of 
the text. McKee (2003) describes this approach as identifying information in the text about its 
sense-making practices to respond to the questions asked of the text. Thematic analysis 
was used to identify the ways in which heterogeneity was represented across diagnostic 
categories, and to organise this heterogeneity into central themes of differences across the 
criteria. 
 
The analysis was therefore both deductive and inductive. The first phase of the analysis 
deductively focused on identifying heterogeneity or differences between the diagnostic 
criteria of each category within the five chapters analysed. Following reading and re-reading 
of the data within the listed diagnostic criteria for each diagnosis, six areas of heterogeneity 
were identified that represented differences across criteria. Four of these themes related to 
heterogeneity within specific diagnostic criteria, and there were two broader themes that 
related to heterogeneity that spanned across diagnostic categories. These six themes are 
listed below: 
• Heterogeneity within specific diagnostic criteria 
o The standards to which ‘symptoms’ are compared 
o Duration of ‘symptoms’ 
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o Identifiers of severity 
o Perspective from which distress is assessed 
• Heterogeneity across diagnostic categories 
• Symptom overlap across categories 
• The role of trauma 
 
The second phase was inductive in that each of the themes outlining heterogeneity was 
grounded within the text of the criteria, and the coding of the data within each of these 
themes was likewise data driven. During this phase of coding, data was extracted from the 
diagnostic criteria for each diagnostic category in each of the five chapters, and coded line 
by line to the themes above. Subthemes were generated from the information within two 
codes (Standards to which ‘symptoms’ are compared, and Duration of ‘symptoms’) as 
different ways of representing these themes emerged across diagnostic categories. At each 
stage of coding, the themes were discussed with my research supervisors in order to 
consider and question my interpretations of the data. 
 
3.5 Findings 
 
The following findings section will demonstrate that heterogeneity in diagnostic criteria is 
found across the chapters of the DSM-5 that were examined. Unless otherwise specified, 
page numbers throughout this section refer to the DSM-5. Heterogeneity was identified 
within diagnostic criteria, concerning the standards to which symptoms or experiences are 
compared, the duration of symptoms, identifiers of severity, and the perspective from which 
distress is assessed. These inconsistencies in diagnostic criteria suggest ways in which 
different experiences are constructed within the DSM-5. Two wider themes illustrate how 
some chapters emphasise the similarities between diagnoses, whilst others create 
distinctions. These themes relate to symptom overlap across diagnostic categories, and the 
role of trauma in the DSM-5. The findings section is organised by the themes and 
subthemes outlined in Table 3-1; each of these will be explored in detail below. 
 
Table 3-1 
Outline of themes and subthemes 
 
Heterogeneity within specific diagnostic criteria 
The standards to which ‘symptoms’ are compared 
Comparisons with prior experience 
Comparison with expected responses 
No comparators 
Duration of ‘symptoms’ 
Minimum duration 
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No duration 
Discrete episodes 
Identifiers of severity 
Perspective from which distress is assessed 
Heterogeneity across diagnostic categories 
Symptom overlap across categories 
The role of trauma 
 
 
 
3.5.1 Heterogeneity across specific diagnostic criteria 
 
3.5.1.1 The standards to which ‘symptoms’ are compared  
 
A key element of heterogeneity in the description of disorders and their constituent criteria 
within diagnostic systems relates to differences in the ways in which the experience of 
‘symptoms’ are compared with normal functioning (or the omission of such comparators). 
Comparators are identified here as a point of contrast for a particular experience, for 
example, a requirement of a change in mood that is distinct from previous or usual 
experience, or compared to an approximation of what is considered ‘normal’ within society. 
Diagnostic criteria in the chapters analysed were represented either by no comparator, or a 
change from previous functioning, behaviour, or mood. 
 
3.5.1.1.1 Comparisons with prior experience 
 
Most criteria associated with change or comparisons with prior functioning or experience 
were mood-related. Some descriptions of change implied a comparison with previous mood, 
for example, Criterion A for persistent depressive disorder (dysthymia) requires “[d]epressed 
mood for most of the day…” (p. 168), and Criterion A for a manic episode requires “[a] 
distinct period of abnormally and persistently elevated, expansive, or irritable mood and 
abnormally and persistently increased goal-directed activity or energy” (p. 124). Certain 
criteria for manic, hypomanic, and major depressive episodes included implied comparisons 
with previous mood or behaviour. For example, Criteria B2 and B3 for both manic and 
hypomanic episodes are “decreased need for sleep…” and “more talkative than usual…” (p. 
124) respectively. Criterion B6 for a major depressive episode requires “[f]atigue or loss of 
energy nearly every day”. Each of these implied comparisons suggest the presence of a 
usual or acceptable behaviour or mood, such as sleep or irritable mood, which is altered to a 
problematic extent. As well as the bipolar and depressive disorders chapters, mood 
components from the schizophrenia and psychosis chapter were also included for three 
diagnoses. Schizophreniform disorder and schizophrenia both include ‘negative symptoms’, 
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which are described as “diminished emotional expression or avolition” (p. 99), implying a 
change from usual mood or motivation. Finally, schizoaffective disorder incorporates the 
mood comparisons made in the major depressive or manic episodes outlined in the mood 
disorder chapters. Other symptoms within the diagnostic criteria for psychotic disorders had 
no comparators; this is described in the following section. 
 
Other descriptions explicitly noted a comparison, for example, Criterion A for a major 
depressive episode states, “[f]ive (or more) of the following symptoms have been present 
during the same 2-week period and represent a change from previous functioning” (p. 160). 
Criterion B2 for panic disorder, the only anxiety-related diagnosis to include comparators, 
requires “a significant maladaptive change in behavior related to the attacks (e.g. behaviors 
designed to avoid having panic attacks, such as avoidance of exercise or unfamiliar 
situations)” (p. 208). In the case of the criteria for panic disorder, the behaviour is 
constructed as unusual or unacceptable by this criterion’s description as ‘maladaptive’.  
 
3.5.1.1.2 Comparison with socially expected responses 
 
Within mood episodes, and criteria for some anxiety and trauma-related diagnoses, there is 
a notion of ‘excessive’ behaviours or responses, suggested a comparison with a socially 
expected response. For example, Criterion B7 of manic and hypomanic episodes requires 
“excessive involvement in activities that have a high potential for painful consequences (e.g. 
engaging in unrestrained buying sprees, sexual indiscretions, or foolish business 
investments)” (p. 124). Criterion B7 of a major depressive episode assesses “feelings of 
worthlessness or excessive or inappropriate guilt…” (p. 125). Separation anxiety disorder 
similarly assesses “persistent and excessive worry" (A2, p. 190). In another way of 
assessing a person’s response in comparison with expected responses, specific phobia and 
adjustment disorder both require the response to be “out of proportion” (pp. 197 and 286), 
with either the object or situation (social phobia) or the stressor (adjustment disorder). A 
subjective judgement is required to assess whether a person’s experiences are out of line 
with typically expected responses. This is discussed further in Section 3.5.1.2.2, 
Perspective. 
 
3.5.1.1.3 No comparators 
 
By contrast, other symptoms or experiences within the diagnostic criteria did not 
acknowledge a comparison with any previous experience. For example, barring the negative 
symptoms described in the previous section, none of the psychosis-related symptoms were 
given a comparator. The presence of delusions and hallucinations, for example, is always 
stated in the diagnostic criteria with no qualification.  
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There is a similar absence of comparators for some of the criteria within the mood disorders 
chapters. For example, “feelings of worthlessness” or “recurrent thoughts of death…” 
(Criteria A7 and A9, respectively, of a major depressive episode), and “flight of ideas…” or 
“distractibility…” (Criteria B4 and B5, respectively, of manic and hypomanic episodes). The 
criteria for manic, hypomanic, and major depressive episodes, therefore, give a mixed 
presentation of criteria with both comparators and no comparators. Three or more of the 
experiences described in Criterion B must be present for identification of a manic or 
hypomanic episode, meaning that presentations of these episodes might reflect either 
discontinuous, disordered experiences, or within a continuum with ‘normal’, or a mixture of 
the two. A function of comparators may be the pragmatics of differentiating problematic 
experiences from experiences that are generally considered ‘normal’ or within an acceptable 
range. For example, more comparators are given for a hypomanic episode compared with a 
manic episode (such as “(t)he disturbance in mood and the change in functioning are 
observable by others”, Criterion D, p. 125), perhaps because a ‘hypomanic’ experience is 
more similar to ‘normal’ mood fluctuations therefore more difficult to differentiate. 
 
The criteria for PTSD and acute stress disorder notably omit comparators. For example, 
“[r]ecurrent, involuntary, and intrusive distressing memories of the traumatic event(s)” (B1, 
e.g. p. 271) and “dissociative reactions (e.g. flashbacks)…” (B3, e.g. p. 271) are examples of 
criteria for both PTSD and acute stress disorder that are compared to neither expected 
responses nor prior functioning. These omissions are perhaps surprising given the severity 
of the experienced trauma or stressor described in Criterion A for both PTSD and acute 
stress disorder; “exposure to actual or threatened death, serious injury, or sexual violation in 
order (or more) of the following ways…” (pp. 271 and 280). This description of the severity of 
stressors gives an expectation that the trauma would have some emotional impact on the 
individual. 
 
3.5.1.2 Duration of ‘symptoms’ 
 
There were three subthemes for the duration of symptoms or experiences described by 
diagnostic criteria in the DSM-5: no duration, discrete episodes, and a minimum duration. In 
effect, these timeframes construct different ‘kinds’ of disorder categories. 
 
3.5.1.2.1 Minimum duration 
 
Most diagnostic categories in the analysed chapters had a specified minimum duration 
requirement. For example, Criterion C for schizophrenia requires continuous signs of 
disturbance to continue for at least 6 months, or at least 2 years of depressed mood 
(Criterion A) for persistent depressive disorder (dysthymia). In the absence of other 
indicators of ‘disorder’ (such as biomedical markers), a minimum duration requirement 
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constructs a definition of severity. Giving a minimum duration criterion creates a way of 
separating between ‘everyday’ distress and that that is considered ‘clinical’, or otherwise 
abnormal and therefore in need of support. 
 
3.5.1.2.2 No duration 
 
The criteria for certain diagnoses offer no timeframe, which suggests that no particular 
duration is needed to meet criteria. Diagnoses in this category include difficulties due to 
other medical conditions for each of the chapters (with the exception of trauma-related 
disorders). Each of these diagnoses is coded as an additional diagnostic category alongside 
the diagnosis for the medical condition. The diagnostic criteria suggest that a timeframe may 
not be necessary as the experiences must be the ‘direct pathophysiological consequence of 
another medical condition’ (e.g. p. 120). This use of physiological signs sets these diagnoses 
apart from other functional diagnoses, suggesting that other diagnoses use timeframes to 
bolster descriptive diagnoses in the absence of physiological tests. This form of diagnostic 
criteria indicates that the presence of symptoms is itself sufficient for diagnosis. 
 
Other diagnoses that do not require a particular duration are ‘other specified’ and 
‘unspecified’ diagnoses at the end of each of the chapters analysed. Specifically included to 
incorporate difficulties that do not meet the criteria for other diagnoses in their respective 
chapters, these diagnostic categories have very broad criteria. The experiences must be 
characteristic of other diagnoses in their chapter, and cause clinically significant distress or 
impairment in functioning (discussed in Section 3.5.1.2.1, Identifiers of severity). However, 
the ‘unspecified’ diagnoses for each chapter do not list any experiences that may be 
included, or their duration, leaving these categories entirely open to clinical judgement. The 
‘other specified’ diagnoses for the schizophrenia spectrum and other psychotic disorders, 
bipolar and related disorders and anxiety disorders chapters give options, that do not contain 
timeframes, for specified difficulties, for example, ‘persistent auditory hallucinations occurring 
in the absence of any other features’, a much briefer criterion than those included in the 
other diagnoses for the schizophrenia spectrum and other psychotic disorders chapter. 
 
3.5.1.2.3 Discrete episodes 
 
Least common are diagnoses that represent discrete episodes, with a specific duration such 
as one day to one month (e.g. brief psychotic disorder). Acute stress disorder (“Criterion C: 
Duration of the disturbance (symptoms in Criterion B) is 3 days to 1 month after trauma 
exposure”, p. 281) is similarly brief, whilst the symptoms associated with adjustment 
disorders must occur within 3 months of a stressor and not persist for more than 6 months 
“once the stressor and its consequences have terminated” (Criterion E, p. 287). These 
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episodic diagnoses suggest an expectation of an end point that is not present for those with 
a minimum duration. 
 
Bipolar and depressive disorders are treated differently again; the bipolar and related 
disorders chapter (including, e.g. cyclothymia) and the category of major depressive disorder 
are unique in that several episodes are combined in various ways to produce disorders 
presented as distinct from one other. Major depressive and manic episodes are the two key 
episodes from which hypomanic episode (shorter duration and lesser severity than manic 
episode) and a mixed features specifier (criteria are met for one episode, with features of 
another during the same timeframe) are derived. The three episodes are then variously 
combined to create eight different diagnostic categories (seven bipolar-related diagnoses, 
and major depressive disorder). 
 
3.5.1.3 Identifiers of severity 
 
The theme of identifiers for severity incorporates statements regarding how severity is 
identified, and if present, what measures are used. Different diagnoses within DSM-5 show 
marked heterogeneity in this respect. In some cases, severity indicators override duration 
requirements, for example, within the criteria for manic episodes and Bipolar and related 
disorder due to another medical condition, any duration is applicable if hospitalization is 
necessary, or there are psychotic features. 
 
Most categories within the analysed chapters stipulate a criterion of “clinically significant 
distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning” (e.g. 
Criterion B, major depressive disorder, p. 161), which is used to establish a particular 
threshold at which a disorder should be diagnosed (p. 21). However, no definition of this 
threshold is provided, therefore representing a subjective judgement, presumably the 
clinician’s.  
 
In contrast, there is a separate idea of a marked change in functioning in both schizophrenia 
and a manic episode, represented in social, occupational or other areas of functioning. 
These criteria indicate that the experiences themselves (e.g. hallucinations or delusions, 
elevated mood) do not have to be distressing, although the person does have to meet an 
overall criterion of socio/occupational dysfunction. By using social, interpersonal, or 
occupational functioning, this criterion makes space for a judgement whereby the behaviours 
experienced by the individual may not be distressing for that person but, rather, distressing 
or disruptive for others (see Section 3.5.1.4, Perspective from which distress is assessed, 
below). These variations across criteria offer practical flexibility for the clinician, 
demonstrating the pragmatic nature of diagnostic categories and their use as a clinical tool. 
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DSM-5 contains a dimensional severity rating of 0-4 for each Criterion A symptom for 
delusional, brief psychotic, schizophreniform and schizoaffective disorder criteria. This may, 
for example, relate to either the pressure to respond to voices or delusions or to what extent 
the individual is bothered by this experience. For other experiences, such as disorganised 
speech, the rating is pragmatically based on clinical observation rather than the individual’s 
experience of these difficulties. Other mood-related diagnoses (bipolar, major depression, 
and related disorders) are rated using a broad dimensional specifier of mild, moderate, 
severe, or with psychotic features. 
 
3.5.1.4 Perspective from which distress is assessed 
 
The theme of perspective describes the point of view from which distress or other diagnostic 
criteria are assessed, for example, from the account of the individual being assessed, others 
around them (e.g. family or friends), or the assessing clinician. Diagnostic categories and 
their constituent symptoms display considerable heterogeneity with respect to whether the 
information comes from the individual whose experiences are being assessed or an 
observer. Many diagnostic criteria do not state a perspective, simply that particular 
symptoms are present, such as “…there have been numerous periods with hypomanic 
symptoms” (Criterion A, cyclothymic disorder, p. 139) or “[t]he presence of one (or more) 
delusions…” (Criterion A, delusional disorder). 
 
In general, the DSM-5 represents a shift towards the perspective of the observer, whereas 
several DSM-IV-TR diagnoses relied on the individual as the principal (or only) source of 
information. For example, in the case of DSM-IV-TR social phobia (now social anxiety 
disorder in DSM-5), reference was made to “marked distress about having the phobia” 
(Criterion E) and that the “person recognises that the fear is excessive or unreasonable” 
(Criterion C). In comparison, whilst the fears themselves are self-reported in the DSM-5 
version of social anxiety disorder, the criteria otherwise rely on the perspective of the 
observer. The distress criterion is removed and the individual need not recognise that their 
fear is excessive, as the clinician makes this judgement. As raised in Section 3.5.1.1.1.2 
(Comparators), there are likewise multiple references to the ‘excessive’ nature of some 
criteria, such as “excessive involvement in activities that have a high potential for painful 
consequences (e.g. engaging in unrestrained buying sprees, sexual indiscretions, or foolish 
business investments)” (manic and hypomanic episodes, p. 124). As well as representing a 
comparison with an expected response, this use of perspective constructs a socially 
accepted level at which the behaviours are considered normal versus abnormal. The 
perspective here demonstrates the power the assessing clinician (or others, such as family) 
holds by virtue of the diagnostic criteria sanctioning the making of a value judgement. 
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For other diagnoses, this person’s perspective is strongly implied but not explicit, for 
instance in the case of PTSD, of which Criterion B refers to experiences such as distress 
and distressing memories, flashbacks and physiological reactions. Likewise, the perspective 
for information regarding the trauma itself is somewhat unclear; although likely to stem from 
self-report accounts, it could also be derived from formal police, military or clinical reports of 
the events. 
 
Finally, in many cases, the question of perspective (who is making the judgment as to 
whether the criterion is met) is unambiguously ambiguous, as in the case of major 
depressive episode; “as indicated by subjective report… or observation made by others”. In 
a pragmatic approach, information is collected, from a range of sources, to assess whether 
or not the diagnostic criteria are met. 
 
3.5.2 Wider heterogeneity across diagnostic categories 
 
3.5.2.1 Symptom overlap across categories 
 
The data demonstrated considerable overlap of symptoms; whereby the same experiences 
occur in multiple diagnostic categories. Major depressive episode, for example, features 
within the criteria for major depressive disorder, bipolar and related disorders, and can be 
included within the criteria for schizoaffective disorder (Criterion A of schizoaffective disorder 
requires the occurrence of “a major mood episode (major depressive or manic)”, p. 105). 
Likewise, hallucinations can occur in schizophrenia and other psychotic disorders, but also in 
major depressive disorder with psychotic features, bipolar and related disorders (except 
cyclothymia), and PTSD. 
 
DSM-5 explicitly refers to bipolar disorders bridging between psychotic disorders and 
depressive disorders, and likewise that schizoaffective disorder bridges several diagnoses. 
Despite this repetition of symptoms or experiences, there is no explicit statement provided in 
the DSM about the phenomenological or qualitative experience of symptoms across different 
diagnoses. The DSM-5 acknowledges,  
 
Although DSM-5 remains a categorical classification of separate disorders, we 
recognize that mental disorders do not always fit completely within the boundaries of 
a single disorder. Some symptom domains, such as depression and anxiety, involve 
multiple diagnostic categories and may reflect common underlying vulnerabilities for 
a larger group of disorders… (p. xli) 
 
Ten specifiers are provided with the DSM-5 to allow the clinician to represent other patterns 
not contained within the main diagnostic criteria for bipolar and major depressive disorders, 
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such as with anxious distress, rapid cycling (for bipolar and related disorders), or psychotic 
features. The range of experiences incorporated within these specifiers acknowledges the 
heterogeneity of diagnoses. Depressive episodes are no longer required in DSM-5 criteria 
for bipolar I, and the diagnostic criteria for cyclothymic disorder incorporates only 
experiences that are sub-threshold for both hypomania and a major depressive episode. 
These changes and the additional specifier of ‘anxious distress’ for bipolar and MDD 
diagnoses represents a shift towards broadening the range of experiences captured by the 
same diagnostic labels. The ‘mixed features’ specifier further blurs the boundary between 
depression and bipolar diagnoses in that it can be added to episodes of depression within 
the context of major depressive disorder where there are symptoms of mania or hypomania 
present. Likewise, panic attacks can be used as an adjunct to any DSM-5 diagnosis, and 
catatonia can be specified across various diagnoses spanning several chapters (including 
neurodevelopmental, psychotic, bipolar, and depressive disorder diagnoses, and other 
medical conditions).  
 
3.5.2.2 The role of trauma 
 
The DSM-5 states at the outset the atheoretical nature of diagnostic categories, and 
generally avoids discussion of aetiology, stating, “[s]ince a complete description of the 
underlying pathological processes is not possible for most mental disorders, it is important to 
emphasize that the current diagnostic criteria are the best available description of how 
mental disorders are expressed and can be recognized by trained clinicians” (p. xli). In the 
absence of traditional medical aetiology, the disorder may effectively be seen as causing the 
difficulties (as described in Section 1.3.2.1.1, Epistemological confusion). Diagnoses in the 
DSM-5 are at times described in this way, for example, “the disturbance… is not better 
explained by another mental disorder” (Criterion E, delusional disorder, p. 90). 
 
One chapter of diagnoses, however, is explicitly framed as caused by or directly influenced 
by external factors; trauma- and stressor-related disorders. Trauma in the DSM-IV-TR was 
represented only by PTSD and acute stress disorder, and housed within the anxiety 
disorders chapter. This delineation is made even more distinct in the DSM-5 by the creation 
of a separate chapter, ‘Trauma- and stressor-related disorders’. The latent variable model of 
distress being ‘caused’ by the diagnosis or disorder itself is maintained within this chapter. 
However, the conceptualisation constructed by this addition of causal information is a 
notable difference from the other analysed chapters. For example, despite contextualising 
PTSD as a response to an extreme traumatic stressor that would be distressing for anyone 
to experience (“Exposure to actual or threatened death, serious injury, or sexual violence…” 
Criterion A, p. 271), in assigning the diagnosis the individual’s response is categorised as 
disordered. 
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A related dilemma can be seen in the remarkable semantic similarity between various 
criteria for schizophrenia and PTSD diagnoses in DSM-5. These include affective flattening 
and avolition, as well as illusions, hallucinations, and dissociative flashback episodes, 
restricted range of affect, and markedly diminished interest or participation in significant 
activities. All of these experiences would, in the presence of a traumatic event, be broadly 
consistent with a diagnosis of PTSD. 
 
3.6 Discussion 
 
This chapter analysed the text of the diagnostic criteria from five chapters of the DSM-5 to 
address the first and third theoretical questions outlined in Chapter 2 (Section 2.4.2); 1) what 
are the conceptual underpinnings of diagnostic categories, and are these consistent across 
contexts and practices, and 3) what do diagnostic categories produce; what are their 
implications? The findings demonstrate heterogeneity in diagnostic criteria across the 
chapters of the DSM-5 that were examined. Heterogeneity, or variation, was found across 
the standards to which symptoms or experiences are compared, the duration of symptoms, 
identifiers of severity, and the perspective from which distress is assessed. Diagnostic 
criteria in some chapters of the DSM-5 acknowledge similarities or overlap in experiences of 
distress, despite being presented as discrete categories of disorder. One chapter of 
diagnoses acknowledges the causal role of trauma, however this sets these chapters aside 
as distinct from the other chapters analysed. The following discussion explores these 
findings, and is organised by the following points: 
 
• Construction of disorder 
o Power and the impact on the individual 
• Threats to the model of discrete disorders 
o Symptom overlap 
o Pragmatism 
• Implications for understanding cause 
o The role of trauma 
o ‘Transdiagnostic causes’ 
o Specific causal pathways obscured by diagnostic categories 
 
3.6.1 Construction of disorder 
 
The heterogeneity demonstrated by findings can be likened to ‘variations’ highlighted by 
discourse analysis. Language is understood within discourse analysis in terms of its 
functions, and the ways in which it is constructed, that is, rather than reflecting or 
representing reality, reality is created by language (Georgaca & Avdi, 2012). The 
constructive aspect of language assumes that objects of study, such as the DSM-5, are 
84 
constructed by the text used to describe them. The findings from this chapter can be 
interpreted in this way to understand how the text of the diagnostic criteria contained within 
the chapters of the DSM-5 constructs the diagnoses, and beyond the categories themselves, 
how mental distress is constructed and conceptualised by the text (Georgaca & Avdi, 2012). 
 
A consequence of the inconsistent use of comparators is in what is constructed by their 
presence and absence. A divide is created between those experiences (such as mood) that 
are seen as problematic only at a particular threshold, and those experiences whose 
presence alone is indicative of disorder. By not comparing a person’s experiences, such as 
hallucinations, delusions, or dissociation, with any previous occurrences of such 
experiences, these experiences are set up as inherently disordered or pathological for both 
the clinician and the individual being assessed. Furthermore, the diagnostic criteria for PTSD 
and acute stress disorder require a change in thoughts, behaviours and emotions following 
trauma. The criteria are also explicit about the severity of trauma experienced, after which it 
would be expected that most people would experience distress. However, there are no 
comparators to identify what a ‘normal’ or ‘appropriate’ response to such a severe stressor 
would entail. That is, the criteria do not provide information about how to identify at what 
point someone has a ‘disordered’ response as opposed to one that is ‘normal’. In the case of 
the criteria for panic disorder, behaviour change related to panic attacks is constructed as 
unusual or unacceptable by the ‘maladaptive’ criteria, despite this behaviour (such as 
“behaviors designed to avoid having panic attacks”, p. 208) arguably representing attempts 
to cope with the experience of panic attacks. 
 
3.6.1.1 Power and the impact on the individual 
 
Crowe (2000) argues that the DSM constructs normality via societal assumptions based on 
values such as productivity and rationality, suggesting ways in which experiences such as 
hallucinations come to be unquestioned as disordered. In her seminal paper, “K is mentally 
ill”, Smith (1978) analyses the discourse of a person who constructs a ‘factual account’ 
defining her friend as mentally ill. Smith describes the “complex conceptual work” (p. 26) 
required to construct this account, and the heterogeneity seen across diagnostic categories 
in the DSM-5 reflect these complexities. These variations hinge on the figure-ground effect 
(Smith, 1978) of the underpinning concept of disorder. For those experiences seen as 
inherently pathological, such as hallucinations, Smith’s argument is applicable; “[t]he rules 
do not have to be further elaborated presumably because they may be taken to be known at 
large. Unlike other features they are ‘obvious’ without having to be declared as ‘obvious’” 
(Smith, 1978, p. 47). The rules or comparators of inherently pathological symptoms do not 
have to be elaborated because they are socially accepted as deviant or otherwise not fitting 
with typical standards of behaviour, ways of being. The clinician is told in the reading of the 
diagnostic category that these types of behaviours or emotions are abnormal, owing to both 
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the language of the diagnostic criteria and the socio-political positioning of the DSM-5 as a 
manual for diagnosing mental disorders. Where the DSM-5 views certain experiences such 
as voice hearing as inherently pathological, and do not require the perspective of the 
individual and their experience, the clinician is placed in a position of power. 
 
Clinical implications of this type of discourse may include a focus on symptom reduction, on 
reducing those experiences seen as inherently disordered, such as voice hearing, rather 
than on removing only the distress associated with the experiences. In addition, labelling 
distress as abnormal may in itself create further distress. For example, flashbacks in the 
context of trauma are distressing in themselves, but the diagnosis potentially makes the 
experience more distressing because they are seen as abnormal. 
 
Although the diagnostic classification is a technological document or tool (Bowker & Star, 
1999), the DSM-5 nevertheless places emphasis on being “first and foremost a useful guide 
to clinical practice” (APA, 2013a, p. xli). This function is highlighted in the pragmatic nature 
of several of the diagnostic criteria. For example, the ‘other specified’ or ‘unspecified’ 
categories at the end of each chapter are included as categories to be used where a 
diagnosis must be assigned in order access treatment or release insurance funding in the 
interest of the service user, in spite of an unclear presentation; the unspecified diagnosis 
criteria in the DSM-5 suggest it may be used where insufficient information is provided, such 
as “in emergency room settings” (APA, 2013, p. 122). These distinct, codable disorders have 
clinical and administrative utility, however they are for the individual diagnosed potentially life 
changing as a result of stigma and impact on the person’s identity (e.g. Hayne, 2003; Pitt et 
al., 2009; and this issue is explored further in Chapter 7). Although these categories are 
pragmatic tools used to meet administrative requirements or gain access to treatment, these 
diagnoses nevertheless use psychiatric discourse to place the individual who is given the 
diagnosis in a pathological subject position (Georgaca and Avdi, 2012). 
 
Similarly, where the individual is not immediately distressed by their behaviour or 
experiences (for example in the case of delusions or ‘excessive’ spending), flexible 
diagnostic criteria still allow a clinician to identify these behaviours as problematic even 
without the individual’s agreement. These criteria are in one sense pragmatic; the clinician is 
enabled to take steps to limit the risk of the individual to themselves or others around them. 
However, the authority constructed within this discourse nevertheless renders service users 
powerless to contribute or negotiate the diagnostic label assigned to them when clinicians 
can make judgements about behaviours and whether these are seen as normal or abnormal. 
The technological discourse of the DSM-5 allows the clinician to disregard the meaning the 
individual ascribes to their experiences. In this situation, it can be questioned who decides 
that the ‘symptoms’ are present, and what happens if there is a disagreement, for example 
between the service user and a psychiatrist.  
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3.6.2 Threats to the model of discrete disorders 
 
3.6.2.1 Symptom overlap 
 
As noted in Section 3.5.2.1, the DSM-5 acknowledges that experiences do not always fit 
within the boundaries of a specific disorder; its rules are therefore internally inconsistent. The 
manual presents a classification of discrete, homogeneous disorders, yet acknowledges that 
this structure cannot always be followed due to the overlap between diagnostic categories. 
For example, the specifiers described in Section 3.5.2.1, used across diagnostic categories, 
such as “with anxious distress”, and the episodes that make up mood disorder categories 
represent heterogeneity and enable more specific labelling of presentations that is not 
otherwise possible with the basic diagnostic categories, to develop clinical utility and 
possibilities for formal record-keeping. Such specifiers allow the possibility of categorising 
extraneous symptoms that do not fit neatly within a diagnosis. As a result, the diagnoses’ 
inherent heterogeneity is effectively increased, while retaining an appearance of 
homogeneity through the use of a single diagnostic label.  However, these over-arching 
specifiers struggle to fit within a model of discrete disorders. The function of incorporating 
heterogeneity, therefore, has a consequence of deteriorating the underpinning model. This 
structure highlights the non-Linnean nature of such diagnostic categories, as well as the 
oddities of relationships between non-exclusive, but non-hierarchical phenomena within 
diagnostic groupings. 
 
3.6.2.2 Pragmatism 
 
The specifiers described above provide an example of pragmatism in DSM-5 criteria, which 
was also demonstrated in other ways across diagnostic categories, such as the allowance 
for distress to be judged as distressing or disruptive for others despite not necessarily being 
distressing for the individual being assessed (described in sections 3.5.1.3, identifiers of 
severity, and 3.5.1.4, perspective). These pragmatic decisions introduce flexibility and 
therefore utility for the clinician, but they may also have consequences for the individual 
diagnosed (as discussed in Section 3.6.1.1), and for the diagnostic model itself. For 
example, information can be gathered from different perspectives, from a range of sources, 
to assess whether or not the diagnostic criteria are met, as discussed in Section 3.5.1.4. 
Likewise, in each of the chapters the ‘other specified’ or ‘unspecified’ categories offer 
flexibility for difficulties that “do not meet the full criteria for any of the disorders in the 
schizophrenia spectrum and other psychotic disorders diagnostic class” (p. 122, for both 
‘other specified’ and ‘unspecified’ diagnoses). Criteria for these diagnoses are minimal, and 
therefore largely open to clinical subjectivity. What is introduced in these pragmatic criteria is 
heterogeneity; the same diagnostic criteria may be applied in different ways by the clinician 
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to suit individual situations and presentations. Whilst practical, this detracts from the DSM-
5’s presentation of diagnoses as rigorously and consistently applied criteria that represent 
stable, homogeneous disorders. 
 
3.6.3 Implications for understanding cause 
 
The findings demonstrate three ways in which DSM-5 diagnostic criteria have implications 
for how the cause of distress is conceptualised. The following sections discuss the role of 
trauma in diagnostic categories other than those within the trauma- and stressor-related 
disorders chapter, the ways in which a model of discrete disorders limits understandings of 
transdiagnostic causes, and, conversely, the ways in which diagnoses may obscure specific 
causal pathways within categories. 
 
3.6.3.1 The role of trauma 
 
The diagnostic model, which presents experiences as symptomatic of and caused by the 
disorder or diagnosis itself, results in limited consideration of the cause of an individual’s 
difficulties. By making reference to trauma or stressors only in one dedicated chapter, the 
DSM-5 implies that the diagnostic categories in the other chapters are unrelated to trauma. 
The consideration of social, psychological, or other adversities in relation to other diagnoses 
is minimised. Returning to her account of the construction of K’s mental illness, Smith (1978) 
describes this as “cutting out” (p. 47) an account of mental illness so as to construct 
behaviours and experiences as disordered. Smith argues that, “’[c]utting out’ is done by 
constructing relationships between rules or definitions of situations and descriptions of K’s 
behaviour such that the former do not properly provide for the latter. The behaviour is then 
exhibited as anomalous” (p. 47). Smith’s analysis can be applied to diagnoses within the 
DSM-5; symptoms are constructed as anomalous or disordered, rather than potentially 
understandable in relation to a person’s life experiences. The DSM constructs a situation 
whereby the definition of a ‘normal’ response to trauma is that a person should respond in a 
particular way. When a person does not respond in this way, and has other experiences 
such as dissociation or flashbacks, the rule or definition of the response to trauma cannot 
account for these other experiences, therefore the behaviour is construed by the DSM as 
anomalous, i.e. disordered. Even within the trauma- and stressor-related disorders chapter, 
the experiences assessed, despite being specifically linked with trauma, are seen as 
symptomatic of a disordered or inappropriate response to that trauma. The reverse of the 
implications of singling out one trauma-related chapter is acknowledged by Spitzer and First 
(2005), who have been instrumental in the development of the DSM. In their response to a 
suggestion that diagnostic categories be clustered according to cause, they stated:  
 
Most problematic is the characterization of the first cluster as patients with “brain 
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disease.” Psychiatry has abandoned the reductionist “organic” vs “functional” 
distinction and now regards all mental disorders as disorders of brain function. It 
would be a big leap backward to delineate a subgroup of DSM disorders as involving 
“brain disease” with the implication that in other mental disorders brain functioning is 
unimpaired. (Spitzer & First, 2005, p. 1898) 
 
By the same logic the same can be said of the role of trauma; for the majority of the DSM-5 
diagnostic categories, the criteria suggest to clinicians that these difficulties are caused by 
the disorder (and implicitly that these disorders are associated with brain function), and may 
therefore limit exploration further than identification of the disorder. However, just as 
Wakefield (2013) describes how stressors other than grief might also be reasonably and 
expectably related to experiences of low mood and depression, accumulating evidence 
demonstrates that trauma or adversity is involved in the development of many conditions 
and symptoms including psychotic experiences. Growing and persistent evidence to the 
contrary to this assumption of a separation between trauma-related diagnostic categories 
and other diagnostic categories is outlined in Sections 1.3.2.3.2.1 and 1.3.2.1.2. 
 
3.6.3.2 ‘Transdiagnostic’ causes 
 
On the one hand, the DSM-5 acknowledges crossover of experiences such as those related 
to mood and anxiety, and the potential for “common underlying vulnerabilities” across 
diagnoses (see Section 3.5.2.1), but on the other, splitting experiences into diagnoses limits 
opportunities for understanding transdiagnostic mechanisms and causes. Frances and 
Widiger (2012) argue that the “DSM is a splitter’s system, with the diagnostic pie divided into 
many small pieces” (p. 113) in order to meet a need for reliability, gained through the 
creation of “clearly demarcated homogeneous constructs” (p. 113). The authors argue that 
each category represents a description rather than a distinct disease, and that “multiple 
diagnoses are better conceived as modular building blocks, each of which adds precision 
and information” (p. 113). However, aside from the ways in which separate diagnostic 
categories are perceived and used (explored further in Chapters 4, 5, and 7, regarding the 
practices of diagnosis), these separated categories are also problematic from a theoretical 
standpoint. In the drive to create unique diagnostic entities by separating collections of 
experiences from each other, potentially important similarities in the experiences, or even 
processes, that exist across diagnoses may be lost. An example of this may include similar 
causal mechanisms for voice-hearing by individuals diagnosed with either bipolar disorder or 
schizophrenia (e.g. Hammersley et al., 2003). 
 
3.6.3.3 Specific causal pathways obscured by diagnostic categories  
 
At the same time as limiting research into common causes that do not respect diagnostic 
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boundaries, by obscuring heterogeneity in the experiences described within a single 
diagnosis, psychiatric diagnoses arguably obscure causal heterogeneity or other key 
differences between individuals (Olbert et al., 2014). Evidence already suggests that there 
may be distinct pathways in the development of specific experiences identified within the 
diagnostic criteria of schizophrenia, for example strong associations between childhood 
sexual abuse and hallucinations, compared with childhood neglect or institutionalisation and 
paranoia (Bentall et al., 2014). 
 
3.7 Conclusions 
 
This chapter analysed the text of the diagnostic criteria from five chapters of the DSM-5 to 
explore the diagnostic criteria as a protocol for practice, analysing the ways heterogeneity is 
represented across diagnostic criteria, and what is produced as a result. The findings 
demonstrate that heterogeneity can be found across diagnostic criteria. Differences in the 
way that symptoms are presented in the DSM-5 construct disordered or inherently 
pathological experiences of distress. Pragmatic criteria offer flexibility for the clinician but 
consequently tend to shift power to the professional. Some of the heterogeneity is a 
consequence of this flexibility, which demonstrates the multiple contexts and applications of 
psychiatric diagnosis. However, alongside the symptom overlap across diagnostic criteria, 
these findings undermine the notion that the DSM-5 is a list of mental disorders, and instead 
supports the concept of psychiatric classification as a human system attempting to respond 
to distress and non-conforming behaviour. The model of discrete categories of disorder also 
has implications for the way that cause is conceptualised; trauma is seen as involved in only 
a limited number of diagnoses, discrete categories may lead to common ‘transdiagnostic’ 
causes being missed, and individual differences within diagnostic categories may be 
obscured. These findings contextualise the following chapters, which explore the practices of 
diagnostic classification when it is taken up by stakeholders including clinicians, services, 
and people who are given psychiatric diagnoses. 
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4 Chapter 4: The functions of diagnosis for clinicians within the 
context of individual clinical assessment  
 
4.1 Abstract  
 
Detailed diagnostic criteria emphasise rigorous application in clinical practice. Yet, the 
psychiatric literature advises clinicians to understand diagnostic categories as works in 
progress, concepts or tools with clinical utility. This chapter uses data from interviews with 
thirteen psychiatrists, ten GPs, and eleven clinical psychologists (a total of thirty four 
clinicians) to explore the ways in which diagnosis is used and made sense of in clinical 
practice, at the level of the clinician carrying out individual assessments. The findings 
demonstrate that diagnostic categories are used as heuristics that guide clinical functions 
such as pattern recognition, intervention planning, and communication. However, these 
heuristics are fallible, and limitations are seen within each of these functions. Local flexibility 
in diagnostic practices is seen across services and clinical disciplines owing to the 
pragmatic, and therefore often idiosyncratic, uses of diagnosis. The findings showed that 
individualised information beyond diagnostic criteria is also a central part of clinical 
assessment. Taken-for-granted understandings of diagnosis and its epistemology are 
explored, and these are seen to differ across clinicians. Implications for both clinical practice 
and wider data capture are discussed. 
 
4.2 Introduction 
 
The functions and limitations of psychiatric diagnosis, outlined in Chapter 1, apply generally 
to the ‘ideal’ use of psychiatric diagnosis, as diagnostic classification is intended to be used. 
Similarly, the examination of DSM-5 categories in Chapter 3 represents diagnostic 
categories as a protocol for use. This chapter explores the ways in which diagnosis is used 
and made sense of in clinical practice, within the context of the individual clinical 
assessment. 
 
Psychiatric diagnoses are often framed as discrete, biologically based illnesses, despite the 
evidence for this supposition being lacking. As Kupfer, the chair of the DSM-5 taskforce 
stated; “We’ve been telling patients for several decades that we are waiting for biomarkers. 
We’re still waiting” (APA, 2013). In spite of this disease framing, clinicians, it is argued, 
should use diagnoses with an awareness of the history of their development and limitations; 
“[n]o sensible mental health professional thinks such systems are anywhere near perfect or 
complete; they are interim summaries with practical aims awaiting clarification” (Callard et 
al., 2013, p. 2). Diagnoses are frequently discussed in psychiatric literature as a practical 
tool with utility for clinicians, with proponents arguing, “[t]houghtful clinicians have long been 
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aware that diagnostic categories are simply concepts, justified only by whether they provide 
a useful framework for organizing and explaining the complexity of clinical experience in 
order to derive inferences about outcome and to guide decisions about treatment” (Kendell & 
Jablensky, 2003, p. 5). Frances and Widiger (2012, p. 113) assert, “[m]ental disorders are no 
more than useful constructs”. These statements seem to confirm, as Kendell and Jablensky 
(2003, p. 7) argue, that there appears to be “…a growing assumption, at least within the 
research community [emphasis added], that most currently recognized psychiatric disorders 
are not disease entities”. However, these statements are in contrast with other public 
conceptualisations, comparing categories of mental distress with physical illnesses. For 
example, the website for the Australian government’s Department of Health states, “mental 
illnesses… are illnesses just like any other, such as heart disease, diabetes, and asthma” 
(Australian Government Department of Health, 2007). 
 
Some flexibility in making diagnoses is assumed by diagnostic manuals, and the literature 
encourages clinicians to use their clinical judgement alongside clinical utility of diagnostic 
categories with an awareness of their construction. However, in spite of this, an emphasis is 
nevertheless placed on meeting the full diagnostic criteria in order to make a “confident” 
diagnosis (WHO, 1992). Systematic checking of diagnostic criteria, it is asserted, “will assure 
a more reliable assessment” (APA, 2013, p. 19). The DSM-5 itself states that its diagnostic 
criteria “are intended to summarize characteristic syndromes of signs and symptoms that 
point to an underlying disorder…” (APA, 2013, p. 19). 
 
In practice, Moncrieff (2010) argues that diagnostic labels embody an assumption that 
service users’ behaviours and experiences are symptomatic of an underlying biological 
disease. Yet at the same time, she argues, these labels mask the complex decision-making 
and judgements that precede the affixing of a diagnosis to a health record. Beyond the 
officially endorsed use of diagnosis as a useful tool or concept, in practice, Bowker and Star 
(1999) described ways in which people ‘subvert’ formal structures of ICD-10 classification 
with ‘informal work-arounds’ (p.54). Both Whooley (2010) and Rafalovich (2005) describe the 
ambivalence that practising clinicians feel towards psychiatric diagnostic categories. In his 
interviews with psychiatrists in the US, Whooley found further evidence of explicit work-
arounds in clinical practice, including fudging the diagnostic codes on official paperwork and 
using alternative typologies (Whooley, 2010). Rafalovich argues that attention deficit 
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) diagnoses “are not automatic, mechanical phenomena, but 
rather, are preceded by processes of negotiation and interpretation” (Rafalovich, 2005, p. 
318), and that diagnostic protocols are not perfectly applied in clinical practice. 
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4.2.1 Rationale: Clinical diagnostic practices 
 
As Blaxter (1978) argues, diagnosis is both a category and a process. The process of 
diagnosis, and its implications, has been given limited attention in psychiatric literature. 
Three central clinical groups are both qualified to make and use psychiatric diagnoses and 
come into contact with psychiatric diagnoses in their day-to-day clinical practice; 
psychiatrists, clinical psychologists, and GPs. Psychiatrists and clinical psychologists were 
included in the study as they represent two of the key literatures outlined in Chapter 1; 
psychiatrists as the predominantly diagnosing group of professionals within mental health 
care, and psychologists, who are professionally in a position to utilise diagnosis to perform 
functions such as communication and research, yet also typically use psychological 
formulation as a means of assessment and intervention planning, thus providing an 
alternative perspective (British Psychological Society, 2013b). GPs were included as a group 
of clinicians who represent often people’s first contact with health services regarding their 
mental distress, and GPs act as a gatekeeper for most specialist mental health services as a 
formal referral from primary care is required (NHS Choices, 2016). Their views and practices 
of psychiatric diagnosis were therefore seen as important to the central research purpose. 
 
4.3 Aims 
 
Within the context of the overall research purpose of examining the functions of psychiatric 
diagnosis from multiple perspectives, this chapter addresses the first and second theoretical 
questions outlined in Chapter 2 (Section 2.4.2); 1) what are the conceptual underpinnings of 
diagnostic categories, and are these consistent across contexts and practices? And 2) how 
are psychiatric diagnostic categories used in practice?  
 
The purpose of this chapter was to explore the ways in which clinicians use and encounter 
psychiatric diagnosis in the individual clinical context, both in terms of its explicit functions, 
and more implicit concepts for which diagnosis acts as a proxy. In light of the previous 
chapter exploring diagnostic classification as a protocol for use, this chapter sought to 
examine diagnosis in practice, and how protocol and practice compare. 
 
4.4 Methodology 
 
As part of data collection for the overall thesis, semi-structured qualitative interviews were 
carried out with GPs, psychiatrists, clinical psychologists, and a group of mental health 
service users who had been given a psychiatric diagnosis (or diagnoses). The following 
methodology section describes the overall research methodology for the data collection with 
each of these participant groups, and goes on to describe specific information about the 
clinicians who were interviewed. 
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Details of service user participants and methodology specific to interviews with service users 
can be found in the methodology section of Chapter 7 (Section 7.4). 
 
The data from interviews with clinicians and service users were analysed as one dataset, so 
that links between the data would not be lost. This methodology section therefore outlines 
the methods of analysis (Section 4.4.5) that that were applied across the whole dataset. 
Some reference is therefore made to interviews with service users, as this is relevant to the 
analysis as a whole. 
 
The findings from interviews with clinicians are presented in this chapter, Chapter 6, and the 
data contribute to Chapter 7. The findings of the interviews with service users can be found 
in Chapter 7. Further details about the presentation of the findings of the interviews across 
the thesis can be found in Section 4.4.5.8, below (Presentation of interview analysis 
findings). 
 
4.4.1 Design: Using qualitative interviews as a source of data 
 
Semi-structured interviews were chosen as an appropriate method of collecting data with 
which to answer the theoretical questions outlined in Chapter 2 (Section 2.4.2). Reflecting 
the overarching epistemological position of thesis (Section 2.3), this approach aims to 
access how the ways that people talk about diagnosis construct the ways that they are used. 
By talking about the ways that they use diagnosis, people are not showing how they use 
diagnosis in practice but instead offering a window into the ways that language and 
discourse used about diagnosis shapes their conceptualisation, and the implications of this. 
Bringing together these accounts is to describe the commonalities in the ways that people 
articulate their relations with the world, shared sense-making processes that are presented 
by individuals as describing or explaining mental health and diagnosis. These processes are 
not seen as ‘real’ in the sense that they are not mirrors of nature or even an attempt to get 
close to how things ‘really are’ in the world, but as an approximation of the common 
elements of shared discourses; the explanations and descriptions that people take up and 
use when articulating their relation with personal and societal representations of mental 
health. 
 
Rather than a phenomenological approach, which seeks to represent individuals’ 
perspectives through their feelings and thoughts (Harper, 2012), in conducting interviews 
with different stakeholders (clinicians, service users), individuals’ accounts are seen as 
serving a variety of functions, both interpersonal and social or cultural (Harper, 2012). I am 
interested in understanding how people represent, talk about, and make sense of psychiatric 
diagnosis and experiences of mental health, holding an assumption that people’s language 
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shapes and makes possible these concepts (Burr, 2003) when contextualised within wider 
social, political, and other environments. Social constructionist understandings of diagnosis 
view the act of diagnosing an individual as a transformation of a person’s distress into the 
model of disorder, which is then used as an explanation. Georgaca (2013) argues that 
studying the process of diagnosis, therefore, is a valuable way of understanding how this 
transformation of distress is achieved. By interviewing clinicians and service users, this 
methodology allowed the study of both process of diagnosis (and other assessments of 
distress) and its implications for the individuals who are diagnosed. 
 
4.4.2 Ethics 
 
4.4.2.1 Ethical approval 
 
The University of Liverpool Research Support Office sponsored the study carrying out semi-
structured interviews with NHS clinicians and service users (see Appendix 1; Sponsorship 
approval confirmation letter). The study underwent full ethical review by the NHS National 
Research Ethics Service (NRES) Committee North West - Greater Manchester East, and 
was granted ethical approval (see Appendix 2; Confirmation of favourable ethical opinion). 
Individual NHS trust approval was given by the two individual trusts from which participants 
were recruited (Trust 1 and Trust 2). 
 
4.4.2.2 Anonymity and confidentiality 
 
All the interview data gathered during this research was anonymised. Each participant and 
their interview data were assigned an identifying number, and their names removed. 
Clinicians were identified according to their profession, for example, ‘Psychiatrist 1’.  
 
Audio recordings of the interviews were transcribed for the purposes of analysis (see Section 
4.4.5.1, Data preparation, below). A portion of the interviews was transcribed by a freelance 
worker within the University of Liverpool. The audio files were transferred to the freelancer 
directly using a password-protected USB data stick. Audio files were labelled using only the 
participant ID number. A confidentiality agreement was signed by the freelancer confirming 
that no information about the data would be disclosed to third parties (Appendix 3). 
 
Following transcription, any reference in interviews to identifying information, such as 
names, places, NHS trusts or services, were removed and replaced with a brief description, 
for example ‘[NHS Trust]’. Some participants gave examples of their own experiences or, in 
the case of clinicians, information about clients or the services in which they worked, that 
provided information for context for my understanding, but which they did not wish to appear 
in the transcript of the interview. In these instances, sections of the transcript were redacted 
95 
prior to analysis, and in one case, a copy of the redacted transcript was sent to a clinician to 
ensure that they were happy with the anonymisation. 
 
4.4.2.3 Data storage 
 
Electronic audio recordings of interviews were stored using anonymised participant ID 
numbers. Interview transcripts were anonymised, password-protected, and stored using 
anonymised participant ID numbers. All electronic files were stored on a password-protected 
computer and will be destroyed at the end of the study, as stated on the participant 
information sheets. Participants’ personal information, such as contact details, will also be 
destroyed at the end of the study. Signed, hard copies of participant consent forms were 
stored in a locked filing cabinet in the Institute of Psychology, Health and Society, University 
of Liverpool, throughout the study, and at the end of the study will be transferred to university 
archiving for a minimum of five years. Any potentially identifiable information will be removed 
from interview transcripts and the transcripts will be stored anonymously and confidentially in 
the university archive for the same period of time. 
 
4.4.3 Participants  
 
4.4.3.1 Sampling 
 
Purposive, or criterion based, sampling (LeCompte, Preissle, & Tesch, 1993; Mason, 2002; 
Patton, 1988) was used in the recruitment of participants for this research. This method of 
sampling selects participants with particular characteristics that are of relevance to the 
research and furthermore will allow the gathering of detailed data that can offer a rich 
understanding of the theory questions designed as part of the overall research approach. 
GPs work within private practices, therefore were selected by region. Psychiatrists and 
psychologists were invited from a wide range of service types, from primary care to tertiary 
services, mild and moderate to complex presentations, and from open to secure services. 
These variations were chosen purposively in order to gain a wide understanding of the ways 
that diagnosis is used across clinical groups and services.  
 
4.4.3.2 Inclusion criteria 
 
Currently practising psychiatrists, GPs and clinical psychologists were invited to take part in 
the study. These three groups of clinicians were interviewed in order to gather data from a 
range of perspectives from individuals with that were thought to have different views and 
uses of psychiatric diagnosis. 
 
96 
4.4.3.3 Recruitment 
 
It was expected that there would be some overlap between professional groups of the 
clinical participants, as a result of training and NHS working practices. There would also 
likely be differences in the ways that the different clinician groups used and encountered 
diagnoses in their practice, for example, owing to the differences in their positions in the care 
pathway and across service types. Therefore, a separate sample of participants was sought 
for each professional clinical group (Green & Thorogood, 2014). 
 
Psychiatrists and psychologists were invited from a range of mental health services in order 
to gather a range of perspectives to compare and contrast how diagnoses might be used in 
different ways across service types. Different services and settings from which clinicians 
were invited included primary, secondary, and tertiary care, therefore representing a range 
of out-patient and in-patient care, general adult and specialist services, and a range of 
severity and risk in the client populations with which those services worked. Invitations to 
take part in the study included a brief summary email, recruitment information, and the 
participant information sheet for clinicians (Appendix 5). 
 
For Trust 1, the majority of clinicians were contacted directly and invited to take part in the 
study. The advice of the Local Clinical Research Network for the NHS National Institute for 
Health Research was sought regarding recruitment, and the network assisted with sending 
out study information to the trust psychiatrists. One of the lead psychologists for the trust 
sent out the information to all the psychologists in the trust. For Trust 2, an invitation to take 
part in the study was sent out to psychiatrists and clinical psychologists by the trust research 
office. 
 
A list of the local GP surgeries was compiled and each surgery was contacted and invited to 
disseminate study information to their doctors. I was also invited to attend a GP conference 
to speak to individual attendees to give them the study information. Recruitment of GPs was 
difficult; feedback was received from some interviewees about the limited time that GPs 
have available in their working day. In order to reflect this, the length of the interviews was 
cut to 30-40 minutes (reduced from one hour). The same interview questions were asked, 
however there was less follow up discussion. Academic GPs within the University of 
Liverpool were also approached and invited to take part; three of the GP sample of ten 
worked at the university as well as practising as GPs. The limitations of these steps taken to 
increase recruitment are twofold. First, due to the shortened length of some GP interviews, 
the data gathered is inevitably less rich. Second, the academic GPs worked in mental health 
as part of their roles of the university, thus introducing some bias to the data. 
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Clinicians who were interested in taking part in the research interview contacted me directly 
and an interview date was arranged. All of the clinician interviews took place at the clinicians’ 
places of work, with the exception of two clinicians, who chose to come to the University of 
Liverpool for ease, for example, due to working in a secure service where visitor access was 
difficult. 
 
4.4.3.4 Demographic information 
 
In order to preserve participant anonymity, the clinicians’ demographic information is divided 
into separate tables. Tables 4-1 to 4-3 give the participants’ age, gender, and ethnicity. 
Ethnicity was self-identified. Where the clinician preferred not to identify with a particular 
ethnicity, the field is left blank.  
 
Table 4-1  
GP demographic information 
 
Participant ID 
 
 
Age 
 
Gender 
 
Ethnicity 
 
GP 1 51 F White British 
GP 2 54 M White British 
GP 3 59 M - 
GP 4 63 M White Irish 
GP 5 57 M White European 
GP 6 42 M British Pakistani 
GP 7 34 F Indian 
GP 8 37 F Mixed white Asian 
GP 9 53 F - 
GP 10 46 M Asian British 
 
 
Table 4-2 
Psychiatrist demographic information 
 
Participant ID 
 
 
Age 
 
Gender 
 
Ethnicity 
 
Psychiatrist 1 51 F White British 
Psychiatrist 2 52 M Indian 
Psychiatrist 3 42 F Asian Indian 
Psychiatrist 4 50 M Asian Pakistani 
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Psychiatrist 5 39 M White British 
Psychiatrist 6 43 F White British 
Psychiatrist 7 39 F White British 
Psychiatrist 8 43 M Indian 
Psychiatrist 9 39 M White British 
Psychiatrist 10 39 M White non-British 
Psychiatrist 11 59 M White British 
Psychiatrist 12 51 F White British 
Psychiatrist 13 40 M British Indian 
 
 
Table 4-3 
Clinical psychologist demographic information 
 
Participant ID 
 
 
Age 
 
Gender 
 
Ethnicity 
 
Psychologist 1 41 F 
 
White British 
Psychologist 2 55 M White British 
Psychologist 3 50 F White British 
Psychologist 4 52 F White British 
Psychologist 5 54 F White British 
Psychologist 6 39 F White British 
Psychologist 7 36 F White British 
Psychologist 8 28 M White British 
Psychologist 9 31 F White British 
Psychologist 10 34 F White British 
Psychologist 11 43 F White British 
 
 
Table 4-4, below, gives the areas of specialty of the psychiatrists and clinical psychologists 
interviewed, and the numbers of clinicians working in those areas. All of the GPs worked in 
private GP practices. Both psychiatrists and clinical psychologists are represented within the 
table in order to protect participant anonymity. The frequency total numbers more than the 
total number of clinicians due to split-post working across more than one speciality. In 
calculating frequencies, the area of specialty was prioritised over the age of the client group; 
for example, hypothetically, a clinician working in an older adults learning disabilities service 
would be counted under learning disabilities only. 
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Table 4-4 
Area of speciality within with psychiatrists and psychologists worked, ordered by descending 
frequency 
 
Area of Specialty 
 
Frequency 
 
 
Early intervention in psychosis (EIP) 5 
Secure / forensic  5 
Prison / probation  3 
Community mental health team (CMHT) 3 
Older adults 2 
Eating disorders 2 
Child & adolescent mental health services (CAMHS) 2 
Improving access to psychological therapies (IAPT) 1 
Learning disabilities 1 
Acute inpatient 1 
 
4.4.4 Procedure 
 
4.4.4.1 Consideration of ethical issues 
 
On arrival, all participants were given a verbal introduction to the interview, which included 
an overview of the participant information sheet (Appendices 5 and 6 for clinicians and 
service users respectively), participant consent form (Appendices 7 and 8 for clinicians and 
service users respectively), and a reminder that the interview would be audio-recorded for 
the purposes of transcription for analysis, to ensure that participants were happy with this 
arrangement. Participants were also given a brief description of the types of questions that 
would be asked during the interview.  
 
Participants were then given another copy of the participant information sheet, which had 
previously been given to each individual prior to the interview meeting. Participants were 
then asked to read through the information sheet and consent form. Care was taken to 
ensure that participants understood the process of the interview, what would be involved, 
and how their data would be used. It was made clear to participants that they did not have to 
answer any question if they chose not to, and that they need not disclose more than they felt 
comfortable with. Participants were reassured that their data would be anonymised and their 
responses kept confidential. All participants were informed that they could request a copy of 
the interview transcript if they wished. 
 
100 
Following this introduction to the interview, participants were asked if they had any questions 
about any stage of the process. Participants were then asked to read the consent form, and, 
if they agreed to the statements, to initial the box for each statement of the consent form and 
sign and date the form, which I then signed and dated. 
 
4.4.4.2 The interview 
 
Interview questions were developed to direct participants’ responses towards the theory 
questions of the research in order to provide appropriate material for analysis. The questions 
were adapted differently for service users and clinicians, reflecting the differences in the use 
of diagnosis as a clinical tool for clinicians, compared with lay uses. However, a common 
thread was a focus on examples of participants’ diagnostic practices, both clinical and 
personal, in order to provide rich data that went beyond participants’ opinions. Service users 
were all asked the same set of questions. Two slightly differing sets of questions were 
developed for clinicians; one set for those who reported using psychiatric diagnosis as part 
of their clinical practice, and another set for those who did not. Clinicians were asked an 
initial question (“Do you make psychiatric diagnoses as part of your clinical practice?), the 
answer to which determined which of set of questions was asked. The interview questions 
can be found in Appendix 4. 
 
Once written consent was given to participate in the study, it was ensured that participants 
were ready to begin the interview, and the digital audio recorder was started. The interviews 
took a semi-structured approach (Wengraf, 2001), in which the interview guide consisted of 
several key questions, which were asked in every interview, and throughout the interview 
follow up and clarifying questions were asked as appropriate to elicit further information. The 
interview questions can be found in Appendix 4 alongside some brief demographic 
questions, which were asked at the end of the interview. 
 
After all the interview questions from the schedule had been asked, participants were asked 
if they would like to say anything more about the topics discussed, and they were given the 
opportunity to bring up any other experiences or thoughts that they felt were relevant to the 
study, or if they had any questions that they wanted to ask me. When both the participant 
and I agreed that we had finished the discussion, the interview was ended and the audio 
recorded stopped. 
 
The mean interview length for psychologists was 60 minutes (ranging from 44-86 minutes), 
and psychiatrists, 51 minutes (ranging from 33 to 62 minutes). 
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The mean interview length for GPs was 47 minutes (ranging from 27 to 65 minutes, 
reflecting the shortened interview time due to recruitment difficulties, discussed in Section 
4.4.3.3, Recruiment). 
 
4.4.4.3 Debrief 
 
Following the interview, participants were thanked for their time. A verbal ‘debrief’ was given 
to each participant, explaining again the purposes of the study of understanding the 
functions of diagnosis and the ways that different individuals use it, in order to inform the 
development of different ways of conceptualising and assessing mental health.  
 
4.4.5 Methods of analysis 
 
As outlined above at the start of Section 4.4, the data from interviews with clinicians and 
service users were analysed as one dataset, so that links between the data would not be 
lost. This section therefore outlines the methods of analysis that were applied across the 
whole dataset. Some reference is therefore made to interviews with service users, as this is 
relevant to the analysis as a whole. 
 
4.4.5.1 Achieving data saturation or theoretical sufficiency 
 
The aim of qualitative research is not to gather data that is representative of the population 
of study (Green & Thorogood, 2014), but to gather “information-rich cases for in-depth study” 
(Patton, 1990, p. 182, as cited in Green & Thorogood, 2014, p. 121). Data was collected until 
it was considered that the data had reached ‘saturation’. Data saturation involves collecting 
data until an increasing sample size no longer offers new information (Green & Thorogood, 
2014). Charmaz (2012), a proponent of grounded theory, has described this process as 
theoretical saturation, whereby no new insights emerge in the theoretical categories of the 
data, and the categories are robustly supported. The practicality, and therefore attainability, 
of theoretical saturation, however, has been questioned (Dey, 2007). Dey (1999) argues that 
the idea of theoretical saturation relies on the researcher’s conjecture that categories are 
saturated; whereas he argues that the theoretical categories are suggested by the data. 
Dey’s preferred term is ‘theoretical sufficiency’ (Dey, 1999, p. 257) instead of claiming data 
saturation. This notion refers to data adequacy (Charmaz, 2006). Data collection for this 
research, therefore, was ceased when no new theoretical insights were gained from the 
interviews, and in light of the concept of theoretical sufficiency, when thoroughness of data 
had been achieved. 
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4.4.5.2 Thematic analysis 
 
Thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006) was used to analyse the interview data. This 
method is used to identify and analyse patterns or themes in the data, and to give a map or 
outline of these themes across the interview dataset (Braun & Clarke, 2006; Green & 
Thorogood, 2014). The thematic analysis used in this thesis was underpinned by the critical 
realist social constructionist epistemology described in Chapter 2 (Section 2.3). This type of 
analysis was chosen as the most appropriate method in respect of the interview data, and 
the theoretical questions asked by the research design (outlined in Chapter 2, Section 2.4.2). 
The central research question for this thesis asks what are the functions of psychiatric 
diagnosis from multiple perspectives. The theory questions for the thesis relate to the 
conceptual underpinnings of psychiatric diagnosis, how diagnostic categories are used in 
practice, and what are the products and implications of their use. In exploring themes or 
patterns of meaning within the data, thematic analysis allows for these multiple functions and 
uses to be explored and compared across perspectives. Reflecting the different stances of 
the theoretical questions, which relate to both practical and conceptual uses of psychiatric 
diagnosis, thematic analysis allows the researcher to analyse both manifest and latent 
content in the data (Joffe, 2012). Manifest content refers to that which is observable directly 
from the data, for example, explicit mention by participants of diagnostic categories being 
viewed as biologically-caused disorders, as compared with latent content, which is implicit, 
for example, participants describing diagnoses in an essentialised way but without directly 
referring to the conceptual model that they are using to understand diagnostic categories. 
The concept of manifest and latent content was also taken up in exploring the different 
functions of diagnosis, for example, the manifest functions described, such as clinical 
assessment and treatment planning, and latent functions, in the sense of for what is 
diagnosis a proxy when clinicians say that diagnosis is used for referrals, for example. A 
combination of inductive and deductive analysis was used, where inductive findings are 
data-driven, emerging from the data itself, compared with deductive analysis, which is 
derived from theoretical ideas that are brought to the research (Joffe, 2012). This 
combination allowed the analysis to place first the themes and understandings that had 
emerged directly from the interview data, and contextualise and interpret this using the 
existing bodies of literature that were outlined in Chapter 1. 
 
Central to the methodological approach of this research is using the four literatures outlined 
in Chapter 1; psychiatry, clinical psychology, service user/survivor literature, and social 
sciences literatures. The focus of the research is in understanding diagnostic practices from 
a wider perspective than the individual clinical situation. The focus of this approach is in 
observing and understanding why particular practices happen. Just as my understandings of 
mental distress are not limited to within the individual themselves, neither are my 
understandings of the ways that people take up diagnostic, and non-diagnostic, practices. 
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The analysis was grounded in the ways that people talk about the practices of diagnosis, 
and what they do in different clinical situations that can shed light on the uses, benefits, and 
limitations of diagnosis.  
 
Contextual information was also an important part of the analysis and in understanding 
participants’ diagnostic practices. Reflecting the epistemological stance underpinning the 
thematic analysis, and to ensure that clinicians’ responses were understood within the wider 
context of their practice, it was important to understand why it is that these practices are 
taken up, what are the constraints imposed upon clinicians, what are the organisational and 
clinical contexts that produce particular ways of doing things. For example, exploring the 
space between diagnosis as protocol and diagnosis in practice is not about being critical of 
clinicians ‘not doing what the manual says’, but instead understanding the ways in which 
diagnosis may be difficult to apply in practice, for example, and the ways in which particular 
organisational contexts or requirements may impose particular ways of carrying out clinical 
practice. This contextual information therefore made up an important part of later analysis. 
 
The interviews from the three groups of clinicians and the group of service users were 
deliberately coded and analysed together, and one coding framework was generated that 
applied across all four groups of participants. This method of analysis was chosen such that 
links could emerge across the participant groups in order to develop cohesive analytic 
findings from multiple perspectives.  
 
4.4.5.3 Researcher positioning 
 
This section outlines the ways that I used the analytical approach of this research to 
maintain an observational and analytical stance to the research question and to avoid a 
position of judgement of participants’ interviews. As is described in Chapter 2 (Section 2.2, 
Personal and political positioning), in approaching this area and in relation to the participants 
I interviewed, I come from a stance akin to Schuetz’s ‘stranger’ (Schuetz, 1944). My 
background experience relates to both clinical psychology and psychological assessment, 
however, I have neither been formally trained in this area nor received a diagnosis myself. I 
am therefore in a position to, as Schuetz (1944) describes, question or make visible “thinking 
as usual” (p.501), the common sense knowledge of participants’ sense making processes 
and their potentially unquestioned “scheme of reference” (p.502) or taken-for-granted 
understandings. 
 
4.4.5.3.1 Management of researcher position across the data analysis phase 
 
An issue that I considered throughout the research was my positionality regarding 
psychiatric diagnosis and conceptualisations of mental distress. As is discussed in Section 
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2.2, in being aware of my own stance and opinions in this topic, I was conscious of how this 
might be brought into my analysis of the interview data. In order to directly address this, a 
log of reflections was kept throughout the analysis process in order to expand upon 
particularly interesting codes or reflect upon coding decisions. These reflections served to 
illuminate assumptions and interpretations made during coding, to ensure transparency and 
to recognise that coding represented an inductive reading of the data but nevertheless 
unavoidably involved a level of interpretation. This process of reflecting was to ensure that 
during later coding and further progression from descriptive to explanatory accounts of 
analysis, the ways in which interpretations were made were transparent, and yet 
accountable to the data. Reflective memo writing during the coding process also helped to 
highlight and reflect upon connections, parallels, and tensions within and across codes, as 
well as to note similarities and differences between different participant groups. The memos 
were used to note interpretations that were made from the data, and to question and 
challenge these, and to try to see the findings from different perspectives. These reflective 
memos contributed to the shaping and revising of the central research purpose, which was 
described in Chapter 2 (Section 2.4.1). 
 
The analytic findings, reflections, and interpretations were shared and discussed with 
colleagues in order to explore alternative explanations and interpretations to challenge my 
perspectives on the data. The transcripts and the coding framework were discussed with my 
supervisors, and I presented sections of my transcripts at a regular data analysis group, 
which was a small group of PhD students in other areas of psychology and in public health, 
and researchers in sociology and public health. The group reviewed and compared sections 
of my transcripts and the group’s interpretations and reflections were discussed. 
 
4.4.5.4 Data preparation 
 
Interviews were transcribed verbatim, although the level of detail of transcription did not 
include non-verbal information, owing to the type of analysis used (Green & Thorogood, 
2014). As described in Section 4.4.2.2, a portion of the interviews was transcribed by a 
freelance worker within the University of Liverpool. The transcripts were anonymised as 
described in Section 4.4.2.2. 
 
4.4.5.5 Data organisation 
 
Data was imported into and organised using QSR International's NVivo 10 Software (NVivo, 
2014). The NVivo package of computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software 
(CAQDAS) was used as a way of organising data. As Spencer and colleagues (Spencer, 
Ritchie, & O’Connor, 2003) caution, nVivo was used not as a substitute or method of 
performing data analysis, but as a support tool for organising and archiving data It has been 
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argued that the use of CAQDAS offers greater transparency of analysis, because a record is 
made of how coding schemes are developed (Green & Thorogood, 2014). 
 
4.4.5.6 Data coding 
 
The coding of interview data involved several steps, which are described in the following 
sections. First, initial open coding was carried out on a sub-section of data. A coding 
framework was then developed by consolidating the codes generated from open coding into 
main themes, themes and subthemes. The consolidation of open coding into a coding 
framework are illustrated by Figure 4-1, below. The full dataset was then applied to the 
coding framework, and explanatory accounts of the data were generated.  
 
 
Figure 4-1: Flowchart detailing consolidation of data codes to create coding framework 
 
4.4.5.6.1 Initial open coding 
 
Initial open coding is a technique drawn from grounded theory (Charmaz, 2006). Initial 
coding ‘fractures’ the data into segments; small units of coding that are phrase-by-phrase, 
and line-by-line (Boyatzis, 1998). Each segment of data is assigned a new descriptive code. 
The aim of this detailed analysis is to avoid making “conceptual leaps” (p. 48) and applying 
existing theories and ideas before the necessary analytic work has been carried out. Initial 
open coding was used to allow new thinking to emerge from the data (Charmaz, 2006). By 
maintaining a close focus on the data, the analytic framework is inductive, with theory 
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emerging from the data. This is in contrast with a deductive approach, which uses the data 
to test existing theory (Lewis, 2003). An inductive approach was chosen in order to ensure 
that findings are grounded in the data rather than shaped by pre-conceived ideas or theory. 
Open coding (Green & Thorogood, 2014) was carried out on a subsection of interview data 
to fracture the data and open up avenues for enquiry. In particular, acknowledging my 
positioning as coming from within a particular set of assumptions, I wanted to give the data 
the opportunity to challenge these assumptions, and for alternative meanings and 
explanations to arise. 
 
Drawing from Bowker & Star's (1999) methodology in their exploration of the ICD-10, this 
approach used participants’ practice as an analysis rather than starting from a theory and 
applying that to the data. Charmaz’s (2006) approach to open coding uses Glaser's (1978) 
concept of using gerunds to label codes to invoke action. The aim of this approach is to 
access actions, practices, and meanings rather than topics and themes. This method of 
coding was used to reflect the mapping of practices across the participant groups 
interviewed. It was decided that open coding in this manner would help focus the analysis on 
processes, practices, and meanings, in order to later move to explanation and theory. 
 
Following initial reading and re-reading of the data, ‘versus coding’ (Saldaña, 2013, p. 115) 
was incorporated into the initial open coding as an additional way of exploring what was 
initially seen as potentially opposing uses and functions of diagnosis. This type of coding 
was used to explore the contradictions and conflicting ideas or tensions that participants 
discussed, and how these might relate to the different perspectives of individuals and the 
different diagnostic functions being taken up. Seeking out tensions and disagreements was 
used as a method of giving equal weight to the different diagnostic practices. The reasons 
for this were twofold: to represent different perspectives and uses across individuals, and to 
try and minimise confirmation bias towards my own perspective. 
 
Due to the detailed nature of open coding, of separately coding each data segment within a 
line, open coding generates a large number of codes. Therefore, for reasons for 
manageability, a subsection of the interview dataset was open coded during the first phase 
of data coding (e.g. Samuels, 2010). Five transcripts were chosen for detailed open coding 
in order to represent subsamples of the samples used in the research as per Boyatzis’ 
recommendations for developing data-driven codes (Boyatzis, 1998). The transcripts 
included in this phase were therefore chosen to reflect rich and varied data, representing a 
diverse range of practices, experiences, and opinions about diagnosis. One transcript from 
each of the three clinician groups was used; these transcripts were chosen because they 
were thought to be broadly representative of the practices of their clinical group. Two 
transcripts were open coded from the service user group. Two service user transcripts were 
used because unlike the clinicians’ interviews, these data did not have a common thread of 
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professional identity or model of practice, which tended to consolidate the clinicians 
interviews. There was, therefore, a wider range of practices across the service user 
interviews. The two transcripts were chosen because they represented differing views, each 
at a different end of a spectrum across the service users in terms of practices that 
represented alignment with, or distance from, the diagnostic model of conceptualising mental 
distress. 
 
644 codes were generated from the open coding phase. 
 
4.4.5.6.2 Development of the coding framework 
 
4.4.5.6.2.1 Generation of subthemes from the codes generated from open coding 
 
Following the initial open coding stage, a coding framework was developed against which 
the full dataset of transcripts was coded. The coding framework was developed through a 
process of consolidating the codes generated from open coding into subthemes. A section of 
the list of codes (alphabetically organised by nVivo) generated from the open coding phase 
can be found in Appendix 10. This list was examined and organised in Microsoft Excel; 
codes referring to similar concepts and descriptions were grouped together and labelled as a 
subtheme. Codes that appeared to be unique and did not relate to any other codes were 
labelled as their own subtheme. An example of this organisation phase is given in Appendix 
11. 
 
This process of organisation consolidated the codes derived from open coding into 430 
subthemes. These subthemes were organised under 66 themes. These 66 themes were 
then organised under 9 main descriptive themes used to describe and organise the data. An 
example of this process of organisation is given in Appendix 12, which shows the themes 
and subthemes under the main theme ‘Uses of diagnosis and other assessments’.  
 
4.4.5.6.2.2 Coding transcripts according to the coding framework 
 
When the codes derived from the initial open coding were organised into a coding framework 
of main themes, themes, and subthemes, the full dataset of transcripts was then applied to 
this framework. Each interview transcript was examined line-by-line within the nVivo 
software. Phrases, lines, or paragraphs were assigned to one or more subthemes within the 
coding framework. Where there was not a suitable subtheme in the coding framework, a new 
subtheme was created. 
 
Multiple iterative cycles were used to move between the coding framework and the data, 
reviewing the data extracts that were coded to each subtheme in the framework in order to 
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ensure that the themes and subthemes represented the interview data. Boyatzis (1998) 
refers to this process as “compare-and-contrast” (p. 42), whereby the information anchored 
within the coding framework from initial open coding is compared and contrasted in order to 
extract differences across the dataset. The coding framework was updated where necessary 
to reflect the data and so consolidation of themes and subthemes continued throughout the 
application of data to the coding framework. Where appropriate, additional subthemes were 
added, and subthemes with very limited data assigned to them were removed. Subthemes 
that contained descriptively or conceptually similar data were merged where appropriate. 
 
The transcripts were worked through across sampling groups, rather than coding all of the 
psychiatrists’ interviews first, for example. The aim of this process was to ensure that the 
spread of data was considered at all times, particularly when updating the coding framework. 
A further aim of this coding approach was to focus on diagnostic practices rather than on 
making potentially artificial divides between participant groups. The same coding framework 
was applied to all the data from each of the sampling groups in order to deliberately consider 
the different uses and experiences of diagnosis alongside each other, as well as to explore 
the ways in which these uses interact across the clinician and service user groups. Constant 
comparative methods were used at each analytic stage (Glaser & Strauss, 1967); a constant 
re-reading of data and comparison of codes to data, data to codes, and codes to codes 
(Charmaz, 2006) to best fit the coding framework to the data. The constant comparative 
methods helped abstract the analysis from descriptive to explanatory accounts. 
 
4.4.5.7 Moving to explanatory accounts of the data 
 
Where the initial open coding and the coding framework described the processes and 
practices within the data, the process of coding all of the interviews according to the coding 
framework helped to move the analysis from descriptive to explanatory accounts of the data. 
Spencer and colleagues (2003, p. 213) describe this as the “analytic hierarchy” in which 
analysis moves from data management, to descriptive accounts, and finally to explanatory 
accounts consisting of increasingly refined, abstracted concepts, with which data is 
associated in order to create meaning. An iterative process was used throughout the 
consolidation of the codes from the open coding, the coding of interviews using the coding 
framework, and the later analysis. 
 
Repeatedly moving between data and the analytic concepts emerging from the consolidation 
of the coding framework allowed further movement from descriptive to explanatory accounts 
of the data. Spencer and colleagues’ (2003) process of moving from data management to 
descriptive accounts, to explanatory accounts was used in the iterative analysis approach. 
Data management created initial themes, labelled data, and sorted data by themes and 
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subthemes.  Descriptive accounts emerged through assigning the interview data to themes 
to convey meaning, refined categories, and distilled abstract concepts.  
 
In order to produce explanatory accounts of the data, preliminary thematic maps (Braun & 
Clarke, 2006) were used to visually map out the data to examine cross-cutting themes and 
analytical concepts across the dataset and the coding framework, in combination with the log 
of reflections kept throughout the analytic process. Patterns were identified across the data, 
and used to develop explanations for the findings. These explanatory accounts were used to 
move beyond the data assigned to the coding framework to use the data to answer the 
theory questions outlined in Section 2.6.5, and to seek application to wider theory and policy.  
 
Having coded the data and examined the themes across participant groups, this allowed the 
analysis to situate clinicians’ and service users’ uses of psychiatric diagnosis within the 
context of how the other participant groups understood diagnostic concepts. Coding and 
conducting analysis across participant groups enabled an examination of the relational 
aspect between different participant groups’ conceptualisations and uses of diagnosis, and 
the tensions between these. To reflect these findings, a concept was developed regarding 
the travel of psychiatric diagnosis from clinicians to service users, and beyond into different 
social worlds. In order to represent this central conceptual finding, it was decided that the 
findings would be best presented within chapters that focused on first, clinicians, and 
second, service users, in order to reflect the different uses and conceptualisations of 
psychiatric diagnosis between these groups. A third findings chapter was included between 
these chapters to explicitly represent the travel of diagnosis between clinicians and services, 
service users, and other social worlds, through an examination of the recording of psychiatric 
diagnoses. The descriptive themes generated from the open coding and coding framework 
phases of analysis were reorganised according to these three domains in order to develop 
the explanatory accounts presented in each of the following chapters. Examples of the 
themes and subthemes reorganised within the three domains of findings – 1) clinicians, 2) 
the travel of psychiatric diagnosis, and 3) service users – can be found in Appendices 13, 
14, and 15, respectively.  
 
The names of themes and subthemes within these domains were refined during the write up 
of the findings chapters in order to produce a coherent explanatory narrative within each 
chapter. 
 
4.4.5.8 Presentation of interview analysis findings within the thesis 
 
The three domains described above are represented by the following interview findings 
chapters: 
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1. Diagnostic practices used by clinicians in the individual assessment setting: Findings 
presented in this chapter. 
2. The travel of psychiatric diagnosis beyond the clinic through formal records: Findings 
presented in Chapter 6. 
3. The ways in which service users take up and use (or do not use) their diagnoses: 
Findings presented in Chapter 7. 
 
These three domains that were derived from the analysis of interview data are presented in 
the thematic map in Figure 4-2, on the following page. This figure illustrates the three 
domains alongside the themes and subthemes presented in the three findings chapters. A 
wider thematic map incorporating all the themes and subthemes from the findings of the five 
empirical chapters within this thesis is shown at the end of Chapter 2 (Figure 2-2). 
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4.5 Findings 
 
The following findings section presents data specific to the first area described above: 
diagnostic practices used by clinicians in the individual assessment setting. 
 
These findings will demonstrate that diagnoses are used within clinical assessments for 
functions such as pattern recognition, a road map for interventions, and for communication, 
documentation and referrals. Throughout the process of the individual clinical assessment, 
diagnoses are used as prototypical rules of thumb, offering clinicians a heuristic approach to 
assessment and management of clients’ distress. These broad uses of diagnosis simplify 
thinking about mental distress; yet, within each of these functions diagnosis has limitations. 
Heuristics are fallible, and more individualised information is needed, particularly for 
treatment planning and for understanding complex cases. 
 
A range of explicit clinical uses of psychiatric diagnosis was reported. Pattern recognition, 
intervention planning, and communication, including record keeping and making referrals, 
are described below. The use of diagnosis was often described pragmatically, such that 
diagnostic categories were applied in flexible ways depending on what the clinician felt 
would benefit the individual the most. The purpose of diagnosis as informing, enabling, or 
otherwise justifying treatment and intervention was seen as an integral function. For 
example, diagnosis was described as in and of itself not making a difference without the 
additional pathways that it might open up: “it helps tell people what’s wrong with you, it helps 
to inform, but at the end of the day…giving them a fancy diagnosis doesn’t really explain 
things to them, doesn’t heal their pain at all” (GP 3). Another participant stated, “…it’s a 
balance…are you going to able, actually be able to offer some specific treatment for this, 
otherwise it’s kind of pointless to make a diagnosis…” (Psychiatrist 10).  
 
The value of diagnoses was identified in clinicians’ descriptions of what it enables, “rather 
than the exercise being just making the diagnosis for its sake” (Psychiatrist 11): 
 
I suppose I’m thinking at the back of my head about what would be useful so I’d 
want to give somebody a label or a formulation if I thought it was gonna help with 
planning treatment, or understanding prognosis and outcomes… (Psychiatrist 1) 
 
The findings section explores these uses of psychiatric diagnosis reported by clinicians. The 
themes and subthemes are illustrated by the thematic map in Figure 4-2, above, and the 
organisation of the findings is shown in Table 4-5 on the following page. Each of the themes 
is explored in detail below. 
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Table 4-5 
Outline of themes and subthemes 
 
Pattern recognition 
Intuitive prototypes 
Limitations of a prototypical approach 
Variability across clinicians 
Difficulty applying diagnostic criteria 
Intervention and treatment planning 
A ‘road map’ for intervention planning 
Diagnosis as a rule of thumb for severity 
Diagnosis as a rule of thumb for cause 
Incorporating causes of distress 
Understandability and ‘proper’ mental health difficulties 
Individual presentations as indicators for cause and intervention 
Social factors and trauma 
Diagnostic attempts to manage complexity 
Using formulation to explain distress and account for non-diagnostic 
difficulties 
Communication between professionals 
Referrals 
 
 
4.5.1 Pattern recognition 
 
Clinicians discussed a need to group individuals or their difficulties in order to identify which 
pathway to follow for the next steps beyond assessment; “you need to have some idea of 
how you want to class it, to group it together” (Psychiatrist 10). Assessment is used to “build 
up a picture” (GP 9) of clients’ experiences, and clinicians described identifying patterns over 
time, rather than a momentary ‘snapshot’. Diagnosis was seen as not simply gathering a list 
of symptoms or experiences, but was described as providing a formalised way of 
recognising patterns. 
 
Clinicians’ descriptions of straightforward assessments reflected the identification of 
patterns. For example, clinicians recognised a “neat presentation” (Psychologist 7) of 
difficulties that fit within a familiar or typical pattern that they had seen before. Such a pattern 
might represent a “classical case” (Psychiatrist 13) where, “on examination they had erm, 
features that all fitted with a particular pattern and nothing that erm was ambiguous, or didn’t 
fit” (Psychiatrist 7). A straightforward case to assess might not necessarily represent mild 
difficulties; clinicians described more severe presentations often being easier to identify 
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owing to less ambiguity; “in some ways a more easy to assess case might be somebody 
who is quite acutely psychotic because it becomes quite apparent quite quickly” (Psychiatrist 
5). A good response to a particular package of treatment or intervention was included within 
recognised patterns; “it almost makes it easier if it’s a psychotic illness and you treat them 
for that and so they get better…it adds to the evidence” (Psychiatrist 10). 
 
4.5.1.1 Intuitive prototypes 
 
Pattern recognition was represented by clinicians both as matching difficulties to diagnostic 
criteria and in recognising similar presentations that have been seen. Diagnostic criteria 
initially offer ‘pre-set’ patterns on which clinicians base their own clinical experience. As this 
develops, their reliance on the patterns within diagnostic criteria is superseded by those 
recognised from their own experience: “…when you have worked enough years and have 
seen enough people presenting with the same sorts of presentations, the same sorts of 
patterns, then this is your clinical knowledge making sense of these repetitive patterns of 
symptoms and behaviours” (Psychiatrist 4). 
 
As clinicians became familiar with these patterns, the ways that they spoke about 
assessment of clients used descriptions more closely associated with their internal 
representations of patterns, rather than checking off diagnostic criteria against a manual 
such as the ICD-10. A broad assessment of diagnosis was described as “intuitive” process 
(Psychiatrist 10). Clinicians described getting “a feeling” (e.g. GP 9, Psychiatrists 2 & 7) or a 
“sense” (GP 6) of an individual’s difficulties. Psychiatrists described a process of “hom[ing] in 
on the bits that seem important” (Psychiatrist 11): 
 
Sometimes you can get quite a strong feel for a diagnosis but not necessarily be so 
conscious of what it is behind that that’s making you er, it’s probably, I think it’s it’s 
probably something that comes out of developing expertise, you know I think erm, 
you do tend to build up a kind of erm, internally held representation of what 
something looks like and sort of match things to that rather than being there kind of 
looking at your ICD-10 criteria and matching whether someone fits that. (Psychiatrist 
7) 
 
I might hold a template of ICD-10 in my head…so often as you're speaking to 
somebody, who, it’s fairly clear which of those you're, you're looking at, erm, I think 
it’s a bit like er, a driving test in some ways, you know, you, you learn in one way to 
pass the test and then obviously you, you learn where you can take shortcuts and 
erm, speed things up a little bit, you know, those rules of thumb and things that, not 
always completely reliable but, erm, quite accurate most of the time (Psychiatrist 9) 
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Echoing the use of intuitive prototypes of diagnostic criteria, GPs described much less 
reliance on specific diagnostic criteria, and some acknowledged being unfamiliar with current 
versions of diagnostic classification: “I don't know the, the ICD classifications, but I do know 
they are, you know, quite finicky, and I don't, I don't think there’s a, there’s a great value in 
that, at the level I’m working, you know…because I’m, a generalist, and, and that's, that's my 
speciality” (GP 2). Other GPs stated, “…I’m not, it’s not something that I, I you know I’ve 
heard of them [ICD diagnostic criteria] but I don’t use them, erm, I’m not, not using them, I’m 
using good old fashioned ears and eyes” (GP 3) and “I haven't even looked at DSM-5, I 
haven't looked at diagnostic things for years, I just know there are certain symptom patterns 
that seem to link to certain things, and certain management approaches” (GP 5). 
 
GPs tended to value this intuitive method of recognition, whilst some acknowledged that it is 
“not clinically based evidence or anything” (GP 6), and “probably isn’t very scientific” (GP 9). 
Clinicians’ recognition of patterns of distress is therefore assisted by, but not reliant upon, 
diagnostic criteria; instead these skills are developed through clinical experience. 
 
4.5.1.2 Limitations of a prototypical approach 
 
4.5.1.2.1 Variability across clinicians 
 
Prototypes by definition reduce data, smoothing away complexities and individual 
differences. However, an issue was raised regarding the variability of prototypes between 
clinicians. Psychiatrist 2, for example, spoke about the category of ‘schizoaffective disorder’, 
introduced to manage the overlapping boundary between the diagnoses of schizophrenia 
and affective disorder categories. He described how clinicians, depending on their 
standpoint, might come to have differing representations of this diagnosis, and the 
implications for reliability across clinicians. Psychiatrist 7 spoke about how differing 
prototypes might be developed across clinicians dependent on the experience they had had: 
 
…in the large part it’s probably not problematic, but it would perhaps depend a bit on 
the experience you’d had. If you’d seen atypical clusters of patients the prototype 
you build might be – so provided you’ve had a kind of broad range of kind of, and 
experience and also standard, you know worked in standard psychiatric settings as 
well then probably that’s, that’s helpful, but if you’ve only ever worked with patients 
within a very narrow range say, and done most of your training within a forensic 
setting or a learning disabilities setting or something you might find that assessment 
in other situations, it wasn’t good to rely on those kind of prototypes (Psychiatrist 7) 
 
Psychiatrist 10 and one of the GPs supported this idea of a non-representative prototype as 
a result of a particular kind of experience: 
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I think probably as forensic psychiatrists our view’s a little bit skewed perhaps, and 
we’d probably want to diagnose more schizophrenia than anything else, erm, and it’s 
probably because we are able to treat it as well, erm, so, not saying that it’s right, 
but, it’s probably one of the things that we tend to do (Psychiatrist 10) 
 
One GP acknowledged a link between social deprivation and mental distress, and how their 
patient population may therefore influence diagnoses: 
 
…it depends on your patient population, you know, I work in a very deprived area, 
and every other person I see has depression you know, so maybe I’m getting to the 
point where I may be under-diagnosing the mild ones because there are just so 
many moderate ones to follow up, moderate to severe (GP 8) 
 
Some of the psychologists interviewed noted the differences in the ways that some 
psychiatrists used diagnosis, with two wondering whether the diagnosis given depended on 
the clinician’s “personal choice” (Psychologist 3), and how “there’s kind of certain people 
who diagnose certain things all the time, erm, kind of have their favourites” (Psychologist 9).  
 
4.5.1.2.2 Difficulty applying diagnostic criteria 
 
Clinicians cited examples of people’s difficulties not fitting neatly within diagnostic criteria or 
typical patterns. For GPs, these examples were not necessarily of more complex difficulties, 
but were difficult because they existed on the threshold of diagnostic criteria. In these 
examples, clients would discuss feeling “low from time to time”, with some anxiety and 
“fleeting” thoughts of suicide, but “it’s not…ticking all the criteria for depression or anxiety, so 
then in that situation, it’s, it’s a bit more er, difficult to come to a proper…you're kind of 
uncertain about what's going on” (GP 7). Psychiatrists, by contrast, cited presentations 
where there were multiple difficulties across diagnostic categories; “just kind of chaoticness 
initially…it could be fitting a number of different things” (Psychiatrist 10). Clinicians discussed 
uncertain or grey areas between diagnoses that made the categories at times difficult to 
apply in clinical practice, such as where blurred boundaries occur between two diagnostic 
categories: 
 
…people don’t fit neatly into sort of categorical things, we’re trying to make 
categories of things that are often dimensional, I think, and if people don’t, you have 
to kind of do something with that, that dissonance or that uncertainty (Psychiatrist 7) 
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People’s experiences might meet the criteria for several diagnoses, and there may be 
disagreement between clinicians’ regarding a diagnosis, despite the person’s needs being 
clear: 
 
…sometimes you think that the diagnosis doesn't matter, because you understand 
the person, so you know what the person needs, and if you just look at the needs, 
erm, there’s not going to be much difference [in clinicians’ opinions] about 
assessments because people will broadly agree that this person needs interventions 
for erm, their vulnerability, or their lack of assertive skills, but if you look at the 
diagnosis then we might have different ideas, so diagnosis can be sometimes 
unhelpful (Psychiatrist 13) 
 
4.5.2 Intervention and treatment planning 
 
Much of the analysis of clinicians’ uses of diagnosis related to intervention and treatment 
planning, which is discussed in this theme. Diagnosis was used as a heuristic or ‘rule of 
thumb’, as an initial guide to care planning, however clinicians described how individualised 
information was also needed in order to plan and make such decisions. Subthemes relating 
to these ideas will be discussed. 
 
4.5.2.1 A ‘road map’ for intervention planning 
 
Clinicians described using diagnoses to inform the next steps for intervention, as a “rough 
guide” (Psychiatrist 2), “road map” (Psychiatrist 5) or a “starting point” (Psychiatrist 3) for 
intervention planning. As one GP remarked, “we’re so used to the structure we have, like if 
you've got this lot of symptoms, you do this, which I do use to an extent” (GP 1). The 
formalised nature of diagnostic categories was seen as providing a ‘structured’ link between 
assessment and management (Psychiatrist 11). Without this “scaffolding” (Psychiatrist 5), 
some clinicians felt that assessments would be “woolly” (Psychiatrists 6, 8, and 11), and 
could result in “hesitant” treatment planning (Psychiatrist 8). Clinicians used diagnosis as an 
indication of the prediction of the course of a person’s difficulties, with implications for longer-
term interventions, “I suppose also sometimes prognosis of things as well, kind of what 
pattern might come up in the future, as well, so I suppose it’s a useful broad brush” 
(Psychiatrist 5). 
 
4.5.2.2 Diagnosis as a rule of thumb for severity 
 
Clinicians described using broader categories of diagnoses, sometimes groups of difficulties 
that would incorporate several different diagnostic categories. Such groups of diagnoses 
were used in broad ways to give an indication of severity of difficulties, and therefore 
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management; “if we do know that somebody's got a severe mental illness, as by definition, 
any psychotic illness really, we do know that they need on-going follow-up in the community” 
(Psychiatrist 3). The GPs described referring to secondary care all new presentations that 
met a particular threshold of risk and/or a group of diagnoses seen as more complex and 
needing confirmation and further input from specialist services. These difficulties included 
presentations of psychosis and suspected bipolar disorder: “…the only diagnosis I would be 
completely erm, definitive about would be depression, but mainly we would leave definitive 
diagnoses to psychiatrists” (GP 1). Others stated: 
 
We would look after most of erm, our patients who’ve got mental health problems in 
the community, we would only refer on those that we cannot manage, or we’re 
unsure of diagnosis, erm, you know or obviously risk, of self-harm (GP 9). 
 
…my diagnosis is more mainly related to anxiety, depression, personality, stress and 
things like that, but if I’m worried about this person who’s having thought disorder, 
hallucination, erm, might have got some psychotic symptoms, erm, then definitely 
there needs to be, referred to the secondary care (GP 10) 
 
…most of them are…like you know, depression or anxiety ones, we do that…as well 
like well post traumatic stress disorder, so these kind of conditions, I can confidently 
diagnose, I don't have to refer them to a psychiatrist for that (GP 6) 
 
Reflecting the use of broad groups of difficulties that may encompass several diagnoses, 
GPs talked about the overlapping nature of mild to moderate problems such as depression 
and anxiety; “I don't distinguish between depression and anxiety because they usually just 
come together” (GP 1). Frequently GPs managed social difficulties alongside these 
problems (these are explored further in Section 4.5.2.4.3, below, Social factors and trauma); 
one GP described being comfortable to hold that ‘mishmash’ (GP 4), which reflected the 
general approach of GPs in managing a wide range of more common or lower severity 
difficulties in the community, alongside social problems. 
 
4.5.2.3 Diagnosis as a rule of thumb for cause 
 
Although diagnoses are deliberately atheoretical and do not contain information about the 
cause of problems, except in specific cases such as PTSD, clinicians described using broad 
groups of diagnoses as a heuristic for identifying the cause of a problem, and therefore 
guiding its management. One example was of understanding some diagnostic categories to 
be biologically caused compared with others that were seen as more related to life 
experiences, “I do believe that there are a series of mental health problems that probably are 
biologically driven” (Psychiatrist 12): 
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I think we have some very clear cut, I think, biological illnesses, and then and then 
there are others that are much more likely to be psychological, and then there’s a 
whole range of, that are kind of in between. So for example if I looked at the, what 
we now describe as the psychotic illnesses, schizophrenia and bipolar, particularly 
bipolar type I, which presents with a more severe manic type of episodes, er, in my 
view these are biological illnesses… the treatment emphasis would be very much 
biological in my mind because we think the origin is very biological, and similarly if 
you looked at the other end of the spectrum for example, the personality disorders 
where we think the aetiology is likely to be largely psychological or psychosocial in 
origin, then the emphasis of treatment with biological treatments is less so really… 
there are exceptions always… but as a rule of thumb that’s kind of, that’s my guiding 
principle (Psychiatrist 2) 
 
4.5.2.4 Incorporating causes of distress 
 
Causal information, in addition to that which may be assumed within diagnostic criteria as 
above, was valued in building and recognising a pattern of distress and planning a 
subsequent intervention. Clinicians identified being able to establish a clear intervention plan 
as making a case straightforward to assess and manage. Seeing an obvious cause for the 
difficulties was an important factor; clinicians described discrete, specific difficulties with a 
clear cause and “without the complexity of social issues around them” (Psychologist 3). For 
example, GPs described cases of stress, low mood or anxiety, and there being a focus for 
intervention owing to a clear triggering factor, for example personal problems such as a 
failing business (GP 3) or termination of pregnancy (GP 10).  
 
4.5.2.4.1 Understandability versus ‘proper’ mental health difficulties 
 
Reflecting a rule of thumb or heuristic approach to treatment options, some GPs discussed 
using causal information outside of diagnostic criteria to untangle the ‘understandable’ from 
the ‘un-understandable’. This information was used to direct the next steps for intervention. 
Where there were clear indicators of the cause of distress, for example, family difficulties, 
bereavement, or otherwise understandable triggers as the cause of low mood, counselling or 
other support might be offered. However, these cases were compared with difficulties seen 
as not understandable, not externally caused or triggered, which were characterised as 
“actual depression” (GP 9) or other mental illnesses, and therefore biologically caused. 
These difficulties were seen as requiring medication and/or further psychiatric support:  
 
…when we see the patients we have to sort of like erm, filter it out, which are a 
general mental health problem, or which could be just a reaction to certain things 
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which happen, you know for example, erm, some people will have problems at their 
work or they have changed their job, so it’s more like adjustment problem rather than 
the actual mental health problem, OK, we don't start them on er, medication which 
we, which we do for our patients who suffer from proper depression or anxiety, but 
yes they do need some help in terms of like, you know, counselling and some time 
off work, you know, things like that, so, so, so that's the filtering out, so once we 
have sorted out well, that's just a reaction, reactional situation condition (GP 6) 
 
These taken-for-granted understandings, however, were not consistent across GPs. One 
GP, for example, discussing low mood in the context of social deprivation and environmental 
factors, said they would still diagnose understandable difficulties: “…no I would definitely 
diagnose it as depression, erm, it’s just that the management of it, or how I follow it up may 
be different… I’d still diagnose it, erm, just access different services” (GP 8). 
 
4.5.2.4.2 Individual presentations as indicators for cause and intervention 
 
Diagnoses offer a recognised pattern against which to match a person’s difficulties, and 
heuristic information about prognosis and the cause of distress which signposts towards 
interventions. However, care plans were often predicated on the particular ‘symptom profiles’ 
and experiences of the individual. Clinicians described the individual factors that give nuance 
to their assessments and steer them towards particular individualised care plans, 
“medication is tailored according to the individual”, “you have to treat…the person” 
(Psychiatrist 8), “it’s more a needs-based assessment and you know, what's right for the 
patient really when they come in” (Psychiatrist 3) and “at the end of the day, you’re dealing 
with whoever’s sitting there in front of you” (GP 9). 
 
For example, clinicians acknowledged heterogeneity within diagnostic categories, whereby 
people with the same diagnosis may have very different experiences or patterns of 
difficulties, prominent features, or specifiers. Some clinicians described recognising different 
‘groups’ of clients within the same diagnostic category that had different trajectories or 
presentations; “you're going to have sub-types…in everything…we want to kind of group 
people together because it’s easier to manage” (Psychiatrist 10): 
 
…if I think of the people on my caseload with depression…I might just say they've all 
got depression, some of them erm, have got severe depression, some of them have 
got psychotic depression, some of them have got predominant sort of, you know, 
neurotic type presentations, some of them have clearly got personality issues, erm, 
so there’s, there’s quite a range within that group of depressed people, erm, that 
when I…input their diagnosis onto the computer, that doesn't go on there, but I 
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suppose when I’m thinking about them, I know I've got certain sort of groups, even 
within the depression group. (Psychiatrist 6) 
 
Identifying different causes within a diagnostic category was most frequently described 
within the context of a diagnosis of depression. This diagnosis is perhaps a more mixed or 
heterogeneous diagnosis in terms of its taken-for-granted understandings about cause, with 
more scope for incorporating other, contextual, factors: “…so I’m kind of teasing out and 
understanding the bit about are there some other things that might be explaining this 
presentation that isn't an illness thing?” (Psychiatrist 12). Psychiatrists and GPs discussed 
what were described as biological symptoms of depression (e.g. Psychiatrists 2, 6, GPs 1, 
9). These inferences often related back to using intuitive prototypes (Section 4.5.1.1, above) 
developed through clinical experience: 
 
…it’s hard to describe, but you get a kind of feeling from someone, where there’s 
just such heaviness erm, and, and, and complete lack of er, kind of, expressed 
emotion, you know, there’s just a heaviness and a deadness about someone who 
seems organic, but that's just, I mean there’s er, that's just my own kind of feeling… 
(GP 1, describing what they called ‘organic’ depression, compared with depression 
related to social circumstances) 
 
Clinicians described prescribing medication for these sorts of more ‘biological’ presentations, 
and seeing a good outcome from this type of intervention, “I got quite used to being good at 
predicting who would respond to antidepressants…and you could literally put money on it” 
(Psychiatrist 11). The same psychiatrist, however struggled to see what that presentation 
[“later middle aged men...with a very biological depression”] had in common with mood 
problems “secondary to something else, either a life event, or say an eating disorder”, 
despite both meeting the criteria for depression. 
 
4.5.2.4.3 Social factors and trauma 
 
Using their clinical experience, clinicians described developing patterns of difficulties that 
incorporated individual information that is not contained within diagnostic criteria. Such 
factors were often important in differentiating between straightforward and complex 
assessments. Psychiatrist 11 described recognising such patterns, “I sometimes say with my 
teams, I, I've seen one of these before”, such as eating distress within the context of a 
turbulent relationship between separated or divorced parents, school absence or bullying. 
Some clinicians remarked that despite having useful functions, individuals’ diagnostic labels 
did not represent “the uniqueness of their difficulties” (Psychiatrist 5). 
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In the context of multiple social difficulties, including traumatic and adverse experiences, the 
diagnostic label was seen by some as becoming somewhat meaningless; “I could construct 
a diagnosis of depression in the middle of that, but I don't think that would be terribly helpful, 
erm, because it would be ignoring…just a million other things that were going on in his life” 
(GP 4). Clinicians described how contextualising a person’s distress could offer a greater 
understanding of what was going on, and the ways that this context could inform patterns of 
the course of a person’s difficulties: 
 
I don't think a diagnostic label, as often as not, it’ll, it labels them with something that 
is not helpful because they're called schizoaffective or this, or that, or bipolar, when 
actually if you find out what their life was like, that's much more revealing than the 
label they've been given… (GP 5) 
 
…so if somebody was erm, hallucinating, then, then I would kind of have in my mind 
that that's more likely to be erm, a biological problem…that might lead me to a 
diagnosis but it wouldn’t be the thing that I would think would have the greatest 
impact on outcome for the patient, so I would be more interested in, have you got a 
job, who’s at home, are they giving you hassle, erm, you know, are you likely to act 
on this voice that er, rather than, well that symptom means you've got this disorder, 
and therefore this is the outcome… (Psychiatrist 12) 
 
Layers of complexity included multiple difficulties that might fall within more than one 
diagnostic category, as well as further complicating non-diagnostic factors such as additional 
drug or alcohol abuse, and social, environmental, or other difficult experiences, including 
poverty and trauma: 
 
I do have patients who, who, who have got an education, have got a job, erm, and, 
and have a period of depression, erm, where, where you know, it’s, it’s er, it comes 
out of the text book, and, and, and er, I can diagnose depression, I can prescribe an 
antidepressant, I can encourage them to take part in an exercise programme, I can 
encourage them to take part in counselling, and then they get better, er, but that's 
not, I think in, in, in deprivation, where often there’s the greatest concentration of 
people who have got a much more substantial, complex erm, problems, the 
diagnostic criteria erm, are, are too restricting… and the patients’ responses are not 
erm, er, just don't match the, the expectation of…diagnostic classification (GP 2) 
 
…all of the social issues that people might be experiencing, that might be 
contributing to their difficulties, and poverty, or being cold, not having enough money 
to put the heating on, or, not having a job, or your family’s not talking to you, or 
you're using drugs, none of that's captured in the psychiatric label (Psychologist 1) 
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Clinicians described three broad categories of these difficulties - social problems, 
experiences of trauma, and drug and alcohol use - however they were typically reported 
together. Social problems that complicated assessment were often described as long-term 
consequences of people having “not great lives” (GP 8), “bad upbringings” (GP 2), or 
spending time in care as a child (Psychiatrist 1). Financial problems and being unemployed 
were frequently described, as well as unstable living situations, including seeking asylum. 
Trauma, frequently repeated experiences of which, was discussed often. Long histories of 
trauma (Psychologist 10), witnessing domestic violence (GP 2), and physical attacks 
(Psychologist 3) were described, and childhood abuse mentioned and alluded to often. 
Clinicians tended to associate traumatic and difficult histories with multiple psychiatric 
problems. In reporting these types of additional difficulties together, clinicians frequently 
made links between these experiences in terms of their causal impact. For example, 
associations between experiencing early and long histories of difficult lives with drug and 
alcohol use in order to cope with these experiences and the toll they took on individuals’ 
mental health and social situation, “…this was a person who just had year after year 
of…appalling experiences…and surprise, surprise, he got drug and alcohol problems er, he 
had difficulty with relationships, erm, you know, couldn't cope with holding down a job” (GP 
2). Clinicians described difficulty identifying the cause of problems and consequently, on 
establishing a treatment plan, because the picture was often longstanding, multi-layered, 
and difficult to untangle:  
 
I suppose that when you've kind of got layers of complexity erm, as opposed to a 
more discreet sort of recent onset of problems, so I suppose yeah, I guess if there’s 
been difficulties for a long time, often you kind of need to go into a lot more depth 
and detail to try and understand kind of the hows and whys of why the person’s 
experiencing the problem at this point in time… (Psychiatrist 5) 
 
There was less of a focus on diagnosis as people’s difficulties were described as so complex 
that it was not generally possible to assign only one diagnosis. Other factors play a much 
more significant role: 
 
…in many ways I've moved away from worrying too much about a single 
diagnosis…often, people here, like I say, they, they will have a psychotic disorder 
but that's often not the particular problem, you know, that's often the easy part to 
treat, erm, you know, and it’s everything else, the, the sort of the individual 
underneath who’s often had a very difficult life and quite damaged by that, erm, 
personality problems, substance misuse problems, and a lack of understanding of 
those sorts of difficulties, it’s often those that are keeping people here (Psychiatrist 
9) 
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4.5.2.5 Diagnostic attempts to manage complexity 
 
Clinicians from each group observed the ways that diagnosis is used to contain people’s 
difficulties, and the limitations of this use were acknowledged. As GP 4 described, “that is my 
worry...we use diagnoses to, to cover up our, yes, er, to ignore the complexities and cover 
up the shortcomings of the things that we’re, we’re doing”; by applying a ‘generic’ diagnostic 
category, the individual differences, and therefore complexities, are contained within a 
familiar, recognised diagnosis. One psychiatrist explained their expertise in diagnosis being 
used by others in the multidisciplinary team as a means of consolidating unclear 
presentations that may have aspects of various different difficulties, “so I kind of get drafted 
into being the containing thing” (Psychiatrist 12). Whilst this simplification of difficulties may 
appear to offer clinical utility, others described the limited implications for intervention: 
 
…it felt a bit like this kind of almost like a wish to contain some of the anxiety around 
complexity, so I think the reason we weren’t sure it was going to be terribly helpful is 
that it was a bit like, you know if they, if we’d done an IPDE [International Personality 
Disorder Assessment] and there was a label somehow it would take all the difficulty 
away, and I think that does happen quite a lot with diagnosis, you know that people 
have multiple assessments and multiple reports that say oh no it’s not this it’s this, 
but it doesn’t really get you much further in terms of your intervention… 
(Psychologist 4, describing a request for an IPDE to be carried out) 
 
…the tribunal wanted to know whether it was personality disorder or mental illness, 
they wanted a definitive diagnosis. So, we spend a long time trying to write this 
report, saying it doesn’t actually matter what the diagnosis is, it’s more about the risk 
and it would be very hard to come down one way or the other… (Psychologist 3) 
 
Clinicians described diagnostic categories as at times prohibiting further efforts to 
understand the individual or explore their experiences. Where a diagnostic category is used 
to contain a person’s complex difficulties, it was suggested that this might limit further 
attempts to understand the person; “…we could just call this dementia, but I almost feel if we 
do that, it will stop me trying to get to the bottom of what's going on for her” (Psychiatrist 6). 
As well as overlooking additional experiences such as systemic or environmental factors, as 
reported above, clinicians described the potential for diagnostic overshadowing (Section 
1.3.2.2.1), overlooking experiences or ‘symptoms’ that do not fit within the given diagnostic 
category. This can even affect clinicians who do not generally make diagnoses but still 
encounter them, for example in referral letters: 
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I think sometimes when people are diagnosed, you miss other stuff that's going on, 
erm, so if you've got in mind, oh this person’s psychotic, and you're looking to give 
them that diagnosis, you might miss other stuff that's going on for them like they 
might be dissociating, for example… (Psychologist 10) 
 
Alternatively extraneous experiences that do not seem to fit the category might be minimised 
in order to create certainty or separation into a label or category. For example, experiences 
of hallucinations additional to a diagnosis of personality disorder might be minimised as 
‘pseudo-hallucinations’: 
 
There’s a lot of talk about kind of pseudo-hallucinations versus hallucinations, and 
sometimes erm, it can feel like erm, clinicians are trying to erm, fit people into 
diagnostic categories and sort of play down the symptoms that don’t fit neatly into a 
particular diagnosis, so if you had somebody with quite a clear say emotionally 
unstable personality disorder, if they had psychotic symptoms that didn’t fit the kind 
of pattern you might expect from that condition they might sometimes be sort of 
downplayed or dismissed because it doesn’t, doesn’t fit neatly… (Psychiatrist 7) 
 
One psychologist gave an example of the way that diagnostic categories can dominate 
interpretations of a person’s behaviour to such an extent that simpler, alternative 
explanations are not considered. Most of the clients with whom Psychologist 4 worked would 
meet the criteria for borderline and antisocial personality disorder, and one person’s non-
attendance at the program was put down to their diagnoses, risk, and lack of engagement, 
whereas further exploration revealed that they simply struggled to get to the appointments: 
 
…I think the other problem with diagnosis actually is people you know people might 
also be highly anxious, like that example I got of someone might not be coming 
because they’re really terrified of getting on a bus, you know that actually you can 
then forget all the other challenges, you know social and psychological difficulties 
that are around, ‘cause you kind of go ‘oh right ok it’s [the diagnosis]’ and actually it 
might be that and multiple other things… (Psychologist 4) 
 
4.5.2.5.1 Using formulation to explain distress and account for non-diagnostic difficulties 
 
When clinicians gave examples of complex difficulties, frequent mention was made of the 
inter-relatedness of multiple factors. Formulation was at times used to represent the links 
between difficulties, for example, to compensate for where the structure of diagnostic 
classification does not allow for difficulties across multiple diagnostic categories to be 
associated, in terms of either having a causal impact on each other, or by having a common 
cause or mechanism. Diagnostic formulation was at times referred to by psychiatrists. 
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Diagnostic formulation is part of the Royal College of Psychiatrists’ curriculum (Royal 
College of Psychiatrists, 2010) and is predicated on a psychiatric diagnosis. It contains 
further information such as differential diagnoses, causes of distress and prognosis (Royal 
College of Psychiatrists, 2010). This approach is not necessarily used during each 
assessment conducted by psychiatrists:  
 
…the good practice from the Royal College, and internationally, suggests that we 
ought to be looking at those kind of formulations for every case we see, so I think, I 
don’t know I think there’s a, there’s an element of time constraints I think, and bit of 
laziness perhaps, and er just a lack of the appreciation of the importance of it I think. 
(Psychiatrist 2) 
 
…you will find that…there’s no standardisation to that multi-disciplinary you know, 
biopsychosocial formulation, erm, I’m quite fond of it, so I work hard at it, there are 
some really biological psychiatrists I've worked with, who just do their bit, do the 
medicines, they don't believe in psychological nonsense… (Psychiatrist 3) 
 
There was a common idea of seeing formulation as a way of exploring and understanding a 
person’s difficulties and their causes. The evidence from interviews with psychiatrists 
demonstrates that diagnostic formulation is a method of incorporating into assessment the 
factors that diagnosis omits. It was used strategically as a way of supplementing diagnostic 
assessment, in particular the integration of problems or factors not incorporated within a 
diagnostic label, such as risk, additional drug or alcohol abuse, and trauma. Views on 
formulation differed between psychiatrists, with some seeing diagnosis and formulation as 
quite different frameworks for assessment (Psychiatrists 3 & 5). Formulation was described 
by some as a way of acknowledging psychosocial factors that were seen as separate from 
symptoms (e.g. Psychiatrist 3), whereas others saw formulation as bringing together 
different perspectives of a multi-disciplinary team assessment (Psychiatrist 13). Difficulties, 
traits, and symptoms were seen by others as inter-related, and formulation was a way of 
integrating these (Psychiatrist 12). One psychiatrist described their use of diagnostic 
formulation as being a useful strategy for some select clients:  
 
…often they're people who've maybe had quite a lot of adverse life experiences, or I 
feel that there’s other factors in their life that's impacting on the, on the 
diagnosis…the other group where I’d maybe think about more of a narrative or 
formulation is people who are just very complex, and maybe I, I can’t come to a 
conclusion… (Psychiatrist 6) 
 
Although not all psychiatrists who worked in complex care mentioned the use of formulation, 
there was a clear indication from the interview data that by virtue of people’s problems being 
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more complex, and therefore less contained or easily explained within one or more 
diagnostic category, diagnostic formulation was more relied upon in these services: 
 
I think if I was running an acute clinic it would be different, I think if somebody comes 
in with acute problems, it’s probably more useful to have a more precise label, erm, I 
think coming up with a more detailed formulation to the level we do is quite a luxury 
and it takes a lot of time, but that’s necessary because you need all that information 
to decide what’s gonna work (Psychiatrist 1) 
 
Psychiatrist 5 described the difference between diagnosis and formulation as diagnosis 
being a “static thing”, a broad-brush used to label and link in with NICE guidelines, versus 
capturing individual uniqueness and problems specific to the individual within a formulation. 
Psychiatrist 11 described taking the diagnosis as “read” at the start of an assessment, 
followed by using a formulation approach: 
 
…in terms of understanding the case and the specifics of its management, the 
formulation erm, and the individualised elements I, I think are more significant, so, 
we have a framework for working in our treatment model [using the diagnosis], but 
erm, the individual aspects…the understanding of the condition, what has led to, 
what maintains it, what might be the obstacles to treatment and I think are probably 
much more important than the diagnosis itself… (Psychiatrist 11) 
 
One psychologist drew on her experience from working in children’s services to advocate a 
more detailed assessment that explored in depth the different factors involved in such 
complex patterns of difficulties: 
 
I've come across erm, people where they've, you know, they've been through 
services multiple times, and then eventually get to a service where they're 
asking…in much more depth about their relationship style and their relationship 
experiences, and actually thinking mmm, this is much more complex than maybe we 
thought…if you've got their history…certainly when I've worked in…looked after 
children’s services, we would have assessments that would include foster carers, 
social workers, teachers…and we’d have an initial consultation with all those people, 
before we’d decided what we were going to do for the child, and actually that was, 
er, and, it’s, it’s not always easy, but actually that was the way we worked, and that 
really helped because you had a whole picture of the, the person before they came 
to your door really, erm, and I guess I do really like that approach, for, for much 
more complex populations. (Psychologist 6) 
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4.5.3 Communication between professionals 
 
Despite the need for individualised information to make specific care plans for clients, 
diagnosis was valued as the central way of communicating with others beyond the individual 
clinical assessment. Record keeping and referrals are likewise connected by communication 
between professionals. Making client referrals to other services was seen as a particularly 
important use of diagnosis, and this is explored below as a sub-theme of communication.  
 
The brevity of a diagnostic category was seen as a useful communication short hand 
between clinicians by relaying a shared understanding of a pattern: “it kind of encapsulates 
all of that sort of cluster, just into a, you know, sort of single phrase” (Psychiatrist 6), and 
“…diagnosis gives an understanding so that you can share it with other professionals, so 
that they have a baseline” (Psychiatrist 13). A psychologist described: 
 
Although I probably do use [diagnoses] when talking with staff, well I mean I tr, I 
don’t think I use the word schizophrenia any more but I’d be talking about psychotic 
symptoms and that sort of thing, as a way of communicating, I guess. So I don’t 
think I do use the, the diagnosis, well…if we’re going to see, assess someone to see 
whether they’d come in [the service], I might write something like ‘has a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia’ but then I’d always describe how they got that diagnosis, and what 
that diagnosis meant… (Psychologist 3) 
 
GPs noted the limited time available in appointments and the importance of the electronic 
clinical record when service users frequently see different GPs; “I have to be able to rapidly 
check the symptom list and see what else has been said, so I think it’s a cop-out if I don't 
communicate with colleagues by putting somebody into a category” (GP 5). Another stated, 
“it’s important that we all know what’s going on…and if they come in and there’s just a ream 
of symptoms then we can’t quickly pick out the important bits, that will affect patient care” 
(GP 9). 
 
4.5.3.1 Referrals 
 
Clinicians routinely used diagnoses, or a queried diagnosis, for making referrals to mental 
health services: “of course I need to have some kind of working diagnosis, erm, otherwise 
my referral letter will sound [like] gibberish” (GP 6). Another GP remarked, “I’d say these are 
the symptoms, and this is what I think it is, but I want your confirmation, and discussion… 
confirmation of diagnosis and/or management plan, those are the reasons for referring” (GP 
8).  
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Those who focused less on diagnosis in their clinical work described feeling pressured to 
reframe clients’ difficulties diagnostically in order for referrals to be accepted, “I guess the 
benefit of a diagnosis is it can open doors to services” (Psychologist 7): 
 
…there have been occasions when I've er, when, when the men who are here have 
required services from adult mental health services…and in, well I feel in order to 
help them access services, I have put a label to their difficulties… (Psychologist 6) 
 
…there’s almost a need to kind of communicate in diagnostic terms, so that people 
actually get the service that they need…maybe they don't take it as seriously as if it 
says ‘schizophrenia’, so…sometimes it has sort of power for actually ensuring 
people have a service as well… (Psychiatrist 5) 
 
…we’ve had a letter back [from the CMHT] saying…please could you ask the 
consultant in your team to write a [referral] letter including the diagnosis, it wasn’t 
clear from your letter on the patient’s diagnosis, erm so there are instances where 
people are specifically requesting that piece of information erm, when they’ve had 
you know very good formulation-based letters written to them. Sometimes people 
still want that, you know that sort of diagnostic label applied. (Psychiatrist 7) 
 
or for funding to be accessed: 
 
…it felt like if the psychiatrist said ‘he has OCD’, that would help us sort of acquire 
another level of funding, another level of kind of concern, so that’s quite interesting 
really ‘cause it kind of went against all my beliefs and ideas, and it reflects, mostly 
the state of play around funding and service design, and the lack of services for 
people with quite complex presentations, as much as actually my beliefs around 
diagnosis… (Psychologist 11) 
 
Conversely, concern was raised regarding the potentially limiting implications of organising 
service entry by diagnosis: 
 
…mental health services are set up in such a way that we have to put people in boxes 
erm, I find that difficult because of the overriding framework that goes alongside 
that…it’s really difficult to meet young people when they don't meet our criteria but you 
know that they're still really struggling, and, you have to go, they're not for us, erm, 
when you kind of think, we could probably offer them something and just because you 
don't meet our criteria, we've got to now send you to a service that perhaps isn't as 
psychological as ours… (Psychologist 1). 
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4.6 Discussion 
 
This chapter addressed the first and second theoretical questions outlined in Chapter 2 
(Section 2.4.2): 1) what are the conceptual underpinnings of diagnostic categories, and are 
these consistent across contexts and practices? And 2) how are psychiatric diagnostic 
categories used in practice? 
 
The findings have demonstrated that clinicians’ explicit uses of diagnosis include pattern 
recognition, intervention and treatment planning, and communication between professionals, 
including documentation and referrals. Diagnoses offer a prototypical approach to pattern 
recognition, and a heuristic for intervention planning, severity, and cause of distress, despite 
diagnostic categories being atheoretical and without including information about cause. 
However, clinicians reported limitations of this short hand approach, including a need to 
incorporate individualised information within assessments. Diagnoses struggle to contain 
complexity, and clinicians use formulation to develop an understanding of distress and 
psychosocial difficulties, and the inter-relatedness between them. 
 
The following section is structured around the following discussion points: 
• Differences between diagnostic classification as protocol and its use in clinical 
practice 
• Conceptual underpinnings of diagnostic categories 
• Clinical implications 
o Reliability 
o Standardising intervention planning: NICE guidelines 
o Constructing certainty 
o Managing complexity 
• Implications for research and data capture 
 
4.6.1 Differences between diagnostic classification as protocol and its use in 
clinical practice 
 
Reflecting Bowker and Star's (1999) analysis concerning the rift between protocol and 
practice, these findings demonstrate that diagnostic criteria are not applied in the precise 
manner that is intended by the DSM model of diagnosis. Instead, diagnosis is a tool that is 
used flexibly by clinicians. The findings are supported by Brown (1987, p. 40), who 
highlights, “[d]espite the attention which professional leaders give to formal diagnosis, 
practitioners have very personal styles which transcend formal systems”. Highlighting the 
loose application of diagnostic criteria, and the varying uses of diagnosis across services, 
some GPs, as generalists by profession, were comfortable with holding in mind and acting 
upon an uncertain ‘mishmash’ of difficulties. These findings are supported by previous 
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qualitative research concerning the ways in which GPs manage risk, and can be comfortable 
within “this glorious twilight zone of uncertainty” (Dew, Dowell, McLeod, Collings, & Bushnell, 
2005, p. 1189). 
 
The use of idiosyncratically developed prototypes of diagnoses also represents an internal 
conflict between the technological and clinical uses of diagnosis; a tension between general 
pattern recognition and the rules-based approach of the DSM and other diagnostic manuals. 
The finding that clinicians tend to use heuristics developed through experience is supported 
by literature showing that rather than using a criteria-matching approach to diagnosis (Maj, 
2011) as the DSM and ICD intend, clinicians tend to use a prototype approach to assessing 
clients (e.g. Blashfield et al., 2014; Hacking, 2013). Although perhaps more intuitive (Ortigo 
et al., 2010), prototype-matching tends to obscure individual differences, including specific 
experiences and personal meaning. The rules of thumb and prototypical approach used by 
clinicians are reflective of a heuristic reasoning style commonly used to navigate uncertainty, 
and is typically illogical fallible (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Likewise, both diagnostic labels 
and corresponding prototypes give little information about the experiences of the diagnosed 
individuals, such that their clinical utility can be questioned. Psychiatric literature associates 
diagnostic expertise with pattern recognition and cognitive shortcuts (Loveday, Wiggins, 
Festa, Schell, & Twigg, 2013), however this differs from the criterion-based protocol of the 
DSM-5 and the ICD-10. Clinicians described narrowing from broad diagnostic categories that 
signpost and offer heuristic reasoning, to using more detailed, symptom-level focus on a 
person’s difficulties. These findings suggest that diagnosis represents a middle ground of 
detail that may have less utility for clinicians than broader categories or a more granular 
assessment of individualised experiences. 
 
4.6.2 Conceptual underpinnings of diagnostic categories 
 
The conceptual underpinnings of diagnostic categories reflect the taken-for-granted 
understandings (Bowker & Star, 1999) that are embedded within classification systems. The 
findings presented in this chapter illustrated two potentially opposing conceptualisations of 
diagnostic categories. Clinicians might describe diagnoses as a neutral tool with pragmatic 
functions, however there was evidence of implicit aetiological influence in the way that 
diagnoses are discussed. The use of diagnostic categories of explanations for difficulties, 
tied up with ideas about disorder and biological and psychosocial causation is associated 
with their reification as categories. There is a tension, therefore, between diagnostic 
categories as a flexible assessment tool or as a system reflecting natural categories. 
 
A distinction might be drawn between implicit and explicit notions of causality. Explicitly, 
diagnostic classification systems are atheoretical and typically do not refer to cause, 
however, implicitly they support an illness model. Diagnostic categories are seen as a way of 
132 
implicitly explaining distress, rather than a more neutral conceptualisation that might see 
diagnoses as a useful way of describing a person’s difficulties. Beyond this explanation, 
diagnoses are also informally assigned causes that are predominantly biological or 
psychosocial, dependent on where on that spectrum a diagnosis lies. 
 
Likewise, more heterogeneous diagnostic categories such as depression, or broader 
categories of difficulties, perhaps including ‘mild to moderate mental health difficulties’, are 
viewed as understandable responses to life circumstances if social causes are clear, or 
biological in nature if not. These findings suggest that clinicians may default to biological 
notions of cause where psychosocial explanations are not obvious. GPs, for example, 
reported a practice of differentiating between understandable and non-understandable 
distress. The former was contextualised as a response to an external stressor or adversity, 
and the latter seeming to have no such triggers and therefore being seen as biological in 
nature. These different ways of categorising mental distress are supported by the research 
of Clarke and colleagues (2008), who found that despite the terms no longer being used by 
specialists, GPs in Australia differentiated between endogenous and reactive depression 
according to whether or not a situational cause could be identified. Demonstrating further 
variability in the uses of diagnostic categories between clinicians, some of the GPs 
interviewed saw this distinction between understandable and non-understandable as a 
distinction between usual/’normal’ distress and a “proper” mental illness. Others, however, 
as with those clinicians interviewed in Clarke and colleagues’ research, labelled both of 
these informal categories as depression and thus as a clinical disorder. These variations in 
the conceptualisation of mental distress have implications not only for treatment but also for 
labelling of individuals. 
 
These findings suggests that diagnoses might therefore have been seen by some as 
categories reflecting clusters of difficulties represented in nature, rather than developed 
through sociocultural means as a way of conceptualising difficulties. These ideas about the 
diagnosis or ‘disorder’ as causing a person’s difficulties might therefore contribute to the 
reification of psychiatric diagnoses. As outlined in Section 1.3.1.4, it has been argued that 
reification of psychiatric diagnoses as biological categories of illness has led to increased 
medicalization of the problems that are represented by these categories (Bracken et al., 
2012). These understandings may also have implications for the ways that clinicians assess 
people’s difficulties; if psychosocial causes such as trauma are not anticipated due to taken-
for-granted understandings about a diagnosis such as schizophrenia being biologically 
caused, the limitations of the prototype approach suggest that any such causes may be 
overlooked or minimised. 
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4.6.3 Clinical implications 
 
4.6.3.1 Reliability and communication 
 
The purpose of the specific diagnostic criteria incorporated into psychiatric classification 
since the DSM-III was to improve diagnostic reliability between clinicians (Blashfield et al., 
2014; and see Sections 1.3.1.1 and 1.4.1.1 of the Literature Review). However, the use of 
intuitive pattern recognition and internal prototypical representations demonstrates a looser, 
less stringent way of using diagnoses than is directed by the DSM or ICD. These findings 
show that the reliability of diagnostic categories, as they are used in clinical practice, may be 
called into question.  
 
As a consequence, the utility of diagnostic categories as a short hand aid to communication 
has important limitations. Psychologists, for example, remarked that clinicians appeared to 
have their “favourites” as to which diagnoses were used. In view of the evidence around the 
prototypical approach to diagnosis, perhaps these “favourites” might be an implication of 
particular clinicians having a prototype or internally held representation about a diagnosis 
that looks quite different to others’, or perhaps a broader representation such that greater 
numbers of clients fit into it leading to more being given that diagnosis by that clinician. 
Alternatively, clinicians’ uses of familiar labels may meet a need to frame difficulties in a way 
that enables access to a particular type of intervention. Nevertheless, the psychologists’ 
perceptions raise a limitation of the use of heuristic diagnoses for communication where 
other professionals may view the labels as unreliable or meaningless. 
 
4.6.3.2 Standardising intervention planning: NICE guidelines 
 
NICE treatment guidelines are broadly organised by diagnostic category, with an aim of 
standardising interventions available to service users. These guidelines may result in a 
construction of ‘safety’ in clinical practice that perhaps enables or justifies more ‘robust’ drug 
treatment (Psychiatrist 8). However, the NICE guidelines can only standardise treatment to 
the extent that there is high reliability and consistency in the application of diagnostic 
categories against which the guidelines are used. As discussed above, these findings call 
the reliability of diagnosis, and therefore of the standardisation of interventions, into 
question. Furthermore, the findings demonstrate that clinicians utilise extensive 
individualised information in care planning, contributing to idiosyncratic application of the 
guidelines according to individual need. 
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4.6.3.3 Constructing certainty 
 
Where a pattern appears to be very clear, for example where a person’s difficulties clearly 
match diagnostic criteria, or there is an obvious pathway between a triggering event, a 
person’s mood, and a plan for intervention, diagnosis appears to offer clinicians a desirable 
level of certainty or assurance about their clinical work. Highlighting the use of diagnosis as 
providing a sense of certainty, clinicians spoke about diagnosis at times offering order from 
chaos. However, given the limitations of diagnosis that clinicians acknowledged (such as 
needing additional information like specifiers within diagnostic categories, or additional 
information surrounding the diagnostic label), the extent to which diagnosis reduces 
ambiguity must be questioned. The provision of certainty was highlighted as useful 
particularly for straightforward cases that reflected a familiar discrete pattern of difficulties 
that fitted tightly into a diagnosis. However, these cases are typically already characterised 
by a seemingly direct cause, a clear focus for interventions, and a good response to 
treatment. It is therefore important to reflect on the question of what further information to 
reduce uncertainty a diagnosis really offers in these cases. It is suggested that the 
diagnostic category simply confirms a certainty or confidence that is already present. The 
assertion is that the certainty described by clinicians in these cases is derived not from the 
diagnostic categories, but from the clinicians’ own experience and confidence. Furthermore, 
where diagnosis is thought to offer certainty, clinicians frame it positively. However, given 
that humanity and human information processing are characterised by uncertainty, perhaps 
it is this search for fixedness, for discrete categories, in an analogue world (Pilgrim, 2014) 
that is problematic. As can be seen in the data, problematic implications arise when 
diagnostic categories overshadow additional difficulties or more everyday circumstances that 
possibly shed light on the nature of people’s difficulties. The ‘draw’ of certainty may be a 
mirage. 
 
4.6.3.4 Managing complexity 
 
Clinicians’ descriptions of more complex presentations demonstrated a failure of diagnostic 
categories to provide clinical utility. In cases such as these, the diagnostic framework may 
not only fail to provide clinical utility but actively hinder clinicians’ work. The characterisation 
of complex case examples and the difficulty clinicians reported in applying diagnostic 
categories in such cases shows that the separation of difficulties into discrete diagnostic 
categories is problematic. Clinicians employ diagnostic formulation in order to understand 
not only the causal context of difficulties but also the complex reverberations that exist 
between distinct difficulties. In these cases, formulation was viewed as a useful supplement 
to diagnosis because it is better able to represent the inter-relatedness of difficulties. Indeed, 
Mohtashemi and colleagues (2016) found that risk or complexity triggered the use of 
formulation by psychiatrists. Time was also found to be a notable barrier to the use of 
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formulation in psychiatric practice (Mohtashemi et al., 2016). Therefore, the increased use of 
formulation within forensic and other complex care services may also reflect greater time 
and space available for its implementation. 
 
Whilst acknowledging the obvious limitations on the time available in GP appointments, as 
GPs described managing overlapping experiences of distress and additional psychosocial 
difficulties, it may be appropriate to introduce training in psychological formulation for GPs to 
develop clinical skills where diagnoses have limited utility. 
 
4.6.4 Implications for data capture 
 
This chapter has shown that diagnoses are used as prototypical heuristics to guide clinicians 
thinking about distress, its severity, causes, and the interventions they may use to support 
their clients. However, these prototypical guides vary across clinicians, and are therefore not 
reflective of standardised categories applied rigorously wherever clients’ experiences of 
distress closely match the criteria given in the ICD-10 or DSM-5. Routine data capture from, 
for example, electronic health records, is used for outcomes measurement, commissioning, 
and soon payments by results in mental health. However, where diagnosis is the central 
measure of distress, there are clearly limitations in the utility of generalising across 
categories that are heuristically and flexibly applied by clinicians. 
 
4.7 Conclusions 
 
This chapter has used data from interviews with psychiatrists, GPs, and clinical 
psychologists to explore the clinical functions and practices of diagnosis and their conceptual 
underpinnings. The findings demonstrate that clinicians use psychiatric diagnosis for pattern 
recognition, intervention and treatment planning, and communication between professionals. 
Diagnoses provide a heuristic for severity, cause, and intervention planning, through 
prototypical representations developed through clinical experience. This prototypical 
approach has limitations, however, and represents a departure from the criteria-matching 
protocol set out by systems of diagnostic classification, and the reliability of diagnosis and its 
clinical utility is therefore called into question. The variation in use of diagnoses between 
clinicians also has important implications for routine data capture. Diagnostic categories 
carry implicit conceptual understandings of cause and disorder, which are not consistent 
across clinicians. There is a tension between diagnostic categories as a flexible assessment 
tool or as a system reflecting natural categories. There is, similarly, a tension between the 
expectation that expert clinicians will be able to follow the rules and protocols for ‘accurate’ 
diagnosis, and the demands on clinicians to use tools flexibly in the best interests of their 
clients. Diagnoses offer a sense of certainty, however the categories may represent a 
certainty already possessed by clinicians in straightforward cases. Within less 
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straightforward cases, diagnoses struggle to contain complexity, and clinicians use 
formulation to develop an understanding of distress and psychosocial difficulties, and the 
inter-relatedness between them. 
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5 Chapter 5: Assessing how diagnosis is used in mental health 
service entry criteria 
 
5.1 Abstract 
 
The purpose of this chapter was to explore how psychiatric diagnosis is used in the service 
entry and eligibility criteria of NHS adult mental health services, and to identify additional 
non-diagnostic factors upon which criteria are organised. A Freedom of Information request 
was made to each of the 17 NHS adult mental health trusts in the north of England asking 
for this information. Thematic content analysis was used to analyse the textual data. Four 
service types were identified: broadly diagnostic specialist services, non-diagnostic services 
supporting specific problems, services supporting specific life circumstances, and needs-led 
services providing specialist services. The findings demonstrate that diagnosis is used to 
some extent, however, there are also many non-diagnostic factors, including severity and 
impact on functioning, that are central to service entry and eligibility criteria. Diagnosis is 
neither sufficient nor necessary in establishing service entry criteria. Broad clusters of 
difficulties (such as ‘severe and enduring mental illness’) were used over specific diagnostic 
categories, and these clusters appeared to differentiate services on the basis of the 
specialist skills needed to support these difficulties, such that services tend to be 
competency-driven. The findings are discussed in the context of the Mental Health Act 
(1983, 2007), and clinical and research implications raised, including the ways in which 
innovative pathways are developed, and the need for an empirical method to explore where 
and when non-diagnostic versus diagnostic models would best meet clients’ needs. 
 
5.2 Introduction 
 
The interview data analysed in the previous chapter demonstrated that clinicians use 
diagnostic categories as broad heuristics or rules of thumb to guide pattern recognition and 
the management of service users’ distress. However, there are limitations to this approach, 
including the need for more individualised information about clients. 
 
The findings of the previous chapter showed that clinicians valued the use of psychiatric 
diagnoses in order to make referrals and gain access to other mental health services for 
their clients. Queried diagnoses were used by GPs if they were not certain, and clinical 
psychologists and other clinicians who focused less on diagnosis in their clinical work 
described feeling pressured to reframe clients’ difficulties diagnostically in order for referrals 
to be accepted. Supporting these findings, proponents of diagnosis have argued in the 
psychiatric literature that it facilitates communication between individuals and professionals 
about support and service needs (Craddock & Mynors-Wallis, 2014), and provides 
boundaries about who can be identified as having difficulties, and who receives services for 
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those difficulties (Callard et al., 2013). Even those who are critical of psychiatric diagnosis 
see it as central to the planning and organisation of mental health services (Harper, 2013). 
Kendell and Jablensky (2003) discuss the poor validity of current diagnostic categories, but 
nevertheless argue that many diagnoses remain invaluable due to their utility for clinicians. 
However, they emphasise that, “statements about utility must always be related to context, 
including who is using the diagnosis, in what circumstances, and for what purposes” (p.11). 
This chapter considers the utility of psychiatric diagnoses from a service perspective, within 
the context of the gatekeeping role performed by service entry criteria. 
 
5.2.1 Rationale: Analysis of NHS adult mental health services eligibility and entry 
criteria 
 
Given the value clinicians place on the use of psychiatric diagnoses in referrals, identified in 
the previous chapter, the service eligibility and entry criteria of adult mental health services 
were used as a source of data in order to examine the ways in which diagnosis is used in 
these policies. Service entry criteria across the NHS are closely tied with the interventions 
particular services are commissioned to provide. Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs) 
were introduced in 2012 consequent to the Health and Social Care Act (2012) (NHS Clinical 
Commissioners, 2017). CCGs are NHS bodies that plan and commission services in 
response to local need. CCGs and local authorities use a Joint Strategic Needs Assessment 
to identify which services are required locally (Department of Health, 2013). Services are 
obliged to follow Department of Health (DoH) implementation frameworks (DoH, 2012) and 
guidelines from the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE), which for 
mental health are largely organised around psychiatric diagnostic categories.  
 
However, owing to their relatively recent establishment, CCGs use large, overarching 
contracts that give the flexibility for already existing services to be commissioned. Because 
trust commissioning and service planning, and therefore service entry criteria, are negotiated 
on a local level, in response to local needs, there is considerable heterogeneity across trusts 
in the way that services are commissioned. This heterogeneity may be a strength of the 
process as it allows for local innovation in service provision. Indeed, innovation is a goal of 
overarching commissioning bodies (NHS Commissioning Board, 2017), and many CCGs 
have specific innovation strategies and funds used to commission pilots. Consequently, both 
traditional diagnostic and innovative non-diagnostic approaches are commissioned, which 
may be directed by CCGs themselves, or bottom-up by trusts. Ultimately, therefore, how 
commissioning contracts are delivered at a local level is a matter of negotiation between the 
trust and the CCG, and this relationship allows for innovation at a trust level. Owing to the 
local flexibility with which services are commissioned, multiple NHS mental health trusts 
were approached in order to understand the different ways in which psychiatric diagnosis is 
used in mental health service entry and eligibility criteria. 
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5.3 Aims 
 
This chapter addresses the second theoretical question outlined in Chapter 2 (Section 
2.4.2); how are psychiatric diagnostic categories used in practice? 
 
The purpose of the chapter was to analyse NHS mental health service entry criteria to 
compare and contrast the ways in which diagnoses are used in gatekeeping decisions. In 
addition, the analysis sought to identify the non-diagnostic factors and methods upon which 
service entry criteria were organised. 
 
5.4 Methodology 
 
5.4.1 Freedom of Information requests 
 
Services’ entry and eligibility criteria is not held centrally within the NHS (Freedom of 
Information, NHS England, personal communication, 17 December, 2015), therefore 
Freedom of Information (FOI) requests were submitted to each of the 17 NHS mental health 
trusts in the north of England. The mental health trusts were identified using the NHS 
England website, north of England region (NHS England, n.d.). This region covers Yorkshire 
and The Humber, the North-West and the North-East of England. The submitted requests 
each asked the same question, using the exact wording as follows: 
 
What are the service entry criteria for each of the adult mental health services 
(community & specialist) within the trust? I.e. on what information is a decision 
based when accepting an individual to each service (e.g. the service entry criteria for 
CMHTs, early intervention, eating disorders services and so forth). 
 
5.4.2 Trust responses 
 
Each of the seventeen north of England NHS mental health trusts responded to the 
requests. An overview of these responses is given in Table 5-1 below, and a detailed 
analysis of these responses is presented in the findings that follow (Section 5.5): 
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Table 5-1 
Outline of responses received from north of England NHS mental health trusts 
 
Number of 
Trusts 
 
 
Response Type 
 
11 
 
Breakdown of service entry criteria for different services within the trust 
2 Signposted to trust website where some or all of the above information was 
publicly available 
2 Brief response giving an overview of the referral and service access process 
2 Declined to respond 
 
Of the eleven trusts that gave criteria for various services, seven gave detailed responses 
that represented all of the services within the trust, as requested, and four trusts gave only 
information for a limited selection of six or fewer services. The services described in these 
incomplete responses are analysed as part of the overall presentation of findings below. The 
majority of the trust responses included descriptive information about the purpose of the 
services, as well as lists of their entry and eligibility criteria. This information was analysed 
as part of the criteria lists. 
 
Two trusts offered only a brief response giving an overview of the process of referrals to 
services; these responses will be discussed in Section 5.5.6.  
 
Two trusts declined to respond (Trust C and Trust L). Within the NHS FOI handling 
procedure (Wanless, 2014), in accordance with the government’s FOI request fees 
regulations, trusts may refuse to respond if they deem the time taken to gather the 
information to exceed 19 hours, or the equivalent to one person working for three and a half 
days. 
 
5.4.3 Method of analysis 
 
5.4.3.1 Deductive thematic analysis 
 
Deductive thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006) was used to analyse the data, in order 
to identify and analyse patterns or themes in the data, and to give a map or outline of these 
themes across the interview dataset. Deductive analysis is used when the structure of 
analysis is derived from previous knowledge (Elo & Kyngäs, 2008). The analysis of service 
entry and eligibility criteria for NHS mental health services, as described above, was carried 
out in order to further elaborate upon the finding from Chapter 4 (Section 4.5.3.1) that 
141 
clinicians used diagnostic labels for making referrals to mental health services, even if 
making diagnoses was not a central part of their clinical assessment practices.  
 
5.4.3.2 Data preparation and organisation 
 
The data received from each of the trusts were prepared and organised in order to ensure 
comparison across services where appropriate. The entry criteria data for individual services 
were identified and extracted for those trusts that returned breakdowns of service entry 
criteria. To assess the spread of services across trusts, the number of trusts that had 
returned information about each service type was noted in a frequency table. The ‘outliers’, 
or idiosyncratic services that were not replicated across trusts were then explored further. 
Details of each outlying service were identified from the information given by trusts. This was 
particularly important where the names were ambiguous as to what service was being 
provided (e.g. ‘access team’, 'clinical treatment team'). In several cases, once these details 
were identified, it was possible to collapse these services within other already identified 
services. For example, the 'clinical treatment team' (Trust G) was an electroconvulsive 
therapy (ECT) service, and so categorised accordingly. Likewise, the 'access team' (Trust F) 
performed the same role as Single Point of Access (SPOA) teams.  
 
Detailed data for each of the services were organised using nVivo software, and the specific 
service entry criteria (including exclusion criteria) were coded under service types (such as 
‘CMHT’), so that data for each service type could be compared across trusts. 
 
5.4.3.3 Data coding 
 
The central question of the use of psychiatric diagnosis within service entry and eligibility 
criteria directed the initial phase of data coding and within each service type, data were 
coded into ‘diagnostic’ and ‘non-diagnostic’ categories of information. For example, the only 
non-diagnostic information coded to attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) services 
was “…an open referral system for people over the age of 18 years. The person being 
referred must consent to this” (Trust P). Examples of diagnostic information coded for ADHD 
services included “The Adult ADHD service will accept both new referrals (for suspected 
ADHD in adulthood) and the transfer of care for individuals open to CAMHS or Paediatrics 
with an established diagnosis of ADHD” (Trust G) and “To provide assessment and/or follow 
up for people with symptoms of ADHD graduating from CAMHs, those adults with a previous 
diagnosis of ADHD not in Service and those adults with a suspected diagnosis of ADHD” 
(Trust A). 
 
Some data extracts were coded into both categories. For example, “Services users with 
severe and persistent mental illness, such as schizophrenia, severe depression or bipolar 
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disorder” (CMHT, Trust I) contains information about the diagnoses accepted, but also about 
the severity of those difficulties. 
 
Following the initial coding of the categorisation matrix of service types against diagnostic 
and non-diagnostic categories, the data extracts coded from each service to the ‘diagnostic’ 
and ‘non-diagnostic’ codes were read and re-read to identify themes against which the data 
could then be coded. For example, the service types were considered, such as whether 
these contained information about the diagnostic or non-diagnostic nature of the service 
(e.g. ADHD services compared with a homeless and traveller service in Trust K). The 
proportion of information coded to diagnostic compared with non-diagnostic codes was taken 
into account, such as the difference noted above in ADHD criteria whereby minimal 
information was coded to the non-diagnostic code and the majority of information was 
diagnostic. This process produced a coding framework of four service types; 1) broadly 
diagnostic specialist services; 2) problem-specific but non-diagnostic services; 3) services 
supporting specific life circumstances; and 4) needs led services providing 
specialist/particular services. All the data were then coded according to this framework. A 
further theme derived from the data was used to explore a finding that emerged during 
coding whereby diagnostic categories were frequently used in exclusion criteria across 
services. This theme is presented below as part of the findings and the analysis sought to 
explain why diagnostic labels were used within exclusion criteria. 
 
The data from the two trusts that offered only a brief response (noted above) giving an 
overview of the process of referrals could not be coded in the same way as described above, 
as they did not include data for separate trusts, and nor did the data have clear delineations 
between diagnostic and non-diagnostic information. These data, therefore, were coded to a 
separate theme, ‘Central access and referrals’, so that these responses could nevertheless 
be included as part of the findings. 
 
The development of the coding framework and the data assigned to it were discussed with 
the research supervisors in order to reach agreement and to ensure that the coding was 
grounded within the data rather than the positioning of the researcher. 
 
5.5 Findings  
 
The following findings section will demonstrate that with regards to use of diagnosis, there 
are five types of service within NHS mental health trusts in the north of England. These 
service types are outlined in Table 5-2 below, alongside an additional theme concerning the 
use of diagnosis within exclusion criteria. Each of these themes and subthemes will be 
discussed in detail below. 
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Table 5-2 
Outline of themes and subthemes 
 
Broadly diagnostic specialist services 
Problem-specific but non-diagnostic services 
Services supporting specific life circumstances 
Needs led services providing specialist/particular services 
 
Central access and referrals 
Exclusion criteria 
Exclusion on the basis of a person’s needs being too low  
Exclusion on the basis of a person’s needs being too high 
Inappropriate service 
 
 
 
5.5.1 Broadly diagnostic specialist services 
 
A breakdown of diagnostic services is given in Table 5-3 below. Additional criteria were 
reported by some trusts for older adults-specific services; these are noted in the table.  
 
Table 5-3 
Number of trusts reporting service entry criteria for broadly diagnostic services 
 
Number of 
Trusts 
 
 
Service 
 
8 
 
Early intervention in psychosis (EIP) 
6 Improving access to psychological therapies (IAPT) 
5+2 Memory / cognitive assessment + dementia service for younger people 
3 Learning disabilities (LD) 
3 Attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD)  
3 Eating disorders  
3 Personality disorders  
1 Gender identity difficulties 
1 Psychological medicine 
Note: '+' denotes number of trusts reporting criteria for older-adults specific services of that type 
 
The services within the broadly diagnostic theme were for the most part specialist services. 
The services categorised to this theme are described as ‘broadly diagnostic’ because 
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diagnostic labels were used predominantly as a signpost to what types of difficulties would 
be supported within the services, however, other measures and non-diagnostic information 
were also used in the service entry criteria, as will be discussed below. Services that typified 
this description were, for example, those for adults with diagnoses of ADHD, or learning 
disabilities (LD). Three service types were for the specific assessment and intervention of a 
particular diagnosis (ADHD, dementia, gender identity difficulties). These services were 
described as being for individuals seeking assessment for the diagnoses concerned, where 
the diagnosis had been potentially indicated, or already formally given. For example, “To 
provide assessment and/or follow up for people with symptoms of ADHD graduating from 
CAMHS, those adults with a previous diagnosis of ADHD not in Service and those adults 
with a suspected diagnosis of ADHD” (Trust A). 
 
EIP services all relied upon identification or suspected presence of psychosis as part of their 
entry criteria, and so have been organised under the ‘broadly diagnostic’ category. EIP 
services, however, are also a special case. Interventions are provided for a specific band of 
experiences across psychosis, which is not a formal diagnosis in itself, often with less of a 
focus on formal ICD or DSM diagnoses, such as schizophrenia. More than one team 
specified an emphasis on symptoms, “Acceptance will be based on symptom presentation 
rather than diagnostic criteria” (Trust D), and another defined psychosis as “distressing 
hallucinations or delusional beliefs of sufficient intensity and frequency” (Trust N), which is a 
much looser definition than the diagnostic criteria for any psychosis-related diagnoses in 
classification manuals. Two highlighted working with “diagnostic uncertainty” (Trust F and 
Trust N), whereby the teams assess and work with people’s experiences even where a 
diagnosis appears unclear. Trust N went on to state, “acceptance is irrespective of potential 
diagnosis”. Furthermore, six of the eight trusts reporting criteria for EIP services made 
specific mention of pathways for those presenting with an “At Risk Mental State” (ARMS), 
which is explicitly for people not currently meeting criteria for psychosis but who report what 
are seen as attenuated psychotic symptoms or other experiences considered to be 
prodromal symptoms of psychosis (Broome et al., 2005). Thus, although EIP services are 
broadly diagnostic, these services vary according to how much value is placed on specific 
diagnostic categories. 
 
Some services within the broadly diagnostic theme were specific, not only to a range of 
difficulties or diagnoses, but also to a particular level of severity. IAPT falls within this group, 
being largely centred around depression and anxiety diagnoses and associated difficulties 
contained within several other diagnoses, such as phobias and body dysmorphic disorder. In 
many ways IAPT services are very diagnostic, commissioned on the basis of particular 
diagnoses (Clark, 2011) and audited on whether the therapies provided are in line with the 
diagnosis according to NICE guidelines (Royal College of Psychiatrists, 2011, 2013). The 
entry criteria for IAPT services reflected this; with some trusts identifying a few diagnoses, 
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“Individuals suffering depression and/or anxiety and/or stress or an anxiety disorder, or living 
with a long term physical health condition that has a psychological impact” (Trust K), to 
others giving lists of a dozen different diagnoses with a statement that treatment “is primarily 
provided for the following psychological problems only” (e.g. Trust F and Trust J). However, 
these diagnoses are used as a proxy for indicating a particular need, at a specific severity of 
difficulties, for people who “experience mild or moderate social and /or functional 
impairment” (Trust F). Services in two trusts (Trust F and Trust J) used a formal rating scale 
to assess level of functioning. Exclusions for IAPT included some diagnostic criteria, 
including psychosis, bipolar disorder or personality disorder, however these diagnoses are 
again used as an indication of “severe and enduring mental health problems”, and tied in 
with other exclusion criteria such as “medium to high levels of risk” and “difficulties which 
prevent [service users] from engaging effectively in short term therapy”. Other services were 
those working with people with diagnoses of personality disorders and eating disorders. 
Similarly, personality disorder services represented services that see people with potentially 
broad bands of difficulties, which were largely diagnostic but criteria also explicitly required 
potential service users have complex needs and significant risk associated with the 
diagnosis that necessitated such a specialist service. Specialist eating disorders services’ 
criteria had a minor remit focussed on diagnoses, however within these were also 
requirements that service users should have ‘moderate to severe Anorexia Nervosa…severe 
Bulimia Nervosa’ (Trust M). These criteria indicate a particular level of severity, with an 
expectation that mild to moderate eating difficulties would be seen in primary care, or other 
non-specialist services. It is therefore evident that despite the existence of specialist services 
commissioned around particular diagnoses, clients with those diagnoses are not seen 
exclusively within that service. 
 
5.5.2 Problem-specific but non-diagnostic services 
 
A breakdown of problem-specific but non-diagnostic services is given in Table 5-4 below. 
 
Table 5-4 
Number of trusts reporting service entry criteria for problem-specific but non-diagnostic 
services 
 
Number of 
Trusts 
 
 
Service 
 
2 
 
Psychosexual 
1 Traumatic stress 
1 Alcohol 
1 Substance misuse 
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These services relied on descriptions of problems without referring to diagnosis in their entry 
criteria. These services provided interventions for collections of similar difficulties, to 
organise and access specialist care, but without diagnostic indicators. Examples from this 
theme are services that provide interventions for traumatic stress, psychosexual, and alcohol 
and substance misuse problems. Although for each of these problem descriptions there is 
more than one DSM or ICD diagnosis that could be associated with it (for instance, DSM or 
ICD diagnoses of substance misuse disorders), the criteria for these services used broad 
descriptions that did not make reference to diagnostic categories. For example, the 
psychosexual services used age and descriptions such as “All adults (individuals and 
couples) who are experiencing relationship difficulties or sexual dysfunction with likely 
psychosexual components” (Trust K). The traumatic stress service (Trust G) used a checklist 
tool to determine the severity of presenting difficulties, stating it is, “a specialist service and 
is provided for patients who are assessed as experiencing severe or extreme symptoms. It is 
assumed that local teams will have the skills and capacity to provide assessment and 
treatment for patients who present with mild to moderate symptoms of trauma” (Trust G). 
These services offer an example of specialist teams working together with specialist skills, 
but also indicative of how NHS trusts can design, commission and manage services without 
necessarily relying on diagnoses. 
 
5.5.3 Services supporting specific life circumstances 
 
A breakdown of the services supporting specific life circumstances is given in Table 5-5 
below. 
 
Table 5-5 
Number of trusts reporting service entry criteria for services that support specific life 
circumstances 
 
Number of 
Trusts 
 
 
Service 
 
2 
 
Military veterans 
1 Homeless and traveller 
1 Perinatal mental health 
 
Some of the less common services for which criteria were given had seemingly been 
established pragmatically in response to local need. These services did not work with 
specific diagnoses but instead worked with individuals experiencing particular life 
circumstances. The veterans’ services, for example, described a clear need for flexible, open 
provisions for a group that may not always be best served by traditional mental health 
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services; “The whole ethos of the service is to be more responsive and accessible to this 
hard to reach cohort” (Trust P): 
 
The individual must be suitable for psychological therapy but unable or unwilling to 
access local mainstream services. The [service] does accept referrals for veterans 
whose mental health problems are co-morbid with alcohol/substance misuse, and 
those with significant forensic histories… (Trust F) 
 
The homeless and traveller service (Trust K) offers support to groups of people who may 
represent diverse demographics and difficulties but are similar in their accommodation 
status; “Homeless families in temporary accommodation and refuges; Young people (16-19 
years), pregnant women and adults in temporary accommodation and hostels; Gypsies and 
Travellers.” It is therefore implied that this service makes provisions for the adaptations 
required to meet the needs of an itinerant or insecurely housed population. 
 
5.5.4 Needs led services providing specialist/particular services 
 
The largest group of services has been categorised as needs led. A breakdown of these 
services is given in table 5-6. Rather than being ordered by frequency as with Tables 5-2 to 
5-5, Table 5-6 is ordered to give a sense of the level of need or severity required to access 
the service, beginning with the highest need. Additional criteria were reported by some trusts 
for older adults-specific services; as in Table 5-3, these are noted in the table. 
 
Table 5-6 
Number of trusts reporting service entry criteria for needs-led services  
 
Number of 
Trusts 
 
 
Service 
 
3 
 
Secure services 
4 Psychiatric intensive care units (PICU) 
5+1 Inpatients 
4 Rehabilitation 
5 Crisis services 
5+2 Home treatment team (HTT) 
4+1 Assertive outreach 
1 Acute day service 
5+1 Liaison psychiatry 
1 Complex needs 
4+2 Psychological therapies 
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11+5 Community mental health team (CMHT) 
2 Community services (psychosis) 
2 Community services (non-psychosis) 
2 Electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) 
3 Recovery services 
5 Single point of access & other access teams 
1 Primary care (not IAPT) 
1 Respite care 
1 Liaison and diversion (offence-related) 
1 Community mental health nursing service 
Note: '+' denotes number of trusts reporting criteria for older-adults specific services of that type 
 
Whilst criteria for these services often require a diagnosis of a mental health problem, they 
are non-specific, such as “patients who present with significant disability due to mental 
illness” (assertive outreach service, Trust D). Examples of needs led services include 
psychiatric intensive care units (PICU), crisis services, including home treatment teams 
(HTTs), and CMHTs. 
 
CMHTs dominated the responses received, being the most common service to be reported 
across all of the trusts. Some CMHTs gave examples of diagnoses, but as with the specialist 
services these also indicate a particular level of severity and need, “Individuals accessing 
secondary care services are most likely to be: Services users with severe and persistent 
mental illness, such as schizophrenia, severe depression or bipolar disorder” (Trust I). The 
level of support required is also used to override diagnostic inclusion criteria, for example, 
although typically accepted diagnoses might be schizophrenia or bipolar disorder, two 
CMHTs stated that they would also accept “Any disorder where there is significant risk of self 
harm or harm to others (e.g. acute depression, anorexia, high levels of anxiety) where the 
level of support exceeds that which the primary care team can offer” (Trust I and Trust M). 
Where lists of accepted diagnoses were offered, additional qualifiers were given that 
indicated the relevant level of need required to access the service, such as “Psychotic 
disorders that cannot be managed within primary care services due to severity or because of 
complex and enduring need…Severe types of obsessive/compulsive disorder, phobia, 
anxiety disorders that significantly impair social functioning” (Trust P). Non-diagnostic factors 
made up most of the criteria for CMHTs; other than geographical criteria these focused on 
the level of input that services could provide, such as “People who have substantial and 
complex mental health needs which cannot be met by primary care, the IAPT Service or 
other community services” (Trust A and Trust K), and that require a “skilled or intensive 
treatment, multi agency approach” (Trust F). Frequently named non-diagnostic factors or 
difficulties were significant levels of risk (“Complex presentations with a significant risk of 
self-harm, harm to others, risk of harm from others or serious self-neglect”, Trust A), 
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impaired functioning and other disability, “Suffer substantial disability as a result of their 
illness, such as an inability to care for themselves independently, sustain relationships or 
employment” (Trust D). Two trusts (Trust N and Trust P) had divided their CMHTs into two 
pathways, identifying broad categories of ‘psychosis’ and ‘non-psychosis’, akin to the wide-
ranging diagnostic, or quasi-diagnostic, use of ‘common mental disorder’ in IAPT. This 
distinction between the two intervention pathways appeared to reflect the different needs 
that these two groups have. For example, the psychosis pathway for Trust P emphasised 
“proactive interventions” to help with “poor treatment adherence”. 
 
Other examples of needs led services included Psychiatric Intensive Care Units (PICUs), 
which similarly required that difficulties be “only in the context of a serious mental disorder” 
(Trust A), but the overarching emphasis across PICU entry criteria was of the level of care 
needed by individuals. For example, “…assessment will always be based on clinical need. 
Patients will only be admitted if they display a level of risk aggression [sic] that presents as 
risk to self, others and property” (Trust H). HTTs’ criteria specified mental health problems, 
such as “Acute onset of a suspected psychiatric illness”, but given the pragmatic nature of 
HTTs, designed to be a last port of call of intensive intervention to attempt to avoid inpatient 
admission, the focus was on individuals’ needing such a high level of care:  
 
• Crisis likely to necessitate psychiatric inpatient admission 
• Imminent risk of harm to self or others by a service user experiencing mental 
health problems.  
• Early intervention is required to prevent relapse… (Trust J). 
 
One trust noted, “Decisions on whether someone should be accepted for services are based 
on their health and social care needs as a whole and not on Diagnosis alone” (Trust I), and 
this balance between assessing the experiences of an individual alongside their needs and 
what could be provided within a given service was a common thread that ran throughout the 
needs led service criteria.  
 
5.5.5 Central access and referrals 
 
Two trusts gave a brief overview of the process of accessing services without giving a 
breakdown of their individual adult mental health services. 
 
Trust B offered information for a Single Point of Access team for primary care referrals as 
other trusts had done, but no further details regarding individual services. Referrals may be 
directly triaged to secondary care services “if the referral indicates longer term support of 
potential severe and enduring mental illness.” This approach outlines the nature of stepped 
care, separating between differing levels of support needs. The broad diagnostic category of 
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‘severe and enduring mental illness’ is used, as within inclusion criteria for CMHTs and 
exclusion criteria for IAPT, as an indication of level of complexity and therefore need. 
 
Trust E outlined their referral service, which is an innovative first point of access service, 
developed following a pilot with the local CCG. The information provided under the FOI 
response outlines the service as carrying out initial screening and forwarding of referrals 
onto relevant services “based on the clinical and risk information contained in the referral 
documentation.” Where the service refers an individual to secondary care, a mental health 
practitioner undertakes a developmental biopsychosocial approach to assess vulnerability, 
precipitating and maintaining factors in clients’ mental health problems, with a focus on 
external factors where necessary (Social Care Institute for Excellence, 2006). The eligibility 
criteria for secondary care services included the same broad stipulation of a ‘severe and 
enduring mental health problem’ but also an ‘and/or’ requirement of ‘social care needs’, 
which included an extended outline of need, including difficulties related to activities of daily 
living, such as “being able to make use of one’s home safely…developing and maintaining 
family or other personal relationships”, and the requirement that these difficulties had “a 
substantial impact on the person’s wellbeing” (Trust E). Each of the overall access criteria for 
both Trust B and Trust E demonstrate a system with greater scope for flexibility within the 
assessment process, with an emphasis on triage and service response on the basis of 
differing level of support need. 
 
5.5.6 Exclusion criteria 
 
Diagnoses were frequently used in exclusion criteria across services, irrespective of whether 
these services were diagnostic or needs led, and so forth, therefore these criteria were 
compared and analysed. The most commonly cited diagnoses in exclusion criteria were drug 
or alcohol misuse and dependency, organic or degenerative conditions such as dementia, 
and LD or autistic spectrum diagnoses, followed by ‘severe and enduring mental illness’, 
with examples given of personality disorder, schizophrenia, and bipolar disorder diagnoses. 
 
In considering for what these diagnoses may be a proxy, the use of diagnoses in exclusion 
criteria can be divided into three categories: 
o Exclusion on the basis of a person’s needs being too low  
o Exclusion on the basis of a person’s needs being too high 
o Inappropriate service 
 
5.5.6.1 Exclusion on the basis of a person’s needs being too low  
 
Exclusion on the basis of low need was sometimes described by higher support services, for 
example mild to moderate difficulties would not usually be seen in a CMHT. However, as 
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mentioned earlier within the context of CMHTs, these decisions might be overruled by 
clinical need, for example, within the exclusion criteria for a specialist psychological 
therapies service, “People who have mild to moderate mental health needs unless other 
interventions and treatments have failed…People whose assessed needs are classed as 
moderate to low unless specialist intervention is necessary to prevent an imminent risk of 
deterioration” (Trust I).  
 
5.5.6.2 Exclusion on the basis of a person’s needs being too high 
 
Exclusion on the basis of high need was frequently noted in lower level services, particularly 
within primary care. For example, “Severe and enduring mental illness or in need of complex 
care package” (Trust N, Primary care), which is listed within the context of other exclusion 
criteria such as high risk.  
 
5.5.6.3 Inappropriate service 
 
Where excluded diagnoses indicate that a service is inappropriate for particular difficulties, 
these diagnoses tended to be alcohol or substance misuse or dependency, organic 
problems or learning disabilities. These diagnoses indicate a need for particular intervention 
or skills that are available in specialist services.  
 
Some trusts’ responses were more explicit about why particular diagnoses were excluded 
from their service entry and eligibility criteria. These descriptions give an indication of what 
these diagnoses represent, and therefore the roles these diagnostic labels have in such 
criteria. For example: When clear evidence of diagnosable antisocial personality disorder 
which infers significant risk.” (Trust N, EIP) and “…repeat suicide attempts, deliberate self-
harm, other impulsive self-injurious behaviours likely to indicate personality problems 
requiring interventions around emotion regulation” (Trust H, IAPT). The same service stated: 
 
Individuals with a current diagnosis of a personality disorder or PD traits which 
prevents them from engaging effectively in short term therapy e.g. patients for whom 
low mood or anxiety is a co-morbid feature of a personality disorder which require 
intervention in themselves. (Trust H, IAPT) 
 
These represent clearer indications of why particular diagnostic categories might be 
excluded, describing specific difficulties or levels of need that cannot be appropriately 
managed within these particular services. This issue is discussed further in the following 
discussion section. 
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Non-diagnostic exclusion criteria included descriptive information to the same effect; for 
example, exclusion criteria for one psychosexual service were based on difficulties outside 
of the remit of the support offered: 
 
We are not able to offer the service to patients whose sexual difficulties or behaviour 
have brought, or are at risk of bringing, them into conflict with the law; patients with 
advanced sexual or other addictions; patients who pose high risk of harm to self or 
others… (Trust A). 
 
5.6 Discussion 
 
This chapter addressed the second theoretical question outlined in Chapter 2 (Section 
2.4.2); how are psychiatric diagnostic categories used in practice? The analysis of data 
derived from the FOI requests made to NHS mental health trusts in the north of England 
demonstrated that diagnosis was neither necessary nor sufficient in establishing service 
entry criteria. Even where service entry criteria were mostly diagnostic in character, these 
diagnoses denote the presence of specific problems at a specific level of need, which could 
arguably be established in other ways, as evidenced by the other less diagnostic-focused 
service types that identify and work with specific difficulties (such as traumatic stress) or at 
particular levels of service need (such as community mental health and home treatment 
teams). As was expected given the process of local commissioning that is negotiated 
between CCGs and individual NHS trusts, service provision was heterogeneous across the 
north of England NHS mental health trusts. This heterogeneity of services represents a 
system that is responsive to local need, where different practical solutions are established to 
best meet the needs of the local population. The service entry criteria data may not be able 
to identify whether or not more diagnostic services better meet clients’ needs, but it is 
evident that diagnosis does not play an essential role in differentiating between services. 
 
This discussion will explore the following matters: 
• How ‘diagnostic’ are diagnostic services? 
• The use of broad, quasi-diagnostic, categories 
• The use of diagnoses in exclusion criteria 
• Wider uses of diagnosis 
• Clinical implications 
• Future research 
 
5.6.1 How diagnostic are diagnostic services?  
 
Diagnostic categories are used to narrow the focus of a service, however a range of 
additional information is necessary to ascertain which service is appropriate for clients, such 
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as the severity of difficulties and their impact upon a person’s functioning. Three services of 
this type worked with specific diagnostic categories; ADHD, gender identity difficulties, and 
dementia. However the majority identified broad bands of diagnoses, such as LD, 
personality disorders, and mild to moderate mental health difficulties (IAPT). One such 
service type was early intervention in psychosis (EIP), which was the most commonly given 
service criteria of the broadly diagnostic service types. EIP services represent a broad range 
of experiences and diagnoses under ‘psychosis’, not a DSM or ICD diagnostic category in 
itself. Some EIP services made explicit mention of a focus on symptoms, and others of using 
a ‘diagnostic uncertainty’ approach. Most EIP services also had an ARMS pathway for those 
considered to be at risk of, but not currently experiencing, a psychotic episode. With less of a 
focus on diagnosis, EIP services, therefore, appear to represent an exception to what would 
typically be seen as diagnostic specific services, such as eating disorders. However, EIP 
services work with a more specific range of difficulties than some of the broad ranges of 
diagnostic services; difficulties for EIP are limited to ‘psychosis’, compared with the wide 
range of diagnoses named in the criteria for IAPT services. They work with a particular client 
group and ethos, with the focus being on early intervention and when people’s difficulties 
may not be as clear, but they nevertheless represent a service type that has a particular 
range of skills for a particular set of people, that does not rely on diagnosis. Rather than 
diagnostic divisions being essential, it could alternatively be argued that the ‘broadly 
diagnostic’ services are about competency-based teams working together because they 
have a specialist skillset necessary to work with particular difficulties, and perhaps a 
particular ethos, in the case of some EIP teams.  
 
5.6.2 Use of broad, quasi-diagnostic, categories 
 
Labels such as “severe and enduring mental illness” are referred to here as broad or quasi-
diagnostic categories, however, they are not diagnostic categories in the sense of current 
classification systems, and bear very little resemblance to DSM or ICD categories. Such 
terms may have clinical or financial utility in organising services, such as identifying 
“common mental health problems” for IAPT services, or separating between “psychosis” and 
“non-psychosis”/“affective disorders” for those trusts that divided their CMHT streams into 
two intervention pathways. These broad categories of diagnosis reflect the heuristic uses of 
diagnostic categories seen in Chapter 4. However, such categories are very different to the 
“rational, careful, respectful, diagnosis” (Callard et al., 2013, p. 2) that is advocated by 
diagnostic classification.   
 
5.6.3 Use of diagnoses in exclusion criteria 
 
The analysis of the use of diagnoses in service exclusion criteria suggested that diagnoses 
are being used as a proxy for other information. The data showed that typical diagnoses of 
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exclusion were categories such as LD, personality disorders, attention deficit hyperactivity 
disorder, and psychosis; each associated with typically higher levels of care input or other 
specialist skills. Where diagnoses are used within exclusion criteria, such as “The service is 
not normally open to service users with a primary diagnosis of schizophrenia (or other 
psychotic disorders), bipolar disorder, dementia, clients with moderate LD and clients who 
have a history of sexual offences” (Trust F, personality disorders service), those diagnoses 
are often used as a way of indicating the types of difficulties that might interfere with an 
individual’s ability to engage with the therapeutic interventions on offer, such as group work. 
Alternatively, they might indicate that other teams may have specific skills to better support 
that person, for example, in the case of LD. However, even where diagnostic categories are 
used to indicate that a person’s needs would be more appropriately met by services that are 
commissioned elsewhere and for different difficulties, such as drug and alcohol abuse, and 
organic causes, these terms, although suggestive of diagnoses, are so broad as to be 
descriptive. Diagnoses are inefficient proxies for individuals’ needs, as evidenced by the fact 
that caveats and exceptions must be made on the basis of individual clinical assessment.  
 
Whilst it is appropriate and good practice to signpost individuals to alternative services if 
their needs can be better met elsewhere, diagnostic categories may not be the most 
effective way of doing this. Not all services use diagnostic proxies, using more detailed 
factors such as risk, and where some trusts use diagnoses, criteria are used where services 
are more explicit about what difficulties a particular diagnosis might convey that make a 
service inappropriate for someone, such as “When clear evidence of diagnosable antisocial 
personality disorder which infers significant risk” (Trust N, EIP). Such descriptions represent 
a more nuanced clinical rationale, which can be applied to both inclusion and exclusion 
criteria, rather than a black and white inclusion or exclusion based on a given diagnosis. 
These descriptions are also more appropriate given the now well-established NHS policy 
that personality disorder is no longer a diagnosis of exclusion (NIMHE, 2003), despite its 
frequent occurrence in trust exclusion criteria. Common across each of the four categories of 
service types derived from the data was the indication that differences across service 
provision are driven more by professional competencies in specific teams than by diagnosis. 
Given the medical history of mental health services, diagnosis may be less a necessity for 
service entry criteria so much as a historical artefact. 
 
5.6.4 Wider uses of diagnosis 
 
The Mental Health Act (MHA) facilitates compulsory admission to hospital and guardianship 
orders within the context of an individual experiencing mental health problems. The 1983 
version of the MHA identified broad categories of ‘mental disorder’, including ‘mental illness’, 
‘severe mental impairment’, and ‘psychopathic disorder’. However, the 2007 amendments 
further reduced these categories, defining ‘mental disorder’ as “any disorder or disability of 
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the mind; and “mentally disordered” shall be construed accordingly…” (MHA, 2007, ch. 12, 
p. 1). Neither version of the MHA, therefore, includes a necessity that a specific DSM or ICD 
psychiatric diagnosis is assigned to an individual’s difficulties prior to admission. These 
references to ‘mental disorder’ hint towards but do not require the use of diagnoses, and are 
far from the rigorously applied criteria of diagnostic classification. 
 
The two most commonly used sections of the MHA, Sections 2 and 3, require simply that the 
individual “is suffering from mental disorder of a nature or degree which warrants the 
detention of the patient in a hospital for assessment…” and “he is suffering from mental 
disorder of a nature or degree which makes it appropriate for him to receive medical 
treatment in a hospital” (Mental Health Act, 1983a, 1983b), and that both the assessment 
(Section 2) and treatment (Section 3) are in the interests of the health and safety of the 
individual concerned and the protection of others. Therefore, neither the wording of the MHA 
nor the data obtained from the FOI requests suggest that diagnosis is required for 
gatekeeping as was identified by clinicians in the previous chapter. The MHA and the 
Equality Act (2010) can be utilised to aid the clinician in achieving what is in the best interest 
of their clients, without using specific psychiatric diagnostic labels. 
 
5.6.5 Clinical implications 
 
Heterogeneity across services can encourage innovation, and this variation can offer trusts 
ways of learning from each other. Alternatives to diagnostic approaches are already 
embedded within NHS mental health services. The mental health system is evolving and 
may travel in either a more or less diagnostic direction. Local flexibility means that innovative 
pathways are developed, which can offer an understanding of the ways that services are 
evolving. For example, some trusts initiated demographic-specific services, such as those 
offering flexibility for military veterans, or the homeless and travellers, who each have 
individual needs that require specific approaches and competencies. Likewise, two trusts 
divided their CMHTs into psychosis and non-psychosis streams. These broad bands of 
difficulties may be a more useful or economical way to manage services to take account of 
these specific needs and competencies. Nevertheless, even needs led services are defined 
narrowly. These services acknowledge different levels of support, however they do not 
formally recognise other needs that are highlighted by the literature (discussed in Chapter 1, 
Section 1.3.2.1.2, Contextualising distress), such financial and income needs, home, family 
and social support, and specific interventions such as trauma therapy. 
 
However, to adopt such innovative practices, including non-diagnostic approaches to service 
delivery, it is necessary to dispel myths; including the myth that diagnoses such as those in 
ICD and DSM are necessary for service planning and delivery. The use of broad pseudo-
diagnostic categories for important gatekeeping functions of both service entry criteria and 
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the MHA are significant. These ways of taking up diagnosis are at odds with the DSM and 
ICD models, new versions of which seek to increasingly define diagnoses in more precise 
ways (Kupfer et al., 2002). The model of diagnostic classification places an emphasis on 
specificity and detail, and of tightening the diagnostic system (Frances, 2014). However, in 
practice, mental health services and legal systems use much broader, more flexible 
definitions. 
 
5.6.6 Future research 
 
Future research exploring these implications could usefully subject the alternatives, including 
diagnosis-led approaches, to empirical tests, in order to compare whether individuals would 
have better access to services and receive better care if services use diagnostic versus non-
diagnostic entry criteria. Research should aim to establish in which context, for which type of 
problems, non-diagnostic versus diagnostic models would be best, as well as further 
exploring whether the use of broad, quasi-diagnostic categories are more effective, flexible 
ways of signposting appropriate services than specific diagnoses. 
 
From an early intervention perspective, empirical research should be used to identify 
whether assessment and intervention provided on the basis of need rather than meeting 
diagnostic criteria would allow earlier, and therefore more effective, intervention in order to 
reduce the progression of difficulties. A recent study (Cross, Hermens, Scott, Salvador-
Carulla, & Hickie, 2016) of youth mental health care found that individuals with more clear 
cut cross-sectional profiles of difficulties that met diagnostic criteria received more care input 
than did those with less clear presentations, irrespective of the potential trajectory of their 
difficulties or impairment in functioning. Lack of a current DSM diagnosis was associated 
with receiving less care than was indicated by their level of functional impairment. The 
authors suggested that clinicians might have biases towards offering more care towards 
those with clearer diagnoses. Research should establish whether these findings apply more 
widely across mental health care, and if a more descriptive approach based not on diagnosis 
but on severity, level of impairment, and support needs could better support service users. 
 
Regarding the frequent use of specific diagnoses in exclusion criteria, and common 
occurrence of ‘comorbidity’ or multiple difficulties, research could usefully establish whether 
having a particular diagnostic label precludes individuals from accessing a service that would 
otherwise be the most appropriate to meet their needs. Closer links and inter-team working 
between services might be used to advise on better managing individuals’ needs where 
multiple difficulties are experienced that with very diagnostic-led services may lead to an 
individual being shoehorned into a particular service due to a ‘primary diagnosis’ but have 
other needs left unmet. 
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5.7 Conclusions 
 
This chapter has used data acquired through FOI requests to NHS mental health trusts in 
the north of England to explore how psychiatric diagnosis is used in service entry and 
eligibility criteria. The findings demonstrate that psychiatric diagnosis is neither necessary 
nor sufficient in planning service entry. Some services used diagnostic labels and these 
represented specific difficulties but also a particular level of severity or need. As with the 
clinicians in the previous chapter, broad, quasi-diagnostic categories are used by services, 
which give an indication of the type and severity of distress experienced. However, it can be 
argued that these broad categories act as a proxy for the team competencies required to 
work with particular expressions of distress. The largest group of services was more 
explicitly oriented towards individual needs and team competencies, and innovative services 
worked with specific life circumstances. However, services could go further to incorporate 
more generally applicable life factors and needs, such as social, financial, and trauma-
related interventions and support. 
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6 Chapter 6: Ways in which psychiatric diagnosis travels beyond the 
clinic: The practices of recording diagnoses 
 
6.1 Abstract 
 
Beyond the clinical settings described in Chapters 4 and 5, diagnosis is used in a variety of 
different functions and contexts. This chapter explores the travel of psychiatric diagnoses 
beyond the clinic through its formal record on health records and other paperwork. Interview 
data from clinicians and services users is contextualised using information about the uses of 
diagnosis in other spheres, such as NHS outcomes and incentives frameworks policies. This 
data is used to analyse the ways in which different social spheres, including business, legal, 
and social worlds, take up psychiatric diagnoses and use them for differing purposes that 
move the categories beyond the clinical setting. The findings demonstrate that diagnoses 
are used to facilitate cooperation between the clinical context and these other contexts. 
Clinicians use diagnoses pragmatically to achieve their clinical aims and to meet service 
users’ needs, however, beyond the individual clinical context, diagnoses are used as 
inflexible categories and without the nuances of clinical use. What begins as a flexibly used 
category in the clinic is stabilised by its documentation on health records, legal forms, and 
other formal paperwork. The changing conceptualisation of psychiatric diagnoses beyond 
the clinic demonstrates their ‘progressive reification’. The implications for clinical work, 
recipients of diagnosis, research and data capture are explored. 
 
6.2 Introduction 
 
6.2.1 Moving from flexible local uses of diagnosis beyond the immediate clinical 
relationship 
 
The previous chapters outline clinicians’ and services’ flexible and pragmatic uses of 
diagnosis as an individual clinical tool and within service entry criteria. Clinicians, even those 
who do not use diagnosis predominantly in their individual clinical work, described a need to 
use diagnosis at administrative and bureaucratic levels. Beyond the individual clinic setting, 
diagnosis is used in a variety of different ways and contexts, which this chapter explores. 
Clinicians are encouraged by services to record a diagnosis on the individual’s electronic 
health record. This information is then used for a variety of purposes by health systems, 
including audit, quality targets, funding and commissioning, which will be discussed 
throughout this chapter (e.g. Mazars LLP, 2013). Often, different forms of support or 
intervention must be accessed beyond the relationship between the assessing health 
professional and their client. In such cases, clinicians need a way of communicating 
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information about a person’s mental health difficulties to other health professionals, mental 
health services, and on clinical legal paperwork to enforce treatment.  
 
6.2.2 Use of diagnoses in organisations outside of the NHS 
 
Outside of health services, the clinician and the recipient of the diagnosis may need to 
convey this information to non-clinical bodies; governmental departments such as the 
Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) or the Criminal Justice System, and regulatory 
agencies such as the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency. Less formally, information may 
need to be passed on to an individual’s place of work or study. Diagnosis is typically used as 
a means of conveying this information (e.g. Burton, 2011). As has been discussed in earlier 
chapters diagnosis has multiple functions. Records of psychiatric diagnosis take on different 
roles according to their context. For a lawyer in a Mental Health Act (MHA, 1983) tribunal, a 
diagnosis on a legal report is an indication of a particular level of risk and need. For the 
DWP, a diagnosis on a benefits application is an indication of functional impairment, a 
justification for receiving welfare payments.  
 
6.2.3 Rationale: Analysis of the travel of diagnostic records 
 
Critical sociological study argues that psychiatric records should be read not simply as 
descriptions of a patient’s behaviour, but instead viewed as “procedures and consequences 
of clinical activities as a medico-legal enterprise” (Garfinkel & Bittner, 1967, p. 168). These 
records, therefore, and the practices associated with them, can reveal important information 
about the functions of diagnosis, how they are used, and their consequences. 
 
6.3 Aims 
 
This chapter addresses the second and third theoretical questions outlined in Chapter 2 
(Section 2.4.2); 2) how are psychiatric diagnostic categories used in practice? And 3) what 
do diagnostic categories produce; what are their implications? 
 
The purpose of this chapter was to explore the practices of recording psychiatric diagnosis 
on health records and other formal paperwork, and to analyse the ways in which different 
social spheres, including business, legal, and social worlds, take up psychiatric diagnoses 
and use them for differing purposes that move diagnostic categories beyond the clinical 
setting, and evaluated the consequences of these practices. 
 
160 
6.4 Methodology 
 
Data for this chapter are predominantly from the interviews carried out with clinicians, who 
reported routinely recording psychiatric diagnoses for administrative and clinical purposes. 
One quote is used from an interview conducted with a service user; this quote is used at the 
start of the findings section to frame the analysis.  
 
The methodology for clinicians’ interview data collection is described in the main in Chapter 
4, Section 4.4. The methodology for service users’ interview data collection is described in 
Chapter 7, Section 7.4. Data were organised, coded, and analysed according to the methods 
described in Chapter 4, Section 4.4.5. 
 
6.4.1 Presentation of findings 
 
The three domains derived from analysis of the full dataset of interviews with clinicians and 
service users are described in Chapter 4, Section 4.4.5.7. Figure 6-1, on the following page, 
is presented to remind the reader of these domains, their themes and subthemes. This 
chapter presents findings from the second area: The travel of psychiatric diagnosis beyond 
the clinic through formal records. 
 
The interview data is presented alongside information about the policies and processes of 
the adjoining social worlds across which diagnosis is used to communicate, for example, 
NHS outcomes and incentives frameworks. This information is presented so as to 
contextualise the interview data, giving a richer understanding of the purposes and practices 
of the formal recording of psychiatric diagnoses. 
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6.5 Findings 
 
The following findings will demonstrate that the recording of diagnosis is ubiquitous in 
communicating information beyond the clinical assessment. Clinicians, particularly 
psychiatrists and GPs, are encouraged by services to record psychiatric diagnoses for their 
clients. However, clinicians described their practices of recording diagnoses as oriented 
towards achieving particular aims, such that the categories represent pragmatic ways of 
navigating bureaucratic systems. Clinicians described potential for diagnostic labels to ‘stick’ 
once recorded, both personally for recipients of diagnoses, and administratively being 
difficult to remove. Conceptualisations of diagnoses change from the flexible clinical uses 
described here and in Chapter 4, to fixed inflexible categories once recorded. Clinicians’ 
practices demonstrated this awareness, judiciously applying diagnoses to reflect a balance 
between meeting clinical needs and reluctance to record an uncertain diagnosis, not least as 
a result of the potentially stigmatising impact for service users of recording a psychiatric 
diagnosis on official documentations. Table 6-1, below, outlines the themes presented in the 
findings; each of these is explored in detail in the following section. 
 
Table 6-1 
Outline of themes and subthemes 
 
NHS uses of diagnosis: Bridging between clinical and business spheres 
Rationing services 
Administrative data capture 
Diagnoses and incentives for best practice 
Bridging between clinical and legal worlds 
Bridging between clinical and social spheres to facilitate practice support 
 
 
The following quote from a service user illustrates the potential for inconsistencies between 
types of records and their different uses as a result of the flexible ways in which diagnoses 
are used for different purposes. The impact of psychiatric diagnoses for service users is 
explored in Chapter 7; however, this quote is used to frame the following findings section. In 
her appointments with health professionals (her GP, and two different psychiatrists), Service 
User 22 was variously told that she had borderline personality disorder, bipolar disorder and 
depression, and she had been referred to a treatment programme for people with personality 
disorder diagnoses: 
 
I’ve had problems in work recently, and I told, they knew about my diagnosis of BPD 
[borderline personality disorder], and I told them when they said bipolar as well, 
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which my work thought was like the right diagnosis, because they were saying we 
can see your ups and downs and that, and I had an incident in work, and they’d 
requested a psychiatrists’ report, and I’ve seen the report, and it says depression, so 
it makes me look like I’ve lied to work, saying that I’ve got BPD, when they haven’t 
diagnosed me with it, but yeah they wrote on the letter that they’re treating me for 
depression. (Service User 22) 
 
Potential problematic implications for the client are highlighted not only when different 
categories are used to perform different functions, as with Service User 22, but also when 
the diagnosis is used in a social setting (such as work) and conceptualised differently to 
flexible clinical uses, as a fixed label rather than a loose category, pragmatically applied.  
 
6.5.1 NHS uses of diagnosis: Bridging between clinical and business spheres 
 
The recording of psychiatric diagnoses on a person’s health records has both clinical and 
business-related functions. Once a diagnosis has been recorded, this information is used to 
inform both individualised care plans and generalised data capture that is used at a trust 
level. Clinicians reported the recording of diagnostic categories as an important part of 
clinical practice; as one psychiatrist remarked, “virtually any document we write will, will have 
a sort of diagnosis written on it I guess” (Psychiatrist 9). Although diagnostic categories were 
critiqued in their utility for individual clinical use, as discussed in Chapter 4, they were 
nevertheless strongly valued for other, often administrative uses. Referring to the brevity of a 
diagnostic label, one psychiatrist remarked: 
 
I think you might as well just have one word really…I think the current system is 
probably ok for that, because it’s, there’s so much diversity that you’re just not going 
to cover it all in a different system, for information gathering... (Psychiatrist 1) 
 
6.5.1.1 Rationing services 
 
Diagnosis was used as a way of giving reason to why a person cannot be seen in a 
particular service, and forwarding them on elsewhere, as was described in the theme of 
‘exclusion criteria’ in Chapter 5. Clinicians described this type of gatekeeping in political 
terms over clinical utility; for example, the limitations imposed by commissioning on the basis 
of divisions made between diagnoses. Forensic or secure mental health services, for 
example, commonly do not accept someone with a primary or only diagnosis of a personality 
disorder, because these services should be commissioned elsewhere. Where more general 
services, such as community mental health teams (CMHTs), are struggling to manage large 
caseloads or limited resources, diagnoses are used in effect to move clients to a more 
specific service that might be able to accept them. This appeared to be a way of at once 
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accessing the timeliest and most appropriate care for clients, and of reducing the burden on 
the original service: 
 
I think often it can be, feels like it can be kind of used a bit politically, kind of between 
services, so if erm, somebody, if, if kind of, I don't know, services are stretched and 
kind of somebody thinks that actually we’d be the best kind of service for them, and 
then you can often see kind of diagnosis being kind of bandied around as a, as a 
kind of way in… (Psychologist 7) 
 
Clinicians who worked particularly within forensic and secure units noted how the 
gatekeeping role of the distinction made between diagnoses of personality disorder versus 
‘mental illness’ could be a useful differentiation. This translation of difficulties into two broad 
categories that are used to differentiate between services creates a temporary sense of 
certainty for gatekeeping purposes. However, clinicians also described the confusion and 
problematic consequences that such distinctions can also create:  
 
…the thing that comes up usually is whether or not erm, people wonder whether 
someone has a personality disorder, or whether they're having psychosis, so that's 
the question that I’m asked, which has so many assumptions in the question, it’s, 
you, you kind of feel like you need to unpack the question before you can answer 
it… (Psychologist 8) 
 
Personality disorder was described as being used as a diagnosis of exclusion, despite policy 
against this practice (NIMHE, 2003); “there is quite a lot of stigma and erm, exclusion on the 
basis of diagnoses, erm, even when there, there’s a kind of, ‘we don't do it’, it’s like well, you 
kind of do…” (Psychologist 9); “I still think there probably is, an exclusion criteria, although 
it’s not supposed to be, of a personality disorder” (Psychologist 3). Psychologists described 
trying to circumvent these requirements by focusing on other factors that would impact upon 
their decision whether or not to accept a person into the service, for example writing a 
tribunal report to argue that the level of risk is more important than whether the diagnosis 
should be of personality disorder or mental illness (Psychologist 3). 
 
6.5.1.2 Administrative data capture 
 
Of those clinicians interviewed, psychiatrists and GPs, but not psychologists, were expected 
by trusts to use diagnoses administratively, including having a responsibility for recording a 
diagnosis, and/or a care cluster for Payments by Results (PbR) systems, for example 
needing an ICD-10 code on online records and discharge summaries. As such, psychiatrists 
and GPs are positioned within services as seeing diagnosis as having a separate 
administrative purpose as well as clinical, including communication to other health 
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professionals via the client record system. Similarly in contrast with psychologists, 
psychiatrists spoke about being subject to “political, internal sort of monetary pressures I 
guess to make a diagnosis” (Psychiatrist 6) due to commissioning targets, and trust 
investments ahead of the introduction of PbR systems and other mechanisms for service 
planning: 
 
…all consultants are required to erm, make a note of the diagnosis of the 
patient…I’ve got about 750 patients, so I’m supposed to go on this portal we have, 
online portal, to record the diagnosis, so we can map out, Dr__ has how many 
dementia patients, how many functional patients, which’ll then have an impact on the 
number of nurses that deploy…so in terms of service delivery that’s certainly one 
use… (Psychiatrist 8) 
 
6.5.1.2.1 Diagnoses and incentives for best practice 
 
The Quality Outcomes Framework (QOF) is a voluntary participation NHS reward 
programme for general practice, incentivising data recording and target outcomes. Statistical 
data derived from the programme includes the prevalence of various common diagnoses of 
particular public health concern, and achievement based on meeting targets, such as the 
“percentage of patients with schizophrenia, bipolar affective disorder and other psychoses 
who have a record of blood pressure in the preceding 12 months” (NHS England, 2016a, p. 
21). Although voluntary, participation is high, with 96% of GP practices participating in the 
reporting year 2015-2016 (NHS Digital, 2016a). Practices are rewarded using a points 
system of payment, with one QOF point in 2016/17 worth £165.18, up to a maximum of 559 
available points (NHS England, 2016a). Points are scored according to achievement against 
various indicators. Four points are available, for example, for keeping a register of patients, 
which largely relies on diagnosis (schizophrenia, bipolar affective disorder and other 
psychoses and other patients on lithium therapy) (NHS England, 2016a). Ten points are 
available for achieving the appropriate percentage “of patients aged 18 or over with a new 
diagnosis of depression in the preceding 1 April to 31 March, who have been reviewed not 
earlier than 10 days after and not later than 56 days after the date of diagnosis” (NHS 
England, 2016a, p. 20). Because achievement, and therefore payment, is measured against 
indicators directly related to diagnoses, practices are incentivised to record a diagnosis in 
service users’ health records. However, incentivised recording practices are nevertheless 
subject to work-arounds by clinicians, as one GP highlighted: 
 
…don't use depression much, but that, but that is for the terrible reason that, with 
this, it’s dreadful, erm, no, if you, if you put down certain depressions, then they get 
coded in the system and, with requirements of GPs, if you di.., it was, er, it’s not the 
case anymore, but at one stage, if you were given a diagnosis of depression, then it 
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was a requirement that you had to have done a silly assessment form…and you had 
to have that repeated in 6 weeks’ time…so we tended not to use it just to avoid 
that… (GP 1) 
 
Similar to the QOF, secondary care services are subject to the Commissioning for Quality 
and Innovation (CQUIN) scheme. The CQUIN reward scheme is another way of incentivising 
clinical improvements, which incorporates national indicators, such as ‘improving physical 
health for patients with severe mental illness’, and local indicators which are negotiated by 
Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs) according to local need (NHS England, 2016b). The 
CQUIN scheme is worth up to 2.5% to providers in addition to the actual annual value of the 
contract (NHS England, 2016b). National indicators for mental health identify 23 ICD-10 
diagnostic codes for inclusion under the ‘severe mental illness’ audit. Specific indicators 
require the use of these diagnostic categories, such as informing the service user’s GP of 
their care plan or discharge summary, of which diagnosis is specifically identified as an 
essential component (NHS England, 2016c). Several local CQUIN templates centre on the 
use of diagnoses, such as screening and assessment of depression in older people (NHS 
England, 2016d). 
 
Following some assessments, a pattern that is ‘abundantly clear’ (Psychiatrist 7) and 
matched diagnostic criteria might be seen, and so a diagnosis would be used in record 
keeping and the client would also be informed. Here, the purposes of the translation of a 
person’s difficulties into a diagnosis go hand in hand; the process is consistently linked. 
However, the data demonstrated a tension between administrative and clinical uses of 
diagnosis, of which service users fall at the intersection. For example, clinicians discussed 
the practice of using the diagnosis where required by the trust, but not informing the client. 
Various reasons were offered for this practice, for example, using an alternative clinical 
approach with clients, such as a formulation-based explanation of difficulties (e.g. 
Psychiatrist 7), to avoid uncomfortable conversations with clients (discussed by Psychiatrist 
3), or because the diagnosis does not accurately represent a client’s difficulties. A diagnostic 
category may at once be seen as vital for formal recording processes, yet therapeutically 
unhelpful for the person diagnosed: 
 
…sometimes we, we’re required to code on a, the erm, on our IT system, and I 
might code without necessarily saying to the patient I've put you with this label, 
‘cause I see the two as separate, you know, that's, that's a statistical task and, and, 
and that's different than actually making a, I might put something on the system that 
I don't necessarily fit, think fits entirely ‘cause I have to put something on the 
system… (Psychiatrist 12) 
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Conversely, it may be seen as important to inform the service user whenever a diagnosis is 
recorded, regardless of the purpose of that record, “this is what the diagnosis is, as far as I’m 
concerned” (Psychiatrist 3). This stance was described within the context of ethics, and not 
hiding information from the service user. 
 
6.5.2 Bridging between clinical and legal worlds 
 
Legal translations of diagnosis move from clinical to legal spheres and back, in the case of 
MHA assessments and tribunals in which decisions are made regarding whether a person 
can be detained in hospital. Documents include MHA papers, and clinical reports. Diagnoses 
are traditionally seen as required for defending detention under the MHA, or for court 
reports. As mentioned in the discussion of Chapter 5, the wording of the MHA itself defines 
mental disorder as “any disorder or disability of the mind”, which the MHA code of practice 
(Department of Health, 2015) states should be used in accordance with good clinical 
practice and “accepted standards of what constitutes such a disorder or disability” (p. 26). 
Diagnostic categories that may be recognised under the definition are listed, however 
specific diagnoses are not explicitly required in order to fulfil the definition according to the 
MHA. The standard joint medical recommendation for admission for treatment under Section 
3 of the MHA (Form A7, Regulation 4(1)(d)(i) of The Mental Health (Hospital Guardianship 
and Treatment) (England) (Amendment) Regulations, 2008), for example, states, “this 
patient is suffering from mental disorder of a nature or degree which makes it appropriate for 
the patient to receive medical treatment in hospital” (p. 29). Indeed, in both of the above 
quotations from the MHA, neither states a requirement for ‘a’ mental disorder, but rather the 
more broadly defined presence of ‘disorder’ (without the indefinite article, which was 
removed in the 2007 revision of the Act). The clinician is required to support their 
declaration, to “describe the patient’s symptoms and behaviour and explain how those 
symptoms and behaviour lead [the clinician] to [their] opinion”. Because, as the code of 
practice states, “[t]he fact that someone has a mental disorder is never sufficient grounds for 
any compulsory measure to be taken under the Act” (p. 27), the focus of the paperwork 
advocating detention is on the supporting information evidencing the necessity for 
hospitalisation, rather than on a given diagnostic category. Nevertheless, the use of 
diagnosis for these purposes was generally accepted as a necessity by clinicians 
interviewed. Both psychologists and psychiatrists described the lack of room for critical 
discussion of the use of diagnoses in such circumstances. Clinicians may not place strong 
emphasis on diagnostic labels clinically, but would use them if it were seen as necessary for 
other purposes, such as for court reports or for use within the criminal justice system. For 
example, Psychiatrist 9 stated: 
 
I wouldn’t tend to worry too much about diagnosis, except that you know, in many 
ways the medical system relies on diagnosis, you know, when I’m detaining 
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somebody under the Mental Health Act, you know, certain sections I've got to have a 
diagnosis and I would be questioned on that diagnosis by tribunals and by 
solicitors… (Psychiatrist 9) 
 
In other words, paperwork such as that of the MHA “forces your hand” to record a diagnosis 
(Psychiatrist 5), even where treatment and intervention planning does not rely on a 
conclusion about a diagnosis being made (Psychiatrist 9). The difficulty in applying 
diagnostic categories in clinical practice, particularly for complex presentations, described in 
Chapter 4, is particularly highlighted when a recorded diagnosis is required for MHA 
paperwork that will keep a person detained in hospital: 
 
…it’s really hard if you've had someone in for a month, and then you don't have a 
diagnosis for them, which is really possible, for God’s sake, not everyone can be 
diagnosed, erm, I just really struggle erm, to, to keep them detained further because 
there’s an expectation that the arbitrary 28 days you have, is enough time to 
diagnose someone with something…so you just kind of, a lot of times end up, giving 
people some diagnosis that I don't really know whether it’s going to be the right thing 
or not, and realise then afterwards, but I have to put something on paper 
sometimes… (Psychiatrist 3) 
 
In her account of a case in which she had to defend what she believed was an incorrect 
diagnosis (but could not identify one more appropriate), Psychiatrist 3 described feeling 
almost compromised by the need for a diagnosis in its use as a way of sharing information 
across the knowledge boundary between clinical and legal arenas, in that she had to defend 
a label of which she did not feel certain. Yet at the same time she felt there was a clear need 
for the person to be in hospital, as a result of being extremely vulnerable as well as a risk to 
others. Irrespective of a diagnosis, she felt that there should be sufficient evidence 
supporting her clinical judgement. A psychologist noted a similar issue: 
 
…what I’m noticing is that parole boards are seen to be very wedded to the medical 
model, so they're now making demands…that this person, we need to check 
whether he’s got a diagnosis of this, or we need to check whether he’s got a 
diagnosis of that, and that's very frustrating because, you know, you sort of think 
well, even if he’s got this label, how is that going to inform risk necessarily and, and 
manage it, and is it going to help this person, or not… (Psychologist 5) 
 
These examples emphasise the tension present for clinicians in these circumstances. 
Clinicians are faced with recording a potentially inappropriate diagnosis, one that they do not 
necessarily believe in, or would use clinically, but which would gain access to care or risk 
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management seen as necessary for their client’s welfare. One psychiatrist described part-
time medico-legal work she does for asylum cases and victims of torture: 
 
…they have to have a proper diagnosis if it’s going to make a difference to their, 
their, their erm, so, so I’m usually looking to make a diagnosis under that 
circumstance, and there’s always one you can find, you know, I’m not lying, that, 
they have, they have got, but probably I wouldn’t of used that in, in a clinical sense, 
but, but, but they have always got something and you can always describe it in 
beautiful detail what symptoms they've got that mean that they've got that disorder, 
‘cause they're so wide really that…if somebody said to me make a diagnosis on this 
person, I could always do that in a beautiful wordy way that purely you've matched 
across two criteria and, but, but I’m not sure that's always that helpful for the person, 
and sometimes people want it and sometimes they don't, so I’ll just frame what I see 
in front of me according to what it would seem most helpful for them… (Psychiatrist 
12) 
 
Legal translations can also bridge between the clinical and the criminal justice system, for 
example in assessing the role played by a person’s mental health difficulties in their 
committing a crime. Documents include court reports, hospital reports and so on. Contrary to 
the flexible use of diagnoses seen at a one-to-one clinical level, once recorded on legal 
paperwork a diagnosis must be defended by the clinician as a fixed, certain idea. Clinicians 
may be content with this concept, for example: 
 
I've done some, quite a bit of medical legal work, as an aside, and I quite like that 
rigour, because one has to argue the case for a particular diagnosis or 
understanding and you know, maybe defend it, in a court or something, so I, I quite 
like erm, that clarity. (Psychiatrist 11) 
 
However, concern was also expressed regarding the potentially negative implications of 
recording a diagnosis in order to achieve a certain outcome (such as keeping someone 
detained in hospital) which then has other consequences of fixing the diagnostic category 
and its association with the person diagnosed. Psychologist 6 spoke of her concern that 
clients would “carry that diagnosis for life” when it is used for bureaucratic systems outside of 
the service: 
 
…it’s not really helpful to have a diagnosis at this point, because then the label 
sticks, and then you might introduce you know, a variable that then impacts upon 
how that person’s life, you know it becomes a risk factor, having, carrying that 
label… (Psychiatrist 4) 
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Administratively, clinicians described the difficulty of removing the category from records 
once it is assigned: “I wouldn’t try and shoehorn them into something that they're not, 
because once you've made that diagnosis, or you've added that label, it’s very difficult to 
actually take it away” (Psychiatrist 10). 
 
Psychiatrist 3, below, was discussing diagnoses given for MHA tribunals, and an example of 
what she believed to be a mistaken diagnosis of schizophrenia: 
 
Respondent:…it takes a…long time to actually write someone’s diagnosis off, do 
you know what I mean? … 
Interviewer: and how do you even go about that, trying, trying to get rid of that? 
Respondent: oh God, it’s hard, it’s hard, oh my God, it’s absolutely, I mean you can 
only say what you want to say, but nothing more we can do about it… really hard…I 
had a couple of dangerous, difficult people, that I think God, Lord knows how they 
got diagnosed with schizophrenia, but they did, you know, er, and it’s one of those 
things isn't it, because the whole damn thing is subjective… (Psychiatrist 3) 
 
Once recorded, particularly in the context of legal frameworks, diagnoses are difficult to 
remove and ‘detach’ from an individual and their health records. 
 
6.5.3 Bridging between clinical and social spheres to facilitate practical support 
 
By using diagnostic labels to represent a particular level of need, severity, or disability, GPs, 
and at times other clinicians, can use a record of the diagnosis to perform particular 
functions in accessing support. The most frequent uses of this type of recorded diagnosis 
were statements of fitness for work (fit notes, previously sick notes) to justify time off work, 
and forms to apply for disability and sickness benefits. These uses of diagnosis represent its 
bridging function between clinical and social spheres. 
 
The form that comprises a statement of fitness for work contains information about the 
‘condition’ a person is experiencing. The guidance for GPs completing the form (DWP, 
2015a) is to give as accurate information as possible about the diagnosis assigned to a 
person, “unless you think a precise diagnosis will damage your patient’s wellbeing or 
position with their employer” (p. 11). Despite the use of diagnosis, the form is largely 
pragmatic, identifying the functional impact of a person’s difficulties, “[y]our advice should 
focus on what your patient can do at work rather than their diagnosis and symptoms” (p. 12). 
Statements of fitness for work and associated medical reports are also used to support 
applications for welfare benefits, such as employment and support allowance (ESA). The 
ESA application form (Department for Work & Pensions, 2017) asks the individual for details 
of their illness, disability or health condition rather than asking explicitly for a diagnosis. 
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Likewise, the Equality Act (2010) defines disability in terms of physical or mental impairment, 
where “the impairment has a substantial and long-term adverse effect on his or her ability to 
carry out normal day-to-day activities” (Section 6(1) Guidance on the Equality Act, Office for 
Disability Issues, 2011) elaborates that the adverse effects of the impairment must be 
substantial, long-term, and affect day-to-day functioning. It is these details, therefore, that 
are the most significant in defining disability, over and above a psychiatric diagnosis, none of 
which are considered de facto disabilities (in comparison with some physical diagnoses, 
such as HIV). In practice, however, clinicians interviewed agreed that, “diagnosis is 
unavoidable when it’s, when it comes to…benefits” (Psychologist 2), “when you have write 
reports for people, which is almost always for benefits, then I would probably use depression 
because they also want a, a diagnosis” (GP 1). 
 
As seen in this chapter and Chapter 4, diagnostic labels were used judiciously and to 
perform specific functions rather than uniformly across clients meeting diagnostic criteria. 
GPs described using the label if it would help their clients, for example to “stave 
off…pressure from elsewhere” (GP 4): 
 
I have to label it as depression to the University, so they can get, so sometimes 
people want a diagnosis because they want to be labelled as disabled because it 
gets them more support, or it gets them more time, erm, gets them a different type of 
accommodation, so sometimes we play that game, but it’s just about how people 
cope with their adverse circumstances and their, their adversity and their, their 
problems coping day to day, for whatever reason… (GP 5) 
 
Alternatively, a diagnostic label might be used simply to access benefits if it would be useful 
for the person, but a diagnosis would not always be formally recorded if it would not open up 
additional practical support; “there are lots of people who kind of, they meet the criteria but 
you don’t want to go down that line” (GP 8). GPs described using diagnostic categories but, 
in accordance with the fit note guidance, were also aware of the potential stigma associated 
with formal diagnostic categories, and the consequences their use may have for the 
individual. Therefore, GPs also used idiosyncratic labels or informal labels that would justify 
their request, but at the same time this represented an attempt to shield their clients from the 
negative impact of the diagnosis in wider social spheres, such as ‘low mood’ or ‘stress-
related illness’ (GP 2). Some GPs described this as a negotiation with the service user: “so I 
could give you a sick note for a couple of weeks and I’ll write whatever you want, anxiety, 
exhaustion, depression on it” (GP 4). In a manner similar to the legal use of diagnosis to 
achieve a particular outcome, some GPs described using diagnosis flexibly on fit notes 
dependent on what would be most useful, and least stigmatising, for the client: 
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…it sort of depends what job people do, I’m mindful, I will use ‘low mood’ a lot 
because employers don’t like ‘depression’…well if there’s an advantage to them 
from having their illness then I will make it sound a lot worse by using terms like 
‘manic depression’, right, as I say I wouldn’t put that on their sick note for their 
employer, but if I felt this patient genuinely couldn’t work I would bang ‘manic 
depression’ on it because obviously you see that and ‘ooh’… (GP 3) 
 
Where clinicians use diagnosis to convey a sense of severity about a person’s difficulties, a 
tension was noted between using a diagnostic label to get a client access to something and 
not believing it to be helpful for clients personally. This finding was in part about the ‘power’ 
that diagnosis holds in communicating with other professionals; Psychologist 11, for 
example, spoke of her discomfort with the power that resides in detailing the severity of a 
person’s difficulties, rather than their strengths. The data also showed that clinicians might 
struggle with the idea that a diagnostic label locates problems within the person themselves 
rather than environmental or other systemic contributing or causal factors: “…if you say that 
they've got depression or they've got a depressive illness, then that's, that, they may have 
some utility in terms of work, but in terms of themselves, you're actually telling them that 
there’s something profoundly wrong with them” (GP 4). 
 
6.6 Discussion 
 
This chapter addressed the second and third theoretical questions outlined in Chapter 2 
(Section 2.4.2); 2) how are psychiatric diagnostic categories used in practice? And 3) what 
do diagnostic categories produce; what are their implications? Using interview data with 
predominantly clinicians, contextualised by documents and policies relating to the recording 
of diagnoses, the findings presented in this chapter show that diagnoses are used to 
facilitate cooperation between the clinical context and other spheres, including business, 
legal, and social contexts. As this discussion will elaborate upon, clinicians use diagnoses 
pragmatically to achieve their clinical aims and to meet service users’ needs. However, 
beyond the individual clinical context, diagnoses are used as inflexible categories and 
without the nuances of clinical use.  
 
This discussion section will be organised by the following points: 
• Pragmatically applied diagnoses 
• Records of diagnosis as boundary objects 
• Reification of diagnostic categories 
• Implications for research and data capture 
• Clinical implications: Practical utility vs. therapeutic utility 
 
173 
6.6.1 Pragmatically applied diagnoses 
 
The findings presented in this chapter demonstrate that clinicians often record diagnoses 
with a view to reaching an intended outcome for what they believe their clients need. 
Chapter 4 demonstrated that clinicians use diagnoses pragmatically, for example only giving 
a diagnosis if they feel it would benefit the person in some way, such as giving access to a 
particular intervention that would not otherwise be available to them. Where flexibility is not 
offered within the context of legal and administrative form filling, clinicians create flexibility 
themselves by adapting these processes to meet the needs of the client. These findings 
reflect Bowker and Star’s (1999) concept of work-arounds, in which it is argued that people 
negotiate the formal restrictions imposed by a standard by introducing their own local 
flexibility. The findings to an extent support research carried out by Brown (1987), in which it 
was found that ambiguity and avoidance of diagnostic clarity was created by the clinician’s 
need to serve non-clinical outside agencies. Clinicians in Brown’s study at times used 
“creative diagnoses” because they felt an administrative pressure to “put some DSM thing on 
paper” (p. 39). Although most GPs and psychiatrists in this thesis research did not describe 
reluctance to put down a diagnosis where administratively necessary, several acknowledged 
that the recording of diagnosis was oriented towards administrative goals rather than for 
patient care. Although not equivalent, the findings are also reminiscent of the psychiatrists 
Whooley (2010) interviewed who chose what they believed to be acceptable diagnoses to 
record on medical insurance forms to meet the bureaucratic requirement for a diagnosis 
before treatment could be reimbursed. The findings from Chapter 4 showed that clinicians 
emphasised the flexibility and nuances within their assessments, and this chapter shows that 
diagnoses are used judiciously to meet client needs. However, this nuanced information is 
not captured within the administrative use of a diagnostic label. As Moncrieff (2010, p. 373) 
argues, the record of the diagnostic label “gloss[es] over the complex subjective judgements 
involved in the process of applying the label”. 
 
6.6.2 Records of diagnosis as ‘boundary objects’ 
 
The findings from this chapter show that psychiatric diagnosis is used to represent mental 
distress across social worlds, from clinical uses to business, legal, and social spheres. The 
application of knowledge across different functions has been referred to as “knowledge 
boundaries” (Carlile, 2002). Carlile argues that knowledge becomes localised and embedded 
within practice, and that this specificity can become problematic when working across 
boundaries of function. Knowledge boundaries are evident in mental health, particularly 
when diagnosis moves beyond immediate clinical uses within services. Where diagnoses 
are used, for example, to support a person to access welfare benefits, the information must 
at some point be conveyed from clinicians to non-clinicians, representing a boundary across 
which information must effectively understood across disciplines and purposes.  
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Scientific objects that are used across and within different social worlds, but at the same 
time satisfy the needs of each, have been described as “boundary objects” (Star & 
Griesemer, 1989). Boundary objects are tools that facilitate the transfer of knowledge across 
these knowledge boundaries. Reflecting the flexible, pragmatic use of diagnosis described 
by the findings of this chapter and in Chapter 4, Star and Griesemer (1989) describe 
boundary objects as “plastic enough to adapt to local needs…yet robust enough to maintain 
a common identity across sites” (p. 393), that is, they are subject to local flexibility and site-
specific use, yet they are universally recognised. The local meanings associated with 
boundary objects may therefore vary, but they maintain common understanding across 
social worlds. The formal records of psychiatric diagnoses that are described in this chapter 
can be conceptualised as boundary objects. In assessing people’s mental distress, it is 
necessary to communicate complex clinical information, and to find a way of convey this 
information to non-clinical settings as well as other clinicians. Diagnoses are used in flexible, 
pragmatic ways to contain information about people’s mental health difficulties, and by 
having broadly shared understandings of what the categories represent they act as a bridge 
into worlds outside of the immediate clinical setting. As seen from this chapter, this 
communication is generally carried out indirectly through various types of records of a given 
diagnosis, from electronic health records, to legal documentation and formal forms, to 
referral letters. These records act as tools, standardised across services and broader 
spheres, to allow the information to be understood in each, enabling cooperation. The 
findings from this chapter demonstrate that cooperation is necessary across social worlds 
including business interests, legal, and social spheres, and that diagnostic labels facilitate 
this cooperation. 
 
6.6.3 Reification of diagnostic categories 
 
Fujimura (1992) has further developed the idea of boundary objects to explain not only 
cooperation across social worlds, but also “fact stabilization” (p. 169), which incorporates 
Latour and Woolgar’s (1986) concept of the hardening of claims or ideas into scientific facts. 
Concepts can be drawn from Fujimura (1992) and applied to the uses of psychiatric 
diagnosis described in this thesis. Fujimura describes the combined influence of flexible or 
“ambiguous” theory and specific, standardised methods in the development of fact 
stabilisation. Flexible or ambiguous theory might be applied to general conceptualisations of 
mental health and illness; the broad diagnostic concepts such as ‘psychosis’ and ‘mild to 
moderate mental health problems’ seen used in Chapters 4 and 5, and inconsistent 
representations of diagnoses as discrete illnesses or disorders, described by clinicians in 
Chapter 4. Given their flexible application and individual interpretations, this term might also 
be applied to diagnostic categories themselves. The standardised tools in this case are 
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represented by the subsequent recording of diagnoses on paperwork to meet various 
requirements for the individual.  
 
Records of diagnosis on formal documentation, such as Mental Health Act papers, health 
records, or journal articles, are akin to Latour and Woolgar’s (1986) “transformation of 
statement types” (p. 81), whereby by accepting and using a particular assertion, such as a 
diagnostic category recorded on such documentation, the category is transformed into “an 
established matter of fact” (Latour & Woolgar, 1986, p. 81). Star describes Latour and 
Woolgar’s argument as the transformation of “everyday uncertainties” into facts (Star, 1989, 
p. 64). In recording a diagnosis on formal paperwork, the critical discussion of diagnosis and 
its flexible use and uncertainties is made invisible. What begins as a pragmatically used 
category is crystallised; formalised by being documented on health records and legal forms, 
potentially moving the category to systems outside of health services via administrative 
means such as claiming benefits. Diagnosis is transformed from a flexible tool to a fixed 
certainty or ‘reality’. As is seen from the findings of this chapter, the clinician no longer has a 
hold on the diagnosis; it is no longer under their ownership, and can be difficult to ‘take 
back’. Documentation of the diagnosis therefore performs a role of what Star (1989) 
describes as “progressive reification” (p. 64). 
 
6.6.4 Implications for research and data capture 
 
The progressively reified or crystallised use of diagnoses as fixed categories in non-clinical 
contexts has been identified previously within the DSM-5 Research Agenda: “…criteria listed 
in the DSMs have been uncritically used by legal professionals and health care 
administrators as representing lapidary, received wisdom about the nature of mental 
disorders.” (Rounsaville et al., 2002, p. 1). However, the recognition of this problem fails to 
acknowledge that it is the way that diagnoses are recorded on formal paperwork that leads 
to these reified ways of using psychiatric diagnosis.  
 
6.6.4.1 Research 
 
Less drawn upon by participants within these interviews is the use of diagnostic categories 
by the pharmaceutical industry, and within research. By virtue of being between clinical and 
social spaces, these uses of diagnostic categories contribute to the crystallisation of 
diagnoses and their use from tools that perform particular purposes to categories that people 
‘have’. These uses then move into more social worlds, for example, where the media report 
on research or individual cases using diagnostic categories. Future research could be used 
to represent individuals’ difficulties more descriptively, in ways that reflect the nuances that 
are present within clinicians’ assessments. 
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6.6.4.2 Data capture 
 
Much of the contextualising information and policies reviewed in this chapter regarding NHS 
outcomes and incentive frameworks concerns data capture. However, the findings presented 
within this chapter demonstrate that clinicians use diagnostic labels with flexibility to meet 
their clinical needs, and/or to protect service users from stigmatising labels, but this 
information is then used for higher level data gathering purposes. For example, whether or 
not a clinician uses a formal diagnostic label on a statement of fitness to work, for example, 
plans for anonymous data collection from fit notes seek to aggregate data using ICD-10 
diagnostic classification (Department for Work & Pensions, 2015b), so this data is likely to be 
transformed into a fixed diagnostic category irrespective of how the information was 
originally framed. This demonstrates that the diagnostic data retrieved from NHS patient 
records cannot be an accurate representation of experiences of mental distress within the 
population. Rather, the data gathered from the formal recording of psychiatric diagnoses will 
represent these political and individual aims. 
 
6.6.5 Clinical implications: Practical utility vs. therapeutic utility 
 
The findings from this chapter represent a tension between the practical versus therapeutic 
utility of psychiatric diagnoses. This tension is discussed below from the perspectives of 
clinicians and of service users. 
 
6.6.5.1 Tension for clinicians 
 
For clinicians, summing up a person’s difficulties in a diagnostic label for administrative 
purposes might make little difference to the immediate clinical situation in which detail and 
nuances can be described in other ways, but the practices beyond the individual health 
record to the outside world demonstrate the different ways in which diagnostic categories are 
used. Clinicians’ concerns about stigma suggested that they were aware of the reified 
conceptualisations of diagnosis outside of the clinical context. Clinicians often weighing up 
the benefits of assigning a diagnosis against the potential stigma and negative impact it may 
have on a person, particularly for diagnoses generally seen as longer lasting, such as 
schizophrenia or personality disorders. Alternatively, idiosyncratic, non-diagnostic labels 
such as ‘low mood’, ‘stress’ or ‘exhaustion’ were used to avoid stigmatised labels. Brown 
(1987) describes this process as the “minimization or normalization” (p. 40) of a person’s 
difficulties, in order to protect clients. Nevertheless, diagnoses are made every day in the 
clinic, and in their position as expert or professional, the clinician is central to the translation 
of mental health difficulties into diagnoses, and onto formal paperwork. The utility of this 
translatory work may often prioritised over the personal impact that it has on the individual 
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whose difficulties are being transformed in this way. The impact upon those who are 
diagnosed in explored further in the next chapter. 
 
6.6.5.2 Consequences for the person given the diagnosis 
 
As is exemplified by the quote from Service User 22 at the start of the chapter, the negative 
implications may be most significant for the person being diagnosed; not least because of 
their personal impact, but also because the individual is at the intersection of many of these 
worlds, by virtue of needing to access them. Linking pragmatic use of diagnosis to Service 
User 22’s experiences, the confusion around which diagnosis was put on the participant’s 
letter for her workplace (depression) compared with one for which she had been referred for 
therapy (borderline personality disorder) was perhaps the result of a well-meaning clinician 
using arguably a less controversial label than personality disorder, yet the potential here can 
be seen for the negative consequences of amending a diagnosis according to its recorded 
context for the intended benefit of the client. 
 
For example, service users may receive a diagnosis due to recording requirements that 
would not otherwise have been given at that time. The pressures on clinicians to assign 
diagnoses for non-clinical trust or legal purposes might accelerate the process of diagnosing 
and ‘fix’ a diagnosis at an earlier stage on a client’s health records than would otherwise be 
made clinically. As highlighted in this chapter, some clinicians view the different purposes of 
diagnosis as quite separate from each other, and therefore assign a diagnosis without 
informing person who has been diagnosed. This practice allows the possibility of the service 
user discovering their diagnosis by accident, and the distress that this may cause. This way 
of working also directly contravenes the government white paper ‘Liberating the NHS: No 
decision about me without me’ (Department of Health, 2012a), which sought to increase 
patient involvement and choice. The uses and implications of psychiatric diagnoses for the 
individuals who receive them are explored further in Chapter 7. 
 
6.7 Conclusions 
 
This chapter has used interview data with clinicians, contextualised by guidance documents 
and policies such as NHS outcomes and incentives frameworks, to explore the ways in 
which diagnostic categories are formally recorded and used across social worlds and 
contexts beyond the clinic. The findings demonstrated that the recording of diagnosis is 
ubiquitous in communicating information beyond the clinical assessment. Clinicians 
pragmatically apply diagnoses to achieve particular aims, and as such diagnoses can be 
framed as boundary objects that facilitate cooperation across contexts. Clinicians 
acknowledged the changing conceptualisation of diagnostic categories beyond the clinic; 
data capture and bureaucratic documents likewise represent categories as fixed, inflexible, 
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and even reified. The implications for research and data capture are important; diagnostic 
data may be collected as representing certain, stable categories, yet this is at odds with their 
nuanced and pragmatic application by clinicians. Clinicians are caught within a tension 
between the practical utility of diagnostic categories facilitating numerous clinical outcomes, 
and the therapeutic impact of giving diagnoses, which clinicians acknowledge may be long-
term and stigmatising for those diagnosed. 
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7 Chapter 7: The meanings and practices associated with a 
psychiatric diagnosis: Recipients’ perspectives 
 
7.1 Abstract 
 
Previous chapters have explored the uses and practices of diagnosis from the perspectives 
of clinicians and services, and the ways that diagnosis travels and its conceptualisations 
change beyond the clinic. At the intersection of these different worlds is the person 
diagnosed. The literature describes psychiatric diagnosis as having both positive and 
negative impact for the individuals who are diagnosed. This chapter uses data from 
interviews with service users, and is supplemented by data from interviews with clinical 
psychologists, to explore the practices in which service users take up and use, or avoid, their 
diagnostic categories, what enables or facilitates these processes and the impact and 
implications of these receiving diagnostic labels. The findings demonstrate four themes that 
illustrate the practices and implications of diagnoses:  
• The positive functions of diagnosis for service users 
• The damaging impact of diagnosis for individuals and their identity and via stigma 
• The ways in which individuals come to question the value of diagnosis 
• Ways of reframing distress outside of the diagnostic model 
 
The findings are discussed with regard to the conceptualisation of diagnosis and the removal 
of its social context, and the process of negative experiences of diagnosis, which makes 
visible the diagnostic infrastructure and allows individuals to explore different ways of 
framing their experiences. There is a tension, however, between service users (and 
psychologists) avoiding diagnostic labels, and the clinicians, systems, and services that 
demand their use, such that avoidance of diagnoses can only be achieved to an extent. 
 
7.2 Introduction  
 
This chapter explores the practices in which service users take up and use, or discard, their 
diagnostic categories, and what enables or facilitates these processes. 
 
7.2.1 The impact of psychiatric diagnoses 
 
Scientific literature on the personal impact of psychiatric diagnoses is somewhat limited. A 
feature that findings have in common is that whatever the valence of the response to 
receiving a diagnosis, the meaning that is conveyed by the diagnosis for the individual takes 
on important personal significance and can impact upon a person’s identity (Hayne, 2003; 
Probst, 2015b). These findings suggest a stark contrast between the pragmatic application 
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of diagnosis as a clinical or bureaucratic tool and the subsequent impact on the individual. 
Studies show that receiving a diagnosis can be both a positive and a negative experience. 
Positive responses to diagnosis include feelings of relief and validation from having a name 
for one’s difficulties (Pitt et al., 2009; Probst, 2015). Diagnoses are used to facilitate access 
to treatment, support, and understanding (Pitt et al., 2009). Where diagnosis has a negative 
personal impact, however, it can be experienced as harmful and stigmatising (Thomas et al., 
2013) and disempowering (Pitt et al., 2009). A diagnosis can de-legitimise the self (Hayne, 
2003), reducing one’s experiences to a simplified category (Probst, 2015b). As discussed in 
Chapter 1, psychiatric diagnoses can become essentialised as biomedically caused 
disorders, and the public may associate individuals with psychiatric diagnoses with violence, 
dangerousness, and as being fundamentally different from ‘normal’ (Dietrich et al., 2006; 
Haslam, 2000; Read et al., 2006). This stigma may lead to social exclusion for the person 
diagnosed (Pitt et al., 2009). Through this essentialised thinking about psychiatric diagnoses, 
Chapter 1 also highlighted the ways in which diagnostic categories may be represented by 
recipients as categorising the person themselves, rather than simply describing their 
distress, such as Pat Deegan, who wrote: “I was told I had a disease… I was beginning to 
undergo that radically dehumanising and devaluing transformation … from being Pat 
Deegan to being ‘a schizophrenic’” (Deegan, 1993). 
 
7.2.2 Avoiding diagnosis and the ‘mentally ill’ identity 
 
As introduced in Section 1.3.3.2 of the literature review in Chapter 1, there is a significant 
body of literature that describes the resistance of service users to diagnosis, the psychiatric 
model, or to mental health services in general. Crossley (2006), for example, describes this 
resistance to psychiatry as formed of rights-based social movements. Campbell (1999) 
suggests that the service user/survivor movement represents a challenge to the perceived 
social status of those who have been diagnosed ‘mentally ill’, and that this movement is 
borne out of the problematic experiences that can result from being labelled in this way, such 
as the impact on people’s identity described above.  
 
Lewis (1995) has described how some participants rejected their diagnoses of depression 
because the diagnosis did not relate to their own understandings of their distress. Compared 
with Pitt and colleagues’ (2009) and Probst’s (2015) research, the diagnosis was seen by 
some in Lewis’ study as pathologising their experiences, rather than validating them. 
Karlsson and Malmqvist (2013) describe Malmqvist’s experiences of conveying an 
alternative narrative to that of social inadequacy and mental illness that she first embodied 
when diagnosed with schizophrenia. The language used to introduce her in the paper 
echoes the non-psychiatric language described by Burstow (2013) in Section 1.3.3.2.1.1, 
“Annika Malmqvist (AM), one of the authors of this article, was diagnosed as schizophrenic 
in her early 20s and considers herself a voice hearer and an ex-mental patient” (Karlsson & 
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Malmqvist, 2013, p. 732). Malmqvist is described as using embroidery as a form of 
resistance, a means of uncensored expression outside of the identity of the ‘mental patient’. 
Coleman has described the shedding of the identity of a ‘schizophrenic’: “In the early 1980s I 
was diagnosed as schizophrenic. By 1990 that was changed to chronic schizophrenic and in 
1993 I gave up being a schizophrenic and decided to be Ron Coleman” (Coleman, 1999, p. 
160). 
 
For Coleman, his ‘diagnosed’ identity was one of being a victim, of being different and 
disordered. He describes his recovery as being about owning his voice hearing, as giving up 
being the victim and losing the ‘status’ of being a victim (Coleman, 1999). These first-hand 
accounts contribute to literature exploring how individuals come to reject their psychiatric 
diagnoses and the identities associated with them, and frame their distress in other ways, 
however this body of literature is limited compared with research describing the social 
movements as a whole. 
 
7.2.3 Rationale: The use of psychiatric diagnoses by those who receive them 
 
Where the existing literature takes a single perspective approach to diagnosis (as discussed 
in Section 1.6.1), the different functions and implications of diagnosis across individuals are 
not considered. The psychiatric literature frequently discusses diagnosis as one of several 
tools available to the clinician, however much of the service user/survivor literature 
discusses the imposition of a diagnosis and the labelled identity and power imbalances that 
can result. These discourses are very different from the perception of diagnosis as providing 
day-to-day utility in an individual’s work. The reason for service users’ inclusion in the study, 
therefore, was to understand how these clinical categories are transformed into social and 
explanatory categories for non-clinicians, and how individuals who are given diagnoses 
make sense of and assign meanings to them. 
 
7.3 Aims 
 
This chapter addresses each of theoretical questions outlined in Chapter 2 (Section 2.4.2); 
1) what are the conceptual underpinnings of diagnostic categories, and are these consistent 
across contexts and practices? 2) how are psychiatric diagnostic categories used in 
practice? And 3) what do diagnostic categories produce; what are their implications? 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the practices of participants in the context of their 
distress and the diagnostic categories assigned to their experiences, and the impact and 
implications of these received diagnostic labels. 
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7.4 Methodology 
 
Data were gathered from semi-structured interviews with service users who had been given 
a psychiatric diagnosis by a clinician (e.g. a GP or mental health professional). The 
methodology for the data collection with service users, including ethics, procedure, and 
methods of analysis, reflect the methodology for the interviews with clinicians, which is 
described in the Methodology section of Chapter 4 (Section 4.4). Differences in the 
participants and procedure for this chapter are outlined in the following sections below: 
 
• Participants 
o Sampling 
o Inclusion criteria 
o Recruitment 
o Demographic information 
• Procedure 
o Consideration of ethical issues 
o The interview 
o Debrief 
o Risk 
 
7.4.1 Participants 
 
7.4.1.1 Sampling 
 
As with the interviews carried out with clinicians (the methodology for which is described in 
the Methodology of Chapter 4) purposive, or criterion based, sampling (LeCompte, Preissle, 
& Tesch, 1993; Mason, 2002; Patton, 1988) was used in the recruitment of participants for 
this research (see Section 4.4.3 for further details). 
 
Service users were recruited in order to purposively sample participants with a range of 
views and practices with regards to their diagnoses. A range of diagnosis types was sought 
in order to recognise the potential differences in impact of different diagnostic labels, for 
example, research shows that the experience of self-stigma for people diagnosed with 
bipolar disorder and schizophrenia differs in its intensity and impact on functioning (Karidi et 
al., 2015). In addition, participants with differing experiences of receiving diagnoses were 
invited, for example, those who had received a single diagnosis versus being given multiple 
diagnoses. 
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7.4.1.2 Inclusion criteria 
 
The inclusion criteria for NHS service user participants were that they were over 18 years of 
age, and had been given one or more psychiatric diagnoses by a clinician. NHS service 
users were invited to take part specifically rather than anyone who considers themselves to 
have experienced mental health difficulties or considers themselves to have a psychiatric 
diagnosis. The reasons for this were twofold. The first was to ensure that participants had 
been formally given their diagnosis by a clinician. The second was to ensure that participants 
had experienced mental health care via the NHS, in order that they had experience of the 
ways that the health system works with mental distress. 
 
Individuals who had been given a diagnosis by a clinician at any time in their life were invited 
to take part; by not imposing a limit on the time since being diagnosed, it was possible to 
gain an understanding of how different individuals had responded to and used (or not used) 
their diagnosis in the time since diagnosis. Individuals must have received NHS support for 
mental distress either currently or in the past. This support could either be from primary care 
or GPs, or from secondary (or tertiary/specialist) mental health services. 
 
7.4.1.3 Recruitment 
 
Clinicians who were interviewed were asked to give the study information to clients on their 
caseload who would meet the inclusion criteria. Local community mental health teams were 
approached and asked to pass on the study information to clients. An advertisement for the 
study was also included within the research newsletter for Trust 1, and within the newsletter 
for Trust 1’s service user group. Recruitment was extended to include non-NHS 
organisations, such as those that run local groups and support hubs. Three local charity-run 
support centres were contacted and advertisement flyers made available across three active 
local sites. The research was also advertised via the mailing list for two local mental health 
interest groups. 
 
Through all means of recruitment, potential participants were invited to contact me directly if 
there were interested in taking part. Usually this contact was via phone or email, and this 
medium was used to have an initial discussion about the study, its purposes, and what it 
would involve, as well as to ensure that participants met the inclusion criteria. At this stage a 
participant information sheet (Appendix 6) was emailed or mailed to potential participants to 
give them further information about the study. Potential participants were invited to contact 
me again to arrange the interview if they were still interested in taking part. If they did not 
respond, a week was allowed for potential participants to consider the information given, and 
then up to two attempts at contact (email or telephone call) were made to discuss whether 
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the individuals would like to take part. If potential participants agreed to set up the interview, 
a time and mutually convenient meeting place was then arranged.  
 
7.4.1.4 Demographic information 
 
All participants were in current receipt of support for their mental health to some extent, for 
example, some individuals were in contact with their GP only, whilst others were engaged 
with secondary care services. All participants were outpatients although many had had past 
experience of being admitted to an inpatient ward. 
 
In order to preserve participant anonymity, the service users’ demographic information is 
divided into separate tables. Table 7-1, below, gives the participants’ age, gender, and 
ethnicity. Ethnicity was self-identified. 
 
Table 7-1 
Service user demographic information 
 
Participant ID 
 
 
Age 
 
Gender 
 
Ethnicity 
 
Service User 1 73 M White British 
Service User 2 24 F White British 
Service User 3 56 M White Other 
Service User 4 58 F White British 
Service User 5 65 F White Irish 
Service User 6 57 M White British 
Service User 7 59 M White British 
Service User 8 66 F Jewish 
Service User 9 53 F White British 
Service User 10 53 M Irish British 
Service User 11 53 F White British 
Service User 12 42 M African British 
Service User 13 55 F Black British 
Service User 14 45 F White British 
Service User 15 60 M Arabic 
Service User 16 54 F White British 
Service User 17 54 F White British 
Service User 18 43 F White British 
Service User 19 42 F White British 
Service User 20 46 M White British 
Service User 21 35 M White British 
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Service User 22 24 F White British 
Service User 23 37 M White British 
 
Table 7-2, below, gives the diagnoses that had been received by service user participants, 
and the numbers of participants reporting those diagnoses. The frequency total numbers 
more than the total number of service users due to many participants having received 
multiple diagnoses, either across their lifetime or given at one time. The specific 
combinations of given diagnoses are not reported in order to protect participant anonymity. 
‘Borderline personality disorder’ and ‘emotionally unstable personality disorder’ are collapsed 
into one category, as these are the different labels given to a roughly equivalent diagnostic 
category in DSM-5 and ICD-10, respectively. Identifying participants’ diagnoses in a thesis 
that explores diagnosis from a critical perspective might potentially be questioned. However, 
it should be acknowledged that psychiatric diagnoses do convey some information, although 
somewhat limited. The diagnoses are given below in order to give the reader some 
information about the spread of diagnoses that participants had received. The diagnoses 
also provide some information about the ways that diagnostic categories are applied in 
practice; for example, just 7 participants had received a single diagnosis. Another reason for 
asking participants about the diagnoses they had received was to enable analysis (if 
appropriate, and if such a finding occurred in the data) regarding the potentially differing 
impact of different diagnoses, as has been found in previous research (e.g. Karidi et al., 
2015). 
 
Table 7-2 
Psychiatric diagnoses received by participants, ordered by descending frequency 
 
Diagnosis 
 
 
Frequency 
 
Depression (including post-natal depression & depression with 
voices) 
 
12 
Borderline personality disorder / emotionally unstable personality 
disorder 5 
Schizophrenia 5 
Anxiety (including panic attacks) 4 
Obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD) 3 
Bipolar disorder (including one queried diagnosis) 3 
Tourette's syndrome 2 
Post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) 2 
Psychosis 1 
Cyclothymia 1 
Body dysmorphic disorder (BDD) 1 
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Dementia 1 
Agoraphobia 1 
 
7.4.2 Procedure 
 
7.4.2.1 Consideration of ethical issues 
 
Consent to participate was obtained through the procedure described in Chapter 4 (Section 
4.4.4.1). Participants were given the participant information sheet (Appendix 6) and consent 
form (Appendix 8) to read prior to the start of the interview. If there was any doubt as to the 
service users’ ability to understand the information given on these two sheets, I read through 
the information step by step with participants. Participants were told that details of the 
interview would not be disclosed to their care teams unless I believed them to be at risk of 
harm, either to themselves or to others. Further details on the management of risk are given 
below in Section 7.4.3.2.1, Risk. Capacity to consent was judged on an individual basis once 
all the study information had been given. No potential participants were deemed to lack 
capacity to consent. 
 
7.4.2.2 The interview 
 
The procedure for the interviews with service users was the same for that of clinicians, 
described in Chapter 4 (Section 4.4.4.2). Within the interviews with services users, 
occasionally the personal experiences being discussed were upsetting for participants. 
When this happened, participants were offered the opportunity to take a break and pause 
the recording or stop the interview altogether. In these circumstances, as throughout the 
interviews, I tried to offer an understanding and empathic response to the person’s distress, 
and give them time to talk or to compose themselves as they needed. None of the 
participants took up my offer to stop the interview in these circumstances, so when they 
were ready, the interview continued. 
 
The majority of interviews took place in a meeting room at the University of Liverpool. There 
were several other venues where the remainder of the interviews took place, according to 
the preference of the participants, including the non-NHS support centres in which a quiet 
room was used for some interviews, and a local library. Two participants preferred not to 
travel, and so interviews were carried out in their homes (see the following section - Risk). 
 
The mean interview length for service users was 57 minutes (ranging from 25 to 102 
minutes). 
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7.4.2.3 Debrief 
 
Participants were thanked for their time following the interview. A verbal ‘debrief’ was given 
to each participant, explaining again the purposes of the study of understanding the 
functions of diagnosis and the ways that different individuals use it, in order to inform the 
development of different ways of conceptualising and assessing mental health. 
  
Participants were asked how they had felt answering the questions and how they were 
feeling now that the interview had finished. The potential for feeling distressed following the 
interview having discussed personal experiences was explored. Participants were 
encouraged to contact me again if they felt they would like to discuss this, or alternatively the 
principal investigator for the study and my supervisor, Professor Kinderman. Service users 
were given a debrief pack (Appendix 9) that included a letter detailing what to do if they felt 
distressed by their participation in the study, and a list of useful contact numbers, including 
the primary care 24 hour urgent care service in Merseyside, and the contact details for 
various mental health charities, including the Samaritans and the Hearing Voices Network.  
 
7.4.2.4 Risk 
 
7.4.2.4.1 Psychological risk  
 
Participants were reassured that their responses in the interview would confidential, and that 
no information would be given to their mental health care teams, except in situations where I 
believed them to be at risk of harm, either to themselves or to others. Participants were 
reassured that if I were to share this information with their clinician I would inform them of 
this first where possible, and that only the information pertaining to risk would be disclosed. 
This disclosure of information was not required for any of the study participants. 
 
7.4.2.4.2 Risk to the interviewer 
 
Most of the interviews were carried out in public places such as the university or in local 
support centres. Two interviews were carried out at participants’ homes, however, and so 
the University of Liverpool’s lone worker policy, using a buddy system, was implemented. A 
designated colleague was informed about the estimated time of the visit and a specific time 
was agreed for a 'safe and welfare' call. In the emergency event that all attempts to contact 
me failed, the designated colleague was instructed to open a sealed envelope containing the 
participant’s address and telephone number and contact local police for a 'safe and welfare' 
check. No such emergencies arose in the course of the study. 
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7.4.3 Methods of analysis 
 
7.4.3.1 Achieving data saturation or theoretical sufficiency 
 
For the service user participants, a slightly larger sample was sought than the groups of 
clinical disciplines recruited (described in Chapter 4, Section 4.4.3.3.1). This was decided in 
order to reflect the possibility that there may be greater variation in the views and 
experiences of service users, as unlike the clinicians, there may be less cohesion as regards 
to the frameworks and explanations that participants used to make sense of their mental 
distress. As with the clinicians’ interviews, data collection was ceased when no new 
theoretical insights were gained from the interviews, and in light of the concept of theoretical 
sufficiency, when thoroughness of data had been achieved (see Section 4.4.5.1, Achieving 
data saturation or theoretical sufficiency). 
 
 
The interviews with each of the clinician groups (described in Chapter 4) and service users 
were analysed as one dataset. The interview data were prepared, organised, coded, and 
analysed according to the methods described in Chapter 4, Section 4.4.5.  
 
7.4.4 Presentation of findings 
 
The three domains derived from analysis of the full dataset of interviews with clinicians and 
service users are described in Chapter 4, Section 4.4.5.7. Figure 7-1, on the following page, 
is presented to remind the reader of these domains, their themes and subthemes. This 
chapter presents findings from the third area of interview findings: The ways in which service 
users take up and use (or do not use) their diagnoses. 
 
In addition to data from interviews with service users, latter findings are supplemented by 
data from interviews with clinical psychologists. These data did not contribute to the theme 
development within this chapter, but are presented to demonstrate some of the similarities 
between service users’ ways of reframing their experiences outside of the diagnostic model 
and the practices described by clinical psychologists. The method for interviewing clinical 
psychologists can be found in Chapter 4 (Section 4.4, Methodology).
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7.5 Findings 
 
The following findings will demonstrate that psychiatric diagnoses are used by service users 
for several positive functions, including offering a sense of relief through recognition of 
distress and reassurance that others have experienced similar kinds of difficulties. 
Diagnoses legitimise a person’s distress, and the labels are used by individuals both as an 
explanation for their own distress, and in explaining and gaining understanding from others. 
As recognised in previous chapters, diagnoses are used to access practical support as well 
as treatment and mental health services. However, a conflicting theme described the 
damaging effects of being diagnosed; through stigma and the impact on a person’s identity. 
Participants who had had these negative experiences came to question the value of the 
diagnostic label, and to what extent it could provide meaning to their distress. The final 
theme explored the ways in which individuals may come to avoid or reject their diagnosis. 
The data highlighted two ways in which people come to reframe their distress using non-
diagnostic ideas; de-problematising their experiences, seeing them as simply part of their 
life, and understanding their distress within the context of difficult life experiences. 
 
This findings section is organised by four themes and associated subthemes, which are 
outlined in Table 7-3, below. Each of these is explored in detail in the following section. 
 
Table 7-3 
Outline of themes and subthemes 
 
Positive functions of diagnosis 
Diagnosis provides relief 
Recognition 
Legitimising distress 
Diagnosis as explanation 
Explanation for the self 
Communication with others 
A starting point for change 
Practical utility and access to services 
Damaging effects of diagnosis 
Negative impact on identity 
Stigma 
Self-stigma 
Stigma and the behaviour of others 
“I’m smelling a bit of a rat…” Questioning the value of diagnosis 
Meaningless diagnoses 
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Avoiding diagnosis 
Reframing distress outside of the diagnostic model 
De-problematising distress 
Understandable responses to traumatic experiences 
A tension between rejecting diagnoses but needing to use them  
 
 
 
7.5.1 Positive functions of diagnosis 
 
The data demonstrated several positive functions of diagnosis for those who had received 
them; the subthemes illustrated the ways in which receiving diagnosis can be a relief, an 
explanation of a person’s distress, a starting point for change, and a way of accessing 
practical support and mental health services. 
 
7.5.1.1 Diagnosis provides relief 
 
Participants often reported experiencing relief on receiving a diagnosis. Feelings of relief 
were divided into two subthemes; recognition, and legitimation of distress. 
 
7.5.1.1.1 Recognition 
 
The data demonstrated that diagnosis offered confirmation that a person’s difficulties were 
recognised. Participants explained this as recognition that difficulties like theirs have been 
seen before, that other people experience similar distress. Part of this finding was about 
having a name for their experiences; “I suppose it puts a name on lots of unknown things 
like, why am I reacting this way?” (Service User 2). Service User 23 described the relief of 
having a name for his experiences, as well as around being able to attribute his upsetting 
intrusive thoughts to the diagnosis, although these thoughts did not allow the relief of the 
diagnosis to last: 
 
…the relief was just…it was just enormous when he said you, it was like it was an 
illness… There was a label for it…I’d never heard of OCD before, and there was a 
label. Yeah it was all to do with that, and, I mean, like I said the relief didn’t last, it 
lasted seconds, and a minute, 2 minutes at most… (Service User 23) 
 
The data showed that a diagnostic label can provide a known quantity that a person can 
attribute experiences to: 
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…family and friends would be like ‘really?’, so that kind of alienates you and makes 
you feel really different and weird because you’re saying these things which, you 
know, so that was, it was such a huge relief, erm, for somebody to say well that’s 
actually part of this diagnosis, and they’re some of the symptoms that you will 
experience because of your experiences, I can handle that, what I couldn’t handle 
was not knowing. And what I was imagining things to be was far worse than what it 
actually was. (Service User 14) 
 
Participants also described a feeling of relief from other things that are tied in with the 
assessment and receiving a diagnosis, for example, talking to someone for the first time 
about one’s experiences, and being reassured that treatment could now be planned: 
 
…the relief was having somebody to open up to, and talk, er, and the diagnosis, 
well, I didn’t feel, er, well I didn’t mind, you know the description. I thought well you 
know what, that sounds about right. Post-traumatic stress disorder. You experience 
trauma in your life, and you’re left with this, er, stress… (Service User 10) 
 
I knew something was wrong ‘cause I wasn’t well, erm, but being able to tell me 
what it was…once they knew what it was they could maybe start thinking about 
treatment for it, erm, and just having some certainty, that was a relief. (Service User 
9).  
 
7.5.1.1.2 Legitimising distress 
 
There was a relief in a person being told by a clinician that their problems are genuine, 
legitimising difficulties by making them real; “it is actually a condition, not a flaw” (Service 
User 6). In this manner, diagnoses were used in order to facilitate communication and 
explanation to others. Participants described diagnoses as a legitimatised acknowledgement 
and explanation of difficulties that enabled their families to recognise their difficulties; to 
understand and be more understanding. In turn, the data suggested that this may be as a 
result of people being able to demonstrate that they were “not swinging the lead” (Service 
Users 4, 5 & 15), shirking work or faking: 
 
I found when I got the diagnosis [my parents] sort of understood more like they didn’t 
really see it as my fault any more, whereas before it was like ‘oh she’s attention-
seeking’ and all that, whereas when I got the diagnosis, they actually saw it like an 
illness and that, so it meant that they were more understanding… (Service User 22) 
 
I think how I felt, and a lot of people do when they’re diagnosed first, they feel relief, 
because it’s got a name, this awful something that happens to you, this very very 
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distressed state, you’re not pretending, you’re not swinging the lead, because 
people say you know ‘pull yourself together’, all that sort of stuff, so when you’re told 
there’s a name for this, you think oh! (Service User 5) 
 
7.5.1.2 Diagnosis as explanation  
 
As is suggested by some of the quotes above, the data showed that receiving a diagnosis 
can give an explanation for a person’s experiences of distress. This explanation extends 
both to the person themselves and in explaining to others. 
 
7.5.1.2.1 Explanation for the self 
 
Participants reported using diagnostic categories as an explanation for the life impacting 
difficulties they experienced. Diagnoses such as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) offer 
more obviously descriptive labels, however diagnoses such as schizophrenia, which have 
embedded within them arguably less tangible explanation for difficulties, were also used to 
identify a known and recognised cause for difficulties. One participant, on receiving a 
schizophrenia diagnosis, explained, “I could put it down to, I wasn't going doodle lally, I 
wasn’t going mad, there was reasons for why I was behaving the way I was behaving” 
(Service User 11). Another participant described: 
 
…it was useful to put a handle on what I’d been experiencing…it helped me to make 
sense and, and even to have someone mention me and bipolar in the same 
sentence, was erm, a revelation, that I just never considered it before… the 
psychiatric services actually helped enormously, in spite of my resistance, to have a 
label, which I’m very reluctant to have, but at the same time it helps me to 
understand what might be going on… (Service User 3) 
 
Distressing experiences are described as caused by the diagnosis, and as the above quote 
shows, this may be reassuring for service users as an explanation in itself even without 
information about the cause of the disorder itself. Knowing that the problems are ‘caused’ by 
schizophrenia or another diagnosis offers a sense of understandability, of recognition by 
mental health professionals, rather than being in the midst of the “unknown” (Service User 
2), despite the person not having explicit information about what is causing the diagnosis or 
condition seen as represented by the diagnosis. The data within this theme suggested that 
diagnoses could be helpful in separating a person’s difficulties from themselves, “it just put 
things in boxes, like, an OCD box and a bipolar box” (Service User 23). In part this process 
was around removing blame or responsibility for uncomfortable behaviours or thoughts: 
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…when I have thoughts that I don’t like, or thoughts that, erm, I find offensive or 
anything like that, I kind of tell myself…‘cause I tend to beat myself up if I have bad 
thoughts, and I need to sort of tell myself…it’s my OCD…and sort of attribute it to 
that label rather than attributing it to me as a person. (Service User 9) 
 
7.5.1.2.2 Communication with others 
 
As well as explaining their own difficulties, participants described diagnoses as facilitating 
communication with others, which relates to the themes of recognition and legitimation of 
distress, above. Diagnostic labels were described as communicating information about 
distress in way that has broadly shared understanding. The data suggested that this shared 
understanding allows communication whilst at the same time sharing minimal personal 
details about how it impacts upon one’s life or from what personal experiences it may have 
stemmed; “…as soon as you say…schizophrenia, they automatically just know what, what it 
is… without going into detail and what, you know, what happens in your life and all that” 
(Service User 11). Another participant shared: 
 
…it’s easier to just say, oh I’ve got bipolar, than to start saying oh well I went through 
this and I went through that, and that’s why I’m like this, like ‘cause then they’d just 
be like ‘oh that’s a bit deep’, like it’s easier to just like give a label…but when you 
give like say bipolar, no one thinks ‘oh why’s she got that?’ You just think, they just 
assume ‘oh you’re ill’, like you wouldn’t really think ‘well what’s caused that?’ Like 
people just accept it at face value, whereas if you start going into it more, people 
then want to know, well what’s caused that, and all this. (Service User 22) 
 
In contrast, more descriptive diagnoses such as PTSD were described as inviting intrusive 
questions about the trauma experienced that resulted in such a diagnosis; “…because you 
then have to say, if you say you’ve got PTSD, ‘well why have you got PTSD, what 
happened?’ so it’s how much do you share?” (Service User 14): 
 
…depending on how well I knew them…I would tell them that I suffer, I suffer, use 
that word, you know er, I wouldn’t say mental illness, I would say you know I suffer 
depression and anxiety and I take meds for it, but…I wouldn’t tell them immediately 
I’ve been diagnosed having posttraumatic stress disorder, again because it leads 
people into thinking ‘alright what happened?’ (Service User 10) 
 
7.5.1.3 A starting point for change 
 
Just as clinicians in Chapter 4 were seen to use diagnosis as a point of departure for their 
assessments, so did service users report using diagnosis as place to start, for the person to 
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make changes for themselves, “it was a starting point…big starting point…to start picking up 
the pieces. I think, it was just knowing where to fight the fires…” (Service User 23): 
 
Before I had the diagnosis I’d never looked at myself before, I was just me, and I just 
done everything for everybody else, nothing for me. I wasn’t important, I was a 
nothing, really. But today, I do things for me… (Service User 16) 
 
7.5.1.4 Practical utility and access to services  
 
Chapter 6 described the ways that the formal recording of diagnosis is used to gain access 
to various means of support, including time off work and early retirement, welfare benefits, 
and within health services, medication and interventions such as therapy. The data from 
interviews with service users demonstrated similar uses of diagnosis, including welfare 
benefits, “I must admit I am on disability, but that’s all, nothing else, and I wouldn’t be on that 
disability if I didn’t have the bipolar” (Service User 16).  
 
…the diagnosis is just the way the system sort of reacts isn’t it…it’s helped me in 
some ways, and not in others…because along the line I’ve had like benefits I’ve 
qualified for, which have helped me when I haven’t been able to work, erm, which 
I’ve needed, for some form of income (Service User 21) 
 
…if you’re applying for benefits and stuff, it helps to have the diagnosis, like they 
wouldn’t give you nothing if you wasn’t diagnosed with anything, and in terms of 
accessing treatment as well, like I’m on, they’ve referred me to [NHS service], which 
is really hard to get onto, and I don’t think I’d have got onto it if they hadn’t 
diagnosed me… (Service User 22) 
 
Another participant described being able to access support services owing to their diagnostic 
label: “I think if, if you’ve got a label or a diagnosis or a name, there’s help somewhere along 
the line, because if I didn’t have that diagnosis I wouldn’t be into the groups I’m into now” 
(Service User 17). 
 
Some participants did not separate the diagnostic label from the support or intervention they 
received, suggesting that the association between receiving a diagnosis and accessing 
support was so important that the two could become synonymous; “it was helpful, ‘cause I 
wasn’t well…at that time I was in a state, and I needed help, I needed something to calm me 
down, and I was getting all the help I could get, from the hospital.” (Service User 13). 
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As one participant replied when asked about what was helpful about receiving his diagnosis, 
“makes you better doesn’t it, so it’s bound to be like dead helpful isn’t it, makes you better” 
(Service User 12). 
 
Similarly, some participants struggled with the idea of conceptualising their distress in 
different ways, giving an indication of the effect of the reification of diagnostic categories. 
Rather than diagnosis being one way of seeing their difficulties, these participants saw their 
diagnosis as simply something they ‘have’ that cannot be changed or thought of in other 
ways. In a discussion of whether she could think of things differently, one participant replied, 
“I would like to be like normal, I would, I wouldn’t like to have schizophrenia, but, it’s the way 
it goes” (Service User 13). 
 
7.5.2 Damaging effects of diagnosis 
 
The damaging effects of diagnosis reported by participants are described within two 
subthemes; negative impact on the person and their identity, and stigma. The above 
descriptions of receiving a diagnosis, experiencing relief and an explanation for distress, 
combined with helpful functions of communication and accessing support, may be the ways 
that people described initially experiencing diagnosis. However, the data showed that since 
originally receiving the diagnosis, these first impressions could give way to a very different 
experience; “…when you’re told there’s a name for this, you think oh! You don’t realise that 
that diagnosis is actually quite malignant, and will affect the rest of your life” (Service User 
5). 
 
Of receiving a diagnosis that allowed them to have early retirement, one participant said,  
 
I think the only time that the diagnosis really mattered was when I probably had to 
retire from teaching after 25 years, erm, and then the diagnosis floored me because 
to do that, it had to be decided I would never be fit to teach again, that my illness 
was so severe that there would be no time in the future when I would have the 
wherewithal… and to read that in black and white that you know, you're like a proper 
sort of basket case… (Service User 4) 
 
7.5.2.1.1 Negative impact on identity 
 
As Service User 4 described in the previous section, the data showed that the pragmatic 
functions of diagnosis could come at a cost to the individual themselves. The same 
participant went on to say, “the pension helped to be sure so you know, it was good that I 
had that diagnosis…but then that was probably the, the most damaging thing that's ever 
happened to me as well” (Service User 4). 
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Other participants described the impact that receiving a diagnosis had had on their lives, 
“how could you not internalise the words that this person of quite a lot of authority and power 
has [used]?” (Service User 3). Another participant described: 
 
I try not to make it part of me, I try and make it really separate, but there are times 
when I’ve really hid behind it, erm, it’s been a reason for me to not engage with 
people, or keep me world really small, erm, because I have this and you know I don’t 
have to get involved with other people (Service User 14) 
 
Even before it has enabled access to support or other functions, the diagnosis can have an 
immediate negative impact on the person diagnosed: 
 
I was given a diagnosis of schizophrenia, erm, it’s about 10 years ago now, erm, 
which devastated me, erm, in the beginning, it really devastated me, erm, I haven’t 
found it helpful in the least…for a while, I kind of walked around thinking that I was 
schizophrenic, I’ve got a chemical imbalance, I’ve got a brain disorder, erm, and 
that’s not a good way of living. (Service User 17) 
 
7.5.2.1.2 Stigma 
 
7.5.2.1.2.1 Self-stigma 
 
Awareness of stigma around diagnoses can also mean that people are wary of receiving and 
communicating a diagnosis for fear of others’ responses and perceived stigma, “when I got a 
bit older, about 21 or so, I actually left home and went to live in another city, another country, 
well, simply because my mother had blurted it out over the neighbourhood” (Service User 7). 
Another participant explained his being cautious regarding what he said and did; “You know 
that stereotype of mental illness can or maybe equal violence, violent behaviour, so er, have 
to be careful, know what I’m saying? You know, I think about that stigma…you’re mentally ill, 
oh he’ll kick off” (Service User 10). 
 
The diagnoses likely to have this immediate impact were those seen as longer term, such as 
a schizophrenia diagnosis, as above, or personality disorder diagnose; “being labelled with a 
personality disorder is a very disabling thing” (Service User 1). As participants remarked 
about borderline personality disorder, “…but BPD, it is a big deal because it’s like they’re 
saying there’s something wrong with you, like there’s something wrong with your personality” 
(Service User 22): 
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I thought it sounded quite horrible…if you put personality and disorder together it 
doesn’t sound good as to what you might be like as a person, it makes it sound as if, 
erm, you haven’t got any illness or difficulties, you’ve got a personality that’s 
disordered, and therefore there’s nothing you can do about it and you’re just a bad 
person. (Service User 18) 
 
7.5.2.1.2.2 Stigma and the behaviour of others 
 
As described in Chapter 6, consequent to the recording of diagnoses for administrative or 
trust purposes but without informing the service user, the potential is raised for the service 
user to discover the recorded diagnosis by accident, “…what? Who gave me that 
diagnosis?” (Service User 18). Several participants described finding out about their 
diagnosis in this manner. The diagnoses the participants had not been informed of could be 
seen as more ‘severe’ than the ones they had or thought they had, for example diagnoses of 
personality disorders or bipolar disorder, perhaps explaining why clinicians had chosen not 
to convey that diagnosis. Participants who found out about their diagnoses by accident 
conveyed their shock at finding out, particularly as they were aware of the stigma associated 
with those diagnoses, in particular personality disorders, and had witnessed what they saw 
as stigmatising attitudes being used towards others with the same diagnosis: 
 
I think this emotionally unstable personality disorder’s the one that’s like, because of 
the stigma with it, and I think is that why it’s so difficult when I ask for something, 
they go oh she’s an emotional personality one, take no notice of her, is that why I’ve 
got to fight? Does everybody have to fight like me to get what they need? And I’m 
thinking is this why, you know, is this why I’ve been being treated the way that I get 
treated, because that, that diagnosis is down? (Service User 19) 
 
These descriptions of stigmatising treatment in clinical settings were experienced beyond 
mental health services in physical health services. One participant described a doctor’s 
response to a complaint she had made about treatment received for an unrelated physical 
health condition: 
 
…‘well you know she has a mental health condition, she’s over-egging this, it wasn’t 
like that’, and it will be held against you forever…no matter what complaint you bring 
anywhere, no matter what you do, there is always that, this is a person with mental 
health issues, therefore they are not a legitimate human being to actually have a go, 
have an opinion…” (Service User 5) 
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The implications for the diagnosed individual reveal the shift from the use of diagnosis as a 
bureaucratic category in the clinic or for other administrative purposes to one that has a very 
different effect in the social world: 
 
[The psychiatrist] was like…it’s just a way of describing your difficulties, which I can 
see, but then if you’re trying to then, at some, point I don’t know explain things to the 
wider public, or a different audience or you know, whatever, then bandying around 
terms like ‘personality disorders’ is not going to endear them to you. (Service User 
18) 
 
Beyond the individual’s meaning making around diagnosis, its negative impact can be a 
result of others’ responses, “I think the labelling thing is very very damaging, because it puts 
you in a situation where people will look at the label and judge you by your label rather than 
looking at the person” (Service User 1). 
 
7.5.3 “I’m smelling a bit of a rat…” Questioning the value of diagnosis 
 
In response to the negative impact of diagnosis described previously, an important theme 
was that of questioning the value of diagnoses, as illustrated by the above quote in the 
theme heading (Service User 4). This theme is divided into two subthemes reflective of this 
critique of diagnosis; finding the label meaningless in relation to distress; and avoiding 
diagnosis. 
 
7.5.3.1 Meaningless diagnoses 
 
In contrast with the positive functions of diagnosis described in Section 7.5.1, the data 
showed that diagnostic labels can lack meaning. Using the psychiatric model, the 
explanation of difficulties may not extend beyond the diagnostic label. Without a clear cause 
for the distress itself, and therefore a lack of information about what the person could do to 
help themselves, a diagnosis can feel insufficient, “…although you say I've got anxiety and 
depression, what does it really mean?” (Service User 8): 
 
I didn’t understand what it meant to me as a person, or, I didn’t quite understand 
how it manifested, erm, I was told by one GP that it was brain chemistry, although I’d 
never had any tests done, so I’m thinking how can you tell me it’s brain chemistry 
when you’ve, you know you’ve not tested my blood or anything, I’ve not had no 
imaging tests done. Another GP told me it was, I was reacting to difficult situations 
badly, so it was often termed as reactive depression…there was so many different 
labels it wasn’t erm, it wasn’t anything tangible that, you know, and the treatment 
options available was medication, at the time, so it didn’t really mean anything to me 
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in terms of how I could self-manage, or what I could do… (Service User 14, 
discussing her diagnosis of depression initially, which was later described as PTSD) 
 
Diagnoses, therefore, may not be useful as explanations of distress, and the categories may 
be seen as so wide as to become meaningless. Service User 18, for example, said of her 
diagnosis of borderline personality disorder, “I didn’t like the name of it…so what I did was 
look it up, and I thought actually after I’d read it that an awful lot of people could get labelled 
that, because it’s quite wide”: 
 
I just feel unsure about the whole, like there’s four things now, on my diagnosis, and 
it’s like, well what is it? Because all the symptoms seem to overlap into different 
diagnoses… I want an explanation as to why you think I’ve got this, I need to 
understand… (Service User 19) 
 
One participant, in explaining his desire to understand how he had come to have particular 
experiences of distress, and how he could help himself to make helpful changes, suggested 
that his psychiatrist did not appear interested in helping him to develop this sense of 
meaning, “they're not particularly interested, you know, in that…they're only interested in 
suppressing it, so I’m not a harm, I’m not a danger to myself or anybody else anymore” 
(Service User 7). 
 
7.5.3.2 Avoiding diagnosis 
 
As has been shown, the data demonstrated that negative and lacking experiences of 
psychiatric diagnosis (described in the previous section) and traditional psychiatric care can 
lead people to shift from a position of acceptance to questioning their diagnoses: 
 
I don’t know if it is the case, but it might be, that if you’re given a diagnosis like 
[borderline personality disorder], you do question the notion of psychiatric diagnoses 
more than you might do, you know if it’s something that appears to be particularly 
poor language, or, you know you kind of perhaps think about rather more than if 
somebody had just said ‘yes well you’ve got chronic depression’ I might not have 
thought about things so much, maybe? But I don’t know… (Service User 18) 
 
Questioning and critiquing psychiatric diagnoses also lead to participants avoiding diagnostic 
services and understandings of their distress, “I fear that it’s only through sad experience 
with the system that people come to the conclusion that a diagnosis is not your man. I fear 
initially they might be wanting, ‘tell me what’s wrong with me’…” (Service User 5): 
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At first, erm, I believed in the mental health system, because I’d never had 
experience of the mental health system, and I did believe, erm, and I was kind of the 
model patient to be honest, erm, took the medication, just accepted whatever, erm, 
and then it was just as I got to thinking over the years, and I thought there’s 
something wrong here, there’s something really wrong… it’s like gradually over the 
years that I’ve kind of took a turn against the system… (Service User 17) 
 
One participant spoke about what she called the illogicality of the biomedical diagnostic 
model, and coming to believe that the traumatic events that she and others had experienced 
may not be coincidental alongside their mental distress: 
 
…when I started properly researching, and it was more, probably the day cen[tre], 
the illogicality of it, the, hang on, you know, this sort of, you know, when you're bright 
you're thinking I’m smelling a bit of a rat going on here, you know, and you've got all 
these stories of all these horrible traumas… (Service User 4) 
 
7.5.4 Reframing distress outside of the diagnostic model 
 
Further to questioning and even rejecting their diagnoses, the final theme centred around 
wanting to reframe, manage, or support distress in more meaningful ways. Where 
participants wanted to use non-diagnostic ways of understanding their experiences, they 
described two key ways of reframing their distress; de-problematising their experiences, 
redefining them in more helpful terms than disorder or diagnosis, and using childhood 
adversities and other life experiences to understand distress as an understandable response 
to these experiences. 
 
This theme is supplemented by data from interviews with clinical psychologists to 
demonstrate some of the similarities between service users’ ways of reframing their 
experiences outside of the diagnostic model and the practices described by clinical 
psychologists. 
 
7.5.4.1.1 De-problematising distress 
 
Participants described reframing their experiences as simply part of their own personality or 
idiosyncrasies, rather than as a fault, problem, or symptom of disorder: “I’d rather not think of 
my head as there being some kind of imbalance of chemicals that's not right, I’d rather just 
think of me as being me, that…I’m more or less sensitive to what's happening around me...” 
(Service User 3). 
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As part of this redefinition of difficulties, a common practice was to reject terms associated 
with the diagnostic model of mental health: 
 
I have a problem with calling it an illness because I think that it’s a way of being, the 
way I am is, and I hate the fact that we pathologise a personality, and a particular 
sort of personality… when I was given a diagnosis I looked on it as an illness, I had 
an ‘illness’, erm, I don’t regard myself at all now as having an illness. (Service User 
5) 
 
Participants frequently described diagnostic labels as judgemental, particularly those that are 
less descriptive or experiential (such as personality disorders or schizophrenia, compared 
with depression, anxiety, or PTSD). By shunning a diagnostic label, some people sought to 
reject with it some of its consequences: 
 
I don’t think of myself as having a personality disorder, ‘cause I don’t think I do. So, I 
think yeah it’s more helpful to not think of yourself as having one, ‘cause otherwise 
you just like, you sort of just, like you don’t think you’ve got any potential or anything, 
you just like, assign yourself to just like being sick for the rest of your life. (Service 
User 22) 
 
7.5.4.1.2 Understandable responses to difficult life experiences 
 
The second way service users described reframing their distress was linking it with past 
adverse or traumatic experiences. Some people did this by adding a contextual 
understanding to their diagnoses. This was particularly apparent for people given a 
diagnosis of PTSD, which by definition takes into account trauma. Service User 14, quoted 
earlier explaining her original diagnoses with various types of depression which had little 
meaning for her, explained that the PTSD diagnosis allowed her to attribute distressing 
visions as re-experiencing past trauma rather than to being psychic, which had previously 
been her only other explanation for the experiences “…the benefit of the diagnosis for me 
was ‘oh ok, ok I understand now what’s been going on’…the diagnosis kind of made sense 
of why there had been such chaos” (Service User 14). However, she went on further to 
discuss the disconnect between the diagnostic model and the concept of her distressing 
experiences being an understandable response to trauma, an approach she had found 
helpful: 
 
I called it symptoms of trauma, traumatic experience, rather than post-traumatic 
stress disorder, erm, and that was more helpful for me…that it was you know it was 
tangible, it was tangible, ‘you are like this because you experienced this, and that is 
203 
a natural reaction to that really unnatural experience’, that feels much more healthy 
that saying you’ve got a disorder… (Service User 14) 
 
Part of this theme highlighted where participants felt that opportunities for understanding had 
been missed as a result of clinicians not asking about their past experiences: 
 
I just think like if they actually spoke to me, like they don’t know anything about my 
experiences, like in life, they’ve not got anything on their notes about it because 
they’ve never asked me, and I just think if they actually knew stuff, like, that I’d been 
through and that, then every, the way that I’ve acted and that, it would make sense, 
they don’t need to label it as like being ill or anything, because really if you think 
about my experiences, and then the way I behave, it all makes perfect sense… 
(Service User 22) 
 
Others had researched different conceptualisations of mental distress that fit better with their 
experiences, and also felt that opportunities were lost at the start of their contact with mental 
health services: 
 
I’ve looked into, like some sort of Soteria Houses and research that, I think 
happened first in America, and erm, and also Open Dialogue, and I believe I was 
just very stressed about erm, certain, well for me it was erm, a lot of the stress was 
around my dad… I think I could have just naturally come out of it, erm, but I don’t, I’ll 
never know really, because I didn’t have that opportunity at the time, and I was, I do 
remember distinctly thinking on the ward, well when am I gonna get the chance to 
talk to anyone about anything? (Service User 21) 
 
…there are other ways, there’s like Soteria House, there’s the Open Dialogue… I 
think because mental health is complex, and it’s not, well I don’t believe it’s an 
illness, but it’s not an illness like any other, erm, and it’s so complex all avenues 
should be explored… at the beginning, erm, as I said I wouldn’t have known any 
different, and I believed in the mental health system, but now looking back in 
hindsight, I think if I’d have been asked the right questions, with the right knowledge 
and experience…that instead of hospitals, if I’d have been put into a retreat…it all 
would have took a different course… (Service User 17) 
  
Another participant described how his difficulties only started to make sense after several 
years’ contact with mental health services, at which point a different psychiatrist took the 
time to listen to his story and the trauma he had experienced earlier in his life, and saw a 
connection between these experiences and his current distress (Service User 10).  
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Similarly, others went to lengths to access interventions that they thought would be more 
helpful: 
 
I was like I need [psychotherapy] to get better. Medication alone is not gonna sort 
my problems out. And then I was discharged by her, so I never got it…I was told by, 
erm, up to now in the last 6 years, I’ve been told by 3 different psychiatrists ‘you 
need psychotherapy’ and I was saying ‘I’m not leaving this hospital until I’m 
guaranteed that I’m getting the psychotherapy’, and they can’t, when you’re in 
hospital, they can’t accept a psychiatric referral…and that’s why I got [senior 
management within the NHS trust] in… (Service User 19) 
 
Where participants had received psychological interventions, some found that therapists or 
psychologists introduce a different perspective that takes a different focus. One participant 
described initially accepting a diagnostic view of difficulties until a counsellor explained to her 
a more helpful way of looking at distress as being a response to difficult life experiences: 
 
…it was only when the counsellor at [service], I used to believe in like, all mental 
illnesses like schizophrenia, I used to not question them whatsoever, I just thought, 
because you just trust the doctors and that…And then when she explained it to me 
it’s like, it’s like a completely different way of thinking, and I’m like oh my god why 
didn’t I see that before? (Service User 22) 
 
The shift from locating problems within the individual towards difficulties that result from past 
experiences and inter-relational problems represented participants’ descriptions of problems 
as being understandable consequences of these experiences. Several service users 
described how useful they felt they would find this approach. Psychologists’ descriptions of 
their practices, and conceptualisations of mental health, including psychological formulation, 
were more closely aligned with and representative of this approach. One psychologist 
described this approach as: 
 
…taking it away from… ‘the problem is you and it’s rooted in you’, and just kind of 
really acknowledging all the other kind of factors that are relevant…seeing that 
something might feel really kind of chaotic or out of somebody’s control, but actually 
if we…trace it, you can just kind of see that erm, yeah, any of us…would end up 
there” (Psychologist 7) 
 
As one psychologist described: “…my sense about people using psychiatric services is that 
they are completely unexceptional people, who've dealt with exceptional circumstances…” 
(Psychologist 2) 
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Modes of support or frameworks for thought outside of NHS services and models were also 
used as a consequence of negative experiences of NHS care. One participant, for example, 
sought other frameworks that better fit their own experiences and meanings of their distress 
and found that spiritual explanations, with which they had always been familiar, were more 
helpful than the medical explanations given to them by psychiatrists: 
 
…[the diagnosis] it threw me off track, erm, because I had to kind of consider the 
chemical imbalance and the brain disorder...I was thinking, well I’ve had spiritual 
experiences but I must have this chemical imbalance, this brain disorder as well, so I 
had two things to deal with…So there was a confusion there. Erm, and it’s only 
through study and my own research…so then I could concentrate on my own 
experiences…it’s not helpful for the mental health to be in that confusion, it wasn’t 
good for me mental health, erm, what’s been good for my mental health is sticking to 
my own explanation of my own experiences… (Service User 17) 
 
Another participant discussed the hearing voices group that he attends outside of mental 
health services, highlighting a need to speak with others in the same situation, experts by 
experience who can share their knowledge and understandings from a unique perspective 
and without judgement:  
 
…you don't have to watch everything [you say], you know, if I say this, you know I, I 
might be…pushed into another [diagnostic] category and all that, but in talking to 
other patients, you don't have that…I mean there’s people in [hearing voices group] 
who, you know, I sort of switch off when they start talking, you know, cause of, oh 
no, he’s, he’s going to start talking about religion again [laughs], you know, but…you 
just tolerate that sort of thing, you know, they're, they're entitled to their opinion on 
what it’s all about as I am, you know, but and if it helps them, why not, but, erm, you 
know, but I think there should be a lot more of that available where patients should 
be able to give their views and their experiences in, in a non judgemental 
environment… (Service User 7) 
 
7.5.4.2 A tension between rejecting diagnostic labels but needing to use them 
 
Outside of mental health services, service users may be forced to use a diagnosis they 
otherwise reject in order to access welfare benefit and other forms of support: 
 
…I guess when I wasn’t working it looked fairly impressive on erm, DLA forms, but 
that, you know that really is a, that’s a kind of hindsight thing, I mean yeah, but you 
wouldn’t want the diagnosis because of that [laughs] it’s just a happy outcome that is 
not intended remotely… (Service User 18) 
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One participant described a struggle between needing commonly shared language to 
communicate, yet wanting to distance herself from the notion of diagnosis and it having an 
association with her identity: “I am the thing called, you know, I have what is called bipolar, 
or I become ill and it is called bipolar, I have the diagnosis of, but I don’t, I don’t say, I’m a 
bipolar person” (Service User 5). 
 
One participant described what they felt as the futility of rejecting their diagnosis of 
schizophrenia in a public sense, “well I just disagree with it totally, erm, but that makes no 
difference ‘cause I’m kind of cursed with the label for life. Erm, it makes no difference in the 
mental health system but it makes a difference to me” (Service User 17). 
 
Some psychologists also preferred to use language that avoided diagnostic terms, yet 
needed to maintain communication with other non-psychologist colleagues: 
 
I used my own vocabulary…I do in such a way that other people who use diagnosis 
will, can, can append their diagnostic thinking to it if they wish…I don't talk in terms 
of symptoms, for example, I’ll talk in terms of experience, erm, er, I don't talk in 
terms of disorders, I talk erm, about difficulties… (Psychologist 2) 
 
Psychologists suggested that they may not use diagnostic labels in their own work, but that 
this represented a tension with needing to work with colleagues and systems that do use 
diagnostic categories. Of feeling she needs to use diagnosis for some purposes such as 
communication and record keeping, one psychologist said: “it’s…about surviving in a world 
that’s dominated by a medical model and psychiatry, and sort of, choosing your battles” 
(Psychologist 3). Others suggested: 
 
it kind of feels like even though it’s, we’re not calling it schizophrenia, there’s still a 
bit of a, it’s still this thing…and…you can’t unpick that in team meetings, other 
people, because you'd have no colleagues wanting to work with you, every time they 
use a term like that if I was saying ‘exactly what do you mean by that?’ (Psychologist 
1) 
 
…it’s negotiating your way through it, because you don't want to collude with it, but 
you don't want to challenge it so much that other people become defensive and stop 
listening to you, so it’s trying to get that, that balance… (Psychologist 5) 
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7.6 Discussion 
 
This chapter used data from interviews with service users who have received psychiatric 
diagnoses (supplemented by some data from interviews with clinical psychologists) to 
address each of the theoretical questions outlined in Chapter 2 (Section 2.4.2); 1) what are 
the conceptual underpinnings of diagnostic categories, and are these consistent across 
contexts and practices? 2) how are psychiatric diagnostic categories used in practice? And 
3) what do diagnostic categories produce; what are their implications? The chapter explored 
the practices of participants in the context of their distress and the diagnostic labels given to 
them, and the impact and implications of receiving diagnostic categories. 
 
This section is organised by the following discussion points: 
• Summary of findings 
• A process of responding to psychiatric diagnosis 
• Removing the social relations of diagnosis 
• The infrastructure of diagnosis becoming visible 
• Reframing distress 
o Rebalancing the concept of ‘expert’ 
o Public versus private rejection of a diagnosis 
• Clinical implications 
 
7.6.1 Summary of findings 
 
The findings in this chapter demonstrated a spectrum of opinion amongst participants; the 
themes derived from the analysis described positive functions of and responses to 
psychiatric diagnosis, however, critical voices were present. Four central themes were 
presented, exploring: the positive functions of diagnosis for service users, the damaging 
impact of diagnosis, questioning the value of diagnosis, and finally reframing distress outside 
of the diagnostic model. The findings demonstrated that service users use diagnosis 
positively as a form of recognising and legitimising their distress, and giving explanation to 
their experiences for themselves and for others. As highlighted in Chapters 4 and 6, 
diagnosis also has practical implications and is seen to facilitate access to financial support 
and mental health services. However, diagnostic labels can have a profoundly damaging 
impact on individuals, through impacting people’s identities, and through stigma. As a result 
of negative experiences of diagnosis, including finding it limited in its explanatory power, 
some participants had come to question the utility of diagnosis and some had avoided or 
rejected the labels to which their experiences had been assigned. The data showed that 
some people chose not to problematise their experiences, seeing them as part of their 
personalities or sensitivities, but not as a disorder. Others conceptualised their experiences 
as understandable responses to difficult life experiences, such as trauma. This fourth theme 
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is informed by data from interviews with clinical psychologists to demonstrate some of the 
similarities between service users’ ways of reframing their experiences outside of the 
diagnostic model. Both service users and psychologists discussed a tension between 
rejecting the use of psychiatric diagnoses, yet needing to use them within systems and 
services that continue to use a diagnostic model. 
 
The findings of this chapter support previous research that suggests that being given a 
diagnosis can have both positive and negative impact for the individual (Hayne, 2003; Pitt et 
al., 2009). Furthermore, the findings of this and previous chapters support research showing 
the pragmatic ways that diagnosis is used by clinicians differs markedly from the personal 
meaning that it takes on for individuals receiving the diagnosis (Probst, 2013, 2015b). The 
findings broadly support Lewis' (1995) study, in which three types of responses were 
reported from those who had received a diagnosis; accepting the diagnosis as a relief, 
offering validation; accepting but questioning the diagnosis; and, rejecting the diagnosis as 
inappropriate. However, rather than representing separate responses to receiving a 
diagnosis, the four concepts in this chapter are seen as a potential process of practices from 
receiving to rejecting a diagnosis and using non-diagnostic ways of understanding distress. 
 
7.6.2 A process of responding to psychiatric diagnosis 
 
The four themes described in this chapter are not mutually exclusive. Some people’s 
accounts of their experiences represented a little from one or several of these themes. The 
four themes can be seen as phases or stages of a process of using a diagnosis, a process 
whereby some people may move through more than one theme or stage, whereas others 
may remain at a particular stage, such as accepting the positive functions of diagnosis. The 
data suggest that negative experiences of the diagnosis and of psychiatric care tend to be 
the factors that drive a move through to later stages. 
 
7.6.3 Removing the social relations of diagnosis 
 
The positive functions of diagnosis demonstrate that the label is used as a tool for 
explanation, to the individual and to others around them, and. As a formal representation of 
a problem, clinically sanctioned, the diagnosis can be used to access care, support, and to 
justify allowances such as time off work, reflecting the findings of Chapter 6, where records 
of diagnosis were conceptualised as boundary objects. Informally, participants described 
using diagnoses to describe their difficulties in a medically recognised way, which helped to 
provide legitimation and validation of distress, and understanding from others. 
 
Diagnostic categories also provided an explanation of experiences for individuals 
themselves in spite of the categories not including information about cause. It could be said 
209 
that the social means that make it possible to use diagnosis in this way is the 
essentialisation of the diagnosis. This process supports the literature introduced in Chapter 1 
(Section 1.3.2.1.1, Epistemological confusion, and Section 1.3.2.2.2, Essentialism and 
stigma), in which it is argued that colloquial language takes up realist, essentialist notions of 
the disorder or diagnosis causing a person’s distress. This is in contrast with seeing 
diagnoses as nominalist categories that are used to represent or describe distress without 
necessarily including any information about how it is caused (Scadding, 1996). 
 
In paring down or essentialising a diagnostic category for ease of communication, the ‘social 
relations’, i.e. the extensive literature on the limitations and debates around psychiatric 
diagnosis, and the social context of distress, are made invisible (Taussig, 1980). The 
diagnosis is simplified to a state in which it is provided as an explanation for the mental 
distress experienced. This way of thinking replicates the model used by psychiatric 
classification systems whereby problematic experiences are seen as symptoms of an 
underlying disorder (as discussed in Chapter 3, Sections 3.5.2.2 and 3.6.3.1, The role of 
trauma), or located as a fault within the individual, as opposed to having some external or 
inter-relational cause (Crowe, 2000). An important finding within this theme was the utility of 
removing the social context of distress. By providing a broad, shared understanding of what 
a particular diagnosis entails, participants used the label as a way of conveying only a 
socially and culturally accepted amount and type of information, rather than going into detail 
about their lives. 
 
However, this conceptualisation and use of diagnostic categories is problematic for two 
reasons. First, the damaging impact of diagnoses reported by participants, alongside using 
diagnoses to explain distress, demonstrate a clear contrast with the clinicians’ uses of 
diagnosis (described in Chapter 4) as a pragmatic, nuanced, flexible tool. Where the 
diagnosis moves from being a clinical and bureaucratic tool to the person, individuals 
internalise, interpret, or otherwise assign meaning to the diagnoses they have been given, 
demonstrating the diagnostic categories’ new significance as more fixed categories that 
represent ‘real’ things in the world, which may be seen as identity changing, long-term 
disorders. These findings support the conclusions of Chapter 6 whereby diagnoses were 
argued to change in their conceptualisation to more reified categories beyond the clinic. 
Second, where explanations for distress are limited to the diagnostic category as a cause of 
symptoms, these ideas perpetuate an individual deficit model of distress that does not 
include contextualised understandings of how distressing experiences come about. 
 
7.6.3.1 Conceptualising distress; diagnosing the person 
 
Consequent to essentialised conceptualisations of psychiatric diagnoses, the data from this 
chapter show that the damaging impact of diagnostic labels is linked with a conceptualisation 
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of the person being diagnosed. The data suggest that diagnoses, especially those such as 
personality disorder and schizophrenia diagnoses, come to be viewed by recipients as 
attached to the person. This is in contrast with their difficulties being diagnosed, and the 
diagnosis being used as a way of describing mental distress, as is implied by the use of 
diagnosis as a clinical tool, described in Chapter 4. 
 
This finding supports those of the previous chapter, whereby recorded diagnoses become 
more fixed or reified beyond their flexible use in the clinic. Just as the conceptualisation of 
diagnostic records becomes reified, so the categories’ conceptualisation changes for some 
individuals when they are labelled. As introduced in Chapter 1 (Section 1.3.3.1), the data 
demonstrated that the diagnostic label can become a part of the individual’s identity, which 
may have damaging consequences. The findings from this chapter support previous 
literature which states that recovery is related to shedding the ‘mentally ill’ identity and its 
effects (Coleman, 1999; Deegan, 1993). 
 
7.6.4 The infrastructure of diagnosis becoming visible 
 
For some participants, having their distress assigned to a diagnostic category was not simply 
a form of explanation or a tool for accessing support. The implications of the diagnosis were 
personal, and could be damaging. The findings of this chapter suggested that as participants 
had negative experiences of receiving a diagnosis or psychiatric care, their psychiatric 
diagnosis was seen as harmful or simply meaningless. This process might be compared to 
Bowker and Star's (1999) analysis of classification as infrastructure, whereby the negative 
experiences of diagnosis or of psychiatric care could be said to be making visible the 
diagnostic infrastructure to the person who is diagnosed. In becoming visible, this 
infrastructure can come in turn to be questioned. Consequently, as in Lewis' (1995) study, 
participants came to question its validity. The process of rejecting a diagnosis could perhaps 
be seen as a process of reintroducing the social relations surrounding it. The data suggested 
that participants made connections between their distress and difficult life experiences, and 
came to uncover the social, political, and historical context of diagnoses through their own 
research, and/or input from clinicians such as therapists or psychologists. This finding is 
supported by the experience of Coleman, who described his experiences of initially finding 
value in the medical model, but later began to see it as unhelpful, and he came to explore 
different ways of understanding his distress: 
 
“For a number of years, I accepted the medical model as a framework of 
understanding… But I gradually came to appreciate drawbacks to the framework. My 
reading suggested the model might not stand up scientifically. The emphasis on 
distress as illness not only encouraged a resort to exclusively physical treatments 
(drugs, ECT) but pushed to one side any consideration of the content and meaning 
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of my crisis episodes. Thinking of myself as having a chronic and incurable illness 
robbed me of power and agency and confined me within an essentially negative 
category. By the time I was entering my second decade of service use, the medical 
model, which I had initially found reassuring, seemed increasingly unsatisfactory, 
without the capacity to encompass the complexity of my interior or exterior life and 
give it positive value. As a result, I began to actively explore frameworks that better 
met my needs.” (Coleman, 2010, p. 22). 
 
7.6.5 Reframing distress 
 
Revealing the social context or relations of diagnosis may allow people to question 
diagnoses and therefore seek new ways of thinking that diverge from the diagnostic model, 
both through NHS and non-NHS routes. This process may be linked with the impact of 
diagnoses on identity described in Section 7.6.3.1 and Goffman’s findings regarding the 
identity of the ‘mental patient’, whereby he argued, “to dodge a prescription is to dodge an 
identity” (Goffman, 1961, p.170). Distress was seen by some as an understandable 
response to traumatic or otherwise adverse experiences earlier in a person’s life, supporting 
the finding from Chapter 4 that more individualised information concerning people’s life 
experiences is needed to support clinical assessment. By assigning understanding to 
distress in this way, individuals described being able to better make sense of their difficulties 
in ways that feel more personally meaningful. Incorporating psychologists’ accounts of their 
approach to mental health demonstrated that psychological models of mental distress more 
closely reflect service users’ accounts of this nature.  
 
However, in contrast with psychologists’ accounts, some service users saw experiences not 
as an ‘illness’ or even as ‘problems’. Participants described what would typically be referred 
to in the clinic as symptoms or difficulties as being ‘more or less sensitive’, or representative 
of a particular kind of personality. These ideas neutralised not only the diagnostic model of 
disorder but also the psychologists’ problematising of experiences as a focus for therapeutic 
work. This finding is supported by work by Plumb (1994, cited in Reeve, 2015) who suggests 
that the experience of being a ‘round peg in a square hole’ may be an important cause of 
mental distress. Rather than trying to conform to societal expectations, Reeve (2015) 
argues, some people are fighting for a society that instead recognises difference and 
diversity and “allows for new and creative ways of being” (Reeve, 2015, p. 103). This 
literature also relates to the resistance through language described in Section 1.3.3.3.1.1 of 
the literature review, in which madness is seen as “a positive assertion of alternative identity 
that distances itself from any biological signifier and which celebrates irrationality rather than 
seeking to erase it from public view” (Tew, 2015, p. 73). 
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7.6.5.1 Rebalancing the concept of ‘expert’ 
 
Avoidance or rejection of diagnosis as an explanation for distress might be said to be 
associated with the rejection of the clinician as the expert. By not seeing the clinician as an 
expert with the power to hold the solution to a person’s distress, the individual may 
themselves be empowered to find other frameworks for understanding elsewhere. Georgaca 
(2013), for example, argues that being positioned as the patient has an impact on the 
person’s agency, and undermines their explanation of their distress. Disputing their position 
as ‘patient’, she argues, may enable individuals to “legitimate their version of reality” 
(Georgaca, 2013, p. 60). This process may explain participants’ descriptions of initially being 
the “model patient” (Service User 17) to the clinician’s expert prior to seeking alternative 
frameworks. Furthermore, factors that may enable this shift in how the clinician is viewed are 
negative experiences of psychiatric care in a broader sense as well as of diagnosis itself. 
 
7.6.5.2 Public versus private rejection of a diagnosis 
 
The way that systems within mental health services are set up, service users, many 
psychologists, and perhaps other clinicians, may personally reject the concept of diagnosis, 
but struggle, within the system, to have this idea accepted and to work alongside their care 
team or colleagues with this tension. 
 
A dilemma faced by service users is the potential difficulty of openly challenging the 
viewpoint or model of the clinician. For example, clinicians can frame a service user’s 
refuting of the diagnostic explanation as ‘lacking insight’, which in turn may be taken as 
further evidence of illness, thus reinforcing their ‘madness’. ‘Anosognosia’, the name given in 
the DSM-5 to ‘lack of insight’, is seen as symptomatic of diagnoses such as schizophrenia. 
For example, the information about associated features supporting a schizophrenia 
diagnosis in the DSM-5 states, “[u]nawareness of illness is typically a symptom of 
schizophrenia itself rather than a coping strategy” (APA, 2013a, p. 101). The DSM-5 
glossary, however, offers a potentially broader meaning that may relate to the rejection of a 
diagnosis or biomedical illness interpretation of distress: “[a] condition in which a person with 
an illness seems unaware of the existence of his or her illness” (p. 817). Roe and colleagues' 
(2008) qualitative exploration of insight showed four different representations of the ways in 
which people express insight about their diagnoses of schizophrenia or schizoaffective 
disorder, and their experiences of distress. One of which involved a person accepting that 
they have difficulties but rejecting the diagnostic label. However, this diagnostic rejection 
may be subsumed under a general perception of ‘lacking insight’, which can lead to 
professionals using more coercive treatment strategies, such as community treatment 
orders. For example, Stensrud and colleagues (2016) found that clinicians place greater 
emphasis on continuity of care (compliance with medication) over patient autonomy, and that 
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perceived lack of insight is used frequently as justification for coercive practices (Stensrud et 
al., 2016). 
 
7.6.6 Clinical implications 
 
Service users and some clinicians already find ways of reframing distress, privately and to 
some extent publicly. These ways of doing things differently demonstrate that other 
perspectives exist and are already in use. These might inform other ways of doing things 
formally within and outside of mental health services. For example, where service users find 
diagnoses damaging and disempowering, practices of taking part in valued activities such as 
peer support can help individuals to become re-empowered (Pitt et al., 2009). The success 
for some of accessing peer support and discussion with other ‘experts by experience’, for 
example through peer-led hearing voices groups, however, may be related to the reduced 
power differential between members. This problematic positioning of the clinician as expert 
links with Goffman’s (1961) caution that “some activities…must remain unofficial if they are 
to be effective” (p.173). The inclusion of experts by experience in formal mental health 
services may also have limitations as a consequence of being a simultaneously a ‘peer’ and 
a paid employee of NHS mental health services. The open discussion of peer support may 
also be co-opted, towing the party line with regards to the psychiatric model. Peer support 
worker posts are also frequently under paid and under valued (Beresford & Russo, 2016). 
For example, a report from 2016 stated that there are eighty paid support roles in NHS 
versus many more unpaid (Christie, 2016). 
 
7.7 Conclusions 
 
This chapter has used data from interviews with service users who have received psychiatric 
diagnosis, supplemented by data from interviews with clinical psychologists, to explore 
service users’ diagnostic practices and uses, the impact and implications of these receiving 
diagnostic labels, and how some individuals come to take up non-diagnostic ways of 
understanding their distress. The findings in this chapter presented four central themes 
exploring: the positive functions of diagnosis for service users, the damaging impact of 
diagnosis, questioning the value of diagnosis, and finally reframing distress outside of the 
diagnostic model. These themes were discussed as a process through which service users 
may travel through depending on their experiences. It is suggested that the social relations 
around diagnosis, including its limitations, history of debate, and the flexible uses by 
clinicians (described in Chapter 4), are minimised, as is, importantly the social context of 
distress. Participants saw this as an advantage when explaining their difficulties to other 
people, allowing a quick way of conveying a shared understanding without giving too much 
personal information. However, this means of viewing diagnostic categories as the cause of 
distress perpetuates the individual deficit model and minimisation of social causes. 
214 
 
The findings demonstrated that the minimisation of the social context of distress felt 
meaningless to some people. These participants sought other means of understanding, 
including reframing their distress as understandable responses to difficult life experiences. 
This perspective was supported by that of the clinical psychologists interviewed. The data 
demonstrated a tension, however, between rejecting the use of psychiatric diagnoses at a 
personal level, yet ‘publicly’ needing to use them within systems and services that continue 
to use a diagnostic model. 
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Section 4: Discussion and Conclusions 
 
8 Chapter 8: Discussion 
 
The following discussion incorporates an overview of the thesis, a summary of its findings, 
and implications and recommendations for mental health services. Reflections are offered on 
the research methodology and limitations of the study are discussed. A section on future 
research addresses these limitations. The possibilities and potential for change in the way 
that mental distress is worked with and conceptualised is explored. Finally, personal 
reflections on the research findings are discussed, and conclusions made. 
 
8.1 Thesis overview 
 
Psychiatric diagnoses have been developed to meet varying needs from individuals, service 
users and clinicians, to health systems and business needs including insurance and 
pharmaceutical companies. With these categories come both utility and costs. The thesis 
takes a critical realist social constructionist epistemological perspective to conceptualise 
psychiatric diagnoses not as reflecting a ‘reality’ of separate illnesses, but as active 
categories, constructed to perform various functions to meet socio-political needs. The way 
that ‘mental health’ is conceptualised need not look this way, and alternatives have already 
been proposed. These alternatives, however, have been developed from the perspective of 
either taxonomy or individual assessment, and struggle to provide pragmatic alternatives 
that meet myriad needs and functions across individuals, clinicians, and health systems. The 
point of departure for the thesis was the argument that the functions of psychiatric diagnosis 
should be more fully understood from multiple perspectives in order develop alternatives with 
greater utility and practical application, that also better meet individuals’ needs.  
 
This thesis maps the functions, practices, and consequences of psychiatric diagnoses from 
multiple perspectives. The findings were organised to represent the broadening out from the 
structure of diagnostic classification itself, to clinical uses by individual clinicians and mental 
health services, to beyond the clinical into other social worlds, including use by the people 
who are diagnosed. Three methods were used to gather data. A thematic document analysis 
examined five chapters of the DSM-5 as a protocol for practice, exploring the ways 
heterogeneity is represented across diagnostic criteria, and what is produced as a result, 
including the taken-for-granted assumptions embedded within the text. A series of Freedom 
of Information (FOI) requests was used to gather information regarding the service entry and 
eligibility criteria of NHS mental health trusts in the north of England. These were analysed 
to understand the ways in which diagnoses are used in gatekeeping decisions and to identify 
the non-diagnostic factors and methods upon which service entry criteria were organised. 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with clinicians (GPs, psychiatrists, and clinical 
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psychologists) and mental health service users who had received psychiatric diagnoses, 
which explored clinical practices, the recording of psychiatric diagnoses and their travel 
beyond the clinic, and the ways in which service users make use of diagnoses and how 
distress may come to be reframed in different ways. The findings chapters were organised to 
reflect the travel of psychiatric diagnosis from the text of the classification itself, to clinical, 
and finally non-clinical uses of diagnostic categories. 
 
8.2 Summary of findings 
 
The following summary brings together the findings from the five empirical chapters of the 
thesis, within the context of the central research purpose and three central theoretical 
questions overarching the thesis, outlined in Chapter 2 (Sections 2.4.1.3 and 2.4.2, 
respectively). The central research purpose was: From multiple perspectives, what are the 
functions of diagnosis? To answer this question, the following theoretical questions were 
asked of the data. 
 
1) What are the conceptual underpinnings of diagnostic categories, and are these 
consistent across contexts and practices? 
2) How are psychiatric diagnostic categories used in practice, and in what ways does 
this differ (if at all) from diagnostic classification, and why? 
3) What do diagnostic categories produce; what are their implications?  
 
The thesis is structured according to the emergent finding of the process of diagnostic 
categories travelling from the text of the classification itself, to clinicians, services, and 
beyond the clinic to the individuals who receive them. This structure was used to highlight 
the functions and practices of diagnosis whilst they were situated within their different 
contexts of use. Analysis of the text of the DSM-5 in Chapter 3 demonstrated heterogeneity 
across diagnostic criteria, showing that the way that symptoms are presented in the DSM-5 
construct some experiences of distress as inherently disordered or pathological. Alongside 
the symptom overlap between diagnostic criteria, the heterogeneity across the presentation 
of diagnostic criteria undermines the notion that the DSM-5 is a list of mental disorders, and 
instead supports the concept of psychiatric classification as a human system attempting to 
respond to distress and non-conforming behaviour. However, presenting diagnostic 
classification using a model of discrete categories of disorder nevertheless has implications 
for the way that cause is conceptualised. Trauma is seen as involved in only a limited 
number of diagnoses, discrete categories may lead to common ‘transdiagnostic’ causes 
being missed, and individual differences within diagnostic categories may be obscured. The 
findings of Chapter 4 demonstrated that for clinicians, certain diagnostic categories, such as 
schizophrenia, reflect these implicit conceptual understandings of cause and disorder.  
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However, these implicit ideas were not consistent across clinicians, and the themes from 
Chapter 4 predominantly reflected the pragmatic ways in which clinicians use psychiatric 
diagnosis as a tool to achieve particular clinical functions, such as pattern recognition and 
treatment planning. Diagnoses provide a heuristic for severity, cause, and intervention 
planning, through prototypical representations developed through clinical experience. This 
prototypical approach has limitations, however, and represents a departure from the criteria-
matching protocol set out by systems of diagnostic classification, and the reliability of 
diagnosis and its clinical utility is therefore called into question. There is consequently a 
tension between diagnostic categories as a flexible assessment tool or as a system 
reflecting natural categories. There is, similarly, a tension between the expectation that 
expert clinicians will follow the classificatory protocol for ‘accurate’ diagnosis, and the 
demands on clinicians to use tools flexibly in the best interests of their clients. The variation 
in the use of diagnoses between clinicians also has important implications for routine data 
capture. The findings from Chapter 4 showed that diagnoses struggle to contain complexity, 
and are insufficient for many assessments, shown by clinicians’ use of formulation to 
develop an understanding of distress and psychosocial difficulties, and the inter-relatedness 
between them.  
 
The findings of Chapter 5 demonstrated that psychiatric diagnosis has limitations with 
respect to service entry and eligibility criteria, and is neither necessary nor sufficient for 
planning service entry. The analysis demonstrated that not all mental health services in the 
north of England use diagnostic labels as a central factor in their entry and eligibility criteria. 
The use of diagnostic categories in service entry criteria represented specific difficulties or 
experiences of distress. However, they were also used as proxies for a particular level of 
severity, risk, or need, rather than as discrete categories of disorder. As with the clinicians’ 
uses in Chapter 4, Chapter 5 demonstrated that broad, quasi-diagnostic categories, such as 
“severe and enduring mental illness”, are used by services. These broad conceptualisations 
again perform functions as representations of the type and severity of distress experienced. 
At the same time these ways of using diagnosis as a tool deteriorate the concept of a 
taxonomy of mental disorders. The data suggested that diagnoses were used as a proxy for 
a broad domain of competence, of the skills required to work with a particular presentation of 
difficulties. This is also reflected in the data from Chapter 4; the psychiatrist who tends to 
diagnose schizophrenia because they can treat it (Section 4.5.1.2.1, Problems with 
prototypes) is therefore using the diagnostic category as a way of identifying what can be 
worked with, rather than identifying a specific disease category as diagnostic classification 
prescribes. Indeed, the largest group of services in Chapter 5 was more explicitly oriented 
towards individual needs and team competencies, and innovative services worked with 
specific life circumstances, such as homelessness, rather than with diagnostic categories. 
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The findings from Chapter 6 demonstrated that the recording of diagnosis is ubiquitous in 
communicating information beyond the clinical assessment. Clinicians pragmatically apply 
diagnoses to achieve particular aims, and as such they can be framed as ‘boundary objects’ 
that facilitate cooperation across contexts. However, the analysis demonstrated that using 
diagnostic records in this manner has consequences for their conceptualisation beyond their 
nuanced, flexible clinical use by clinicians and mental health services. The data showed that 
diagnoses are represented as fixed, inflexible, and even reified categories when they are 
formally recorded and used on administrative and bureaucratic documents such as Mental 
Health Act (MHA) (1983) papers and applications for welfare benefits. Clinicians described 
the tension between the practical utility of diagnostic categories facilitating numerous clinical 
functions, and the personal impact for service users of receiving a diagnosis, which they 
acknowledged could be long-term and stigmatising. These findings again demonstrate the 
tension between diagnoses as flexible tools and as representing discrete categories of 
disorder. The implications for research and data capture are important; diagnostic data may 
be collected as representing certain, stable categories, yet this is at odds with their nuanced 
and pragmatic application by clinicians. 
 
The findings from Chapter 7 demonstrated that psychiatric diagnoses can have several 
important positive functions for those who receive them, including relief that one’s difficulties 
are recognised and legitimised, an explanation for oneself and others, and practical 
functions such as access to services and financial support. Another important theme, 
however, was the damaging effect that diagnoses can have on the individual. The data 
demonstrated that both the negative impact on a person’s identity and the stigma 
experienced as a result of the label were associated with essentialised conceptualisations of 
diagnostic categories. These ways of viewing diagnostic categories were not aligned with 
clinicians’ uses of diagnosis as a pragmatic tool. The data suggested that diagnoses became 
a way of labelling the people themselves, rather than their experiences of distress. As part of 
this process, the social relations around diagnosis, including its limitations, history of debate, 
and its flexible use by clinicians were minimised, as was the social context of distress. The 
diagnosis itself may even be seen as the cause of distress. These findings support the 
changed conceptualisations of diagnosis seen in Chapter 6. The data showed that this 
conceptualisation could be used to individuals’ advantage, allowing a quick way of conveying 
a shared understanding without giving away too much personal information. However, this 
essentialised view of diagnostic categories perpetuates the individual deficit model and 
minimisation of social causes. 
 
The data in Chapter 7 suggested that for individuals, negative or damaging experiences of 
diagnosis and of psychiatric care could begin to unravel this model of viewing distress. By 
questioning its meaning and validity, the infrastructure of diagnosis and its social, political, 
and historical context was revealed, allowing different ways of framing distress to be found. 
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As part of the process of avoiding psychiatric diagnoses, the final theme described other 
means of understanding distress. These included deproblematising experiences altogether, 
or reframing distress as understandable responses to difficult life experiences. The latter 
perspective was supported by that of the clinical psychologists interviewed. The data 
demonstrated a tension, however, between rejecting the use of psychiatric diagnoses at a 
personal level, yet ‘publicly’ needing to use them within systems and services that continue 
to use a diagnostic model. 
 
Described above are several tensions between the functions of psychiatric diagnosis. In its 
clinical functions, for example, there is a tension between psychiatric diagnosis as a tool and 
as a system of discrete disease categories, and likewise, clinicians are caught between 
following the protocol of diagnostic classification and using the categories flexibly to best 
meet clients’ needs. Beyond the clinic, the data demonstrated the damaging personal impact 
that diagnoses can have on the individual, and this is at odds with its practical clinical, 
business, social, and personal functions. Because of this tension, individuals who may 
choose to avoid using diagnostic ways of framing their distress are not free to do so publicly 
across all the functions of diagnosis, in light of potential ramifications within mental health 
services, and because access to support, including benefits, is frequently seen as diagnosis-
led. These tensions demonstrate the process by which diagnosis travels from the 
classification itself to different contexts of use. Its multiple functions and changing 
conceptualisations mean that the utility of one function may result in damaging 
consequences elsewhere. At the intersection of these functions is the person diagnosed. 
 
8.2.1.1 Different conceptualisations of diagnosis in the literature 
 
These multiple functions make a ‘moving target’ of psychiatric diagnosis in terms of 
evaluating its utility and implications. This is reflected in the debate by-line quoted in Section 
1.6.1, “Felicity Callard and Pat Bracken argue that a psychiatric diagnosis can disempower 
people rather than help them, but Anthony David and Norman Sartorius think that the 
diagnostic framework ensures that resources are allocated appropriately”, (Callard et al., 
2013, p. 1). This quote demonstrates that different functions, conceptualisations, and 
consequences are invoked in order to argue the relative merits or issues with diagnosis, 
rather than comparing ‘like for like’, for example following through the process of particular 
functions and thier consequences for both clinicians and service users, as this thesis has 
sought to do. 
 
These multiple functions invoke different underpinning conceptualisations, which are 
inconsistent across contexts and as a result diagnostic categories have potentially damaging 
consequences for the individuals given these labels. Responses in the literature to these 
different conceptualisations and the divide that diagnoses creates between ‘normal’ and 
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disordered’ are varied. Smail (2005), for example, argues that power pervades by creating 
difference, and that those in power exploit this ‘difference’: 
 
Our common humanity rests upon our common embodiment. We are all made in 
exactly the same way. We all suffer in the same way. Most immoral enterprises seek 
in one way or another to deny this truth and to justify the greater suffering of the 
oppressed or exploited on the grounds of their being ‘different’ in some way… 
(Smail, 2005, p. 93) 
 
As discussed in the literature review (e.g. Section 1.3.2.3.5), proponents such as Kinderman 
(2014; Kinderman et al., 2013) therefore argue for a continuum model that entirely drops the 
separation of disorder from ‘normality’. Others argue that a continuum model puts everyone 
at risk of being pathologised (Pilgrim, 2014). Converse to this, some have argued that a 
continuum model “trivialises” (Pies, 2015) or “domesticates” (Carroll, 2015) experiences at 
the severe end of the spectrum of distress. Commentators such as Frances (2013) argue for 
clear delineation of ‘normal’ from ‘genuine mental illness’. However, the findings from 
Chapters 4 and 6 demonstrate that this divide between ‘normal’ and ‘disordered’ is not 
applied in a rigorous manner. The data showed that diagnostic criteria are applied flexibly, 
and decisions are nuanced, subject to socio-political contexts and clinicians’ views on the 
needs of their clients, the resources available, and the implications for the individual. 
Chapters 6 and 7 demonstrate that beyond the clinic, diagnoses and this demarcation of 
‘genuine mental illness’ perform important social and financial functions, however, 
essentialising diagnostic categories as reified, biologically caused illnesses can also be 
damaging for the individual, both personally and socially. 
 
In Chapter 4, the GPs’ descriptions of distinguishing between understandable responses to 
difficult life circumstances and “proper” mental illness reflected Frances’ (2013) binary 
between “normal” and “genuine mental illness”. If these distinctions were consistently 
applied across individuals, they may help a GP to make pragmatic care planning decisions. 
However, conceptually, by constructing an experience such as low mood as either 
understandable or as part of a formal (biomedical) diagnostic category, this binary may serve 
to de-legitimise or invalidate the understandable form of distress. Language such as “just a 
reaction” (GP6) versus “proper” (GP 6) and “actual” (GP 9) disorder suggests that distress in 
response to life circumstances or experiences may not be conceptualised as seriously as 
presentations of distress that are perceived as more biological. Research such as that of 
Lewis (1995) also demonstrates the potentially negative impact of one’s experiences being 
on the wrong side of this demarcation, thereby being denied a diagnosis. Findings such as 
these reveal what Smith (1978, p. 26) calls the “complex conceptual work” needed in order 
to maintain the reasoning of the diagnostic disease model.  
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8.3 Implications and recommendations for mental health services 
 
This research for this thesis began on the premise of seeking an alternative way of 
approaching mental health care. The findings demonstrated that psychiatric diagnosis acts 
as a proxy for multiple functions. The specific alternatives proposed in the literature 
discussed in Chapter 1 are therefore demonstrated to be too limited in their scope. Such 
alternatives included technical approaches such as the National Institute of Health 
Research’s Research Domain Criteria, scientist-practitioner approaches, including problem-
list assessment, and humanistic alternatives such as psychological formulation and Open 
Dialogue. Each of these proposed alternatives is limited to only a small number of the many 
functions of diagnosis, such as individual clinical work or research. Because psychiatric 
diagnosis acts as a proxy for many different factors, and its representation changes across 
clinical and other social worlds, the implications of these findings are complex. Replacing 
one assessment method with another would be insufficient. As stated by Kendell and 
Jablensky (2003) (discussed in Section 1.3.1.2.4), the utility of diagnosis (and other tools) 
must be considered within the contexts in which they are used. The implications for mental 
health services, therefore, must consider the functions and proxies that diagnoses represent, 
and the contexts within which these are used. As Millerand and Bowker (2009) argue, 
standards must be organisationally situated, and cannot exist outside of their social and 
organisational contexts. This thesis demonstrates that a wider process of system reform is 
necessary to take into account the different functions, contexts, and proxies that psychiatric 
diagnosis currently seeks to fulfil. 
 
The following section outlines the implications of the findings of this thesis for mental health 
services, their delivery, and commissioning. These implications are grounded within the data 
and focus on largely technical findings that have been highlighted from each of the empirical 
chapters. Despite the thesis premise that alternative, or new, methods of assessment and 
working with mental health would be necessary to reform mental health services, the 
findings suggested that there are methods and conceptualisations that are already used by 
individuals and services. The following recommendations suggest making use of this existing 
infrastructure and related approaches. To address the multiple functions and proxies that 
diagnosis seeks to represent, it is anticipated that each of these recommendations should be 
followed, in keeping with the notion of system reform described above. Without a 
comprehensive process of system reform, individual changes are at risk of becoming 
incorporated into the existing diagnostic model, or falling prey to the same limitations. For 
example, broad groups of difficulties may become essentialised or used as labels without a 
change in the model underpinning the approach. 
 
Table 8-1 outlines the recommendations and examples that will be discussed in this section. 
These recommendations are limited to implications for mental health services. Future 
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research is outlined in Section 8.5, and further reaching implications are discussed in 
Sections 8.6 and 8.7. 
 
Table 8-1 
Recommendations for mental health services & implementation examples 
 
Recommendation 
 
 
Implementation examples 
 
Neutralising the model underpinning 
assessment 
 
• Using ICD ‘symptom’ codes to 
describe distress and difficult life 
experiences/environment 
Changing the use of tools that stabilise 
diagnostic categories 
• Using the Equality Act to 
demonstrate impact and effect of 
mental distress 
• Using non-diagnostic language to 
describe distress 
Broad groups of difficulties and competency-
based service organisation 
• Needs-led services 
Representing heterogeneity by making 
explicit flexibility 
• Wider training in psychological 
formulation, e.g. for GPs 
 
8.3.1 Neutralising the model underpinning assessment 
 
The findings suggest moving towards a more neutral model of mental health, that does not 
‘ground’ interpretations of mental health difficulties against a set of beliefs and assumptions 
about disorder. A truly descriptive account, compared with a disorder-driven descriptive 
account such as the DSM, can be used as a more neutral approach at least until patterns 
with greater utility for both service users and clinicians are identified. Diagnosis of an illness 
is very different from the description of phenomena. To use the example from service entry 
criteria, the need to identify specific difficulties in order to accept clients into a service that 
has a team with appropriate competencies or skills to work with those difficulties is distinct 
from the need to diagnose a medical illness or disorder. Patterns may be recognised, and 
the severity of distress judged, but this is distinct from the Oxford English Dictionary 
definition of diagnosis, which focuses on the identification of disease: “Determination of the 
nature of a diseased condition; identification of a disease by careful investigation of its 
symptoms and history; also, the opinion (formally stated) resulting from such investigation” 
(Oxford English Dictionary, 2017). 
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Proponents of the biological concept of ‘mental illness’ have argued that not using the 
diagnostic model would be to deny people’s distress, under the notion that if a person’s 
distress is not mental illness then it is not valid. Langford, a psychiatrist, argues:  
 
…it would mean looking all your friends and family who’ve had a mental illness in the 
eye and telling them that their diagnoses were nonsense and they weren’t really ill, 
they shouldn’t have seen their doctor for that, they shouldn’t have been allowed 
health insurance or sick leave or medication or treatment for that, that they were just 
sad, obsessed, stressed or weak. (Langford, 2014) 
 
However, neutralising the diagnostic model in favour of a descriptive account of people’s 
difficulties is not to argue that nothing is wrong (although the individual deficit model of 
mental distress has been challenged, see Section 1.3.3.1.2) or that services cannot be 
offered. Instead, distress is acknowledged, described, and even likened to difficulties to 
others have, but without the assumptions embedded within the diagnostic model.  
 
Despite the history of debate around psychiatric diagnosis (described in Section 1.3 of the 
Literature Review), service users currently do not have a choice as to how their distress is 
framed because the diagnostic model is dominant, and used by the clinicians with which 
service users initially come into contact. However, if the diagnostic model does not always 
underpin assessment and conceptualisation of mental health difficulties, the meanings and 
narrative ascribed to a person’s difficulties have greater opportunities to be negotiated 
between clinician and service user, rather than re-defining a person’s difficulties within the 
medical model, which may not always be welcomed. With a neutral starting point of 
assessment, service users would at this point still have the option of understanding their 
difficulties within the framework of a diagnosis. Two of the service users interviewed were 
keen to keep the diagnostic labels they had been given.  It is not possible to know at this 
stage, with the available literature, whether having alternative ways of conceptualising 
mental health difficulties from the initial point of assessment would negate this desire for a 
diagnostic label, but this implication could be empirically investigated. 
 
The thesis findings suggest that the diagnostic model can obscure different methods or ways 
of thinking on an individual level, such as identifying trauma as a cause of distress. Within 
the organisational context of mental health, the infrastructure of diagnosis also obscures 
existing infrastructure that might usefully be taken up to further our understandings of mental 
distress. An example of using ICD codes to facilitate this approach is discussed below. 
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8.3.1.1 Example: Using ICD ‘symptom’ codes to describe distress and difficult life 
experiences/environment 
 
Examples of existing infrastructure that offers different modes of data capture and ways of 
conceptualising distress are the descriptive, non-disease codes in the ICD-10 (World Health 
Organization, WHO, 1992) and DSM-5 (American Psychiatric Association, APA, 2013). The 
ICD-10 details descriptive codes for specific experiences of distress that can be used without 
use of diagnostic illness categories including, for example, auditory hallucinations (R44.0), 
restlessness and agitation (R45.1), unhappiness (R45.2). However, for record keeping or 
report writing, these current descriptors may be invalidating as they may not convey 
sufficiently ‘significant’ distress in comparison with the experiences contained with diagnostic 
criteria for mental distress. This issue relates back to the binary constructed by the 
diagnostic model, and the potentially invalidating impact of not using diagnostic language 
while the diagnostic model underpins conceptualisations of mental distress. Further ICD R 
codes could be included to better represent the severity of distress that is currently included 
within diagnostic categories, but without the overarching diagnostic model. Representing 
specific experiences in this way may even comprise a political act in the sense that 
psychological conceptualisations of mental distress would be represented within the ICD 
alongside medical, diagnostic conceptualisations. 
 
Both the DSM-5 and the ICD-10 include codes for descriptive information that relates to 
difficult life experiences or living environments. For example, Chapter XXI of the ICD-10 lists 
factors influencing health status and contact with health services. Within this chapter, codes 
Z55-Z65 list ‘persons with potential health hazards related to socioeconomic and 
psychosocial circumstances’, which is a large section of codes relating to overarching 
difficulties associated with potential health hazards related to socioeconomic and 
psychosocial circumstances, including homelessness, negative life events in childhood, 
poverty, discrimination and persecution. These codes describe multiple situations and 
experiences that do not describe distress, but are of note for clinicians as potential social 
determinants of mental distress. For example, there are various codes for child sexual 
abuse, including problems related to sexual abuse by a person inside (Z61.4) or outside 
(Z61.5) of the primary support group. There are also codes, for example, relating to the 
effects of deprivation (ICD-10 section T73) and codes relating to maltreatment, including 
neglect, abandonment, and abuse ICD-10 section T74). Similarly, the DSM-5 (APA, 2013) 
includes V codes, described as issues that may be a focus of intervention, but that are not 
assigned to a disorder. These codes mirror the ICD-10 codes, including sections for 
‘Problems related to family upbringing’ (p. 715), and ‘Housing and economic problems’ (p. 
723). 
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8.3.2 Changing the use of tools that stabilise diagnostic categories 
 
Chapters 4 and 6 demonstrate that diagnostic categories act as useful ways of conveying 
information quickly, particularly on written records and communication. However, Chapters 6 
and 7 showed that these records of diagnostic categories change their conceptualisation 
from flexible categories applied pragmatically by clinicians to fixed, reified categories that 
can have harmful consequences for individuals who are diagnosed. This research, therefore, 
suggests that mental health services could change the ways that administrative functions are 
carried out, such that they more transparently represent individual needs, without using 
diagnostic labels that crystallise distress as long-term and unchanging. Chapter 5’s analysis 
of the service entry criteria of NHS adult mental health trusts in the north of England showed 
that a hybrid model is already in use, utilising factors such as risk, severity, and support 
needs. Diagnostic labels, therefore, should not be required for service referrals, so long as 
sufficient need is demonstrated and that the required skill sets for intervention are matched 
with the services on offer. Two examples of this recommendation are given below: using the 
Equality Act (2010) to demonstrate mental distress, and the use of non-diagnostic language 
in formal documents such as legal reports. 
 
8.3.2.1 Example 1: Using the Equality Act (2010) to demonstrate impact and effect of 
mental distress 
 
Laws such as the Equality Act (2010) can be utilised as tools to help people to access 
appropriate care and support without recourse to diagnosis. In the Equality Act (Schedule 1, 
Disability: Supplementary provision, Part 1, Determination of disability, Office for Disability 
Issues, 2011b), the focus of the legal determination of disability is on the demonstration of 
impact and effect of the disability caused by mental distress. However this determination of 
disability does not rely on psychiatric diagnoses. Furthermore, its inability to rely on 
diagnoses (in comparison to the certain physical health diagnoses that are de facto accepted 
as disabilities; HIV diagnosis, multiple sclerosis, and cancer) is a demonstration of the fact 
that psychiatric diagnosis does not encapsulate the information required to make such 
decisions.  
 
8.3.2.2 Example 2: Using non-diagnostic language to describe distress 
 
Furthermore, Kinderman (2015) has demonstrated ways in which legal reports, such as 
those concerning forensic cases or detention in hospital, can be written using non-diagnostic 
language to identify the support needs of individuals, justification for care, and using 
psychological explanations of behaviour. 
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8.3.3 Broad groups of difficulties and competency-based service organisation 
 
Chapters 4, 5, and 6 demonstrated that diagnosis is used as a proxy for many different 
factors by both clinicians and services, including demonstration of risk, severity, and level of 
need. The diagnostic model can be set aside in favour of making transparent what it 
represents.  
 
Whilst services currently use the clustering system, associated with Payment by Results, 
broad selections of clusters were used in service entry and eligibility criteria (Chapter 5), 
such as clusters 1-3, representing mild to moderate difficulties, or 4-17, representing all 
other severities of psychotic or non-psychotic difficulties, and excluding organic problems 
such as dementia or other cognitive impairment. These findings suggest that broader 
groupings (than specific diagnostic categories) satisfy service requirements and represent 
differing levels of severity and need. Following the Section 8.4.1 on neutralising the model 
underpinning assessment of mental distress, these data suggest using broad groups based 
on pragmatic needs, such as required skillset, and ability to meet people’s needs, without 
any assumption that these categories are a) discontinuous, or b) represent illnesses or 
disorders. This way of organising mental health services would be more closely aligned with 
a clinical description model, without the unwarranted influences of the diagnostic model that 
Hyman (2010) describes, such as dividing difficulties into ‘highly specified disorders’ or 
‘discontinuous categories’ (p. 161). 
 
Diagnosis at times gives utility and offers a tool for clinicians, whereas flexible, needs-based 
assessment is responsive to, and driven by, the personal, individual experience, meaning 
and need. The potential issues of creating a ‘broken continuum’ by marking at which point an 
individual becomes eligible for support from mental health services is discussed in Section 
8.2.1.1. However, using a system that separates between differing levels of need does not 
create just one but several incremental divides, that recognises differing support needs and 
skills required to work with those needs, including people experiencing extreme distress and 
high risk of self harm or suicide. Rather than defining a case as ‘complex’, an informal 
category that may become attached to the person and associated with negative 
conceptualisations such as deviance (Jeffery, 1979), what is defined is their need and the 
type of resources they may require at that time. Deegan (1993) has cautioned about the 
impact of labelling of individuals, not only in terms of diagnoses, but also as high or low 
functioning. She describes how this type of labelling, like diagnosis, comes to be 
represented as an attribute within the person, rather than, as she sees it, a value judgement 
that is placed on that person. It would therefore be important to consider the potential 
implications of any new or different ways of conceptualising mental distress. 
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The concept of using broad descriptive groups of difficulties ties in with empirical literature 
studying transdiagnostic dimensional approaches. The potential value for keeping broad 
categories of common or severe mental disorders has been acknowledged (van Os et al., 
2013). Research suggests that cross-cutting dimensions may better represent empirical 
findings, more flexibly representing transdiagnostic difficulties that bridge between 
categories, for example across psychosis and affective disorder diagnoses (Allardyce et al., 
2007). Similarly, as discussed in Section 1.3.1.3.1 regarding dimensional approaches, 
McGorry and van Os (2013, p.343) discuss the feasibility for services of a precise separation 
between ‘normality’ and ‘disorder’, suggesting instead a “soft and flexible entry (and exit)” 
approach instead. An example of needs led services is given below. 
 
8.3.3.1 Example: Needs led services 
 
As well as broad groupings based on mental health difficulties themselves, and the specialist 
needs that may arise from these types of distress, the data from this thesis suggest service 
organisation also be based on the needs of service users. Data from predominantly the 
analysis of service entry criteria and clinicians’ definitions of complex cases suggest 
competency-based services that are led by service user needs. For example, the support 
needs for increased risk, and multi-agency working to support those with multiple difficulties 
that may not always be mental health based, but instead may be complicating and/or causal 
factors in people’s difficulties, such as financial and economic difficulties, or social problems 
such as housing and so forth. Specific skills may be provided by services that do not 
necessarily divide along the lines of the type of distress (e.g. psychosis) but working with 
other common factors such as providing trauma work. Trauma was important in the 
description of complex cases (Section 4.5.2.4.3), as well as in the consideration of different 
ways of working, particularly by psychologists and service users (Section 7.5.4.1.2). If 
services were organised around what the person needs at that time, the need, not the 
person, is categorised, and so moving away from labelling people. This may allow a greater 
focus on the individual and their experiences without overshadowing by the diagnostic label 
(Section 1.3.2.2.1). For example, essentialised societal discourses around danger may 
influence referring and interventions around psychosis in particular. The findings from 
Chapter 5 suggested that diagnoses were used predominantly within exclusion criteria, and 
that these may relate to concerns about engagement, for example disruption of group work. 
However to use psychosis within exclusion criteria, for example for Improving Access to 
Psychological Therapies (IAPT) or lower level services, imposes a blunt criterion that may be 
unhelpful if people are able to make use of an intervention. 
 
There already exist examples of non-diagnostic services that work flexibly according to 
service users’ needs. For example, the Psychology in Hostels project, a partnership between 
the London Borough of Lambeth, South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust and 
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homeless charity Thames Reach Waterloo Project, was set up to support homeless people 
who struggle to maintain accommodation (Rhodes, 2016). Psychologically informed 
environments as used to support homeless people to stabilise and maintain accommodation, 
reduce psychological distress, drug and alcohol abuse, and contact with the criminal justice 
system (Williamson & Taylor, 2015; Woodcock & Gill, 2014).  
 
8.3.4 Representing heterogeneity by making flexibility explicit  
 
Heterogeneity could further be represented by transparently using assessment in flexible 
ways. The findings from Chapters 4 and 6 showed that diagnosis is adapted frequently, 
dependent on the situation, the individual, and the psychosocial factors impacting upon their 
distress. More flexible methods of assessment would make this heterogeneity explicit. 
Flexible assessment would allow different uses across services, for example, including the 
broad categories used by GPs. A key difference between clinicians’ descriptions of 
psychological formulation, a suggested alternative to diagnosis (Section 1.3.2.3.3), and 
psychiatric diagnosis was that of flexibility. Formulations were seen by clinicians in this 
research as readily updated to represent changing information, needs, or discussion 
between clinician and service user as to what felt the most useful for therapeutic work. 
Whether or not a changing approach used formulation, the same philosophy of an adaptable 
description assessment could be utilised. An adaptable description would acknowledge 
changing needs and difficulties, dependent on the environment or situation and changing life 
circumstances, rather than a representation of a diagnosis that becomes a fixed and 
consistent entity, seen as impacting a person in similar ways across their lifespan. 
 
Different timescales of assessment would be acknowledged by differing descriptions that 
represented either snapshot assessments carried out in one community mental health team 
(CMHT) appointment or in an emergency situation, versus patterns that had been developed 
and understood over a period of longitudinal assessment. The depth of assessment would 
be adapted according to the present needs and available support. In situations of very acute 
risk, for example, there may be less of a focus on in-depth exploration of the meanings the 
individual ascribed to their difficulties, compared with more ‘here and now’ information about 
the current difficulties. Where follow up support is not available, it may not be appropriate to 
explore more in-depth assessment, such as asking about trauma. Guidelines for why, when, 
and how to ask about childhood abuse (Read, Hammersley, & Rudegeair, 2007), for 
example, recommend a comprehensive psychosocial assessment, the time for which may 
not be available in a short GP appointment. Nevertheless, psychological formulation 
presents an opportunity for the flexible assessment of distress in a range of clinical settings. 
An example of offering wider training in formulation is given below. 
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8.3.4.1 Example: Wider training in psychological formulation 
 
The findings of Chapter 4 demonstrated that diagnostic categories struggle to manage 
complexity and clinicians reported needing to incorporate psychosocial factors, which are not 
included with diagnostic criteria. More widespread use of psychological formulation could be 
used to better represent the heterogeneity in distress across individual experiences. For 
example, GPs in Chapter 4 described managing a “mishmash” of distress entangled with 
social and psychological causes (Section 4.5.2.2), thus this group of clinicians in particular 
may benefit from training in psychological formulation in order to capture this complexity. 
 
 
8.4 Research methodology and limitations 
 
In reflecting the above findings, it is important to take into consideration the research 
methods and their underpinning assumptions, which have produced these findings. Data are 
produced rather than simply collected (Green & Thorogood, 2014), and reflecting on the 
research methodology can allow space to consider how these factors impacted upon the 
research findings. 
 
8.4.1 Personal reflections on interviewing 
 
Research findings are constructed between the researcher and the research participants 
(Green & Thorogood, 2014). The relationship between these two perspectives is central to 
the findings produced by the research process. In line with the epistemological perspective 
taken in this thesis, the research findings need not look this way, and other conclusions 
might have been drawn from the data if analysed by another researcher with different 
experiences. Outlined in the methodology are the steps taken to use an iterative process of 
analysis, of moving between the data, my interpretations, and the research and theoretical 
literature, and back to the data. These steps were taken to continually reflect on the data and 
the analytic process, challenging my interpretations, to ensure that the findings are grounded 
in the data. 
 
8.4.1.1 Differing perspectives 
 
For interviews with clinicians particularly, I was mindful of my positioning within psychology 
and the background of debate about the DSM-5 and diagnosis in mental health (introduced 
in Section 2.2, Personal and political positioning). Perhaps revealing this concern, early 
reflections on my relationship with research participants did note a contrast between 
interviews with psychologists in contrast with psychiatrists. I noted feeling a greater affinity 
with psychologists, and often these interviews felt more relaxed, with perhaps more of a 
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feeling of ‘being on the same side’. This was of particular note when psychologists described 
the challenges they faced in marrying their beliefs and ideas about mental health with those 
of other disciplines and those represented in the mental health system itself. By having a 
background in psychology, and likely my participants’ knowledge of my main supervisor 
Professor Kinderman, a prominent figure in clinical psychology in the UK, I wonder whether 
this made it easier for psychologists to express their difficulties more freely, even when 
participants expressed concern that they were “colluding with the [diagnostic] system” 
(Psychologist 3). By contrast, some interviews with psychiatrists felt prickly at first, with some 
psychiatrists appearing defended about the ways that they work, which was understandable 
in the wider context of debate and critique between mental health professions. Some 
psychiatrists were keen, also, to show that they used diagnosis as a tool but not as 
something that they used uncritically. One psychiatrist, for example, said early on in the 
interview, in response to my focus on the use of diagnosis in clinical practice, “I’m not 
actually that bothered about diagnoses” (Psychiatrist 1). In the early stages of data 
collection, part of me expected to disagree with at least some of what was said by clinicians 
who used diagnoses, and perhaps in return this was expected by some participants. 
However, maintaining a methodological focus on the practices of diagnosis, rather than on 
opinion, helped me to develop a much richer understanding of the uses of diagnosis from the 
clinicians’ perspectives. This understanding was particularly developed by hearing examples 
from clinicians’ work, of clients’ difficulties, and the challenges that clinicians face, from 
personal, professional, and organisational perspectives, such as holding clients’ risk and 
often having very few resources to offer. As discussed in Section 2.8.3.1.4.1, my focus was 
not on making judgements as to the ‘right’ way to do things, but to understand how and why 
clinical practices come about, and what their implications may be. Taking a curious stance 
within interviews, of that of Schuetz's (1944) ‘stranger’, as someone who is not trained in 
diagnostic assessment, facilitated a perspective of not assuming or challenging but of 
seeking to understand, which I felt resonated with participants. The same psychiatrist 
(Psychiatrist 1) who had been keen to let me know her views on diagnosis remarked at the 
end of the interview, with some surprise, how “painless” it had been. This ‘unfamiliar’ stance 
was maintained throughout analysis, with a focus on representing data from participants’ 
perspectives, not my own. 
 
8.4.1.2 The messiness of real life 
 
I noted a contrast between the accounts of clinicians and that of service users. In describing 
their practice, within the immediate clinic setting, clinicians’ accounts represented what 
appeared to be a more sanitised version of mental health care. This fell in contrast with the 
stories shared by service users, many of whom painted a much messier picture of mental 
health services and the ways that they work, or at times fail to work. For example, 
participants described diagnoses losing meaning when their label had been changed or 
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updated so frequently over the years. This may be understood using the framework of 
Goffman's (1959) ideas about the presentation of self as a comparison with the theatre. The 
‘front stage’ self is constructed with an awareness of having an audience, and the actor 
chooses what to portray to that audience in order to present a positive, consistent account. 
When analysing participants’ accounts, it was important to consider what people had chosen 
to share, or not to share, with me. For the clinicians interviewed, and given the social and 
political contexts of the research which have already been described, clinicians might have 
felt in a position of having their clinical practice critiqued, whereas service users’ descriptions 
of their experiences came from a different perspective, and to discuss the successes or 
failures of mental health services was perhaps less personally threatening. 
 
Hearing service users’ accounts of their experiences of diagnostic assessment over a longer 
period of time, often a lifetime, of interactions with mental health services provided important 
context for the consideration of clinicians’ assessment practices. This context was 
considered alongside understanding why clinical practices occur, and the social and 
organisational contexts of these practices. When I compared the accounts of clinicians and 
services users in this manner, what I had originally seen as ‘tensions’ between the accounts, 
and the functions of diagnosis, I came to view more as a process. The process of diagnostic 
categories travelling from the text of the classification itself, to clinicians, services, and 
beyond the clinic that I used to structure this thesis became a useful way for me to 
understand the functions and practices of diagnosis whilst they were situated within their 
different contexts. I used this process to try to understand how and why such ‘tensions’ 
occur rather than judging them from one perspective or another. Rather than seeing the 
comparisons in the clinicians’ and service users’ accounts as contradictory or at odds, 
functions and consequences that appeared to clash, I understood these contrasts as a more 
contextualised account of the ways that the meanings of diagnostic categories change and 
practices differ beyond the individual clinic setting. 
 
8.4.2 Limitations 
 
8.4.2.1 Design 
 
Given the positionality of my approach to the research (outlined in Section 2.2 of the 
Methodological background chapter), different approaches could have been taken with 
regards to the design of the research that took into account broader perspectives. For 
example, as well as clinical psychologists, the research could have included the 
perspectives of professionals from different disciplines such as psychiatrists and/or GPs in 
designing the research methodology and interview questions. This type of participation could 
be particularly beneficial with regard to service users, for whom it has been argued that there 
is a need to “create their own knowledge” (Faulkner, 2012, p.40). These types of approaches 
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are closely related to survivor research and emancipatory disability research (Beresford & 
Wallcraft, 1997), the process of which aims to empower service users through the process of 
research. This approach would tie in with the service user/survivor literature described in 
Section 1.3.3. 
 
8.4.2.2 Interview participants 
 
The semi-structured interviews focused on the most immediate stakeholders of mental 
health care; clinicians and the individuals who use their services. Qualitative research 
methods were used to gain a rich understanding of the ways clinicians and service users 
discuss and make sense of psychiatric diagnosis and its practices of use. Interviewing other 
types of participants would have offered further perspectives on the issues discussed 
regarding diagnosis and its uses. Other important stakeholders and users of diagnosis could 
include other clinicians, such as mental health nurses, who are involved in care planning, 
and those who work in a service organisational capacity, such as individuals responsible for 
commissioning and managing mental health services. Likewise, several participants spoke 
about their families wanting them to be given a diagnosis. Incorporating these broader 
perspectives within the findings could give further information as to the ways that diagnosis 
travels and is taken up beyond the client-clinician relationship. Broadening the discussion of 
issues and functions of diagnosis to a wider service level, speaking with commissioners and 
other key individuals involved in service planning would likely reveal wider functions, and 
potentially limitations, of diagnosis. 
 
In addition, by interviewing service users who had received a psychiatric diagnosis, this 
research cannot offer information about those who do not access NHS services. Likewise, 
the research does not explore the experiences of people who access services but are not 
given a diagnosis. For example, a participant in Lewis' (1995) research described the 
damaging and de-legitimising experience of being told by her GP that she was not 
depressed, which Lewis describes as being denied a diagnosis. Interviewing these two 
groups of people could offer further information about perceptions of diagnosis and why 
people may want a diagnosis, the ways in which mental health services may not be 
appropriate for everyone, and how and why people come to manage their distress without 
support from NHS services. 
 
Likewise, people may not access services through choice or as a consequence of the 
inaccessibility of services. For example, research has found that mental health services can 
perpetuate inequalities such as social exclusion for African Caribbean communities (Mclean, 
Campbell, & Cornish, 2003). Furthermore, if the purposive sampling method had sought to 
include more participants who had both been given diagnoses and who came from black and 
minority ethnic groups, different findings may have been drawn from the analysis that may 
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have reflected the literature discussed in Chapter 1 (Section 1.3.3.2.1, Ethnicity), which 
highlighted race bias and uses of psychiatric diagnosis that reflect oppression and 
discrimination on the basis of racial identity. 
 
8.4.2.3 Analysis 
 
The process of analysis for the interview data used initial open coding of a small proportion 
of the interview transcripts. The codes generated from this detailed analysis of a subsection 
of the data were used to form the coding framework against which each of the other 
interviews were coded. This process may have unduly influenced later analysis in two ways. 
First, the process may have limited the analysis of interviews by closing down alternative 
avenues of enquiry within the analysis of the full interview dataset. Second, it may have 
biased the analysis in the sense of establishing a set of assumptions, which then 
constructed a particular lens through which the other data was analysed. This approach may 
therefore have influenced the findings and conclusions that were drawn from the other 
interviews. 
 
Furthermore, analysis of all the participants groups together, including both clinicians and 
service users, although chosen as a method of bringing together the groups and analysing 
the similarities across groups, may have resulted in a less in-depth exploration of the 
differences across the groups. Likewise, efforts to use as similar questions as possible 
across participant groups may have meant that some questions, including the theoretical 
questions used to guide the research, were less appropriate for participant groups who did 
not make psychiatric diagnoses, such as clinical psychologists and service users. This may 
have led to important information being lost or left unexplored during the interview process. 
For example, asking service users about the functions that psychiatric diagnosis had for 
them may have not have had sufficient meaning to some participants as a result of their not 
using or rejecting their diagnoses. Conducting and analysing a phase of pilot interviews, or 
taking a grounded theory approach, may have better identified which questions and avenues 
of enquiry were most fruitful in terms of topic exploration and relevant for participants. 
Similarly, a grounded theory approach (Charmaz, 2006) may have been usefully employed 
to identify gaps in the participant sample, such as the inclusion of more participants who 
identified with black and minority ethnic backgrounds, referred to above in Section 8.4.2.3. 
Furthermore, use of feminist analytic approaches (e.g. Kleinman, 2007), for example, may 
have elicited greater exploration of issues of power and oppression and differing 
experiences across gender from the data. 
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8.4.2.4 Limitations of what the data can offer 
 
Each of the data sources used in this thesis, diagnostic classification, policy documents on 
service entry criteria, and interviews with clinicians and services users, can provide valuable 
information about the ways that diagnoses are described and conceptualised. Conclusions 
can be drawn about the ways that people and organisations conceptualise mental health, 
and the language used can indicate how sense is made of psychiatric diagnosis. However, a 
limitation of this type of data is that whilst documents can provide information about what 
should be done in clinical practice, or the ways that people talk about what they do, and what 
they choose to tell us about what they do, it cannot tell us what they actually do in real life, 
and in the case of clinicians, in their clinical practice. 
 
This limitation applies both to the semi-structured interviews and the analysis of service entry 
and eligibility criteria in Chapter 5. In Chapter 5, for example, these data identify the main or 
publicly available criteria by which decisions are made. On a day-to-day basis, clinical 
decisions would be made on a case-by-case basis most likely by a working team. However, 
this might further support the argument that individual and other non-diagnostic factors may 
have an important influence on decision making over and above the criteria. In cases where 
both a diagnosis and other factors such as risk, need, and severity, are identified within the 
criteria, it is not possible to establish the extent to which diagnosis determines decision-
making compared with the other factors. Other data that were not explored were service and 
trust reporting mechanisms, data capture, or information on which services were 
commissioned. Given the competing constraints on local commissioning, it is possible that 
influences such as the guidelines from the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence 
(NICE), which are organised along largely diagnostic lines, may impact upon service entry 
criteria, and demand that diagnostic categories play a specific role in making in/out decisions 
for clients.  
 
It should be acknowledged with regards to the findings in Chapter 5 that although diagnoses 
may appear from these data to be neither necessary nor sufficient for service entry criteria, if 
all the stakeholders in a particular decision believe a diagnosis is necessary, then, 
pragmatically, it becomes so. For example, within a MHA decision, if the relevant 
psychiatrist, ward manager, and tribunal solicitor agree that a diagnosis is required, currently 
this is the way the system is working de facto. The letter of the law of the MHA or of the 
service entry and eligibility criteria may not require the use of specific diagnostic labels, 
however if each party involved in the decision-making process relies on a diagnosis, the use 
of diagnosis is subsequently maintained.  
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8.4.2.4.1.1 Representativeness 
 
A range of participants for the semi-structured interview data collection was recruited across 
three clinician groups, who worked in a variety of clinical settings, and a group service users 
who had been given a mix of psychiatric diagnoses, some with a single diagnosis and others 
with multiple diagnoses. Participants were chosen with an aim of gathering data on differing 
views on psychiatric diagnosis. However, as representativeness is not the aim of qualitative 
research (Green & Thorogood, 2014), the data is not statistically representative of the 
populations from which they were taken. Qualitative research seeks to gather “information-
rich cases for in-depth study” (Patton, 1990, p. 182, as cited in Green & Thorogood, 2014, p. 
121), which this research provides, however, the data cannot be generalised to the wider 
populations from which the participants were drawn. 
 
As described in Sections 4.4.3.1 and 7.4.2.1 (Sampling), the sampling approach was 
theoretically driven in the way that groups and types of participants were chosen for 
participation. Inevitably, however, those who responded to invitations to take part and 
consented to the interview were self-selected. Participants, therefore, may have been more 
likely to be interested in critiquing or looking beyond diagnosis in conceptualising mental 
distress. However, not all participants were in favour of changing the way that mental health 
is conceptualised or clinical work is carried out. In the analysis of interview data from this 
study, these perspectives of the participants were acknowledged, in that the data was 
therefore potentially likely to say more about when diagnosis does not work than when it 
does. However, this is nevertheless important information, particularly when diagnostic 
practices are damaging for the people who are diagnosed. 
 
8.4.2.4.2 Would other frameworks have better outcomes? 
 
From this research it cannot be identified whether or not doing things in a different way 
would be better. For example, Chapter 5 demonstrated that psychiatric diagnoses are 
neither necessary nor sufficient for service entry and eligibility criteria. However, the data 
analysed in this chapter cannot answer the question of whether care is better or worse 
across service provision that uses diagnosis to different extents. Quantitatively, this research 
cannot tell us whether alternative approaches would result in more positive outcomes for 
people using services. More qualitatively, the research cannot inform as to whether 
alternatives would remove the harmful effects of diagnosis, or what other (potentially 
unintended) consequences or implications would be created as a result of using different 
approaches. These limitations will be addressed in the following section on future research. 
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8.5 Future research 
 
This chapter has acknowledged what the research findings of this thesis can and cannot tell 
us, and considered the implications and recommendations for mental health services. In 
taking forward the findings of this thesis, there are a number of clear areas in which future 
research could progress the exploration of alternative approaches to psychiatric diagnosis.  
Further empirical data is needed to support change. With better data capture from the 
recommendations in Section 8.4, we could contribute to this research. Further ways of 
contributing to the evidence base are outlined in the following sections below. 
 
• Alternative qualitative methodologies 
• Exploring patterns of distress that incorporate psychosocial factors 
• Operationalizing levels of need 
• Using non-diagnostic outcome measures that better represent improvement 
• Evaluating alternative approaches 
 
8.5.1 Alternative qualitative methodologies 
 
The thematic analysis of the service users’ interview data, presented in Chapter 7, showed 
that there may be a process by which people come to reject or avoid the psychiatric 
diagnoses given to them. In light of this finding, further research might better explore this 
process by using a narrative approach to interviewing and to the analysis of interview data. 
Narrative analysis explores the ways in which people organise their interpretations of their 
experiences into narrative form (Murray & Sargeant, 2012). Labov and Waletsky’s (1967) 
analytic approach, for example, highlights different elements of participants’ stories, centring 
on the ‘complicating action’. This particular aspect is the essence of the story, and may 
relate well to the ways in which people come to frame their distress differently or view their 
diagnosis negatively, for example through the category having a damaging impact on their 
identity (e.g. Service User 4, Section 7.5.2.1.1) or when a professional such as a therapist 
introduces a different way of viewing distress (e.g. Service User 22, Section 7.5.4.1.2). Using 
a narrative approach may contribute richer data that would better represent the experiences 
of participants, particularly service users. 
 
Alternative methods that may expand upon these findings might include more ethnographic 
approaches, whereby people and their practices are studied in naturally occurring settings in 
order to capture ordinary activities, without meanings being imposed externally onto those 
activities (Brewer, 2000). Within this approach, observations are used alongside interviews, 
field notes, and the gathering of data from documents and policies to bring together a rich 
dataset for analysis (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995). This type of research could more 
directly analyse the everyday practices of diagnosis and assessment of mental distress, 
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whilst also including of wider net of stakeholders and those involved in decision making from 
a service level, for example through observing the ways in which service entry decisions are 
made.  
 
8.5.2 Exploring patterns of distress that incorporate psychosocial factors 
 
The findings of chapters 4, 5, and 7 demonstrated that using contextualising psychosocial 
information was valued by clinicians, services, and service users in making sense of and 
working with mental distress. Likewise, an increasing body of research literature documents 
the social determinants of mental health problems (see Section 1.3.2.1.2, Contextualising 
distress). By understanding mental health from the more neutral perspective described in 
Section 8.4.1, and gathering data accordingly using the existing psychosocial codes in the 
ICD-10 (WHO, 1992), it would be possible to establish different patterns based on research 
evidence. Such research might gather descriptive data about individual’s distress alongside 
information about social determinants. For example, people who are street homeless may be 
50-100 times more likely to be diagnosed with a psychotic disorder than the general 
population (Rees, 2009). Z62.2 codes individuals who have had an institutional upbringing, 
who are approximately eleven times more likely to experience paranoia than those with a 
less disruptive early history (Bentall et al., 2012). Sexual abuse has been strongly 
associated with onset of psychotic experiences in childhood (McGrath et al., 2017). 
Evidenced-based clusters of types of distress and their relation to psychosocial factors could 
provide a scientific basis for categories, but these need not be accompanied by an 
assumption of an underlying disorder causing the distress. 
 
Broadening routine data capture within NHS health records could establish more inclusive, 
social, systemic, and psychologically comprehensive patterns of difficulties in order to 
standardise the knowledge that clinicians come to individually develop over time and with 
clinical experience. Such patterns might be established on the basis of commonly co-
occurring types of distress and life experiences, but need not be underpinned by a causal 
assumption of a discrete or biological disorder. For example, recognised patterns regarding 
the trajectory of difficulties, and patterns associated with trauma. Such routine data collection 
would target information regarding established social determinants of mental health 
problems. Data could include measures of poverty, for example, relative income poverty 
(Wickham et al., 2017) and the index of multiple deprivation (Wickham, Taylor, Shevlin, & 
Bentall, 2014), and a simple measure of trauma, such as the Adverse Childhood 
Experiences scale (Felitti et al., 1998). The potential implications of such data capture 
should be noted; information should be gathered where the necessary therapeutic and 
support frameworks are in place in order to appropriately address disclosures of trauma, for 
example. 
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8.5.3 Operationalising levels of need  
 
In order to assess need and help assign appropriate services to individuals according to 
team competencies, as described in Section 8.4.3, for example according to risk and 
severity, operationalising categories or levels of need may be necessary. If broad groups of 
difficulties are used, as suggested in 8.4.3, and reflecting the findings of Chapter 5, it would 
be clinically useful to identify evidence-based ways of delineating pathways for different 
levels of difficulty. For example, outcome measures may be used to empirically test the 
predictive validity of categories of need, to assess whether these ways of describing 
people’s difficulties and needs are associated with how much therapeutic input is required, 
and their outcome. 
 
8.5.4 Using non-diagnostic outcome measures that better represent improvement  
 
The IAPT programme delivers interventions approved by NICE for depression and anxiety, 
and other related difficulties that fall under the bracket of common mental health difficulties. 
The IAPT programme is supported by extensive monitoring and reporting of routine outcome 
measures. The government target is that 50% of eligible referrals to IAPT services should 
meet defined criteria for recovery following IAPT intervention (NHS Digital, 2017). The 
concept of recovery hinges on the notion of ‘caseness’ at the start of an intervention, 
whereby referrals’ scores on symptom measures of anxiety and depression are high enough 
to be considered a clinical case. The caseness threshold is typically derived from a score on 
the Patient Health Questionnaire-9 (PHQ-9) (Kroenke, Spitzer & Williams, 2001) and the 
relevant Anxiety Disorder Specific Measure (ADSM), for which there are different versions 
according to diagnosis, including obsessive-compulsive disorder and generalised anxiety 
disorder. Caseness is therefore diagnostic, despite being derived from questionnaire scores. 
Recovery is defined by a client no longer meeting the criteria for caseness once an 
intervention has been completed (NHS Digital, 2017). 
 
Not only do IAPT outcomes use diagnostic measures, which are problematic in the context 
of the issues discussed in this thesis, they are somewhat blunt tools. Focusing on symptom 
numbers and severity does not take into account other factors that may be important to the 
individual receiving support, or the intervention undertaken, such as measures of 
functioning. Outcome targets that rely on no longer meeting the caseness for a diagnosis are 
also problematic with the imminent extension of IAPT to more complex difficulties, Improving 
Access to Psychological Therapies for Severe Mental Illness (IAPT-SMI). Trial 
demonstration sites have been set up across England, including IAPT-SMI early intervention 
in psychosis (EIP) sites (NHS England, 2016c). No longer meeting the diagnostic criteria for 
a psychosis or schizophrenia diagnosis, for example, is unlikely given the longer-term nature 
of experiences associated with the diagnosis. EIP support, for example, is typically funded 
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for three years, before clients may be referred to other secondary care teams such as 
CMHTs for longer-term support (NHS England, 2016c). The IAPT outcome measures of 
caseness and recovery, therefore, do not have utility as an outcome. Goal attainment scaling 
might provide a method of assessment to empirically research for mental health, 
representing individualised goal setting that represents the person’s own aims for the 
intervention, but across a standardised measure so that outcomes may be compared. 
 
8.5.5 Evaluating alternative approaches 
 
Empirical research should subject both diagnostic-led approaches and the alternatives to 
empirical tests to compare their efficacy and implications across a range of variables, for 
example, identifying whether clients with different difficulties would receive a better service 
with one or other approach, and establishing in which contexts, for which type of problems, 
non-diagnostic (e.g. needs-led) versus diagnostic (or broad pseudo-diagnostic bands of 
difficulties) models would be best. Qualitative research could be used to gather detailed 
information regarding the impact and implications of receiving a non-diagnostic care 
approach, addressing common negative implications of receiving a diagnosis to compare the 
impact, such as stigma and the impact of language. 
 
8.6 Possibilities and potential for change 
 
Many have written about the persistence of psychiatric diagnosis (e.g. Harper, 2013; Pilgrim, 
2007) therefore the opportunities and potentials for change are considered here. Reasons 
for its persistence in the face of several decades of criticism reflect the varied and powerful 
nature of its functions. The following represents an overview of the explanations that have 
been given, organised by technical and socio-political perspectives. In their paper outlining 
the wealth of evidence for social adversities, such as childhood trauma, in the development 
of difficulties defined within psychiatry as psychosis and schizophrenia, Read, Dillon, and 
Lampshire (2014) ask how much of such evidence will be necessary before a paradigm shift 
is effected within mental health that refocuses from predominantly biomedical to 
psychosocial explanations. Indeed, it has been argued that reification of psychiatric 
diagnoses has led to DSM categories becoming “largely immovable anchors” that are 
“impermeable to data and resistant to revision” (Patrick & Hajcak, 2016, p. 416). DSM 
categories have also been described as “locked in” (Cooper, 2015). Bowker and Star (1999) 
describe the way that QWERTY keyboards were originally designed to solve a no longer 
relevant issue of key clash on typewriters, however people and systems are so familiar with 
this design that new, more efficient keyboard layouts have failed to take hold. Likewise, 
Cooper (2015) argues, so the DSM committees themselves have failed to make significant 
changes. She cites examples of work-arounds needing to be developed in the face of the 
removal of Asperger’s Syndrome as a diagnostic category, and the much-touted but 
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eventually side-lined dimensional model of personality disorders. Interestingly, these 
examples are arguably more technical and evidence-based than the social values-driven 
revisions described in Section 1.4.1, however they nevertheless remain more difficult to 
change. 
 
Perhaps these arguments demonstrate the power of the socio-political, or what Harper 
(2013, p. 78) describes as the “social functions and institutional interests served by 
diagnosis”. Examples of these include the interests of psychiatry itself, and even clinical 
psychology (Boyle, 2011; Boyle, 2002; Harper, 2013; see Section 1.3.2.4); including the 
revenue from sales of the DSM by the American Psychiatric Association, and the legitimation 
of psychiatry as a discipline and of the clinicians themselves (Boyle, 2002; Foucault, 2006; 
Harper, 2013). Most mental health research is organised around diagnostic categories 
(Harper, 2013) and administrative uses including health records and service planning is also 
frequently cited (Harper, 2013), however evidence from Chapter 5 suggests that service 
entry and commissioning is less reliant on diagnosis than perhaps is assumed. It has also 
been argued that diagnosis is a political device used to re-categorise social problems as 
medical, so as to sanction responses to negatively valued social behaviour that might 
otherwise be challenged (Moncrieff, 2010). Moncrieff describes the ways that diagnosis 
allows responses such as behavioural control to be reframed as ‘care’ and ‘treatment’, and 
therefore legitimated. 
 
8.6.1 Changing practices within existing mental health care structures 
 
By reframing people’s difficulties as medical, Moncrieff (2010) also highlights the process of 
apportioning these difficulties to the ‘experts’ of mental health care, so as to side step the 
need to address social problems within political arenas. This thesis considers mental health 
care and alternative provisions of such, but remains contained within the existing structure of 
mental health services and the NHS. By continuing to work within the existing structures of 
mental health ‘care’ and ‘treatment’, Smail (2005) suggests that we perpetuate the political 
avoidance that Moncrieff (2010) describes. Just as psychiatry has been criticised for the 
biomedical framing of problems at the level of the individual, as has psychology for its use of 
psychological frameworks that revolve around the individual and their difficulties (Burr & Butt, 
2000; Pilgrim, 2014; Smail, 2005). Some have argued that both disciplines have a vested 
interest in conceptualising difficulties at an individual level, given the interventions 
traditionally employed by both disciplines are individualistic, such as drug treatment and 
individual therapy (Boyle, 2011; Smail, 2005). 
 
Therefore, we might change the ethos behind mental health services, such as neutralising 
the diagnostic model, but in carrying out this work within this same structural system, Smail 
(2005) argues that the impact of these services remains set up to ‘help’ individuals rather 
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than address wider political and societal structures that create difficulties in the first place. 
Thus if working with individuals does not help or have the intended outcomes, it would be 
easy to look no further and hold responsibility with the individual themselves, rather than 
seeing beyond this to the situation and environment they are in, and question what 
structures, power, or societal issues create and maintain these problems. Smail suggests, 
therefore, that the tools of change are political rather than therapeutic. 
 
These points are raised in the introduction, although it is acknowledged that this thesis takes 
a particular stance on mental health (as acknowledged in Section 2.4), which problematises 
mental distress. By problematising the types of experiences defined as mental distress, and 
focusing on mental health services that offer support through working with the individual, the 
thesis could be argued to perpetuate the notion of difficulties at the level of the individual, in 
spite of its contextualising difficulties within wider social and political contexts. The social 
model of disability (Oliver, 1983), discussed in Section 1.3.3.1.2, highlights the potential for 
oppression and social exclusion when individuals are labelled in this way. It could be argued 
that by individualising distress, non-diagnostic but psychological approaches may still 
contribute to this form of societal disability, even without explicit labelling. One way of 
considering this problem may be to open up opportunities for individuals to consider other 
narratives that do not problematise their difficulties (discussed below in Section 8.7.2). 
 
Furthermore, Harper (2016) emphasises the limitations of individual work in mental health, 
and argues that clinical psychology should act beyond individual therapy. As the scientific 
literature grows regarding the social determinants of mental health problems, supported by 
the routine data collection above, measures should be taken to act upon this evidence in 
working towards preventative as well as reactive interventions. Current mental health 
services are set up to respond to the impact of trauma and other adversities on individuals. 
However, Patel (2003, 2011) has drawn from her work with refugees and asylum seekers to 
argue that a focus on trauma narratives still individualises distress, focusing on the 
traumatised victim rather than the causes of trauma, including social inequalities, human 
rights violations such as torture.  
 
Primary prevention strategies would work towards preventing adversities so that they do not 
impact upon individuals in the first place. For example, in their meta-analysis of the 
association between childhood adversities, such as abuse, neglect, and bullying, and later 
development of psychosis, Varese and colleagues (2012) calculated that if the adversities 
they studied were prevented, the number of people experiencing psychosis would reduce by 
33%. This would necessitate further integration between health and social care, and inter-
agency working, such as policies and action plans towards the prevention of child abuse. 
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8.6.2 Are things changing already?  
 
In spite of the above difficulties in making changes to psychiatric diagnosis, and therefore 
our conceptualisations of mental distress, there have been several recent developments in 
public treatment and discussion of mental health. These developments stem from several 
perspectives, representing a story advancing on multiple points. Some examples of the shifts 
in psychological, political and social arenas are outlined below. 
 
8.6.2.1 The psychological 
 
Reflecting some of the concerns raised in the previous section, the extension of the role of 
clinical psychology beyond the traditional individual therapeutic context has gained 
momentum in recent years. A new conference series, ‘Beyond the Therapy Room’, for 
example, champions psychological work outside of traditional contexts. Wider consideration 
has been given to the involvement in psychology of the arts and people with lived experience 
of mental distress, including the Clinical Psychology Fringe Festival (2017) that ran 
alongside the BPS Division of Clinical Psychology’s annual conference in 2017. 
 
There has also been a resurgence of community psychology, which focuses on expanding 
the reach of psychology, and takes a more preventative orientation (e.g. Albee & Ryan, 
1998) akin to public health, with a focus on health inequalities, social change, and issues of 
social justice (Albee & Ryan, 1998; Wolff, 2014). The renewed interest in community 
psychology reflects a recent politicising of the discipline in some areas, for example, Lisa 
Cameron is the first clinical psychologist member of Parliament, who moved to politics to 
further her interest in social justice and inequality (Cameron, 2015). Browne (2017) explored 
psychologists’ transitions from traditional clinical psychology practice to involvement in 
national health and social care policy in the UK, and recommended that clinical 
psychologists need to look to population-level issues, take a greater lead in policy making, 
and incorporate social action into their work. 
 
Others have advocated a human rights-based approach to psychology (Hagenaars, 2016; 
Patel, 2011). Patel (2011) describes this approach as “not a therapy, or a method, rather a 
political and moral stance that reorients psychological practice…” (p. 247). 
Recommendations related to Patel’s extensive human rights work with torture survivors 
include re-defining mental health professionals as “political agents” (Patel, 2011 p. 252) who 
contribute to the prevention of mental distress and its causes, “towards individual, social, 
economic and political wellbeing” (p. 252). For example, Patel (2003) has argued that 
focusing on post-traumatic stress as a disorder experienced by refugee people has stunted 
possibilities for the development of a “just psychology” (p. 25) that could instead work 
towards the prevention of human rights violations. Referring to this individualised focus on 
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trauma, and post-traumatic stress services for refugee people, Patel (2003) stated, “[a] 
disturbing question to ask is: would psychologists remain so naively earnest and resistant to 
reflexivity if there were similar suggestions to develop say, ‘depression clinics’ for the 
unemployed or the homeless?” (p. 25). Almost 15 years later, however, exploration of UK 
government workfare schemes has demonstrated their coercive use of psychology that has 
been argued to “erase the experience and effects of social and economic inequalities, to 
construct a psychological ideal that links unemployment to psychological deficit…” (Friedli & 
Stearn, 2015, p. 40). Service users, carers, and psychologists have protested the BPS 
involvement in workfare programmes (e.g. Barnett, 2017). The BPS (2017) called for the 
government to suspend its system of benefits sanctions while a full review of its 
psychological impact is carried out. However, the BPS stopped short of withdrawing its 
support for psychological work in workfare policies, preferring instead to negotiate from a 
position of involvement (Barnett, 2017). 
 
Further work involving the politicisation of clinical psychology in response to austerity politics 
has included ‘Walk the Talk’ in 2015, in which psychologists, service users, and activists 
joined for a 100-mile trek between the BPS offices in Leicester and London to raise 
awareness of the damaging psychological impact of food poverty, homelessness, and the 
benefits system (Foster, 2015; Walk the Talk, 2015). Follow-up events to raise awareness of 
damaging social policies included a conference on ‘Psychologists and the Benefits System’ 
(Walk the Talk, 2016). Similarly, the Psychologists Against Austerity group (later renamed 
Psychologists for Social Change) formed in 2014, and launched a briefing paper on the 
psychological impact of austerity at the House of Lords in 2015 (Psychologists Against 
Austerity, 2015). The paper identified five ways in which austerity policies can impact upon 
mental health, including humiliation and shame, and fear and distrust. The two central aims 
of the Psychologists for Social Change campaign are to mobilise psychologists to become 
politically involved and speak out about austerity, and to publicise psychological knowledge 
relevant to these types of social policies (McGrath, Walker & Jones, 2016). The shifts 
described above represent greater awareness and work within clinical psychology around 
issues of social inequalities and injustices, but the multiple calls to action demonstrate the 
work yet to be done. 
 
8.6.2.2 The political 
 
In their 2011 report No health without mental health (HM Government, 2011) the government 
and the Department of Health outlined their policy to bring mental health care into parity of 
esteem, or equal priority, with physical health care. The report outlined six key objectives 
around improved outcomes, better access to care, and reduction of harm, stigma, and 
discrimination. Building upon this, a working group within the Royal College of Psychiatrists 
published its priorities for action to introduce holistic ‘whole person’ care across health and 
244 
social care services in the report Whole-person care: From rhetoric to reality (Bailey, Thorpe, 
& Smith, 2013). Since then the government has outlined key areas for change (Department 
of Health, 2014a) introduced the first waiting time targets in mental health (Department of 
Health, 2014b). In 2016 the then Prime Minister David Cameron pledged a ‘revolution’ in 
mental health treatment, with almost a billion pounds of investment and the introduction of 
waiting time targets in new areas including early intervention in psychosis (Prime Minister’s 
Office, 2016). Critics have, however, raised concerns regarding the parity of esteem 
objectives, highlighting that bringing mental health care closer in line with that of physical 
health prioritises the biomedical model of mental health, which is as yet poorly evidenced in 
terms of treatment outcomes, and has been shown to be linked with increased stigma and 
discrimination (Timimi, 2014). Others have demonstrated that the need for parity of esteem 
has been recognised for the last century but there have been consistent barriers to it being 
implemented effectively (Hilton, 2016). The recent influx of policies and introduction of 
waiting times is nevertheless evidence of political recognition and advances towards 
changing mental health in the UK. Mental health was included within the NHS Patient Choice 
as of 2014 (NHS England, 2014), initially giving people the choice of where they have their 
first outpatient appointment. This incorporation of mental health care into the choice agenda 
paves the way for people being able to choose social over biomedical approaches to their 
care. Furthermore, and reflecting the psychological shifts discussed above, a recent report 
from the United Nations Special Rapporteur (UN Human Rights Council, 2017), called for 
measures that redress the dominance of the biomedical model in mental health services, 
stating: 
 
Reductive biomedical approaches to treatment that do not adequately address 
contexts and relationships can no longer be considered compliant with the right to 
health. While a biomedical component remains important, its dominance has 
become counter-productive, disempowering rights holders and reinforcing stigma 
and exclusion. (p. 17) 
 
The crisis in mental health should be managed not as a crisis of individual 
conditions, but as a crisis of social obstacles which hinders individual rights. Mental 
health policies should address the “power imbalance” rather than “chemical 
imbalance”… The urgent need for a shift in approach should prioritize policy 
innovation at the population level, targeting social determinants and abandon the 
predominant medical model that seeks to cure individuals by targeting “disorders”. 
(p. 19) 
 
This report offers an important precedent from which service users, clinicians, and mental 
health services may continue to pursue and demand change. 
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8.6.2.3 The social 
 
In recent years there have been changing and more positive attitudes towards mental health 
(Angermeyer & Dietrich, 2006). The proliferation of mental health festivals and campaigns 
suggest a greater openness towards discussing mental health difficulties. Initiatives include 
the Only Us campaign, which seeks to break down ‘us and them’ attitudes towards mental 
health, and the Time to Change campaign. Time to Change, headed by Mind and Rethink 
Mental Illness charities, was established in 2009 and aims to reduce stigma and 
discrimination. Survey research has suggested that compared with before the campaign was 
launched, public beliefs and attitudes towards mental health have significantly and 
moderately improved (Evans-Lacko, Corker, Williams, Henderson, & Thornicroft, 2014). For 
the first time, the Royal Family has fronted a mental health initiative, with the Duke and 
Duchess of Cambridge and Prince Harry representing the Heads Together campaign 
established to tackle stigma. Furthermore, public figures in positions of power have spoken 
up about difficulties with their mental health, including MPs in the UK parliament (Time to 
Change, 2012) and the Norwegian Prime Minister, Kjell Magne Bondevik (World Health 
Organization, 2011). With regards to the media, the stylebook of the Associated Press global 
news network recommended in 2013 that journalists stop using phrases such as 
‘schizophrenic’, and instead use diagnostic labels as a description that moves the phrasing 
away from locating the problem within the individual, such as ‘he was diagnosed with 
schizophrenia’ (Siegel, 2017). In 2017 this recommendation was similarly extended to drug 
abuse, and referring to individuals ‘having a substance use disorder’ rather than being an 
addict or abuser (Associated Press, 2017; Siegel, 2017). These examples are based on 
diagnoses, but nevertheless represent a shift towards greater openness and more sensitive 
thought in the area of mental distress. 
 
Research suggests, however, that stigma is still a barrier to accessing mental health support 
(Salaheddin & Mason, 2016), and that media portrayal of less common mental health 
difficulties, particularly diagnoses of schizophrenia, continues to impact upon people’s beliefs 
about the dangerousness of people experiencing mental health difficulties (Reavley, Jorm, & 
Morgan, 2016). Reavley and colleagues’ research suggests that knowing someone with 
mental health difficulties reduces the likelihood of holding stigmatising beliefs. This research 
emphasises the need to continue to build upon the developments that have already been 
made regarding openness about mental health difficulties and stigma reduction. The growing 
public awareness and official recognition of mental health difficulties, however, is reminiscent 
of the beginnings of the socio-political revolutions that led to homosexuality being removed 
from the DSM, outlined in Section 1.4.1.2. 
 
246 
8.7 Personal reflections on research findings 
 
These reflections are more explicitly embedded with my own views, extrapolating from the 
clinical implications and incorporating my beliefs and personal reflections regarding the 
research. 
 
8.7.1 Choice and the availability of alternative discourses 
 
In their key paper on the discursive production of selves, Davies and Harré (1990) describe 
the ways in which people “actively produce social and psychological realities” (p. 45).  They 
quote Frazer (1990), who argues from her interviews with adolescent girls, that their 
“experience of gender, race, class, their personal-social identity, can only be expressed and 
understood through the categories available to them in discourse” (Davies & Harré, 1990, p. 
45). I argue that the same statement can be applied to people experiencing mental distress. 
Some participants who had been given diagnoses appeared to struggle to conceptualise the 
idea of ‘alternatives to diagnosis’, because the medical framing of their difficulties was seen 
as simply ‘how it is’. As an interview participant was quoted in Kinderman (2014, p. 53), the 
diagnosis is “what they’ve got”. There was a sense that some participants were ‘stuck’ in the 
models and discourses that they had been exposed to, even biomedical clinicians, both due 
to disciplinary frameworks and lay discourses on mental health. Of the service users I 
interviewed who had come to question the concept of diagnosis, none had been offered 
different ways of looking at their distress at the outset, rather, each of them described a 
process of being given a diagnosis and going through a process of gradually questioning or 
even rejecting it. As Service User 5 described, “I fear that it’s only through sad experience 
with the system that people come to the conclusion that a diagnosis is not your man. I fear 
initially they might be wanting ‘tell me what’s wrong with me’”. Currently socially accepted 
and lay discourses about mental health tend to focus on finding out what is wrong, and 
getting treatment for mental illness. Speed (2006) describes the survivor discourse as 
rejecting medical causes of difficulties and replacing these ideas with non-medical causes, in 
ways that suit the person, such as a spiritual crisis or family difficulty. This is only possible, 
however, if alternative discourses about mental distress and its causes are in some way 
available to the person. Whether, as some of my participants described, this taking up of an 
alternative discourse is enabled through doing personal work to revisit childhood 
experiences, trying to re-frame significant events such as trauma in relation to current 
difficulties and personal belief systems, or through accessing networks of alternative ways of 
thinking, such as hearing voices groups and activist organisations. 
 
Returning to the language used to describe difficulties, diagnoses has persuasive uses, 
particularly to service users, of having a common word or phrase to identify other people 
with similar types of distress, to communicate difficulties without going into details, or to 
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simply use as a starting point to find further information. Problematic to the development of 
alternatives is that the medical language of diagnostic labels, of ‘illness’ and ‘disorder’, is the 
lay language used in everyday descriptions of mental health. Mobilising the social, through 
publicity and awareness raising, might provide an effective means of promoting and making 
available different and more empowering discourses about distress (Georgaca, 2013). By 
making other discourses available, this in turn may help to shape the everyday language 
used to describe distress. 
 
8.7.2 Driving forward the social 
 
In discussing the possibilities for change, I raised the potential difficulty of trying to change 
attitudes and interventions in mental health within existing health care structures. Although 
the Health and Social Care Act (2012) made steps towards bringing health and social care 
together, I believe further steps can be taken in this respect. In considering the impact of 
psychosocial determinants of mental distress, including poverty, inequality, and childhood 
trauma, a truly integrated support system would actively acknowledge these risks and take 
steps to prevent the occurrence of these problems, as well as respond to and minimise their 
impact. Another way of bringing closer social and health worlds might be the greater 
involvement of experts by experience, or people who have experienced mental distress 
themselves, in mental health care. Much valued by several of the service users I 
interviewed, this model of care might offer people a broader understanding of their 
difficulties, and create a more socially centred model of mental health care that does not 
solely focus on the medical or psychological. 
 
Similarly, in taking steps to reform and improve our conceptualisations of mental health and 
the ways that we support people’s distress, it seems clear that the technical challenge of 
diagnosis and its medical model have as yet made little dent (e.g. Read et al., 2014). Indeed, 
Harper (2013) notes, in his application of Smith’s (2012) discussion of political revolutions to 
psychiatry, that where resistance movements struggle as a result of using only one or two 
methods, attempts at mental health reform have focused largely on ‘intellectual argument 
[and] empirical research’ (p. 81) and that more social campaigns have focused on specific 
diagnostic categories only. When historical changes to diagnostic classification are reviewed 
(see Section 1.4.1, Historical development of the DSM), it becomes evident that the most 
significant changes to diagnoses have been as a result of socio-political pressure and 
changing values and norms, such as homosexuality, PTSD, and gender dysphoria. I believe, 
therefore, that driving forward socio-political change, alongside further research evidence, is 
likely to effect change at a greater rate than the technical alone. Of the potential power of the 
population, those who are not typically considered experts or powerful who may believe they 
cannot influence change, Smail states:  
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If the many can be persuaded that they have no say in the shaping of material 
reality, and that personal satisfaction is purely a matter of self-doctoring and private 
consumption, the world is left wide open for exploitation by the few (Smail, 2005, p. 
95).  
 
Moncrieff (2010) describes one of the roles of psychiatric diagnosis as to “re-designate 
social problems as medical ones” (p. 381). If these problems can be redefined as social 
problems, greater political pressure would be mounted in order to provide services to both 
prevent and work specifically with their causes. We should question the effectiveness of 
providing medication or psychological work, no matter how effective in the short-term on an 
individual basis, if the person in distress must return to the same problematic social and/or 
economic environment. 
 
8.8 Conclusions 
 
The findings of this thesis demonstrate that diagnostic classification, and its uses, are at 
times underpinned by epistemological assumptions that support a disease model. However, 
these assumptions are not consistently applied by those who use diagnosis. Supporting 
technologies, including the recording of diagnosis for administrative processes, reinforce this 
underpinning diagnostic model, which shapes the foreground of how mental distress is 
viewed. In spite of repeated diagnostic revisions towards ever more ‘precise’ diagnoses, 
many of the ways of using diagnosis outlined in this thesis are far from the specific 
diagnostic categories described in the ICD or DSM. The need for such highly specified 
criteria can therefore be questioned. Likewise, diagnoses may be used for data capture, for 
administrative and organisational uses, but ‘fudged’ numbers are not useful to planners. 
Flexibly and pragmatically applied categories are not useful for public health departments. 
 
Mirowsky and Ross (1989) have said, “[m]any psychiatrists and epidemiologists who are not 
inclined to reify [diagnostic categories] nevertheless accept them as politically necessary” (p. 
22). Almost thirty years later, (Frances, 2015) argues, “[h]owever flawed, we have to use the 
available diagnostic tools” (p. 577). This thesis, however, demonstrates that diagnostic 
infrastructure has obscured existing infrastructures that could be used, such as the 
descriptive psychosocial codes within the ICD-10. As well as different assessment 
approaches that are already used, such as psychological formulation, there are existing 
infrastructures and practices that are currently used under the guise of diagnosis, such as 
organising service entry upon needs-led factors for competency-driven teams. The notion of 
‘alternatives to diagnosis’ has been taken up by some as a way of politicising the issue, but 
this concept may distract from seeing current infrastructures and processes that could be put 
to use more transparently. 
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Moving beyond the clinical environment, this thesis has demonstrated how what begins as a 
seemingly neutral category for describing a person’s difficulties, which is applied in order to 
help that person by opening access to treatment plans and support systems, travels beyond 
this setting and becomes a stabilised, crystallised category that becomes essentialised and 
stigmatised for the person who bears that label. Some of the people interviewed in this 
research who had been given psychiatric diagnoses told powerful stories of profoundly 
negative experiences of diagnosis and the psychiatric system, a framework of understanding 
that they had, through difficult work, come to replace with more personally meaningful 
understandings.  
 
Receiving a diagnosis clearly remains an affirmative juncture in many people’s care, but for 
those for whom it is not a positive experience, there are already existing opportunities for 
different approaches that may fit better for some. It is hoped that through a process of 
comprehensive system reform, existing and novel approaches may be utilised that have 
clinical, administrative and social utility. Most importantly, however, such approaches may 
enable those in distress to find approaches that suit their needs and perspectives without the 
“sad experience with the system” (Service User 5) that typically preceded the more positive 
reframing of distress described by participants in this research. 
 
Interviewing clinicians for this research emphasised how the psychiatrists, GPs and clinical 
psychologists were frequently doing their best to help people in distress within the limitations 
that they had in clinical practice, and that were imposed by service commissioning and so 
forth. However, people do have choices, and there are opportunities within the system as it 
is at the moment to do things differently, although it nonetheless takes tremendous effort to 
work against the grain of a well-established model. Those in professional roles nevertheless 
hold greater power than the people who are trapped by diagnostic labels that they may feel 
are inappropriate, marginalising, and damaging, and yet on which they are simultaneously 
reliant for essential care and support. Many, therefore, do not have the privilege to reject 
diagnosis outright. Those who do should be using it. 
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Appendix 4: Interview questions / topic guides 
 
Appendix 4.1: Clinicians who make psychiatric diagnoses as part of their clinical 
practice 
 
Introduction: In the first part of the interview, I’ll ask you about your experiences of diagnosis 
and assessment in mental health, ideally with reference to your current practice and case 
examples, and in the second part I’ll ask you about your opinions and ideas about different 
ways of assessing mental health problems. 
 
Do you make psychiatric diagnoses as part of your clinical practice? 
If yes: 
How often and in what circumstances? 
 
Can you tell me about how you go about assessing mental health difficulties & 
making a diagnosis, with reference to specific cases if possible?  
 
Prompts: 
• How do you rule out other diagnoses? 
• Boundaries between diagnoses; clear vs. overlap? What makes the difference, what 
would steer you towards one diagnosis or another? 
• What sort of factors might be included in your assessment that don’t come under 
diagnosis specifically? Eg history, trauma, functioning, relational difficulties, risk 
• How is severity determined? 
 
Could you tell me about a more difficult case? / one that was more straightforward? 
 
Can you tell me what you use diagnosis for, with reference to specific cases if 
possible? 
 
Prompts: 
• Treatment / intervention plans 
• Would you do the same thing for every person with that diagnosis? If not, what 
would make the difference? Examples – what is it about a particular person that 
leads you to a particular plan? 
• Referrals – how are decisions made re referrals, acceptance into services [eg would 
you just give the diagnosis, or additional information as well? Given any additional 
information, what does a diagnosis add to the referral?] 
• Communication [with the client, with colleagues, other professionals/agencies] 
• Record-keeping 
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• [Prescription] 
• [Any other consequences of using diagnosis?] 
• How often do you use the diagnosis? Other info referred to/relied upon? 
• What info used in making decisions re care for ppl with multiple diagnoses? How 
would each diagnosis influence intervention? - eg prioritise, one at a time, all 
difficulties at once (separate interventions within care plan dependent on dx?) 
 
How well do you think diagnosis achieves its functions? Does it meet all your needs 
for those functions? 
 
Prompts: 
• Are there any other problems or needs that clients present with that are not covered 
by a psychiatric or medical diagnosis? How does diagnosis fit into that?  
• Relational difficulties, social care, financial needs 
• Causal / contextual information 
• Descriptive info 
• Psychological processes vs behaviours / emotions / thoughts 
• What about problem- or needs-based referrals, such as to non-NHS agencies (eg 
police, foodbank) – how does diagnosis fit in here? [eg would they use the 
diagnosis, or something else? What are they using diagnosis for here? A description 
of the person’s problems/needs?] 
• Risk 
• Functional difficulties 
 
If there were another approach to assessing mental health that might better meet your 
needs, what would it look like? 
 
Prompts: 
• What other ways are there that might capture that information? 
• What information would be lost if a diagnosis were not used? 
• [Could the same method of assessment be used across services/professional 
disciplines etc?] 
 
How would a simple list of people’s problems, operationally defined, meet the needs 
of assessment that we’ve discussed? 
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Appendix 4.2: Clinicians who do not make psychiatric diagnoses as part of their 
clinical practice 
 
Introduction: In the first part of the interview, I’ll ask you about your experiences of diagnosis 
and assessment in mental health, ideally with reference to your current practice and case 
examples, and in the second part I’ll ask you about your opinions and ideas about different 
ways of assessing mental health problems. 
 
Do you make psychiatric diagnoses as part of your clinical practice? 
 
If no: 
 
Can you tell me in what context you make assessments of clients’ difficulties, and 
how you go about the process of assessment, with reference to specific cases if 
possible? 
 
Prompts: 
• Elements included eg 
• Causal / contextual information 
• Descriptive info, functioning  
• Psychological processes vs behaviours / emotions / thoughts 
• Difficult case vs more straightforward 
• Timeframe? 
 
Can you tell me about ways you use and encounter psychiatric diagnoses in your 
practice? 
 
Prompts: 
• How are decisions made re entry to services & referrals? 
• Communication [with the client, with colleagues, other professionals/agencies – are 
there any situations where you are required to use diagnosis?] 
• Record-keeping 
• Treatment / intervention plans 
• [Prescription] 
• [Functions from the client’s point of view] 
 
299 
How well do you think diagnosis achieve its functions & meet clinicians’ needs? 
 
Prompts: 
• [Refer to functions discussed above] 
• Are there any other problems or needs that clients present with that are not covered 
by a psychiatric or medical diagnosis? How does diagnosis fit into that?  
o Social care, financial needs, relationships 
o [Other things that are used in their assessments] eg: 
o Causal / contextual information 
o Descriptive info 
o Psychological processes vs behaviours / emotions / thoughts 
• What about problem- or needs-based referrals, such as to non-NHS agencies (e.g. 
police, food bank) – what information would you give in these referrals? A 
description of the person’s problems/needs?] 
o Risk 
o Functional difficulties 
 
If there were another approach to assessing mental health that might better meet your 
needs, what would it look like? 
 
Prompts: 
• What other ways are there that might capture that information? 
• [What information would be lost if a diagnosis were not used?] 
• [Could the same method of assessment be used across services/professional 
disciplines etc?] 
 
[Given what you’ve just said] How well would a simple list of people’s problems, 
operationally defined, meet the needs of assessment that we’ve discussed? 
 
Appendix 4.3: Demographic questions – Clinicians 
 
• Occupation; How long have you been practicing as a clinician? 
• Age 
• Gender 
• What ethnic origin do you identify with? 
• Do you consider yourself to have a disability? 
• Which service(s) do you work in currently? e.g. inpatient, outpatient, adult mental 
health, specialist services etc. 
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Appendix 4.4: Service users who have been given a psychiatric diagnosis 
 
Introduction: Overall we’re looking at how people assess mental health difficulties, how 
useful these ways are, and what the impact is. In the first part of the interview, I’ll ask you 
about your experiences of diagnosis and having assessments of your mental health, and in 
the second part I’ll ask you about your opinions and ideas about different ways of assessing 
mental health problems. 
 
Have you been given a psychiatric/mental health diagnosis? 
 
Prompts: 
• When? 
• [If multiple diagnoses] was that a diagnosis that was revised over time, or additional 
diagnoses? 
 
Can you describe your experience of being given a diagnosis? 
 
Prompts: 
• e.g. the assessment you had and the kinds of questions – just about difficulties? 
Context? 
• What services were involved? 
• How did you get the diagnosis? Who gave it to you? 
• Has the diagnosis changed at any point? How did you experience this? 
• [If multiple psychiatric diagnoses – how does that experience of getting a diagnosis 
compare with getting the other diagnosis? Separate diagnoses for same problems 
(e.g. a revised diagnosis, for example from bipolar to schizophrenia) or multiple 
diagnoses at one time (e.g. for different problems?) 
 
How did you make sense of your difficulties after you were given the diagnosis? 
 
Prompts: 
• What does the diagnosis mean for you? (A label, an identity, a description of 
symptoms or difficulties, a result of things that have happened?) 
• eg a different understanding of problems 
• Positive impact? 
• Negative impact? 
• Label / identity 
• Illness / disease model 
• Do you refer to it much? 
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What uses or functions does having a diagnosis serve? 
 
Prompts: 
• Practical uses, e.g. access to services/care, support, benefits 
• Communication (friends/family, medical professionals) 
• Explanation of difficulties 
• Avoidance? E.g. events/commitments/conversations? 
• How well do you think the diagnosis meets your needs? 
 
If there were another way of assessing your mental health, what might that look like? 
 
How would you feel about having a description of your difficulties rather than a 
diagnostic label? 
 
Prompts: 
• In what ways would it serve the same functions as you described about diagnosis? 
More? Less? 
• Language 
 
Appendix 4.5: Demographic questions – Service Users 
 
• Age 
• Gender 
• What ethnic origin do you identify with? 
• Do you consider yourself to have a disability? (Is the mental distress discussed in 
the interview the source of disability, or something separate?) 
• Currently working? 
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Appendix 5: Participant information sheet - Clinicians 
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Appendix 6: Participant information sheet – Service Users 
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Appendix 7: Participant consent form – Clinicians 
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Appendix 8: Participant consent form – Service Users 
 
309 
 
310 
Appendix 9: Debrief pack – Service Users 
 
 
 
 
 
Debriefing Sheet 
 
 
Title of Study: Development and validation of non-diagnostic assessment 
methods in mental health care 
Researchers: Kate Allsopp, Professor Peter Kinderman, Professor 
Rhiannon Corcoran 
 
 
Dear Participant,  
 
Thank you very much for taking the time to participate in this study 
developing an alternative assessment of mental health problems. We aim to 
assess mental health difficulties without using psychiatric diagnosis, and 
hopefully improve the assessment, care and wellbeing of people with these 
difficulties. If you have any questions regarding this study please feel free to 
contact me on the number provided below (or if you prefer you can send me 
an e-mail). I will be more than happy to talk to you about any concerns or 
doubts that you may have about the study or your participation.   
 
In the event that you feel distressed by your participation in this study, we 
encourage you to contact us. If, for whatever reason, you are unable to do so 
please contact someone directly involved in your care (e.g. psychiatrist, 
community nurse, social worker or support worker). If you are not currently 
seeing a mental health team please contact your GP. It is important that you 
receive support from someone involved in your care and who knows your 
difficulties but also your strengths. Out of hours, you can access the primary 
care service for an emergency (Urgent Care 24 Patient Access Telephone 
Number: 0151 220 3685 for Merseyside residents only) or the NHS advice 
line (Dial 111).     
 
If you feel that you may benefit from psychological therapies or counselling 
(commonly known as ‘talking therapies’) please ask your Primary Care 
Doctor (GP) to refer you to Inclusion Matters (website: http://inclusion-
matters-liverpool.org.uk/ ). This is a service staffed by skilled professionals 
that have been trained to help people with mental health difficulties. They 
have a vast range of expertise and substantial experience helping people 
with low mood, anxiety and related problems. Another service that you may 
find helpful is Careline (0151 233 3800) which is a 24-hour phone line staffed 
by Social Services. Careline staff can provide you with advice on how to 
access extra support on issues related adult and child safeguard and social 
care (e.g. housing, debt, benefits, etc.).  
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Alternatively, if you feel that due to your distress you or people around may 
be unsafe please don’t hesitate to contact the Access Team at the Royal 
Liverpool University Hospital (mental health crisis line from 7:30-21:00 
contact 0151 250 5056; from 21:00-8:00 contact 0151 706 2782) or the 
Mental Health Team at University Hospital Aintree (mental health crisis line 
0151 529 8145). These teams work 24 hours, 7 days a week and will provide 
you with professional advice on how to access emergency mental health 
services out of hours. These teams can also quickly engage you with acute 
mental health services.    
 
Attached to this sheet you will find a range of helplines and services that you 
may find helpful,  
 
Again thank you very much for your participation,  
 
Kate Allsopp 
Institute of Psychology, Health and Society 
Waterhouse Building, Block B, 2nd Floor 
University of Liverpool Brownlow Street 
Liverpool  
L69 3GL 
0151 795 5375 
kallsopp@liverpool.ac.uk 
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Whether you're concerned about yourself or a loved one, these are helplines 
and services that can offer you help:  
 
MIND 
Mind is a charity that provides independent information and advice about 
mental health problems and treatments. They also offer advice on legal 
issues related to mental health and can put you in touch with local 
community members and networks. 
Phone: 0300 123 3393  
E-mail: info@mind.org.uk  
Website: www.mind.org.uk  
Facebook:  www.facebook.com/mindforbettermentalhealth  
Twitter: www.twitter.com/MindCharity  
Blog: www.mind.org.uk/blog).  
 
Hearing Voices Network (HVN) 
The Hearing Voices Network is a self-help user-run organisation for people 
who hear voices (to what psychiatry generally refers to as ‘auditory 
hallucinations’) or have other unusual experiences. The organisation 
provides information about local support groups where people have an 
opportunity to talk freely with the aim of understanding and learning from 
these experiences.  
Phone: 0114 271 8210 (this is not a helpline) 
E-mail: nhvn@hotmail.co.uk   
Website: http://www.hearing-voices.org/  
 
CALM 
This charity is aimed at helping young men aged 15-35. They offer help and 
advice on a range of different issues from depression and anxiety to issues 
related to victimisation of minority and ethnic groups.   
Phone: 0800 58 58 58 (Monday-Sunday 5pm-12am) 
E-mail: info@thecalmzone.net  
Website: www.thecalmzone.net  
You Tube http://www.youtube.com/thecalmzonenet 
Facebook http://www.facebook.com/pages/The-CALMzone/49764419689 
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Twitter: www.Twitter.com/theCALMzone   
 
Rethink Mental Illness 
This is a charity that runs a helpline that provides advice and support for 
people living with mental problems. 
Phone: 0300 5000 927 (Monday-Friday 10am-2pm) 
Email advice@rethink.org 
Website: www.rethink.org  
Facebook: www.facebook.com/RethinkCharity  
Twitter: https://twitter.com/rethink_  
Blog: 
www.rethink.org/about_mental_illness/personal_stories_blogs_forum/blogs/i
ndex.html        
     
Depression Alliance 
This is a charity for people who experience depression. The website has 
information about local self-help groups. 
Phone: 0845 123 23 20 (this is not an helpline) 
Website: www.depressionalliance.org  
 
Samaritans 
This is a charity that provides confidential support for people experiencing 
feelings of distress or despair.  
Phone: 08457 90 90 90 (24-hour helpline) 
E-mail: jo@samaritans.org  
Website: www.samaritans.org.uk  
Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/samaritanscharity  
Twitter: https://twitter.com/samaritans  
 
Sane 
This charity offers emotional support for people with mental health problems.  
Phone: 0845 767 8000 (Monday-Sunday 6pm-11pm) 
E-mail: sanemail@org.uk  
Website: www.sane.org.uk  
Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/charitySANE  
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Twitter: https://twitter.com/CharitySANE 
Forum: http://www.sane.org.uk/what_we_do/support/supportforum/   
 
RASA (Rape and Sexual Abuse Centre)  
RASA is a charity that works with all individuals who have been victims of 
sexual violence at any time in their lives.  
Phone: 0151 707 4313 (Friday 2pm-4pm). Calls to this helpline outside of 
this time will be responded to within 48 hours.  
E-mail: rasa@rasamerseyside.org 
Website: http://www.rasamerseyside.org/ 
 
NAPAC (National Association for People Abused in Childhood) 
This is a national support helpline for adults who have suffered any type of 
abuse in childhood. 
Phone:  
0800 085 3330 for free from landlines, 3, Orange & Virgin mobile phones 
0808 801 0331 for free from O2, T-Mobile and Vodafone mobile phones 
(Monday – Thursday 10am-9pm; Friday 10am-6pm) 
E-mail: support@napac.org.uk 
Website: www.napac.org.uk 
 
Victim Support 
This is a charity that provides support and information to people affected by 
crime, including rape and sexual abuse, as a victim or a witness.  
Phone: 0845 30 30 900 (Monday-Friday 9am-9pm; Saturday-Sunday 9am-
7pm) 
E-mail: supportline@victimsupport.org.uk 
Website: www.victimsupport.org 
 
Survivors UK (for men only) 
Provides support for men who have been raped or sexually abused at any 
point in their lives. 
Phone: 0845 122 1201 (Monday – Tuesday 7pm-9:30pm; Thursday 12pm-
2:30pm) 
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E-mail: info@survivorsuk.org 
Website: www.survivorsuk.org 
 
Rape Crisis (for women only) 
Provides support for women who have been raped or sexually abused at any 
point in their lives. 
Phone: 0808 802 9999 (Monday-Sunday 12pm -12:30pm & 7pm – 9:30pm)  
E-mail: info@rapecrisis.org.uk 
Website: www.rapecrisis.org.uk 
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Appendix 10: A section of the list of codes generated from initial open coding 
(alphabetically organised by nVivo) 
 
OPEN CODING CODES 
'Illness' as illogical, un-understandable 
'Social prescribing' 
A dramatic change indicating more organic illness 
Absence (seemingly) of contextual triggers inferring biological cause 
Absence of context in diagnostic criteria & the implications 
Acceptability of diagnoses or conceptualisations varying across 
diagnoses 
Accepting people's need to categorise & name things 
Acknowledging different purposes of assessment 
Acknowledging different purposes of communication & documentation 
Acknowledging the heterogeneity within a diagnostic label 
Advancing mental health care - expectation of using better more helpful 
language 
Aiming to ensure that all patients have a diagnosis 
Alluding to adversity 
Alluding to adversity or life experiences as linked to MH problems 
Anger at being labelled in a particular way 
Applying rigour to make diagnoses 
Arrogance of clinicians; clinicians as expert 
Asking a person's diagnosis to understand their perspective 
Asking according to interests 
Asking the patient to define the 'problem' 
Asking the patient; using general medical training 
Asking the standard questions - making assumptions about what these 
are 
Assuming a contextual cause of a problem 
Assuming everything can be explained within a formulation 
Assuming that formulation incorporates everything whereas diagnosis 
doesn't 
Assumptions made about diagnosis from one or 2 symptoms 
Attributing even 'normal' responses to the diagnosis 
Attributing overwhelming responses or thoughts to a disorder 
Attributing past difficulties to an undiagnosed problem 
Attributing unusual or not typical responses to diagnosis 
Being aware of possible negative impact of diagnosis 
Being confused as to why difficulties not acknowledged as a diagnosis 
Being forced to talk about difficulties by worsening severity (threshold for 
seeking help) 
Being lost without a structure to start from 
Being more interested in experiences other than 'symptoms' 
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Being offered fewer opportunities for treatment because diagnosis seen 
as too big, too difficult to treat 
Being overpowered by the patient 
Being reluctant to make diagnoses; perhaps due to training or point in 
care pathway 
Being told you've 'got' a disorder 
Being treated differently as a result of PD diagnosis 
Being unsure about how difficulties are conceptualised 
Biological symptoms as being more organic than life related 
Boxing off difficulties into separate diagnoses being helpful 
Broad diagnostic criteria could fit to a lot of people 
By fixing a certain model or explanation (diagnosis), making changes is 
more difficult 
Certain behaviours being judged more harshly in the context of certain 
diagnoses 
Challenging (medical model) clinicians to better understand the 
individual 
Challenging the notion of a 'typical' person with that diagnosis 
Changing a (comfortable) structure is difficult 
Changing the conceptualisation of MH changes the treatment 
Clear ends of the spectrum of severity being 'much easier' to decide 
Clinician needing to ascribe a diagnosis 
Clinician understanding difficulties 
Coming to an agreement 
Comparing MH with alcoholism; seen as always an alcoholic, always 
having MH problems 
Complex and long-term patterns needing more time & info to diagnose 
Complexity & risk denoting progression from primary to secondary care 
Complexity - long history of difficulties 
Complexity - lots of different difficulties attracting multiple diagnoses 
Complexity - lots of intertwined difficulties 
Complexity - trauma 
Complexity of patterns & how to identify these 
Conceptualising in a particular way having implications for treatment 
Confirmation bias of diagnosis - missing other information 
Conflict related to diagnosis, not internal 
Confusing diagnoses & indistinct lines between them 
Connecting primary & secondary care; overriding risk-complexity divide 
to access psychological interventions 
Considering availability of other (supportive) resources 
Considering long-term implications of treatment & association with 
certainty 
Considering the implications of not using multi-axial system 
Consistency being important across individuals 
Continual updating of formulation 
Conveying a degree of severity 
Creating implications for people when labelling them 
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Appendix 11: Example of the organisation of codes generated from open 
coding into subthemes 
 
SUBTHEMES 
 
 
CODES FROM OPEN CODING 
BENEFITS TO THE 
INDIVIDUAL (general) 
Individual benefit of diagnosis 
 
Positive impacts (uses) of diagnosis (for the patient) 
 
  
UNDERSTANDING 
DIFFICULTIES 
Offering understanding 
 
  
RECOGNISING OWN 
DIFFICULTIES; A STARTING 
POINT 
Diagnosis helpful in recognising difficulties, giving insight 
 
Diagnosis used to 'know what I was dealing with' 
 
Diagnosis being used as a starting point for fighting difficulties 
 
  
MAKING SENSE OF 
DIFFICULTIES BECAUSE OF 
THE DIAGNOSIS VS. AGE & 
EXPERIENCE 
VS - making sense of difficulties via age & experience vs. 
being given a diagnosis 
 
  
ACCESSING PRACTICAL 
SUPPORT 
Diagnosis conveying a degree of severity (access to benefits) 
 
‘Playing the game’ 
 
Using diagnosis where its useful - e.g. getting access to things 
 
Diagnosis being the only method of access (practical uses) 
 
Diagnosis getting access to things - a by-product, hindsight, 
not a main aim 
 
Using diagnosis for practical uses (individual level) 
 
  
SICK NOTES 
Having to use diagnosis on sick notes 
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ACCESSING 
INTERVENTIONS, 
TREATMENT, THERAPY 
Using diagnosis to access specific, targeted therapy 
 
Using diagnosis to access therapy 
 
Diagnosis allowing access to treatment 
 
Diagnosis as a way of getting access to services elsewhere 
 
  
GIVING PERMISSION 
Using diagnosis to allow people to feel what they're feeling 
 
Giving permission to feel this way 
 
  
IDENTIFYING WITH OTHERS 
Identifying with others with the same diagnosis 
 
  
SHARED UNDERSTANDING: 
CLINICIAN-PATIENT 
Developing a shared understanding - clinician to patient, 
clinician to other clinicians 
 
Direct pathway from problem to intervention being about 
having shared goals 
 
  
RISK MANAGEMENT; 
INDIVIDUAL 
Using diagnosis for both individual and population safety 
 
  
A WAY TO MOVE PEOPLE 
OUT OF THE SERVICE 
(RATIONING) 
Diagnosis being used to move people on to different (more 
specific) services to help with rationing 
 
  
DEVELOPMENT OF 
SERVICES 
Diagnosis & prevalence figures allowing development of 
services for people perhaps otherwise neglected 
TREATMENT/RESOURCE 
PLANNING 
Accuracy of diagnosis used for accuracy in treatment planning, 
research, audit 
AUDIT & ADMIN (SERVICE 
LEVEL) 
Using diagnosis at a broad, group level (audit, service 
planning) 
 
Service uses of diagnosis; broad non-individual categories 
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Accuracy of diagnosis used for accuracy in treatment planning, 
research, audit 
 
Using diagnosis at a broad, group level (audit, service 
planning) 
 
Using diagnosis for non-clinical needs 
 
Acknowledging different purposes of communication & 
documentation 
 
Aiming to ensure that all patients have a diagnosis 
 
Clinician needing to ascribe a diagnosis 
RISK MANAGEMENT; 
POPULATION 
Using diagnosis for both individual and population safety 
 
  
CATEGORISING FOR 
RESEARCH 
Psychological research being diagnosis-based 
 
Accuracy of diagnosis used for accuracy in treatment planning, 
research, audit 
 
  
TIMES WHEN DIAGNOSIS IS 
NOT USED 
Not having a PD diagnosis even though criteria met 
 
  
INDIVIDUAL (SU) VS. 
INDIVIDUAL (CLINICIAN) 
NEEDS 
Diagnosis capturing what is important to the clinician but 
missing what is important to the client 
 
VS - separation between own experience & needs vs. the 
needs of psychiatrists 
 
VS - Managing patient vs. managing self 
 
VS - Public vs. personal uses of diagnosis 
 
  
USEFUL FOR SOME THINGS 
VS. CONFUSING FOR 
OTHERS [INDIVIDUAL] 
VS - multiple diagnoses as confusing for treatment planning vs. 
giving a guide to a person's difficulties 
 
  
RESEARCH (STRICT) VS. 
CLINICAL (FLEXIBLE) USES 
OF DIAGNOSIS 
VS - differing uses - strict research criteria vs. more flexible 
clinical adaptations 
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TECHNOLOGICAL USES VS. 
INDIVIDUAL NEEDS/ 
EXPERIENCE/ USES 
VS - diagnosis as a categorisation vs. a representation of what 
the experience feels like 
 
VS - diagnostic uses; categorisation & classification vs. 
explanation of difficulties to SU 
TECHNOLOGICAL NEED 
OVERRIDING THAT OF THE 
INDIVIDUAL 
VS - diagnosis is shared always vs. formulation shared only if 
consent given 
[OPPOSITE TO ABOVE] 
INDIVIDUAL OVERRIDING 
THE 
TECHNOLOGICAL/ADMIN 
USES 
VS - diagnosis always on records but not always shared with 
patient vs. formulation always shared with patient but not 
always on records 
 
VS - technological vs. individual needs 
 
  
SERVICE VS. INDIVIDUAL 
USES OF ASSESSMENT 
VS - Provision of services vs. individual patient work  
 
VS - for the person vs. for the system or service 
 
VS - different uses of diagnosis (non-individual) eg providing 
services vs. 1to1 work 
[BEST FOR THE PERSON 
VS. RATIONING SERVICES] 
VS - finding the most relevant support vs. needing to establish 
sufficient need to see a psychologist 
INDIVIDUAL VS. 
GROUP/POPULATION 
LEVELS (NON-CLINICAL) 
VS - non-clinical uses of diagnosis; individual vs. group or 
population level 
 
322 
 
Appendix 12: Organisation of subthemes into themes and main themes using 
an example of the main descriptive theme ‘Uses of diagnosis and other 
assessments’ 
 
MAIN THEME THEME SUBTHEMES (Subthemes) 
 
USES OF 
DIAGNOSIS & 
OTHER 
ASSESSMENTS 
   
 
Different purposes of 
diagnosis/ assessment; in 
whose interest is 
diagnosis 
  
 
Individual 
  
  
To classify is human 
 
 
Individual (clinicians) 
  
  
Giving a broad 
understanding, idea of how 
clients likely to be, what to 
expect 
 
   
Telling you how other 
people have made 
sense of a client's 
difficulties 
  
Communication shorthand 
 
  
Predicting course of illness 
 
  
Informing treatment 
planning 
 
  
Understanding clients; 
managing self 
 
  
Being pragmatic about 
when diagnosis is used 
 
 
Individual (service users) 
  
  
Equating diagnosis with 
treatment 
 
  
Benefits to the individual 
(general) 
 
  
Understanding difficulties 
 
   
An end to uncertainty 
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A way to take away 
blame 
   
Using diagnostic-type 
language for client 
benefit (to name specific 
difficulties) 
  
Recognising own 
difficulties; a starting point 
 
  
Making sense of difficulties 
because of the diagnosis 
vs. because of age & 
experience 
 
  
Accessing practical support 
 
  
Sick notes 
 
  
Accessing interventions, 
treatment, therapy 
 
  
Giving permission 
 
  
Identifying with others 
 
  
Patients & families liking a 
diagnosis, label 
 
  
Diagnosis removing 
responsibility 
 
  
Having an 'actual' problem 
 
 
Clinician-service user 
relationship/interaction 
  
  
Shared understanding: 
clinician-patient 
 
 
Risk management; 
individual 
  
 
Service needs 
  
  
A way to move people out 
of the service (rationing) 
 
  
Development of services 
 
  
Treatment/resource 
planning 
 
  
Audit & admin (service 
level) 
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Legal uses 
  
  
Mental health act 
 
  
Criminal justice system 
 
 
Broader & population/ 
National uses 
  
  
Risk management; 
population 
 
  
Categorising for research 
 
 
Tensions & conflicting 
uses of diagnosis, 
assessment 
  
  
Individual (su) vs. individual 
(clinician) needs 
 
  
Useful for some things vs. 
negative for others 
[individual] 
 
  
Research (strict) vs. clinical 
(flexible) uses of diagnosis 
 
  
Technological uses vs. 
individual needs/ 
experience/ uses 
 
  
Technological need 
overriding that of the 
individual 
 
  
[Opposite to above] 
individual overriding the 
technological/admin uses 
 
  
Service vs. individual uses 
of assessment 
 
   
[Best for the person vs. 
rationing services] 
  
Individual vs. 
group/population levels 
(non-clinical) 
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Appendix 13: Example of the reorganisation of themes and subthemes to 
represent clinicians’ uses and conceptualisations of psychiatric diagnosis 
 
THEME SUBTHEME (SUBTHEME) 
  Clinicians being aware of 
potential negative 
implications of diagnosis 
    
 
    Different diagnoses having 
different conceptualisations & 
therefore connotations 
  
  
Negativity of judgements depends on 
diagnosis 
 
   Recognising negative 
impact   
 
        'Scary labels' (eg psychosis) 
 Conceptualisations & 
beliefs, ideas about cause     
 
    Continuum between the 
social & the organic   
  
      Untangling the understandable 
from not understandable 
  
    Continuum or dimensional 
experience 
 
   Defining disorder, MH 
problems   
 
    Identifying external, 
experience, contextual cause 
of difficulties 
  
  
      Presence of external trigger 
  
      Understandability 
 
   Illness being illogical, un-
understandable   
 
    Inferring organic or 
biological cause   
  
      Absence of contextual triggers 
  
      Biological symptoms of depression 
  
      Dramatic change 
  
      Family history 
 
   Interaction between brain & 
experience   
 
    Particular services having 
different conceptualisations of 
difficulties 
  
  
      CAMHS 
  
      Early Intervention 
  
        Diagnostic uncertainty 
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        Offering meaning in relation to 
experiences 
  
      IAPT 
  
      Older adults 
 
   Problems seen as fixed 
across situations (because 
within the indivdiual) 
 
 
    Shifting conceptualisations 
of dx over time 
   Implications     
      Impact on client-clinician relationship   
      Positive impact   
      Tensions around the implications of diagnosis   
  Implications for treatment 
 
  
 
   Changing 
conceptualisations for MH has 
implications for treatment 
  
 
    Meeting the client at their 
point of conceptualising MH   
 Individual functions of dx 
(clinicians)     
      Academic exercise   
      Certainty   
      Containing complexity (& limitations of this)   
      Conveying impact, severity   
  
    Giving a broad 
understanding, idea of how 
clients likely to be, what to 
expect 
  
  
      Telling you how other 
people have made sense of a 
client's difficulties 
  
        Using diagnosis as a broad guide to the person   
  
    Managing own responses 
(towards client behaviour; 
getting an understanding) 
  
      Practical uses   
    
      Clinician using diagnosis 
pragmatically; where it would help the 
client 
            Being pragmatic about when diagnosis is used 
          Communication shorthand 
          Informing treatment planning 
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            Using diagnosis to connect with evidence to inform practice 
          Justify treatment planning 
          Predicting course of illness 
          Record keeping 
          Standardised care 
      Risk management   
      To classify is human   
  Limitations of diagnosis - 
Individual (clinician)     
 
    Defining, pathologizing 
normal responses   
 
    Diagnosis stops you going 
further to understand the 
person 
  
 
      Not being able to relate 
diagnosis to the person   
 
    Diagnostic categories don't 
fit with complex, longstanding 
problems 
  
 
      Diagnosis as a short 
circuit; bypassing complexity   
 
        Leads to simplistic 
intervention & management 
strategies 
  
 
      Diagnostic model assumes 
straightforward pathways into 
MH whereas usually complex 
  
 
      Multiple diagnostic 
categories missing underlying 
problem 
  
 
    Diagnostic clusters lacking 
added value (in practical uses)   
 
    Diagnostic overshadowing   
 
    Difficulty trying to get rid of a 
diagnosis   
 
    Effective intervention is 
more than just a biomedical 
diagnosis-treat model 
  
 
      Gives limited information   
 
        Excludes systemic, 
developmental & other 
environmental factors 
  
 
        Needs & information 
outside of diagnosis can be 
more important 
  
 
        Not giving information 
about the experience of the 
person 
  
 
      Problem of multiple 
diagnoses in treatment 
decisions 
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    Limitations of biomedical 
model   
 
      Limitations of medical 
treatment   
 
    Limits explanations other 
than biomedical model   
 
    Uncertainty, grey areas, 
difficulties in applying in 
practice 
  
          Official, expert view of diagnosis vs. subjective & changing 
    
      Technical (criteria, cut offs) vs. 
idiosyncratic clinical decisions, 
heuristics 
          Uncertainty impacting on treatment decisions 
  Limitations of diagnosis - 
Technological aspects 
(categorisation, 
classification) 
    
      Categorical vs. dimensional, transdiagnostic classification   
  
    Categorises presenting 
symptoms but not underlying 
difficulties 
  
      Comorbidity   
  
    Creating (unhelpfully) strict 
or artificial distinctions 
between people 
  
      Heterogeneity of diagnoses   
        Broad diagnostic criteria   
        Diagnosis being nebulous, ill-defined   
        Diagnostic labels masking individual differences   
  
      Heterogeneous diagnoses 
treated as whole rather than 
addressing specific difficulties 
within 
  
        Managing heterogeneity   
        Multiple forms of variation within diagnoses   
        Some diagnoses more heterogeneous than others   
        Tensions around heterogeneity   
      Implications - downplaying symptoms that don't fit   
      Non-aetiological diagnoses   
      Overlapping diagnoses   
      Problematic nature of cross-sectional assessment   
      Reifies diagnostic categories   
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      Reliability   
  
 
      Prototypes differing between 
clinicians 
     Too many diagnoses in the DSM to be useful   
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Appendix 14: Example of the reorganisation of themes and subthemes to 
represent the travel of psychiatric diagnosis beyond the clinic, through 
an examination of the practices of recording diagnosis 
 
THEME  SUBTHEME  (SUBTHEME) (SUBTHEME) 
 
Reification of 
diagnoses 
      
 
Tension between SU 
& clinician's 
conceptualisations of 
difficulties 
      
 
  Tensions & 
conflicting uses of 
diagnosis, 
assessment 
    
 
  
    Different purposes 
of diagnosis, 
assessment; in 
whose interest is 
diagnosis 
  
 
  
    Individual (SU) vs. 
individual (clinician) 
needs 
  
 
  
    Individual vs. 
group or population 
levels (non-clinical) 
  
 
      Individual vs. legal needs   
 
      Legal uses   
 
          Criminal justice system 
 
          Limitations - Legal uses 
 
          Mental Health Act 
 
    Political, financial 
vs. individual needs     
 
    Research (strict) 
vs. clinical (flexible) 
use of diagnosis 
    
 
    Service uses     
 
  
      A way to move 
people out of the 
service (rationing) 
  
 
        Audit & admin   
 
        Clustering   
 
  
      Planning & 
development of 
services 
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          Treatment, resource planning   
 
        Service entry criteria   
 
        Service payment   
 
    Service vs. 
individual uses of 
assessment 
 
  
 
  
     Best for the 
person vs. rationing 
services 
  
 
        Formulation   
 
    Technological 
need overriding that 
of the individual 
    
 
    Technological 
uses vs. indivdiual 
needs, experiences, 
uses 
    
 
    Useful for some 
things vs. negative 
for others (individual) 
    
 
    Tensions across conceptualisations   
 
  
    Helping people 
transition to different 
services with 
different 
conceptualisations 
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Appendix 15: Example of the reorganisation of themes and subthemes to 
represent service users’ uses and conceptualisations of psychiatric 
diagnosis 
 
THEME SUBTHEME (SUBTHEME) (SUBTHEME) 
Clinician to service 
user power 
imbalance 
      
 
    Clinician as expert     
 
    Negative implications of 
status in psychiatry     
 
    Us & Them in MH care     
Conceptualisations 
& beliefs, ideas 
about cause 
      
 
    Difficulties as survival 
mechanisms     
 
    Interaction between life 
experiences & biological 
causes 
    
 
    MH diagnosis & difficulties 
seen as lifelong vs. not 
permanent or lifelong 
    
 
    Mentioning life problems 
alongside MH problems     
 
      Experiences of trauma, 
difficult events (not 
necessarily attributed as 
cause) 
    
 
    Not understanding cause     
 
    Seeing different diagnoses 
as separate illnesses     
 
    Separation between self 
and diagnosis (illness)     
 
    Using biomedical 
explanations     
 
    Using life experience as 
explanation     
 Experiences of 
MH problems       
  Experiences of 
services       
 
    Criticisms of MH services     
 
        A mess   
 
  
      Difficulty 
accessing the right 
help 
  
 
        Feeling unsupported   
 
        Lack of communication   
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      Trauma not 
asked about, 
understood 
  
   Helpful aspects 
of care, of clinicians       
 
      Asking about wider living 
situation & experiences     
 
      Availability of support, 
contact time     
 
      Holistic, seeing the 
person rather than the label     
 
      Less medical model 
focused     
 
      Offering understanding     
 
      Understanding the 
person     
   Unhelpful 
aspects of care, of 
clinicians 
      
 
      Judgement or other 
responses by MH 
professionals 
    
 
      Not considering non-
medical causes eg trauma     
 
  Explanation of problems by 
clinicians     
  Implications       
 
    Diagnosis becoming part 
of you, defining you     
 
    Diagnosis inviting intrusive 
questions from people     
 
    Experiences interpreted 
within biomedical model     
 
    Importance & implications 
of language     
 
    Negative impact (individual 
responding)     
 
    Stigma     
 
        Association with criminality, violence   
 
  
      Barriers of the 
label, being judged 
by the label 
  
 
        Media   
 
  
      Negative 
attitudes towards the 
person diagnosed 
  
 
  
      Not wanting to be 
associated with the 
diagnosis 
  
 
  
      Pejorative 
associations, 
stereotypes & 
negative attitudes 
towards particular 
diagnoses 
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        Personality disorder diagnoses   
 
  
        Language 
implying a fault with 
the self 
  
 
  
        Language 
implying a 
permanent problem 
  
 
        Seeing self as damaged, flawed   
 Individual 
functions of dx 
(service users) 
      
 
    A battle     
 
    Addressing stigma     
 
    Communicating with 
others     
 
    Diagnosis as an indication 
of level of need     
 
    Explaining & 
understanding problems     
  
      Explaining 
problems (with the 
diagnosis) 
  
  
      Information about 
course of 'illness'   
  
      Making sense of 
difficulties because 
of diagnosis vs. due 
to age & experience 
  
  
      Understanding 
difficulties   
  
  
        Using 
diagnostic-type 
language for 
client benefit (to 
name specific 
difficulties) 
 
   Knowing what's wrong 
(certainty perhaps)     
  
      An end to 
uncertainty   
  
      Diagnosis being 
containing   
 
   Patients & families liking a 
diagnosis, label     
 
    Practical uses     
  
      Accessing 
information about the 
diagnosis 
  
  
      Accessing 
interventions, 
treatment, therapy 
  
   
        Equating 
diagnosis with 
treatment 
   
        Getting a 
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cure 
  
      Accessing 
practical support   
  
      Identifying with 
others, finding like-
minded others 
  
  
      Sick notes   
  
      Support & 
security of contact 
with services 
  
  
      Triggering 
making changes in 
life 
  
 
    Recognition     
  
      Diagnosis 
removing 
responsibility 
  
  
          A way to take away blame 
  
      Giving 
permission 
 
  
      Having an 'actual' 
problem 
 
  
        Problems are 
genuine 
 
  
      Others (eg 
family) recognising 
problems 
 
  
      Recognising own 
difficulties; a starting 
point 
  Limitations of 
diagnosis - 
Individual (service 
user) 
      
 
    Arbitrary diagnoses     
 
      Being meaningless to the 
person     
 
      Vagueness of diagnosis     
 
    Benefits of diagnosis vs. 
negative impact of the label     
 
      Diagnosis as disabling; 
people see the label not the 
person 
    
 
      Enabling unhelpful uses 
of label     
 
      Excludes people from 
services     
 
      Focus on the negative     
 
      Hindering people's 
understanding of you     
 
      Negative impact on the 
self     
 
      Problem located within 
the individual     
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    Diagnosis not necessarily 
giving access to treatment     
 
      Diagnosis itself does not 
treat underlying distress     
 
    Does not offer 
understanding or help make 
sense of things 
    
 
      Being diagnosed needs 
additional explanation, 
understanding, meaning 
    
 
      Biomedical explanations 
limit possibilities for changing 
model, explanation 
    
 
    Does not represent lived 
experience     
 
      Difficulties not quite fitting 
with diagnosis     
 
    Holding back details for 
fear of being judged, 
sectioned 
    
 
    Negative language     
 Making sense of 
difficulties       
 
    Biomedical ways of 
understanding     
 
    Difficult to understand 
what's going on     
 
    Making sense of childhood 
experiences     
 
    Making sense of difficulties 
being about understanding, 
moving forward 
    
 Rejecting 
biomedical model, 
finding alternatives 
      
 
    Not wanting to use 
medical language     
 
    Shifting conceptualisations 
since initial diagnosis     
 
      Changing beliefs about 
cause     
 
      Not about illness but just 
who you are     
 
        Being more or less 
sensitive to environment     
 
      Pathologising normal or 
understandable experience     
 
      Thinking critically about 
diagnosis having had a 
negative experience of it 
    
 
